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Abstract 
Corporate governance is currently on the agenda of many countries, and is receiving 
considerable attention in the business world as well as in the area of academic research, 
which is an indication of its importance for business development and for society as a whole. 
A large body of the currently available knowledge addresses this phenomenon from the 
perspective of the developed economies. Although the knowledge base about corporate 
governance in developing countries appears to be limited, it is growing. 
The main aim of this study is to investigate current corporate governance practices, 
perceptions and obstacles within Libya following the introduction of the Libyan Corporate 
Governance Code (LCGC). To achieve this aim, the study investigates: first, the nature and 
extent of applying current corporate governance; secondly, the perceptions of listed 
companies' staff (senior managers and employees in financial positions) and Libyan financial 
experts (academics and auditors) regarding the introduction of the LCGC; thirdly, the current 
obstacles facing the application of LCGC; and, finally, the views of the Libyan regulators and 
officials in relation to the obstacles identified and how they may be reduced. 
In order to accomplish the research objectives, a mixed research methodology was 
adopted: This involved using two types of research methods for collecting data: semi- 
structured interviews and a questionnaire survey divided into three sequential stages: firstly, 
interviews were conducted with board members of the companies surveyed; secondly, a 
questionnaire was distributed to selected staff of the companies surveyed and Libyan 
financial experts; thirdly, further interviews were conducted with Libyan regulators and 
officials. 
The findings of the study revealed that corporate governance in Libya is in its early 
stages of development and is characterised by a weak legal environment, lack of knowledge 
about corporate governance, poor leadership, lack of training among directors and weak 
investment awareness among investors. Therefore, the influence of social, cultural and 
economic factors is evident. The results also suggest that urgent action is needed in order to 
facilitate the implementation of a good corporate governance system in Libya. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction and Outline of the Thesis 
1.1 Introduction 
Corporate governance became an international issue in the early 1980s. Interest in the 
UK has increased following the financial scandals of the late 20th century, such as Polly 
Peck, Maxwell Group, BCCI, Barings Brothers and Northern Rock. It also appeared during 
the 1997 Asian financial markets crisis (Abdel-Shahid 2001; Baek, Kang et al., 2004; Mallin 
2007; Monks & Minow, 2008), along with the collapse of large companies in different 
countries, like Enron and WorldCom in the USA, which resulted in a loss of confidence in 
financial data and audit reports. These cases led to a pressing need for improvement in 
systems of corporate governance. 
The bulk of the existing research has focused on developed countries. However, the 
importance of understanding the interaction of corporate governance in the developing 
countries is also necessary, because globalisation, international investment and international 
trade require improved corporate governance (Dahawy, 2008), which will enable developing 
countries to achieve high and sustainable rates of growth by attracting more investment. This 
will also increase the ability of their capital markets to mobilise savings and to have 
confidence in their national economies, which will create more stable political systems 
(Gregory & Simms, 1999). Corporate governance can help in bringing transparency and 
reliability to business activities in a number of ways: 
First, by demanding transparency in corporate transactions, in accounting and auditing 
procedures, in purchasing and in all individual business transactions, corporate governance 
attacks the supply side of corrupt relationships. Secondly, corporate governance procedures 
improve the management of firms by helping managers and boards of directors to develop a 
company's strategies, and by ensuring that compensation systems reflect performance. 
Thirdly, the adoption of standards of transparency when dealing with investors and creditors, 
as well as the implementation of adequate bankruptcy procedures, helps to ensure there are 
methods for handling business failures that are fair to all stakeholders. Without such 
procedures, especially enforcement systems, there is little to prevent insiders from stripping 
the remaining value out of an insolvent firm for their own benefit (Gregory & Simms, 1999; 
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OECD, 1999). In addition, various studies have confirmed the importance of the corporate 
governance system in attracting investment (De-Jong and Semenov, 2002; Klapper & Love, 
2004; Leal and Carvalhal-da-Silva, 2005; Black, Jang et al., 2006; Brown and Caylor, 2006; 
Black & Khanna, 2007). These have shown that countries with a strong corporate governance 
system for minority shareholders have larger and more liquid capital markets, while countries 
with a weak system are controlled by dominant investors rather than a widely dispersed 
ownership structure. 
Consequently, in recent years, there has been a remarkable worldwide effort to issue 
and develop corporate governance principles and standards in order to ensure that good 
practices are in place so that companies can be protected from potential crises (Solomon, 
2007). Furthermore, some codes have been issued for specific continents or regions in the 
world by specialist organisations such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD). 
In Libya, corporate governance did not become an issue until early 2001, when the 
country implemented a programme of economic reform and restructuring that moved from 
socialist oriented policies toward a free-market economy. A massive privatisation programme 
was also adopted covering all economic sectors and the Libyan Stock Market (LSM) was 
established in 2006. As a result, the debate started about the need for good corporate 
governance in Libya, in order to attract local and foreign investment and to enhance the role 
of the private sector in the economy (Otman & Karlberg, 2007). 
1.2 Research Aim, Objectives and Questions 
The main aim of this research is to investigate current corporate governance practices, 
perceptions and obstacles within Libya following the introduction of the Libyan Corporate 
Governance Code (LCGC). 
To achieve the above aim, the study has several broad objectives: 
1. To explore the nature and extent of applying current corporate governance within 
eight listed Libyan companies following the introduction of the LCGC. 
2. To survey the perceptions of listed companies' staff (senior managers and employees 
in financial positions) and Libyan financial experts (academics and auditors) 
regarding the introduction of the LCGC. 
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3. To identify the current obstacles to the application of the LCGC. 
4. To examine the views of the Libyan regulators and officials in relation to the 
obstacles identified and how they may be reduced. 
The study, therefore, endeavours to answer the following research questions: 
1. What are the nature and extent of current corporate governance practices within eight 
listed Libyan companies following the introduction of the LCGC? 
2. What are the perceptions of listed companies' staff and Libyan financial experts regarding 
the introduction of the LCGC? 
2.1 What are the perceptions of both groups regarding the rights of shareholders as set 
out in the LCGC? 
2.2 What are the perceptions of both groups regarding the board structure as set out in 
the LCGC? 
2.3 What are the perceptions of both groups regarding the board responsibility as set 
out in the LCGC? 
2.4 What are the perceptions of both groups regarding internal auditing as set out in 
the LCGC? 
2.5 What are the perceptions of both groups regarding disclosure and transparency as 
set out in the LCGC? 
2.6 What are the perceptions of both groups regarding conflict of interest as set out in 
the LCGC? 
2.7 What are the perceptions of both groups regarding the board committees as set out 
in the LCGC? 
3. What are the current obstacles to the application of the LCGC? 
4. What are the views of the Libyan regulators and officials in relation to the obstacles 
identified and how they may be reduced? 
1.3 The Rationale and Motivation for the Study 
The motivation for conducting this study is mainly due to the importance of 
`corporate governance' in developing countries, especially Libya, where significant political, 
social and economic changes are taking place. 
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Additionally, in Libya, considerable interest in corporate governance emerged when 
the LSM issued the LCGC in 2007, to motivate improvement in company practices and to 
encourage local investors. The LCGC covered the main principles of good corporate 
governance, namely, shareholders' rights, board of directors, conflict of interests, discourse 
and transparency and board committees. 
Consequently, in the period following the issuing of the LCGC, the attention of most 
Libyan parties was drawn to factors relating to the practice of corporate governance. There 
were debates about the need for such regulations in the local environment and its benefits, the 
ability of local companies to comply with such a system and the main obstacles that might 
affect the application of the LCGC. 
At an international level, considerable attention to the importance of Libyan corporate 
governance practices appeared as a result of government adoption of free market capitalism 
and encouragement of foreign investment in the country. Thus, there has been a significant 
increase in the number of foreign investors wishing to learn more about the nature and extent 
of Libyan corporate governance. Furthermore, because of globalisation and pressure from the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO) to open the country to international competition, Libya 
was required to take essential steps to improve its corporate governance system. 
Investigating Libyan corporate governance practices will contribute to research on 
both developing countries and the Arab world, as the country is in a region that is still deeply 
rooted in the conventional social and economic structures of the past. 
All of the above reasons have motivated the researcher to carry out a study that 
investigates current Libyan corporate governance practices, perceptions of various groups 
regarding the introduction of LCGC and the obstacles that affect its application. This work is 
especially significant since there has been a lack of studies that investigate corporate 
governance practices in Libya. 
1.4 Research Methodology 
To achieve the study objectives, a comprehensive review of the literature on the 
subject of corporate governance was undertaken both in terms of developed countries, such as 
the UK ( Cadbury Report, 1992; Greenbury Report, 1995; Hampel Report, 1998; Higgs 
Report, 2003) and the USA (Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 2002), and developing countries (Kadir 
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1999; Nganga, Jain et al., 2003; Limpaphayom & Connelly, 2004; Nam & Nam, 2004; Arce 
& Robles, 2005; Sori & Karbhari, 2006; Black, Carvalho et al., 2008; Gupta, 2008; McGee, 
2008; Wong, 2009). 
In addition, this present study includes a review of Libyan regulatory initiatives over 
the last decades, for instance, economic reforms and privatisation programmes, accounting 
and auditing profession and corporate governance. 
There are two main methodologies that can be used in performing research in the 
social sciences: the qualitative approach and the quantitative approach. Both approaches and 
their methods of collecting data (e. g. questionnaire surveys, semi-structured interviews) have 
been used in previous related corporate governance studies. Each method, however, has its 
advantages and disadvantages. Studies that use only one method are more vulnerable to 
mistakes than studies that use multiple methods and provide cross-data validity checks 
(Robson, 2002; Collis & Hussey, 2003). Therefore, in order to overcome the weaknesses of 
using either method, and to obtain reliably accurate results, this study has adopted both 
qualitative and quantitative methods for collecting data. This approach is discussed in more 
detail in chapter four. 
Three stages of collecting data were conducted in the current study: 
" The first stage was based on a qualitative approach using semi-structured interviews 
(A) to explore the nature and extent of current corporate governance practices within 
eight Libyan listed companies and to identify the current obstacles to the application 
of the LCGC. 
" The second stage was based on a quantitative approach using questionnaires to survey 
perceptions of listed companies' staff (senior managers and employees in financial 
positions) and Libyan financial experts (academics and auditors) regarding the 
introduction of the LCGC. 
" The third stage was based on a qualitative approach using semi-structured interviews 
(B) to examine the opinions of the Libyan regulators and officials as regards the 
reduction of identified obstacles. 
1.5 Scope of the Study 
This is primarily an investigation into current corporate governance practices in 
Libya, as well as the perceptions and obstacles following the introduction of the LCGC. 
5 
Moreover, the study elicits the views of boards of directors regarding corporate governance 
practices within eight listed companies, and the obstacles facing LCGC. 
Therefore, semi-structured interviews (A) were conducted with board members of 
eight Libyan listed companies: five commercial banks (Wahda Bank, Gamhuria Bank, Alsari 
Bank, Sahara Bank and Bank of Commerce & Development) and three insurance companies 
(Libya of Insurance, Co.; Al-Sahara Insurance and Co.; United Insurance Co. ). It is important 
to note that these were the only companies registered in the LSM by the end of 2009 and 
subject to the LCGC. The particular interviewees were selected based upon their high 
positions within management. Other factors that influenced the selection of interviewees were 
their knowledge, experience and participation in the field of corporate governance. 
This study also attempts to elicit the perceptions of two Libyan groups, listed 
companies' staff and financial experts, regarding the introduction of the LCGC. 
The first is the internal group, which consists of the staff of companies listed on the 
LSM (senior managers and employees in a financial position). The second is the external 
group, which consists of Libyan financial experts (external auditors and academics). 
Finally, the study examines the views of the Libyan regulators and officials in relation 
to the obstacles identified and how they may be reduced. 
The semi-structured interviews (B) were conducted with twelve interviewees 
representing four Libyan official and regulatory bodies, namely, Ministry of Trade and 
Economy (MTE), Libyan Stock Market (LST), Insurance Monitoring Body (IMB) and 
Central Bank of Libya (CBL). The decision of choosing these four groups depended on their 
relevance to the scope and objective of this study. 
Hence, it was decided to interview participants from four groups: the MTE, since it 
represents the highest authority and oversees all economic sectors in Libya; the LSM, which 
issued the LCCG and is also regarded as the only means to monitor the application of this 
code; and the IMB and the CBL because they supervise the insurance companies and banking 
sectors that were investigated in the first stage of this study. 
However, this study does not investigate corporate governance in other Libyan 
companies or business sectors, since they are not required to adopt the LCGC requirements 
and are not registered in the LSM. 
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1.6 Structure of the Thesis 
The overall outline of the thesis is illustrated in figure 1.1. It is divided into eight 
chapters. 
Chapter One: Introduction and Outline of the Thesis: comprising of a discussion of the 
background, aims and objectives of the study, its rationale and motivation. There is also 
included a summary of the methodology, scope of the study and the structure of the thesis. 
Chapter Two: Libyan Economic Environment. An overview of the Libyan economic 
environment, including consideration of economic reforms and privatisation programmes in 
both financial and non-financial sectors. This chapter also gives an overview of corporate 
governance in a Libyan context, the legal framework and the OECD principles, the LCCG 
and the challenges of its application. 
Chapter Three: Literature Review on Corporate Governance. Part one deals with 
definitions, historical background of corporate governance and the theoretical background of 
the study. Part two reviews the corporate governance mechanisms, such as ownership 
structure, shareholders' rights and legal protection, board of directors, board committees, 
internal auditing and disclosure and transparency. In addition, this part examines corporate 
governance practices in developing countries. 
Chapter Four: Research Methodology. A discussion of the methods used to carry out this 
study in terms of research philosophy, paradigm and approach (Quantitative and Qualitative 
Methods). In addition, this chapter gives an overview of the current research design, outlining 
the objectives and the research questions and data collection methods - semi-structured 
interviews (A) and (B), and questionnaire survey - as well as the three main stages of 
collecting data. 
Chapter Five: Results and Analyses of Semi-Structured Interviews (A). A discussion of the 
analysed data from the semi-structured interviews (A) that were conducted with board 
members of eight Libyan listed companies, regarding current corporate governance practices 
and the obstacles to the application of the LCGC. 
Chapter Six: Results and Analyses of Questionnaire Survey. An examination of the data 
from the questionnaire that was conducted with two targeted groups (listed companies' staff 
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and Libyan financial experts), regarding the participants' perceptions on the introduction of 
LCGC in Libya. 
Chapter Seven: Results and Analyses of Semi-Structured Interviews (B). A discussion of the 
analysed data from the semi-structured interviews (B) that were conducted with Libyan 
regulators and officials regarding identified obstacles and ways of decreasing them. 
Chapter Eight: Conclusion and Recommendations. This final chapter presents a summary of 
the research findings. It also makes recommendations, highlights the potential contribution 
and limitations of the study and suggests areas of further investigation. 
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Chapter Two: 
Libyan Corporate Governance and Economic Environment 
Part 1: Overview of Libyan Economic Environment 
2.1 Introduction. 
The Human Development Report of the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) classified Libya as a medium-developed country, ranked 64`h out of 173 countries in 
the human development index in 2002 and rising to 56`h out of 175 in 2005 (UNDP, 2002 & 
2005). 
In addition, in 2009, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) ranked the Libyan 
economy as among the weakest and least diversified compared to the Arab Moroccan region 
and other oil producing countries. As illustrated in Table 2.1, this is despite the energy 
resources owned by Libya (IMF, 2008). 
Table 2.1 Libya Comparative indicators, 2008 
(In percent of GDP unless otherwise specified) 
GDP per capita (in US$) 8.430 3.577 8.641 
Non-hydrocarbon GDP per capita (in US$) 2.211 1.935 7.022 
Share of non-hydrocarbon GDP(in total) 26.2 71.4 57.3 
Real GDP growth 5.6 7.1 6.5 
Government expenditure 32.3 31.1 30.3 
Fiscal position (deficit -) 36.6 9.9 13.3 
Government revenue% 71.2 41.0 43.6 
Gýternnl tradr hal: inrc (riificI -1 ý1 I '' (6 I0 
* Maghreb: Algeria, I'ibya. Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia. 
** OPEC.: Algeria, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq. Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar. Saudi Arabia. UAL. and 
Venezuela (Excluding Iraq). 
Source: Country Report (IM11ý, 20U8, p. 3) 
As regards structure, Table 2.2 illustrates the main Libyan economic indicators, 
including GDP per capita, in the years between 1970 and 2008. Despite its low population 
density, Libya experiences income inequality among its citizens. In real terms, GDP per 
capita in the early 1970s was US$ 1.834, and increased rapidly until 1980 when it reached its 
peak of US$ 10.953 to become the highest in Africa (CBL, 2000). 
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In the 1990s, GDP per capita slumped to US$ 5,640 due to the fall of world oil prices 
in this period; after that, it continued to increase rapidly to reach US$ 14,500 in 2008. 
Meanwhile, nominal GDP was estimated at US$ 3.601 billion in 1970, increasing to US$ 
33.330 billion in 2004 and to approximately US$ 89.900 billion by 2008, as illustrated in 
Table 2.2. 
Table 2.2 Main Libyan Economic Indicators (1970-2008) 
Year 
Population (Millions) 
1970 
1.963 
1980 
3.246 
1990 
4.844 
2000 
5.310 
2004 
5.740 
2006 
5.900 
2008 
6.191 
Nominal GDP in billions (in 
LD) 
1.288 10.554 7.750 25.200 43.577 72.300 114.00 
Nominal GDP in billions (in 
US$) 
3.601 35.556 27.319 19.800 33.330 55.100 89.900 
GDP Per capita (in US$) 1.834 10.953 5.640 5.600 5.800 8.430 14.500 
Exports & Re-exports (in 
billions L. D) 
0.856 6.489 3.744 5.221 20.848 36.336 40.972 
Oil Exports (%) 98.25 99.96 94.41 95.61 96.3 96.00 96.60 
Imports( In billions L. D) 0.263 3.070 2.145 1.911 8.255 7.934 8.501 
Trade Balance (In billions 
L. D) 
0.593 3.419 1.599 3.310 12.593 28.402 32.471 
Source: Annual Report of (CBL, 2000,2004,2006, & 2008) 
The data above highlight one of the most central features of the Libyan economy, 
which is its heavy dependence on the exports of crude oil for export receipts and government 
revenue; more than 96% of exports and more than 60% of the national GDP. Oil production, 
in general, is an extremely capital-intensive activity with a high level of labour productivity. 
The large share of this sector in the Libyan economy, therefore, tends to overstate the 
underlying level of productivity. Furthermore, due to this significant dependence on oil 
exports, the Libyan economy has become susceptible to external factors, especially 
fluctuations in world oil prices (Kridan, 2006). 
Moreover, the 2006 report of the IMF argues that "the predominance of the oil sector 
is also highly noticeable in the country's external and fiscal accounts....., during 2000-2005, 
hydrocarbon exports accounted for about 97 percent of total exports receipts and were the 
main source of official reserves. Overall, the non-oil sector remains largely dependent on 
imports, as evidenced by the high non-oil imports- to non-oil GDP ratio (70 percent) and the 
low coverage of non-oil imports by non-oil exports (11% in 2004)" (IMF, 2006, p. 3). 
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Porter and Daniel (2006) argue that Libyan oil has a direct impact on the performance 
of the overall economy and affects the quality of the country's business environment in many 
ways, including investment and incentives for non-energy sector activities. 
Therefore, oil as a source of wealth for Libya can provide two significant advantages: 
first, oil wealth can have a positive effect on individual prosperity and, therefore, the standard 
of living of all Libyans if distributed effectively to the population; secondly, oil wealth can 
provide an important source of investment capital for other industries and economic 
development initiatives (Porter & Daniel, 2006). 
However, Porter and Daniel (2006), state that despite some advantages, the presence 
of substantial oil-derived wealth also brings a number of significant disadvantages: 
" "Libya is a price-taker for the commodity that accounts for the bulk of its income, and 
therefore experiences significant price fluctuations. This volatility creates difficulties 
for long-term planning, consistent management and responsible investment in the 
economy; 
" when most of the wealth generation takes place within one industry, entrepreneurs 
and investors have incentives to focus on their investment and activity within this one 
sector, thus increasing dependence and volatility in the economy; 
" supposedly market-oriented institutions, such as import-export bank and licensing 
agencies, are used instead as tools for redistribution and their resources are diverted 
away from market-oriented action; and 
" perhaps the most damaging potential effect is that the people of the country may 
develop an expectation that `everything is for free' and that their time is best spent 
trying to capture a greater share of the windfalls rather than engaging in productive 
employment or enterprise" (p. 33). 
2.2 Libyan Economic Reforms and Privatisation Programmes 
From 1970 until 1990, the Libyan economy was centrally planned; the government 
controlled both the production and services sectors. In the early 1970s, after the El-Fatah 
revolution in September 1969, the Libyan government chose nationalised-oriented economic 
policies, which in turn led to specified limits in investment. At the same time, they enforced 
strict regulations on foreign trade, which eliminated the private sector almost completely 
(IMF, 2007). 
Libyan government interference and the adoption of these policies for several 
successive years caused deterioration in the economy of the country and a decrease in its 
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growth generally. Also, it led to the lowering of standards of living for individuals, the 
weakening of total economic conditions and the increase of external threats to the economy 
(Porter & Daniel, 2006). 
In the mid-1980s, Libyan economic condition deteriorated further because of the 
decrease of oil prices, on the one hand, and the enforcing of international sanctions by the UN 
on Libya in 1986, on the other hand. As was mentioned in the 2006 report of the IMF, "Other 
impediments to economic development included weak institutions and poor governance. 
Economic conditions started to deteriorate in the mid-1980s with the fall in world oil prices, 
and worsened in the 1990s as a result of international sanctions" (IMF, 2006, p. 3 ). 
In 1987, the Libyan government introduced a series of measures with regard to 
economic liberalisation. In the early 1990s, the economy was passing through an intermediary 
phase as a result of adopting policies of free economy and enlarging the ownership base and 
allocation of wealth among Libyan citizens with limited income. These policies started in 
1992 with the issuance of law no. 9/1992) concerning economic activities and its 
amendments in 2003. The Banking Law (no. 1/1993), furthermore, permitted the 
establishment of commercial banks owned by the private sector. 
The Law 5/ 1997), concerning foreign capital investment and its amendment Law 7/ 
2003) and the Libyan Banking Law (LBL 1/2005) gave authority to the CBL to issue licenses 
to foreign banks and free the interest rates on deposits. It also led to the re-structuring of 
commercial banks owned by the government and transformed them into corporate 
organisations. In addition, the issuance of the decision 134/ 2006) of the Libyan General 
People's Committee (LGPC) established the Libyan Stock Market (LSM). 
The following sections will focus on economic reforms in the non-financial and 
financial sectors. 
2.2.1 Economic Reform (Privatisation) in Non-Financial Sectors 
As is often the case politically, privatisation has caused many disagreements in Libya. 
However, while many developing countries have overcome doubts about privatising publicly 
owned organisations, Libya has encountered difficulties. This was confirmed by the IMF in 
its 2006 report; "Libya is working on implementing the arrangements for economic reform 
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and openness since the freezing of the United Nations penalties in 1999, but the progress 
towards establishing the economy of the market was slow and interrupted" (IMF, 2006, p. 5 ). 
Privatisation reform policies started in Libya in the late 1980s with the issuance of the 
decisions of the LGPC (no. 447/1987) concerning the transfer of ownership of government 
plants. The standard for privatisation was that the activity of the company should not be 
essential for the economy, and that the private sector should have the willingness and the 
financial capacity to accomplish it (LGPC, 1987). 
This was the first step of the Libyan government privatisation programme, which 
consisted of transferring the ownership of public sector companies from the state to 
employees working for those companies with the intention of enlarging their ownership base. 
In 1994 and 1995, about 145 and 295 companies - from all economic sectors except finance 
- were, respectively, privatised according to the previously-mentioned decisions. 
In 2003, the LGPC (no. 313/ 2003) was aimed at transferring 360 other economic 
units in three stages, as illustrated in Table 2.3, starting in 2004 and ending late 2008. The 
objective of the first phase was to privatise 260 companies and transfer their ownership 
completely to the private sector. This was to be accomplished by the end of 2005. The second 
phase concerned the transference of the ownership of 46 companies to the private sector by 
the end of mid-2007. In these two phases, privatisation was offered to local investors only 
(employees and all other local categories) and the companies took the form of corporate 
organisations (LGPC, 2003). 
Table 2.3 The Stages of Privatisation According to Targeted Economic Sectors 
Sector Phase One Phase Two Phase Three 'Total 
Industrial sector 145 41 I8 201 
Agricultural sector 28 4 24 56 
Livestock sector 71 0 11 82 
Marine resources 16 1 1 18 
sector 
Total of the phase 260 46 54 360 
Investors type Local employees Local employees Local and 
and investors and investors foreign 
investors 
Starting date of 1/1 /2004 1/1/2006 1/7/2007 
phase 
End date of phase 1/1/2005 1/7/2007 31/12/2008 
Source: Decision of LGPC (no. 313/ 2003) 
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The last phase included the privatisation of 54 companies between the beginning of 
the second half of 2007 and the end of 2008. These privatised companies also took the form 
of corporate organisations, but were offered for investment to foreign investors. The same 
decision of LGPC (no. 313/ 2003) allowed the exemption of both local and foreign investors 
from fees or taxes for five years, starting from the date of transfer of ownership of these 
companies to the private sector. This was encouragement from the Libyan government to 
help make the privatisation programme successful. 
2.2.2 Economic Reform (Privatization) in Financial Sectors 
In general, the Libyan financial sector is divided into two parts: the banking system 
and financial and investment institutions. However, to be more precise, the banking sector 
includes the central bank, specialised banks and the commercial banks, whereas the financial 
and investment institutions incorporate companies that are strongly linked to the banking 
system. The latter include the insurance sector, the Social and Economic Development Fund 
and the Libyan Stock Market. 
2.2.2.1 The Libyan Banking Sector 
2.2.2.1.1 The Central Bank of Libya 
The Central Bank of Libya (CBL) was established in 1951. It was known as the 
"monetary authority" and came under the supervision of the Ministry of Finance. In 1956, the 
name was changed to The Central Bank of Libya. It is owned by the government as the 
monetary authority and enjoys the status of an independent corporate body. The main branch 
of the CBL is located in the capital, Tripoli, and it has three branches in three deferent cities, 
Benghazi, Sabah and Sert. Its capital at the end of 2008 was LD 500 million (CBL, 2008). 
As regards the importance of the financial sector in the economic reform of any 
country, the IMF in 2006 mentioned that for Libya to succeed there should be a stronger and 
more efficient banking system based on market rules. This requires "enhancing banking 
supervision; restructuring the banking system; modernizing the domestic payment system; 
and revising the legal and regulatory frameworks" (IMF, 2006, p. 10). 
The Libyan government has taken some steps to reform its banking system. The most 
visible sign of change has been the adoption of the new LBL (1/ 2005 ), which came into 
effect in January 2005. The main objectives of the LBL are: 
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a. Emphasising the independence of the CBL in line with international best practices. 
b. Improving the capital adequacy ratio of commercial banks. 
c. Strengthening the competitiveness of domestic banks, eventually leading to the 
participation of foreign banks in domestic banking markets. 
d. Extending the domain of the CBL supervision to include all banks (including 
specialised banks such as Agriculture, Real Estate Investment and Development 
Bank), which were previously excluded from its supervisory domain. 
e. Adopting the principles of the Basel Committee on effective banking supervision. 
f. Improving standards of and requirements for supervisory disclosure by the bank 
(Porter & Daniel, 2006). 
The LBL (1/2005) seems to have incorporated many of the recommendations of 
international agencies like the IMF. Article 5 of the Banking Law (1/2005) specified the main 
duties and responsibilities of the CBL as follows: 
1. "Issue the Libyan currency and maintain its stability within Libya and abroad. 
2. Manage the government's reserves of gold and foreign exchange. 
3. Regulate monetary policy and supervise currency conversion transactions within Libya 
and abroad. 
4. Regulate credit and banking policy and supervise its implementation within the 
framework of the government's general policy. 
5. Achieve the goals of economic policy in terms of stabilizing the general level of prices 
and maintaining the soundness of the banking system. 
6. Manage the liquidity of the national economy. 
7. Regulate and supervise the foreign exchange market. 
8. Provide advice to the government on matters related to the general economic policy". 
In addition, the LBL (1/ 2005) has allowed the re-structuring of Libyan commercial 
banks and their transfer from CBL ownership to private sector corporate companies. The 
LBL also led to the reorganisation of specialised banks under the auspices of the CBL 
(Otman & Karlberg, 2007). 
2.2.2.1.2 The Libyan Specialist Banks (LSB) 
There are four specialist banks in the Libyan business environment whose objectives 
include financing and granting credit for specific economic activities: 
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a. Agriculture Bank: Established in 1957, it comprises 36 branches, providing interest 
free production loans to farmers. It also offers medium-term loans for up to five years 
for machinery and materials, and long-term loans for up to 15 years for land 
reclamation projects, irrigation and agricultural construction. 
b. Real Estate Investment Bank: Established in 1965 under the name of the 
'Manufacturing and Construction Bank', it comprises two branches and provides loans 
to Libyan citizens for building and buying houses. This reflects the importance of 
mortgages and state loans in supporting the economy and social development. 
c. Libyan Arab Foreign Bank: Established in 1972, it aims to deal with Libyan 
investments abroad, operating through subsidiaries or affiliates in about 30 foreign 
countries. 
d. Development Bank: Established in 1981, it comprises 23 branches, which provide 
loans and funds needed for production work in all manufacturing, agriculture and 
tourism projects, as well as any other economic projects in Libya (CBL, 2008). 
2.2.2.1.3 The Libyan Commercial Bank 
In a domestic Libyan context, until 1993, the commercial banking sector was 
composed of The National Commercial Bank, Gumhouria Bank, Umma Bank, Sahara Bank 
and Wahda Bank. These were owned by the government and directly controlled by the 
central bank (Otman & Karlberg, 2007). 
Thus, the main results of the Banking Law (no 1/1993) were the establishment of the 
Bank of Commerce and Development in 1994, with 2,000 private shareholders. This was the 
only privately owned commercial bank in the Libyan market and eventually started 
operations in 1996 (Otman & Karlberg, 2007). Since then, this sector has grown rapidly and a 
number of private commercial banks have been established, as illustrated in Table 2.4. The 
number has reached 5 commercial banks and more than 50 private local banks. 
In early 2006, the Libyan government started to sell state-owned banks to private 
investors in accordance with the framework of reforms recommended by the IMF and the 
LBL (1/ 2005). The first step was taken when the Libyan government privatised two large 
state-owned banks, the Sahara Bank and the Wahda Bank (Otman & Karlberg, 2007). 
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The Sahara Bank and Wahda Bank were privatised and a foreign partner was 
introduced with a 19% stake in each. Two of the other three state-owned banks, Gumhouria 
and Umma, were integrated into the Gumhouria Bank and 11 % of its shares were offered to 
the private sector (CBL, 2009). 
Table 2.4 Structure of Libyan Commercial Banking to the end of 2004 
Bank Name 
No. Of 
Branches 
No. Of 
Agencies 
Assets Paid 
Capital 
Ownership % 
Public Private 
Gumhouria Bank 54 27 392,67 40,0 100 - 
National Commercial Bank 48 12 344,41 35,0 100 - 
Umma Bank 40 15 226,83 23,0 100 - 
Wahda Bank 60 12 283,86 36,0 87 13 
Sahara Bank 41 7 264,40 63,0 83 17 
Bank of Commerce & 
Development 
6 10 696,8 9,0 22.2 77.8 
National Tripoli Bank 1 2 42,8 3,0 - 100 
El -Wafaa Bank 2 1 54,4 1,5 - 100 
El -Aman Bank 1 6 53,1 3,0 - 100 
AI-E'maa Alarabi Bank 3 1 34,6 0,9 - 100 
Libyan National Banking 
Institution 
I - 353,9 119 - 100 
The I oral hail., (AS hank. ) - 14 1 15.3O -16.8 - 100 
Amounts are, in million L[) 
Source: Annual Report Of(CM- '(W). 
Currently, the CBL is seeking to sell the rest of the Gumhouria Bank shares to the 
private sector, and to become a monetary authority, monitoring and supervising 
administration of the banking sector without owning and running those banks. Meanwhile, 
the National Commercial Bank is still owned by the government (CBL, 2009). 
Thus, the following headings provide an overview of the Libyan commercial banks 
listed on the LSM. 
1. Wahda Bank 
Wahda bank is a Libyan Joint Stock Company, established under the "the 
Nationalization Decision" (153) of 1970, which demanded that all foreign banks shares were 
nationalized and completely owned by Libya. Its paid capital is LD 108 million (Kridan, 
2006). 
Upon issuing the "the Nationalization Decision" (153), Bank of North Africa, African 
Arab Bank Company, Al-kafela Bank, Al-nahda Bank and The Commercial Bank were 
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merged into one bank called the `Wahda Bank', which until 2004 was 87% owned by the 
Libyan government (Eltawish, 2006; Kridan, 2006). 
Wahda Bank provides all sorts of banking products and services through a network of 
76 branches and 12 agencies spread across the country. It is supplied with modem technology 
and hardware, as can be seen in Table 2.4. 
In 2007, the Wahda Bank was privatised in line with Libyan banking reform and the 
Banking Law of 2005. Its shares were transferred to the private sector and it became the first 
bank in Libya to enter into a strategic partnership with the `Arab Bank' (2007) (Wahda Bank, 
2008). 
Currently, the ownership structure of the Wahda bank consists of: 
" The Economic and Social Development Fund (ESDF): 54.1% of the stocks. 
" The private sector: 26.9 %. 
" Arab bank (The strategic partner): 19% (Wahda Bank, 2008). 
2. Sahara Bank 
The Sahara Bank was established in 1964, as a foreign bank, and its owners were the 
Bank of America (29%), Banco di Sicilia (20%) and the Libyan government, which held the 
majority of shares (51%). In 1970, "the Nationalisation Decision" was taken, which 
demanded that all foreign banks shares were nationalised and became completely owned by 
Libya (Eltawish, 2006; Kridan, 2006). 
In 2007, within the framework of CBL reform - restructuring, developing and 
upgrading the Libyan Banking services at local and international levels - the Sahara Bank 
was privatised and its shares transferred to the private sector. It became the second financial 
institution in Libya to enter into a strategic partnership, in this case with the 'BNP Paribas 
Group' in 2007 (Sahara Bank, 2008). 
The Sahara Bank provides its services through a network of 41 branches and 12 
agencies, and more than 1500 experienced staff in all the main regions of Libya (Sahara 
Bank, 2008). Currently, the ownership structure of the Sahara Bank consists of: 
" The Economic and Social Development Fund (ESDF): 5% of the stocks. 
" The Libyan Iron and Steel Company: 5%. 
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9 The BNP Paribas Group: 19%. 
" The private sector and individuals: 71% (Sahara Bank, 2008). 
3. Gumhouria Bank 
This bank is a Libyan Joint Stock Company established under the "the Nationalization 
Decision" (153) of 1970 to take over the Libyan operations of Barclays Bank (Eltawish, 
2006). 
Within the framework of implementing the strategy approved by the Central Bank of 
Libya for restructuring, developing and upgrading banking services at local and international 
levels, approval was given for Umma and Gumhouria to merge into one banking entity, on 
the basis of the decision of CBL (74/2007) (CBL, 2009). The new bank was named the 
Gumhouria bank. 
Because of this merger, a unified Libyan bank, and one of the biggest (CBL, 2009), 
came into existence, with a budget exceeding LD 8 billion and a branch system network of 
146 branches. Moreover, the CBL started to privatise Gumhouria Bank and 11% of its shares 
were offered to the private sector. As a result, the new ownership structure of the Gumhouria 
Bank consists of. 
" The private sector: 11 %. 
" The CBL: 89% (CBL, 2009). 
4. Bank of Commerce & Development 
The Bank of Commerce & Development is a Libyan Joint Stock Company established 
under the Law no. 1/1993) as the first private bank with paid capital of LD 9 million. The 
bank was officially inaugurated in early 1996 and joined as a member of the Union of Arab 
Banks and the Libyan Banks Association in the same year, and of the Union of Maghreb 
Banks in 1998 (Bank of Commerce & Development, 2008). 
The Bank of Commerce & Development provides services through a small network of 
6 branches and 10 agencies covering the main big cities. In 2008, it was decided to raise the 
bank's capital to the value of 50 million LD by offering new shares in the market (Bank of 
Commerce & Development, 2008). 
Currently, the ownership structure of the Bank of Commerce & Development consists 
of: 
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" The World Islamic Call Society: 5%. 
" The Libya Insurance Company: 5%. 
" The Investments of Tax Jihad Fund: 5%. 
" The private sector and individuals: 85% (Bank of Commerce & Development, 2008). 
5. Assaray Bank 
The Assaray Bank is a Libyan Joint Stock Company established in 1997 under the name 
"National Tripoli Bank", in accordance with the provisions of Law no. 1/1993. It began with 
one branch in Tripoli with a paid capital of LD 900,000 (Alwaddan, 2005). 
Upon the issuance of Banking Law (1/ 2005 ), and in order to meet its requirements, the 
name was changed to Assaray Bank and the paid capital raised to LD 10 million in 2006. 
Currently, the ownership structure of the Assaray Bank consists of: 
9 The Libya Insurance Company: 8%. 
" The private sector and individuals: 92%. 
2.2.2.2 The Financial and Investment Institutions 
There are many financial institutions other than banks in Libya. These are: The 
Insurance Sector, the Economic and Social Development Fund (ESDF), the Libyan Investment 
Institute, the Libyan African Investment Portfolio, Libyan Arab Foreign Investment Company 
and the Libyan Stock Market. However, this study will focus on the Insurance Sector, the 
Economic and Social Development Fund and the Libyan Stock Market as they are related to the 
research subject. 
2.2.2.2.1 The Libyan Insurance Sector (LIS) 
In fulfilment of the need of the national economy, the Libyan insurance industry has 
witnessed major development in recent years. The latter has an important role in supporting 
economic activity by providing a network of trustworthy economic institutions in society ( 
CBL, 2008). The number of working insurance companies reached seven by the end of 2008, as 
illustrated in Table 2.5. It should be mentioned that the private insurance sector plays an 
important role in the national economy. 
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Table 2.5 Operating Insurance Companies in Libya in 2008 
Year Authorised Paid Ownership (%) 
Company Name Established Capital Capital Public Private 
Libya Insurance Co 1964 70.0 70,0 44° o 56" 0 
United Insurance Co 1997 20,0 20,0 - 100 
African Insurance Co 2004 15,0 5,4 - 100 
Sahara Insurance Co 2005 10,0 15,0 - 100 
Libo Insurance Co 2005 10,0 3,0 - 100 
Trust Insurance Co 2006 10,0 3,0 - 100 
Takaful Insurance Co 2007 10,0 3,0 - 100 
* Amounts are in million LD 
Source: Annual Report of (('I3I.. 2008) 
Only the Libyan Insurance Company was operating in that field until the end of 1990s, 
and it was a publicly owned company. However, under the framework of economic reform, it 
was privatised. As for the rest of the companies, they have been private sector companies since 
they were established (the CBL, 2008). 
Table 2.6 Premiums and Payouts of the LIS (2000-2008) 
Year Instalments Rate of CrowtIt (%) Compensations (%) Rate of Growth 
2000 88,4 ---- 88.6 ---- 
2001 97,9 9.8 91.7 3.4 
2002 146,7 33.3 90.1 -1.8 
2003 201,5 27.2 120.2 25.0 
2004 166,11 -21.3 79.2 -51.8 
2005 192,5 13.7 66.0 -20.2 
2006 195,0 1.3 72.8 9.5 
2007 192,0 -1.6 82.9 12.2 
Source: The Annual Report of (CBL, 2008). 
With regard to the activity of the insurance companies between 2000 and 2008, there 
was an evolution in instalment size from one year to the next in all insurance branches, as 
illustrated in Table 2.6. The instalments in 2008 reached LD 275.1 million, as opposed to LD 
192.0 million in 2007, which meant an increase of 43.3%. The compensations reached the 
amount of LD 1 10.4 million in 2008, as opposed to LD 82.9 million in 2007, realising a growth 
rate of 33.2%. 
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The following headings provide an overview of the Libyan insurance companies listed 
on the LSM. 
1. Libya Insurance Company 
The Libya Insurance Company (LIC) was founded in 1964, with capital of LD 100,000. 
It was the first company of its kind established and registered in Libya, and although some 
foreign insurance companies operated at that time, these were nationalized in 1970 and merged 
into two companies, the LIC and the Al-Mohktar Insurance Company (Alwaddan, 2005). 
Subsequently, the Al-Mohktar Insurance Company was liquidated and merged with 
the Libya Insurance Company. The new insurance company was established in 1998 as a 
stated-owned company with capital of LD 50 million (Alwaddan, 2005). 
In 2008, the LIC was privatised and its shares transferred to the private sector, which 
raised its capital to LD 70 million. This made it the largest insurance company operating in 
the Libyan market (LIC, 2008). 
Currently, the ownership structure of the LIC consists of 
" The Economic and Social Development Fund (ESDF): 45% of the stocks; 
" The Social Security Fund Investment Company: 10% 
" Gumhouria Bank: 7% 
Private sector and individuals: 38%. 
2. United Insurance Company 
The United Insurance Company (UIC) is a Libyan Joint Stock Company established 
under Law no. 9/1992 in 1997 as the first private insurance company with capital of LD 20 
million. The UIC, which was officially inaugurated in 1998 (UIC, 2008), is also a member of 
the Arab War Syndicate, African Insurance Organisation and Asian Insurance Federation. 
The UIC provides its services through a small network of three branches located in 
the main Libyan cities of Tripoli, Benghazi and Misurata (UIC, 2008). The current ownership 
of the UIC consists of. 
" The National Commercial Bank: 5% 
" Sahara Bank: 6% 
" Wahda Bank: 5% 
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Gumhouria Bank: 10% 
" Real Estate Development Company: 5% 
" Private sector and individuals: 69%. 
3. Sahara Insurance Company 
The Sahara Insurance Company (SIC) is a Libyan Joint Stock Company established 
under the Law (no. 9/1992) in 2005 with paid capital of 15 LD million. Among its main 
objectives (SIC, 2007) are: 
" to increase the awareness of insurance among policyholders and the community; 
to cooperate with insurance companies in order to strengthen the Libyan national 
economy; and 
0 to increase domestic savings rates and contribute to the national investment. 
Currently, the ownership structure of the SIC consists of: 
" Gumhouria Bank: 10%. 
9 The private sector and individuals: 44%. 
" National Investment Company: 46% (SIC, 2007). 
2.2.2.2.2 The Economic and Social Development Fund 
The Economic and Social Development Fund (ESDF) was established in 2006 in 
accordance with the LGPC Decision no. 18/2006, and reorganised under the LGPC Decision 
( no. 356/ 2009) as an investment organisation of independent entity and financial status. The 
ESDF was established by the Libyan government during the process of privatisation. Profits 
from the privatised companies would be allocated to low-income/ disadvantaged families 
(ESDF, 2009). 
In an effort to elevate the standard of living, the ESDF manages and follows-up the 
investment of funds allocated to low-income families. However, the general aim of its 
formation is to realise social and economic development in different state activities (ESDF, 
2009): 
" to contribute to the creation and improvement of the economic situation of 
disadvantaged families, and to encourage them to integrate into the production base. 
This helps increase the wealth of society and improve living conditions; 
" to contribute to the creation and improvement of institutions supportive of economic 
and social development; 
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" to manage the funds of disadvantaged families and their investment and development 
in all areas of productive projects and services; and 
" to distribute profits to disadvantaged and low income families, in accordance with the 
rules and principles specified in the Decision of the LGPC (no. 18/2006 ). 
Therefore, among its most important investment tools is the development and 
distribution of portfolios, which are managed for the interests of citizens, who benefit from 
the programme of wealth allocation (low-income citizens). The ESDF makes direct and 
indirect investments. The details of the former (2009) are summarised below: 
1. Enmaa Services Investment Holding Company (35 companies, 24% of the total 
investment, LD 3.5 billion): engaged in several service areas, such as air and maritime 
transportation, insurance and oil services. 
2. Enmaa Industrial Investment Holding Company (20 companies, 9% of the total 
investment, LD 1.5 billion): engaged in industrial sectors such as cement, glass, animal 
feed and electricity cables. 
3. Enmaa tourism Investment Holding Company (13 companies, 9% of the total investment, 
LD 1.3 billion): engaged in tourism investment inside Libya, such as hotels and resorts. 
4. Enmaa Construction and Real Estate Investment Holding Company (9 companies, 4% of 
the total investment, LD 521 million): engaged in construction and real estate 
development, such as building administrative and service towers, hotels and housing. 
5. Libyan Holding Company for Development and Investment (22 Companies, 2% of the 
total investment, LD 219 million): engaged in real estate investment (ESDF, 2009). 
In comparison, indirect investments are represented in foreign investments in bonds 
and shares and other financial securities (ESDF, 2009). 
2.2.2.2.3 Libyan Stock Market (LSM) 
According to the LGPC Decision no. 134/ 2006, there are three main reasons why the 
Libyan government believed it was essential to establish a stock market. First, Libya had seen 
successive reforms and movement toward a free market. Second, the government viewed as 
important the role which stock markets played in advanced, growing and, especially, 
transitional economies. Third, a framework of new modifications occurred in the Libyan 
economy, such as the adoption of the privatisation policy and enlargement of the ownership 
base. 
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Since the early 1990s, many Arab countries have embarked on economic 
diversification, liberalisation, privatisation and the creation of stock markets. There have been 
three main aims: first, to provide greater financial depth to their economies, making available 
finance to nascent indigenous companies for expansion and diversification; secondly, to 
provide absorptive capacity for privatisation; and thirdly, to improve corporate governance 
for an evolving private sector (Otman & Karlberg, 2007). 
By 2007, there were stock markets in most of the Arab world. It is generally 
recognised that five Arab countries possess the largest and the most active markets: Egypt, 
Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Morocco and Tunisia. Four other countries have established stock 
markets (Libya, Iraq, Syria and Yemen), which are still in their infancy and have teething 
problems (Otman & Karlberg, 2007). 
In line with the LGPC Decision (134/2006), the establishment of the LSM was 
assigned to the Libyan General People's Committee for Trade and Investment (LGPCTI). 
The LSM was created in the form of a `joint stock company' with a capital of LD 20 million. 
It has two branches; the main branch is in Tripoli and the other in Benghazi (LGPC, 2006). 
Article 3 of LGPC Decision(134/ 2006) specified the objectives and tasks of the LSM 
as follows: 
" creating an investment climate for securities in the interest of the national economy; 
" increasing awareness about investment and encouraging and directing savings toward 
economic sectors with the highest optimum profit rate; 
" supervising the organisation and monitoring of security circulation and transfer of 
ownership operations; 
" participating in the privatisation programme of state economic units, which 
contributes to the enlargement of the ownership base; 
" organising the offering of shares for subscription in new corporate companies; and 
" developing relations of cooperation between the LSM and Arab, regional and 
international markets, which enhances the investors' trust in the national economy. 
As illustrated in Table 2-7, the number of listed companies at the end of 2008 was 
eight, as opposed to six in 2007. The trading value inside the LSM in 2008 reached about 
5787 operations, amounting to a total of LD 36,810,380 thousands, as opposed to LD 
25,460,000 thousands in 2007. 
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Table 2-7 Listed Companies on LSM in 2009 
Listed Company Value 
(thousands of 
LI)) 
Volume Number of 
Deals 
ah-da--Bank 9,136,346 415,506 1457 
Bank of Commerce and Development 2,982,912 222,195 713 
Assaray Bank 273,191 2,710 118 
Libya Insurance Co 627,623 56,485 324 
United Insurance Co 450,625 33,207 24 
Sahara Insurance Co 453,380 2,468 13 
Libyan Stock Market (LSM) 7,753,949 872,418 1646 
Total 36,810,380 2,421,634 5787 
Source I Iic : Annual Rehort of (I SNI. 2Ut)$). 
It is important to note that the listed companies on the LSM are all from the financial 
sector (banking and insurance) and the number is still small. The CBL stated in 2008 that the 
weakness of the LSM was due to the limited number of listed companies despite the fact that 
it had been established for three years (CBL, 2008). 
In 2009, the CBL issued part of the shares of the Gumhouria Bank for the private 
sector and it was listed on the LSM (CBL, 2009). This step was taken by the CBL in 
accordance with the Banking Law 1/ 2005. 
2.3 The Foreign Direct Investment in Libya (FDI) 
In 2009, Oxford Business Group (OBG) reported that the economic problems of many 
Middle East and North Africa countries were due to lack of diversification in industry. This 
created dependence on the energy sector, low domestic agriculture production and narrow 
industrial focus (OBG, 2009). 
On the one hand, Libya's transition from a state-planned to a market economy is 
driven largely by a need to diversify and to make the provision of public services more 
efficient. On the other hand, Libya is an oil producing country, whose budget reliance is on 
oil revenues, which generate 72% of GDP and 97% of export earnings. This affects the 
quality of the country's business environment in many ways, including investment and 
incentives for non-energy sector activities (OBG, 2009). 
Therefore, the Libyan government has tried, since 1997, to open the way for FDI in 
all economic fields through the issuance of the Law (5 /1997), and the establishment of the 
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Libyan Foreign Investment Board (LFIB). However, the international sanctions imposed by 
the UN on Libya in this period hampered the goals of this law (Otman & Karlberg, 2007). 
In 2003, the Libyan government amended Law (5 /1997) by issuing the Law (7/ 
2003). This offered many incentives and guarantees to attract FDI to help accomplish 
economic development in Libya. 
This law, according to Article 1, aims to achieve a number of vital goals including: 
" transfer of modern technology; 
" training and building Libyan technical cadres; 
" diversification of income sources; and 
" contribution to the development of local industries in order to compete in international 
markets and to realise economic potential. 
Table 2.8 Libyan Investment Projects According to Areas and by Type of Capital 
Area 
i Indu, tr\ 
(2000-2009) 
Number Type of luvestment 
of projects 
Size of Foreign Size of Local 
Investment in I, I) investment in 
LD 
I. i ; 
_i 
111(1I -1-1 xI `)i_)0 
Total in 
Ii) 
I-i 
Tourism 51 303,480,100 173,540,916 477,021,016 
Services 28 147,670,645 148,123,291 295,793,936 
Health 10 24,716,604 23,403,289 48,164,893 
Agriculture 2 5,808,730 - 5,808,730 
Real Fstate II IN. 11.000 3.553.0OO 1 7.106.000 
Total 146 1,486,721,891 1,141,682,029 
2,628,403,920 
tiurkýc: I Iic . AniiuaI 
Rq)oli , )1 (1. I M. _'(fl))). 
The overall areas of investment in Libya are industry, agriculture, health, tourism and 
services. This is, more specifically, agricultural projects, industries and services, oil refining 
and petrochemicals, electricity generation, communications services, real estate, 
infrastructure and tourist projects (LFIB, 2009). 
According to Table 2.8, the total number of investment projects was 146 between 
1/1/2000 and 30/11/2009. Generally, the highest area of investment was the industrial sector 
with about 37%, and then, the tourism sector with 35%. However, the lowest areas of 
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investment were the agriculture and real estate sectors with just two projects and one project 
respectively (LFIB, 2009). 
In terms of the type of capital, the total amount of investment was LD 2,628,403,920 
divided into approximately 57% foreign investment (LD 1,486,721,891) and 43% local 
investment ( LD 1,141,682,029) (LFIB, 2009). 
2.4 The Accounting and Auditing Profession in Libya 
Historically, most developing countries have been subjected to long periods of 
colonisation by developed countries. Therefore, colonisers were responsible for administering 
the country's affairs and implementing their laws and systems. Libya was no exception. 
Western international accounting firms, mainly from the UK and the USA, were responsible 
for the establishment and development of the accounting system and profession in Libya. 
This continued to be the case even after the country's independence in 1954, as the lack of 
locally qualified and expert accountants reinforced the dominance of western companies 
(Bribesh, 2006). 
However, the impact of the decision in 1969, which demanded nationalisation of all 
foreign companies and banks, was a lack of locally qualified experts and regulators of 
accounting and auditing standards and practices. As a consequence, there was an urgent need 
to set up a professional body to take responsibility for developing a general framework of 
accounting and auditing (Ahmad & Gao, 2004). 
To meet the above demand, in 1975, the Libyan Accountants and Auditors Association 
(LAAA) was established under the Law (116/ 1973). This was the first law concerning the 
accounting and auditing profession. It had the following objectives: 
" "To organise and improve the conditions of the accounting profession and to raise the 
standards of accountants and auditors professionally, academically, culturally and 
politically; 
" To encourage the professions to organise and participate in conferences and seminars 
related to accounting internally and externally and to keep in touch with new events, 
scientific periodicals, lectures and so on; 
" To establish a retirement pension fund for its members; 
" To increase co-operation between its members and to protect their rights; and 
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" To take action against members who violate the traditions and ethics of the 
profession" (116/1973). 
Kilani (1988) described how in Libya, as in several of its counterparts in the rest of 
the world, a number of laws had been issued to regulate accounting practices. Therefore, 
Libyan professional accountants and auditors, business accounting and auditing and financial 
reporting are influenced by the rules and regulations of the state, that is to say, the Libyan 
Commercial Code (LCC) and Income Tax Law (Ahmad & Gao, 2004). 
For instance, under the rules governing corporation books and record-keeping and 
financial reporting, which is required by the LCC Article no. 580, each enterprise must have 
at least: i) a journal, (ii) an inventory book and (iii) a balance sheet book (LCC, 1972). 
In addition, Article 570 of LCC requires joint stock companies to keep the following 
records: 
, 
(i) a register of members, (ii) a register of bondholders, (iii) a minute book of 
members' meetings, (iv) a minute book of directors meeting, (v) a minute book of statutory 
auditor's meetings, (vi) a minute book of executive committee's meetings and (vii) a minute 
book of bondholders' meetings (LCC, 1972). 
Further, the provisions of Article 573 of LCC state that every company's board of 
directors is responsible for preparing a balance sheet and a profit and loss account once a 
year, and reporting the financial statement to the AGM for approval (LCC, 1972). 
According to the LAAA, an auditor must have at least a Bachelor's Degree in 
accounting as well as meet other training requirements (e. g., have five years' experience of 
accountancy related jobs in an accounting office after obtaining the Bachelor's Degree). In 
Libyan universities and higher institutes, auditing is taught as a part of the requirements for 
the Bachelor's Degree in Accounting (Khorwatt, 2006). 
In 2005, Mashat reported that "the LAAA has so far done nothing to regulate and 
organize the Libyan accounting practices in terms of issuing or adopting accounting and 
auditing standards.... Many professional services accounting were not widely provided by the 
public accounting profession in Libya" (2005, p. 55). In addition, Libyan accounting firms 
were generally engaged in auditing and bookkeeping and tax and liquidation services. 
Therefore, the need for professional accounting services in Libya exceeded their availability 
to the business community (Mashat, 2005). 
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Part Two: Corporate Governance in a Libyan Context 
This section deals with corporate governance in the Libyan environment. It starts with 
the extent to which the Libyan legal framework accords with corporate governance principles 
of the OECD, followed by the Libyan code of corporate governance, which was issued by the 
LSM in 2007. In addition, some challenges in applying corporate governance in Libya are 
presented. 
2.5 The Libyan Legal Framework and the OECD Principles 
The legal regulatory system plays a significant role in strengthening corporate 
governance levels within companies. This is because the level of a country's legal system 
determines the company's level of corporate governance mechanisms (Johnson, Boone et al., 
2000; Denis & McConnell, 2003). 
In Libya, as in several other countries in the rest of the world, a number of corporate 
laws are considered the main reference for the control and supervision of the business 
environment. In addition, the basic regulations of each company, derived from the legal 
system of the state, are reference for the procedures and practices implemented by the 
management and employees to enhance and accomplish a company's goals (Otman & 
Karlberg, 2007). 
Most contemporary commercial law originated from one of two main legal systems: 
English common law and Roman civil law (French, German and Scandinavian law) (Denis & 
McConnell , 2003). In Libya, the legal system 
is largely influenced by the French Civil Law 
(Otman & Karlberg, 2007). Therefore, the purpose of this section is to provide an overview 
of the Libyan legal system in accordance with the OECD principles (2004), namely, 
shareholders' rights, equitable treatment of shareholders, the role of stakeholders, disclosure 
and transparency and responsibilities of the board of directors. 
2.5.1 Shareholders' Rights 
The LCC (1972) ensures the fundamental rights of shareholders; Article 522 
stipulates that the AGM should be convened within three months of the end of the last 
financial year. The shareholders must be notified about the date and place of the AGM at 
least 15 days before it is held, and this information should also be published in two daily 
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newspapers. Moreover, shareholders must be provided with summaries of the financial 
statements, auditors' reports and the agenda of the AGM. 
As regards voting rights, Article 522 of the LCC (1972) stipulates that shareholders 
who have paid 50% of the shares' issue value are entitled to all voting rights. They are 
allowed to vote in person or by proxy, although the latter is subject to some conditions: it 
should be written and kept in the company's office; it should appoint the agent of a 
shareholder. However, it is not permitted for a director or employees of the company to be an 
agent for shareholders. 
In accordance with the provisions of the LCC (1972), the legal quorum to convene the 
AGM requires the attendance of at least three board members, the auditor and shareholders 
representing at least 25% of the issued and paid up share capital. However, if the first quorum 
is not reached, the invitation to the second meeting will have no requirements. 
The LCC (1972) also allows shareholders, who represent 5% of the company's 
ownership structures, to call for the AGM (in case the board of directors does not do so) and 
to add items to the agenda. This must take place three days before the meeting. As for the 
right to transfer ownership, shareholders are entitled to sell or buy shares without referring to 
the company's management. Article 6 of the Law (no 65/1970) stipulates that there are no 
restrictions on transferring the ownership of shares. 
2.5.2 Equitable Treatment of Shareholders 
Article 500 of the LCC (1972) allows the issuance of different categories of shares, 
such as common and preferred shares, which are based on the company's statutes. These 
categories differ. For instance, shareholders of preferred shares category have three 
advantages: first, they may enjoy voting rights (e. g. multi-votes) according to the company's 
statutes. Secondly, they have the priority to obtain a specific dividend out of distributable 
profits. Finally, they have priority in the case of increasing share capital or liquidation. 
Articles 541 of the LCC (1972) entitles all shareholders, including those holding 
shares of limited voting, to oppose decisions taken by the general assembly, if those decisions 
are contrary to the laws or the company's statutes. Moreover, shareholders have the right to 
participate in the company's decision-making, whether, for instance, to increase or decrease 
share capital, to modify the statutes, to change its original purpose or to add new objectives. 
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2.5.3 The Role of Stakeholders 
In general, stakeholders include all people interested in the company's operations and 
who can affect or be affected by its success or failure. These are, for example, investors, 
employees, lenders, customers, suppliers and government, auditors, shareholders and 
community (Clement, 2005). 
The LCC (1972), in provision of Articles 544 and 564, gives special protection for 
bondholders. For instance, they are allowed to form bondholders' associations and select a 
legal representative to act on their behalf. They are further entitled to attend the AGM 
without having the right to vote. But, the legal representative of the bondholders is permitted 
to obtain all the company's information that shareholders have the same right to obtain by 
law. 
Article 577 of the LCC (1972) also gives the creditors special protection by 
stipulating that each company must have a legal reserve, which should not be less than 'one- 
fifth' of the capital. 
Lastly, Libyan Legal framework protects stakeholders' rights through law and 
contracts such as the Environment Law and Labour Law. Furthermore, there are many 
organisations and official bodies, such as trade unions, federations and professional 
associations, which give special protection to the stakeholders. 
2.5.4 Disclosure and Transparency 
In Libya, the regulatory procedures of accounting disclosure are based upon the 
legislation of companies, as mentioned. Under the provisions of Article no. 573 of the LCC 
(1972), every company's board of directors is responsible for preparing a balance sheet and a 
profit and losses account once a year and for reporting the financial statement to the AGM for 
approval (LCC, 1972). 
In relation to the banking sector, Article no. 83 of the LBL (1/2005) stipulated that 
each bank must assign the auditing of its accounts annually to two chartered accountants 
selected by the bank's general assembly from among the registrants in the register of the 
CBL, and each auditor must: 
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9 Not be a member of the bank's board of directors, a bank employee or agent, or the 
recipient of a loan or facility from the bank with or without a guarantee. 
9 Not be related to any member of the board of directors or to the bank's other chartered 
accountant by a kinship tie up to the fourth degree. 
Moreover, Article no. 84 of the LBL (1/ 2005 ) stipulates that each bank must display, 
throughout the year, and in a conspicuous place at its head office and at all of its branches, a 
copy of its most recent, audited financial statements. 
As for transparency, Article no. 541 of the LCC (1972) requires that each board 
member and manager, who has a personal interest in an operation which conflicts with that of 
the company, must inform other board members and the control committee, and he/she is not 
allowed to participate in discussions within the decision process of this operation. 
2.5.5 Responsibilities of the Board of Directors 
The board of directors is one of the various interested parties that contribute to the 
proper functioning of the corporate governance system (Abdel-Shahid, 2001). According to 
the LCC (1972), the board of directors is responsible for managing the company by a 
delegation of the general assembly. The general assembly elects members of the board of 
directors and specifies the minimum and maximum number according to company statutes, 
except what is stated in Article 68 of the LBL (1/ 2005 ): 
" "A commercial bank shall be directed by a board of directors comprising a minimum 
of five members and a maximum of seven members. The members of the board of 
directors shall be appointed, and their remuneration set, in a resolution issued by the 
bank's general assembly. The board of directors shall select a chairman from among 
its members. The bank's charter shall stipulate the tenure of the chairman and 
members of the board of directors. 
" The bank shall have a general manager, who shall be appointed by its board of 
directors based on the recommendation of the chairman or two members of the board 
of directors. 
" The chairman and members of the board of directors and the general manager must 
enjoy civil and political rights, possess a university degree, and possess adequate 
experience". 
It is not required that the members of the board of directors should be among the 
shareholders in the bank. 
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The most important tasks and responsibilities of the board of directors are stated in the 
LCC (1972) and the LBL (1/ 2005 ). They are as follows: 
" "Setting the general policies and objectives of the company. 
" Setting and supervising the internal systems related to regulating administrative and 
financial matters. 
" Specifying functions of company management and managers' compensation 
" Inviting the general assembly of the company to convene. 
" Preparing annual reports about the company's activities". 
In terms of board composition, the Libyan legal framework does not deal with this subject 
despite its importance. There are no rules that govern how the board of directors' 
membership is formed of executive and non-executive directors. Additionally, there are no 
rules dealing with the independence of board members. However, there is a separation 
between the CEO and board chair positions in the banking sector, according to Article 70 of 
the LBL (1/ 2005), whereas there are no such rules in other types of business and by the 
LCC (1972). 
Finally, it should be mentioned that despite the importance of, for example, audit, 
compensation and nomination board committees, according to the Libyan Legal framework, 
there are no rules for their formation. 
Nevertheless, the LCC (1972), in Articles 547,548 and 550, obliges all companies to 
form a control committee, consisting of five members, three of them originals and two spare, 
to be selected, appointed and supervised by the general assembly. The provisions of Articles 
553,555 and 556 of the LCC (1972) contains the duties and responsibilities of the control 
committee (see Appendix F). 
2.6 Libyan Corporate Governance Code (LCGC) 
The increasing concern about the subject of corporate governance in most developed 
and developing countries and, equally, in the international financial institutions, has had an 
influence on Libya, resulting in the manual of corporate governance for the banking sector. 
This manual, which was issued by the CBL in 2005, is considered an essential guideline for 
boards of directors of commercial banks. However, the rules of this manual are neither 
mandatory nor legally binding; rather, they promote and regulate responsible and transparent 
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behaviour in managing corporations according to international best practices (CBL, 2005). 
The document includes five main parts: 
Part one. Introduction: identifies the essence of corporate governance and its importance in 
achieving safety in banking operations, as well as shedding some light on the best 
international practices. 
Part two. Criteria of the board and its effectiveness: this part contains the criteria of the 
members of the board of directors and senior management, setting forth how they should 
perform their duties vis-ä-vis shareholders, depositors and other stakeholders efficiently and 
effectively. 
Part three: Choice of management and its supervisory role: this includes a description of the 
most important tasks of the board of directors and how they interact with the executive 
management. 
Part four: planning and policy formulation: this includes a description of the responsibilities 
of the board of directors on the formulation and monitoring of plans and policies. 
Part five: auditing and internal control: deals with the interaction of control systems, internal 
controls and internal and external audit (CBL, 2005). 
In 2007, through cooperation with some Arab financial markets (Egypt, Jordan and 
Tunisia), the LSM issued the LCCG (see Appendix F), according to which rules, and besides 
other legislation, it was to function (LSM, 2007). 
However, the rules of the LCCG are not mandatory. Rather it promotes and regulates 
responsible and transparent behaviour in managing corporations according to international 
best practices for joint-stock companies listed on the LSM The following, in brief (see 
Appendix F), are the most important clauses included in the LCCG in 2007 (LSM, 2007): 
A) The rights of shareholders: shareholders are entitled to a share of the profits and of the 
company's assets upon liquidation. They have the right to attend the AGM, to vote on 
resolutions and to dispose of shares. Furthermore, they are permitted to control the board of 
directors and to file a complaint to the members of the board. Shareholders are afforded the 
right of inquiry and may request information which does not compromise the interests of the 
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company, and is not inconsistent with the market system and its regulations. All of these 
rights are dealt with in detail in the following clauses: 
B) Facilitate the exercise of shareholder rights and access to information. 
C) The rights of shareholders concerning the AGM. 
D) Voting rights. 
E) The rights of shareholders as regards payment of dividends. 
F) Disclosure and transparency: all companies should develop policies and procedures of 
disclosure and supervisory regulations in written form in accordance with the rules 
determined by the LSM. 
G) Disclosure in the report of the board of directors: addressing a range of important points 
that the board of directors should disclose in its annual report. 
H) Board of directors: addresses the main tasks of the board of directors. 
I) Responsibilities of the board of directors: includes the main responsibilities of the board of 
directors. 
K) Composition of the board of directors: includes a range of important points related to 
board composition, such as numbers of board members, number of non-executive board 
members on the board, CEO duality with chairman of the board and board independence. 
L) Audit committee: includes the structure of the audit committee and its tasks and 
responsibilities. 
M) Nominations committee: includes the structure of the nomination committee and its tasks 
and responsibilities. 
N) Board of directors meetings and their agenda: includes a range of important points related 
to board meetings. 
0) Board of directors' compensation: the AGM has rights to determine the level of 
compensation for the board of directors' members. The compensation may be paid as a 
certain remuneration or allowance for attending meetings. 
P) Internal audit: includes the structure of the internal audit and its tasks and responsibilities. 
Q) Conflict of interest: companies are required to have a written code, which is known to 
employees, managers and the board of directors, in order to prevent conflicts of interest. 
R) Control committee: includes the structure of the control committee and its tasks and 
responsibilities (LSM, 2007). 
2.7 Challenges of Applying Corporate Governance in Libya 
Despite the large number of rules governing corporate governance, in reality, the 
application of this system in Libya has faced a number of challenges, among which are the 
following: 
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2.7.1 Legal Challenges 
The LCCG rules contradict some laws of the state, especially the LCC (1972). For 
instance, the provisions of the LCC (1972) state that the chairman of the board of directors is 
allowed to be the CEO at the same time. Meanwhile, article 3-K of the LCCG states that it is 
not allowed for one person to exercise both positions. 
Also, the rules of the LCCG states in article 4-K that the majority of the members of 
the board of directors should be non-executive, while under the LCC (1972) and LBL (11 
2005), there are no rules governing the executive and non-executive members structure of the 
board of directors. 
The most important point is that rules of the LCCG require the formation of board 
committees - the audit and nomination committees - but it is not a legal requirement 
according to existing legislation in Libya. 
In an assessment of Egyptian corporate governance, Fawzy (2003) revealed that its 
legal framework is among the most important fields, which requires additional efforts to raise 
the efficiency of its application in the country. 
2.7.2 Cultural and Environmental Challenges 
It is clear that the principles of the LCCG are based upon those of developed 
countries, which are advanced culturally and professionally and have democratic rules 
governing the development process. It is also necessary to take into consideration the local 
environment and general climate for investment in Libya, which is characterised by a lack of 
full recognition and understanding of the meaning of corporate governance, either by 
companies or by institutions supervising the application of this code. 
It should be mentioned here that a corporate governance system requires the raising of 
the efficiency of supervisory, regulatory and judicial bodies and the establishment of special 
courts to deal with financial market cases. It also requires institutions to develop the skills of 
employees in order to raise governance levels, as performance requires training and a'change 
in work culture, as well as sessions and conferences over the long term (Fawzy, 2003). For 
instance, in the UK, the Combined Code of Corporate Governance almost twelve years to be 
issued - from the appearance of the Cadbury report (1992) to the issuance of the first 
Combined Code of Corporate Governance in 2003. 
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2.7.3 Financial Challenges 
The rules of corporate governance issued by the stock markets require the formation 
of various committees. The creation, for example, of the audit and nomination committees is 
required to be made up of about nine members. However, in most Libyan companies, 
especially those in the banking sector, the number of members does not exceed five or seven 
members, which is in accordance with the LBL (1/ 2005). 
Moreover, there should be one individual in a company responsible for corporate 
governance and another responsible for risk assessment and internal control and audit. This 
leads to increased financial burdens incurred by the company. 
This was confirmed in the USA by a survey of corporate governance, conducted by 
the Business Roundtable (BR) in 2006, about the cost to companies applying the Sarbanes- 
Oxley law (BR, 2006). This survey showed that: 
" 40% of corporations are bearing costs of over US$10 million; 
" 27% of corporations bear from US$ 6-10 million; and 
" 33% of corporations bear from US$ 1-5 million. 
This confirms the high costs to companies, even those internationally, which are required to 
commit to corporate governance processes. 
2.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to discuss the Libyan economic environment and report on 
changes currently underway within the country to transform it to a more open and liberal 
economic model. Among the most important issues raised were: 
The Libyan economy is currently over-dependent on oil revenues and vulnerable to 
fluctuations in world commodity prices. This has encouraged the state to seek to widen the 
range of economic activity within the country and broaden the ownership base of 
economically active organisations. 
A more open economic model based on a broader base of corporate ownership 
requires a mature corporate governance code: to this end the LSM has published the LCGC. 
Adequate corporate governance safeguards can increase investor confidence in emerging 
sectors of a transition economy, such as tourism and export-based manufacturing. 
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Libya faces the difficulty that it must implement the LCGC in the context of an 
existing legal system, which includes influences from many legal traditions, and in some 
cases the requirements of the LCGC are not included in Libyan law, or even contradict 
Libyan law. 
The financial sector in Libya in the form of the main state-owned banks and insurance 
companies were and remain the only entities listed on the LSM. The auditing profession has 
remained fragmented and isolated from international influence, leaving it unsuited to reacting 
to rapid changes in ownership structure and unsuited to providing leadership in the 
enforcement of new corporate governance code. 
This chapter has reviewed the current state of corporate governance in Libya and 
reported on the problems facing it as a process, as they are stated in the extant literature. The 
literature indicates that there is a requirement for further research in the area process of 
corporate governance in Libya, and in particular the problems facing the process. The 
literature also highlights the complexities and issues being raised by the changes in Libya's 
political and economic systems. These changes make Libya a rich and interesting research 
environment and one as a point of transition that offers unique research opportunities in 
relation to corporate governance processes within a developing country. 
Chapter three will build on this background by presenting a review of the literature 
on the theoretical foundations and mechanisms of corporate governance, and the extent of its 
implementation in both developed and developing countries, with particular focus on 
developing countries facing an economic situation similar to Libya's. Particular attention is 
given to studies which identify obstacles to corporate governance implementation, and how 
developing countries have overcome these obstacles 
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Chapter Three 
Literature Review on Corporate Governance 
Part One: Overview of Corporate Governance 
3.1 Introduction 
Corporate governance became an international issue, in both academic and 
governmental debate, in the early 1980s. This concern emerged in the UK following the 
financial difficulties of the late 20th century and some corporate scandals such as Polly Peck, 
Maxwell Group, BCCI, Barings Brothers and Northern Rock (Pickett, 2007). 
It also appeared during the 1997 Asian financial markets crisis (Johnson, Boone, 
Breach, & Friedman, 2000), as well as the collapse of large companies in different countries, 
such as Enron and WorldCom in the USA. These cases caused a loss of confidence in 
financial data and audit reports, and led to a pressing need for improvement in systems of 
corporate governance. 
Consequently, in recent years, there has been a remarkable worldwide effort to issue 
and develop corporate governance principles, in order to ensure that good codes of practice 
are in place to protect companies from potential crises that poor standards could cause. 
Furthermore, some codes have been issued for specific continents or regions in the world, or 
by specialist organisations such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD). 
The main purpose of this chapter is to present a review of the literature on corporate 
governance so to provide a general picture of current practices. The remainder of this chapter 
is organised in the following way: Section 3.2 describes the concept of corporate governance; 
Section 3.2 provides a brief historical background of corporate governance in the UK, the 
USA and in the OECD; Section 3.3 presents the theoretical framework of corporate 
governance; and Section 3.4 discusses corporate governance mechanisms, which includes 
ownership structure, shareholders' rights, boards of directors, board committees and 
disclosure and transparency. The final section, 3.5, examines corporate governance practices 
in developing countries. 
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3.2 Definition of Corporate Governance 
Corporate governance has gained a lot of attention in the last decade from different 
interested parties such as regulators, professional bodies and academics. However, despite 
this fact, no specific definition has won general agreement among these parties (Solomon, 
2007). Therefore, the traditional literature on corporate governance approaches the subject 
from various angles and reveals a number of definitions based on different business 
environments and corporate systems. 
Solomon (2007) argues that the existing literature on corporate governance tends to 
share similar ideas about the definition of corporate governance, one of which is the concept 
of accountability. Therefore, corporate governance can be addressed from `narrow' or 
`broader' perspectives: the narrow perspective is orientated toward only corporate 
accountability to shareholders. In this respect, the main goal of companies is to serve the 
interests of their shareholders. Within the broader perspective, corporate governance requires 
corporate accountability to shareholders and other stakeholders (such as investors, 
employees, lenders, customers, suppliers and government auditors). In this latter regard, 
shareholders are regarded as just one of a range of stakeholders groups. 
In its narrowest sense, corporate governance can be defined as "the set of rules and 
incentives by which the management of a company is directed and controlled in order to 
maximize the profitability and long term value of the firm for shareholders" (Shahid, 2001, p. 
3). This definition tends to accord with the agency theory, in which companies should act in 
favour of shareholders by maximising their profits (Shahid, 2001). 
In the context of finance, the focus is on the protection of outside investors from 
expropriation by insiders. This definition, given by Shleifer and Vishny (1997, p. 737)"deals 
with the ways by which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a 
return on their investment". 
This is similar to Prowse's definition of corporate governance: "rules, standards and 
organisations in an economy that govern the behaviour of corporate owners, directors, and 
managers and define their duties and accountability to outside investors, i. e., shareholders and 
lenders" (1998, p. 2). 
A broader definition provided by the OECD (2004, p. 1) describes corporate 
governance as: "the rules and practices that govern the relationship between the managers 
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and shareholders of corporations, as well as stakeholders like employees and creditors 
. contributing to growth and financial stability by underpinning market confidence, financial 
market integrity and economic efficiency". 
Solomon (2007, p. 14) defines corporate governance in broad terms as: "the system 
of checks and balances, both internal and external to companies, which ensures that 
companies discharge their accountability to all their stakeholders and act in a socially 
responsible way in all areas of their business activity". 
In the same context, corporate governance can be defined as: "the manner in which 
companies are controlled and in which those responsible for the direction of companies are 
accountable to the stakeholders of these companies" (Dahya, Lonie & Power, 1996, p. 72). In 
addition, Sir Adrian Cadbury defined corporate governance as: "The system by which 
companies are directed and controlled"(Cadbury, 2002, p. 11). 
An assessment of the above definitions appears to suggest that not all of them limit 
the responsibility of companies to shareholders. These are based on a narrow agency 
perception of corporate governance as an internal task of a company. Instead, the definitions 
tend to argue that a good corporate governance system should determine the responsibility of 
companies to a range of stakeholders beyond only their investors. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that there are four key players affected by and who, in 
turn, affect the proper application of this concept and determine, to a large extent, its success 
or failure (Shahid, 2001): 
First, shareholders provide capital for the company through their ownership of shares. They 
obtain profits from their investment and are able to select and elect the members of board for 
the protection of their rights. 
Secondly, the board of directors represent the basic rights and interests of shareholders and 
the other interested parties (stakeholders at large). They are responsible for the selection of a 
qualified management team, setting out company policies and objectives, as well as 
evaluating management performance by comparing the actual performance and the targets. 
Thirdly, the management reports to the board about all the company's activities and 
achievements and is responsible for running the day-to-day operations. It is tasked with 
achieving set goals and purposes. 
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Finally, stakeholders, mainly creditors, are strongly interested in the high probability of 
repayment of their debt. Other stakeholders also need protection, among them suppliers, 
customers, employees, government and the public at large. 
3.3 A Brief Historical Background of Corporate Governance 
As mentioned earlier, the number of significant events that have occurred over the 
past ten years or so, has led to heightened concern about the standard of corporate governance 
around the world (Pickett, 2007). These cases led to a pressing need for improvement and 
development in this system of checks and balances. However, the history of concern over 
corporate governance dates back to the start of business (Vinten, 2003). In the UK, for 
instance, the first corporate failure was in the 1700s, which became known as the `South Sea 
Bubble' (Dragomir, 2008), while in the USA, this was the stock market crash of 1929 
(Clarke, 2004). 
3.3.1 Corporate Governance in the UK 
In the UK, there is a well-developed market with different shareholders types among 
others institutional investors, financial institutions and foreign investors. However, the 
development of corporate governance in the UK was originally driven by corporate failures 
and scandals of some big companies (Mallin, 2007). 
In 1720, the earliest corporate collapse in UK history became known as the `South 
Sea Bubble'. As a consequence, the laws and regulations governing UK business were 
changed to protect investors trading on the stock exchange from corporate collapses such as 
this (Dragomir, 2008). 
In the early 1990s, a number of high profile corporate failures led to a growing lack of 
confidence in financial data and audit reports. This attracted the attention of the UK 
government (Dulewicz, 2004). A range of significant changes were made to British corporate 
governance by different committees, whose aims were to restore investor confidence in the 
system (Arcot & Brun, 2006). The UK's approach involved the creation of committees to 
deal with the issues of corporate governance, starting from the Cadbury report in 1992 and 
ending with the combined Code on Corporate Governance in 2003. 
Following a number of corporate scandals (e. g. Coloroll and Polly Peck), the Cadbury 
Committee was formed in 1991 by the British government and regulators (Arcot & Brun, 
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2006). The scandals at Maxwell and BCCI happened while the committee was being set up 
(Solomon, 2007). The Cadbury committee took the name of its chairman and its report 
became known as the `The Cadbury Report'. This report was issued in 1992 with special 
focus on financial reporting and accountability (Dragomir, 2008). 
According to Solomon(2007), the Cadbury Report covered three main aspects of 
corporate governance, namely, the board of directors, shareholders and auditing. First, they 
stated that the most important corporate governance mechanism, which required constant 
monitoring and assessment, was the board of directors. Secondly, corporate transparency was 
also shown to play an important role for their shareholders and other stakeholders. Finally, 
the essential role in good corporate governance was the function of both financial accounting 
and internal auditing. 
The Cadbury report has had a major influence, not only on the UK corporate 
governance system, but also on an international level, with many countries around the world 
adopting a similar code of best practices to Cadbury. 
In 1995, the Greenbury Report was issued in response to shareholders' concerns about 
the structure of boards' and directors' remuneration. The committee investigated directors' 
remuneration in large UK quoted companies. The main recommendation was for 
remuneration committees and the disclosure of directors' remuneration in annual reports to 
their shareholders. Mallin (2007) states that strengthening accountability and enhancing the 
performance of directors were essential recommendations of the Greenbury Report, and this 
could be done by disclosing the directors' remuneration to their shareholders annually, linked 
to performance measures of individual directors. 
In 1998, the Report of the Hampel Committee was issued, reviewing the 
implementation of the recommendations of the Cadbury and the Greenbury committees. The 
Combined Code was published in the same year. The Hampel Report also emphasised similar 
issues considered by Cadbury. The Combined Code consisted of 18 principles and 48 code 
provisions related to the Cadbury, Greenbury and Hampel recommendations published by the 
London Stock Exchange (Keasey, Thompson et al., 2005). 
The Enron collapse in the USA spurred the UK and the rest of the world into re- 
evaluating issues related to corporate governance, particularly the role of non-executive 
directors. In the UK, the Higgs Committee report was published in 2003 with special focus 
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on the effectiveness of non-executive directors. In 2003, the UK reviewed the Combined 
Code, which was originally published in 1998, to cover a number of key Higgs 
recommendations (Solomon, 2007). 
3.3.2 Corporate Governance in the USA. 
In the USA, economic prosperity in the 1920s ended with the Wall Street stock 
market crash of 1929 (Clarke, 2004). This market collapse revealed manipulation in the 
market, internal trafficking, mismanagement and reckless violation of the rights of 
shareholders that led to a long recession between 1929 and 1933. As a consequence of these 
problems, the Securities Act 1933, as well as the Securities and Exchange Act 1934, were put 
in place by the US government (Clarke, 2004). 
In 2001, the massive bankruptcies of Enron and WorldCom, and the relatively smaller 
corporate debacles of companies like Tyco, Aldephia Communication and Global Crossing, 
served as catalysts for change (Holmstrom & Kaplan, 2005). This corporate governance crisis 
reflected a need to reform US corporate governance and increase regulation, because 
shareholders no longer had confidence in corporate reports. Therefore, the US Congress, in 
2002, responded to these corporate governance failures by enacting the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
(2002), which is considered as the most sweeping reform of American business law since the 
1930s (Litvak, 2007). 
Cornelius and Kogut (2003) argue that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 was a 
compromise bill, which gained support among both Republicans and Democrats. It was 
intended to highlight and strengthen criminal penalties against top management who falsified 
financial statements, and engaged in other unethical behaviours. While the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002 required the chief executive to carefully consider and thereafter sign-off the 
audited company reports, it also played a major influence on strengthening the powers of the 
audit committees and highlighting the regulatory oversight of audit firms. 
3.3.3 The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance. 
In 1999, the OECD provided the first worldwide corporate governance model (Mallin, 
2007). It was the very first model to be proposed and implemented by countries which were 
members of the Business Sector Advisory Group in 1996. A task force formulated a set of 
major principles of good corporate governance. While business crises experienced in Asian 
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countries revealed a complete failure in corporate governance, this led to the publication of 
the Corporate Governance Principles by the OECD. The same framework of principles was 
approved and authorised by the World Bank (Mallin, 2007). 
The OECD revised its principles in 2003, to take into consideration developments 
since 1999. Furthermore, general and open consultations with non-OECD countries sought to 
include other regional corporate governance. In April 2004, OECD governments accepted the 
new principles, which encompass six important areas of corporate governance listed below: 
1. Ensuring the basis for an effective Corporate Governance framework: a good 
corporate governance framework should clearly show the responsibilities of every 
group in the company management to avoid conflicts of interest and to ease 
performance evaluation. 
2. The right of shareholders and key ownership functions: a good framework of 
corporate governance should seek to defend the shareholders' interests and help them 
exercise their rights. 
3. The equitable treatment of shareholders: a good framework should ensure all types 
of shareholders are protected and treated equally, including minority interest 
shareholders and foreign shareholders. 
4. The role of stakeholders in corporate governance: a good framework of corporate 
governance should extend the company responsibilities to all stakeholders established 
by law. 
5. Disclosure and transparency: a good framework of corporate governance should 
ensure accuracy and timeliness of a company's reports. In addition, it should ensure 
that all significant matters regarding company operations are clearly disclosed, such 
as financial status, performance and ownership, corporate social responsibility and the 
organisation's corporate governance. 
6. The responsibilities of the board: a good framework of corporate governance should 
strategically guide the company toward the attainment of its targets and ensure growth 
through the effective monitoring and evaluation of management by the board. 
Moreover, the board is accountable to the company, as a whole, as well as its 
shareholders (OECD, 2004). 
In summary, this historical background has set out the development of corporate 
governance both in the US and the UK, as well as underlining the similarities and differences 
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between them. It emphasised the importance of good corporate governance in detecting 
unethical management practices. 
3.4 Theoretical Framework of Corporate Governance 
The development of corporate governance, as seen earlier, is a worldwide issue, 
concerning law, culture and capital structure (ownership), as well as relations between 
companies. Corporate governance may, therefore, be applied differently from one region of 
the world to the next. Indeed, certain practices may be more vital to some countries than to 
others. And in an individual country, they may be more appropriate at different times 
depending on the stages of development (Mallin, 2007). 
However, the main corporate governance problems are based upon the conflicts of 
interest between various parties, the shareholders and management of company on one hand 
and with other stakeholders on the other hand. Therefore, the concept of corporate 
governance was driven by two theories. First, the agency theory addresses the relation 
between the shareholders and the management of a company as proposed by Jensen and 
Meckling (1976). Secondly, the stakeholder theory, proposed by Freeman (1984), examines 
the relation between multi-parties inside and outside the company. 
3.4.1 Agency Theory 
The extraordinary economic growth after the Second World War, especially in 
developed countries, led to the formation of multi-national companies and joint ventures. 
The emergence of such companies has shaped economies and businesses as well as our 
corporate environment. In every company, the shareholders are the owners of the company, 
whereas the directors and managers are to control all business activities and to ensure that the 
company is operating in the interest of its shareholders (owners). 
Indeed, directors and managers have high influence on company operations as well as 
on the decision regarding the projects to be undertaken. On the other hand, shareholders, who 
are the owners of the company, delegating the authority to the managers to exercise all 
relevant duties on their behalf. In this respect, the owners (shareholders) of the company are 
the principal and the directors and managers are the agent (Mallin, 2007). Shailer (2004) 
argues that apart from attending the annual general meetings, shareholders do not normally 
participate in company management or in the control of the company's activities. 
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Jensen and Meckling (1976, p. 5) define "an agency relationship as a contract under 
which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform 
some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision making authority to the 
agent" (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). They discuss and clarify the impact of the separation of 
ownership from company management, which, in turn, leads to the development of `agency 
theory' and the agency problem. Agency theory creates a relationship between two parties, 
whereby the owners are known as principals, who contract specialists (agents) to manage the 
business on their behalf. 
In other words, the shareholders are the owners of the company, whereas the directors 
and managers are there to ensure that the business is operating in the interest of its 
shareholders (owners) (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). In this regard, company directors and 
managers have high influence on company operations as well as the decision on the projects 
to be undertaken (Staikouras & Staikouras et al., 2008). 
In some cases, the agent (management) does not necessarily act in the best interests of 
the principal (shareholders) and, as a result of this relationship, there arises what is known as 
the `agency problem' (Solomon & Solomon, 2007). 
The agency theory suggests that most of the times, the manager's decisions are not 
necessarily directed toward the single aim of maximising the value of the firm. Instead, they 
have many other goals which align with their own interests. In addition, the principals do not 
have access to all types of information. This causes information asymmetry between the 
agent and the principal because they will have different levels of information access (Mallin, 
2007). 
For instance, the shareholders' ability to control all managers' decisions and the 
activities taking place in the company may be limited by the rights or interests of other 
stakeholder groups, which also need to be considered. This control may also be limited to a 
decision-making level. Thus, shareholders may not have, for example, the right to monitor 
the methods employed and the reasons why these were used in recording transactions. Hence, 
agency problems arise (Brenna, 1995) because of the impossibility of the agent to track all 
the decisions and actions that are likely to affect both his own interest and the interest of the 
principal. 
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The conflicts of interest between the principals and agents lead to `agency costs'. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) classified the agency costs into three main types: first, 
monitoring costs, which are incurred by shareholders in controlling and ensuring managers' 
activities and behaviours are in line with their interests; secondly, bonding costs, which are 
incurred by managers to indicate that shareholders' interests are being protected and fulfilled; 
and thirdly, residual agency costs, which are incurred in case bonding and monitoring does 
not eliminate the conflict of interests and information asymmetry. 
Therefore, the corporate governance concept came about as a result of the agency 
problem, which arose when the company owners were separated from the decision-making 
process (Solomon, 2007). 
Hart (1995) points out two reasons why corporate governance issues must arise in an 
organisation. The first reason is the presence of conflict of interest or agency problem 
between the owners (shareholders) and company management (managers or directors). The 
second reason is that conflict of interest or an agency problem cannot be solved through the 
use of contract. 
Hart (1995) gives several reasons why solving an agency problem through the use of 
contract might not always be possible. In particular, all business events and transactions may 
not be done through the use of contract. In addition, there are costs associated with 
negotiating contracts and enforcing them known as agency costs. Agency costs would be 
extreme if shareholders tried to ensure that all managers' decisions and actions are aligned 
with the shareholders' interests. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that the adoption of corporate governance practices 
push directors and managers to plan and make decisions which will align their interest with 
those of the shareholders and help increase share value. Moreover, Walsh and Seward (1990) 
state that there are available governance mechanisms that might be used to assimilate the 
interests of shareholders with those of management. One of the mechanisms would be 
associated with individual performance; managers' rewards reflect performance level. 
Another mechanism is to reward managers by giving them the opportunity to subscribe 
shares at a lower price. In this way, they encourage them to go for projects that will increase 
the shareholders' value. 
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Shleifer and Vishny (1997) conclude that an effective corporate governance system 
may be driven by the legal consideration of all types of investors as well as the presence of 
concentrated ownership. Companies rieed a proper governance to protect the interests of their 
shareholders. In addition, small investors (minority interest) need to be legally protected 
against the unethical practices of large investors. 
As result, strong legal protection of especially minority shareholders' interests may 
reduce the agency problem, while poor legal protection of shareholders' rights may increase 
the agency problem, which leads to an increase in agency costs (Claessens, 2003). However, 
Mallin (2007) notes that in many countries there is no strong law protecting minority 
shareholders, especially those which use a code of civil law as opposed to the common law. 
3.4.2 Stakeholder Theory 
The stakeholder theory emerged in the 1970s and developed slowly. It was explored 
by Freeman in his 1984 work, "Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach". The same 
author is recognised as having built a strong foundation for the development of this theory 
(Solomon, 2007). 
According to Freeman, stakeholders can be defined as all people who have interest in 
an organisation and, therefore, can affect or be affected by its decisions and performance 
(Freeman & Vea, 2001). In other words, stakeholder theory, rather than focusing on 
shareholders, seems to include a wider group, such as customers, suppliers, employees, 
government, auditors, community and others (Letza, Sun et al., 2004). 
In the traditional concept of corporate governance, the director's responsibility is 
mainly focused on shareholders' interests (increasing shareholders' wealth) as they are the 
providers of the funds and the owners of the company. However, in the modern concept of 
corporate governance, a set of legislative, regulatory and legal market mechanisms are put in 
place inviting companies to consider all other interest groups associated with the social, 
environmental and ethical aspects of the company (Pease & Macmillan, 1993). 
Collier (2008) concludes that stakeholders have significant influence on the 
organisation and, for this reason, they need recognition from the directors and managers. 
Simmons (2004) argues that stakeholder theory helps the organisation to identify and protect 
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interests by extending the organisational obligations to a wider range of stakeholders and 
more ethically concerned constituents. 
This means that a company's goal should be extended to all people interested in its 
operations and who can affect or be affected by its success or failure. This includes other 
investors, employees, lenders, customers, suppliers, government, auditors, shareholders and 
the community. These may have financial, social, economical, environmental and 
technological effects (Clement, 2005). 
Collier (2008) classified stakeholders into two categories, taking into account the 
governance structure:, primary or contractual and secondary or diffused stakeholders. While 
primary or contractual stakeholders have a direct relationship in the form of a contract with 
the firm (i. e. creditors), secondary or diffused stakeholders do not have a direct relationship 
with the company. However, the latter may still be affected by the company's activities. 
Gillan (2006) provides a broader perspective of the firm and its governance in 
contrast to the narrow perspective of the firm as consisting of the company board, company 
managers, and shareholders, as shown in Figure (1). 
Figure 1 Stakeholder in the Corporate Structure 
Law/ Regulation 
Suppliers politics 
Markets 
Board of Dk *ors 
Shareholders Employees Management 
Debt 
Assets 
Equity 
Creditors 
Customers 
Culture Communities 
Source: Gillan (2006, p. 20) 
Clement (2005) argues that companies are under constant pressure to review their 
corporate governance process by including all stakeholders. Luoma and Goodetein (1999) 
found that many companies tend to include on their boards of directors people selected from 
stakeholders, such as customers, suppliers, employees and members of the public. They also 
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suggested some reasons for such a selection. One pivotal factor is the enforcement of laws in 
the majority of countries giving the boards of directors the powers to consider and protect 
stakeholders' interests. Another reason is that a company expects people coming from 
different corporations, those mostly from highly regulated industries, to act effectively on 
behalf of the community and government (Luoma & Goodetein, 1999). 
Hence, the OECD principles argue that "The corporate governance framework should 
recognise the rights of stakeholders established by law or through mutual agreements and 
encourage active co-operation between corporations and stakeholders in creating wealth, 
jobs, and the sustainability of financially sound enterprises" (OECD, 2004, p. 12). 
In summary, agency theory is focused on the protection of shareholder interests and 
the separation of ownership from company management. However, the stakeholder theory 
exposes the responsibility of a company management, which is to maximise shareholders' 
wealth by supplying a variety of needed products and services to a range of stakeholders. 
There is also emphasis on corporate efficacy in a social context (Letza, Sun et al., 2004). 
Therefore, using both theories (shareholder theory and stakeholder theory) may prove more 
clear and comprehensive as they all involve corporate governance. 
Part Two: Corporate Governance Mechanisms and Practices 
3.5 Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
3.5.1 Ownership Structure 
Ownership structure refers to the characteristics of equity shareholders and their 
shareholding capacity in any firm (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). It can also be described as the 
capital composition of a firm and the size of each source of capital. Ownership and control 
are linked in most cases and they are rarely split within any company. 
Commonly, company management (directors and managers) have some level of 
ownership in the firms they manage. The firm's ownership may be classified into two forms: 
ownership by management, also called "inside ownership", and ownership by other 
shareholders, known as "outside ownership" (Setyadi, Rusmin et al., 2008). This is for 
motivation reasons, and helps to reduce the conflict of interest between shareholders and 
company management. Some owners effectively have some control over the firms they 
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possess. Thus, ownership structure is a very important component in a firm as well as in 
corporate governance (Denis and McConnell, 2003). 
Governance by shareholders relies on their degree of control. In addition, it depends 
on whether a group of shareholders are both motivated and have a strong ability to participate 
in the monitoring of all management actions and decisions (Hart, 1995; Denis and 
McConnell, 2003; Berglof & Claessens, 2004). 
In some cases, conflicts of interest between shareholders and company management 
can be avoided because the equity is held by the majority shareholders and inside investors. 
This can act as a governance mechanism to align the interests of shareholders with those of 
managers (Claessens and Djankov, 1999). Shleifer and Vishny (1997) consider legal 
protection and concentrated ownership to be the key for a good corporate governance system. 
However, corporate governance may be affected either positively or negatively by 
ownership concentration. On the one hand, concentrated ownership may act as a way of 
monitoring managers' actions and decisions (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). The greater 
ownership control held by the largest shareholders leads them to make decisions that increase 
the value of the firm as a whole, benefiting even the minority interest. On the other hand, 
concentrated ownership structure can also empower shareholders with a large degree of 
control to make decisions and pursue activities, which will benefit them at the expense of 
other shareholders (La Porta, De-Silanes et al., 1999). 
Therefore, Setyadi et al. (2008) argue that "Ownership structure is a primary 
determinant of the extent of agency problems between controlling insiders and outside 
investors" (p. 3). This is because outside investors influence the appointment of directors and 
managers, who are to work in a firm to reduce the agency costs. Furthermore, Florackis, 
Kostakis and Ozkan (2008) find that managerial ownership and ownership concentration 
seem to play an important role in solving agency problems and in mitigating agency costs. 
Denis and McConnell (2003, p. 11) states that "of the various corporate governance 
mechanisms that have been studied in the US, ownership structure is the mechanism that has 
been studied most extensively in the rest of the world". In general, they found that the results 
of empirical studies conducted in various places revealed very different ownership structures 
and types of shareholders, who can also influence corporate governance. Research should 
consider all these factors when examining the corporate governance systems in different 
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countries (Denis & McConnell, 2003). In the model developed by Shleifer and Vishny 
(1986), concerning the role played by majority shareholders, the latter monitor all the firms' 
management activities and decisions, and engage themselves in proxy contests and takeover 
activity as needed. 
In developing countries, Berglof and Claessens (2004) argue that concentrated 
ownership is the key mechanism of a good corporate governance system. Majority 
shareholders play a vital role in the firm's management and this is reflected in management 
and board turnover following majority-block trading. When a large number of shares is held 
by a single shareholder or a small number of shareholders, it motivates the shareholders to 
change management whenever it is needed and to match the organisation's activities and 
needs to the current competitive environment (Berglof & Claessens, 2004). 
Boubakria, Cosset, and Guedhamic (2005) investigated the role of ownership 
structure and investor protection in post privatisation corporate governance. They used a 
sample of 209 privatised firms from 39 countries over the period 1980 to 2001. The findings 
revealed that the firm's size, the industry affiliation and growth, the privatisation method 
employed, as well as the level of institutional development and investor protection, explained 
the cross-firm differences in ownership concentration. It was also seen that in countries with 
weak investor protection, the positive effect of ownership concentration on firm performance 
mattered more compared to countries with strong investor protection. 
In addition, Omrana, Bolbol and Fatheldin (2008) investigated the determinants of 
ownership concentration on a sample of 304 firms from different sectors of the economy, and 
from a representative group of Arab countries (Egypt, Jordan, Oman and Tunisia). They 
concluded that ownership concentration is an endogenous response to poor legal protection of 
investors, but which seems to have no significant effect on firms' performance. This should 
put the urgency of corporate governance reforms at least on par with real sector and 
commercial reforms. 
In the literature, different views are presented regarding the role of shareholders types 
(institutions, foreign investors and government) with respect to corporate governance in any 
organisation (Banerjee, Leleux et al., 1997; Claessens & Djankov, 1999). 
The first type is institutional shareholders, who may also play a key role in corporate 
governance, especially in reducing the agency problem (Shin-Ping & Tsung-Hsien, 2009). 
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An institutional shareholder of a firm may take the role of monitoring all the actions and 
decisions taken by the top management (Baek, Kang et al., 2004). 
An institutional shareholder may also act as an agent of change in a firm through 
shareholder activism efforts regarding corporate governance issues. He may, for example, 
influence change in the system of laws and rules, as well as in factors that control the day-to- 
day operations of a firm (Gillan and Starks, 2003). 
Hartzell and Starks (2002) found evidence that institutional investors play a big role 
in monitoring executive compensation contracts. Their findings indicated a positive 
association between institutional ownership concentration and the performance-related pay of 
a firm's executives, and a negative association between institutional ownership concentration 
and excess salary for these executives. 
Chung, Firth and Kim (2002) concluded that when institutional shareholders hold a 
large percentage of a firm's equity shares, there is less use of discretionary accruals, which 
results in a decrease in the levels of opportunistic earnings management. 
Secondly, when a government holds a large proportion of a company's shares, this 
may also play a key role in corporate governance. Wei and Geng (2008) conducted a study 
on listed companies in China, and concluded that government ownership, as the majority 
shareholder, exercised a strong control over corporate governance and, consequently, 
impaired the rights of other minority shareholders in the arrangement of corporate 
governance. 
However, Shin-Ping and Tsung-Hsien ( 2009) argued that in companies with high 
government ownership, decisions which are made by the board of directors have to be 
approved first by the government authority. This imposes a lack of flexibility in decision- 
making, which can also impact the performance of these companies. 
Finally, foreign investors play an influential role in the corporate governance of a 
company. Generally, foreign investors participate in monitoring functions and improve 
corporate governance (Robertson, Gilley et al., 2003). 
Arun and Turner (2004) argue that the entry of foreign investors into developing 
countries, especially in the banking sector, may strengthen practices, as many western 
companies emphasise the need for implementing sound corporate governance. 
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The findings of Khanna and Palepu (2000) revealed that foreign investors perform a 
valuable monitoring role, particularly in the period of transition from a control to a market 
economy. Henry (2000) pointed out that foreign investors provided economic benefits by 
sharing risk between domestic and foreign participants. In addition, Stulz (1999) argued that 
international investors provided developing and transitional economies with enough capital 
needed to finance their activities, and that they have contributed much to the success of Asian 
economies (Stulz, 1999). 
Zelenyuk and Zheka (2006) examined the effects of different ownership structures on 
corporate efficiency in a set of Ukrainian joint-stock companies. First, the results indicated 
that domestic ownership of the company was the most important factor in improving 
efficiency. Secondly, managerial ownership has a weak effect on efficiency. Thirdly, 
concentrated ownership rights (government or non-government) improve efficiency, possibly 
reflecting country-specific factors. Finally, foreign ownership was found to have a positive 
and significant effect on the corporate governance quality of an organisation. 
3.5.2 Shareholders' Rights and Legal Protection 
The legal regulatory system across countries plays a significant role in strengthening 
corporate governance levels within companies. This is because the level of a country's legal 
system determines the company level of corporate governance mechanisms, among which are 
the board structure, the ownership structure, transparency and discourse, board committees 
and their composition (Johnson, Boone et al., 2000; Denis & McConnell, 2003). 
Ensuring and shielding the rights of shareholders is fundamental to good corporate 
governance, and must be an inevitable policy goal. Achieving and supporting the 
shareholders' rights incorporates various facets. Shareholders must be empowered to choose 
and change directors and to promote formally minority interests so that they are fairly 
represented on the board. Finally, shareholders should be provided with information 
pertaining to directors' votes on major issues regarding the firm's decisions (OECD, 2004). 
The Cadbury Report* (2002) specified how the UK Companies' Act recognised 
shareholders as highly ranked corporate members, who are always mandated to determine the 
required size and composition of boards at their general meetings. To be more specific, it is 
the responsibility of directors to exercise the powers granted to them by shareholders at the 
firm's board meetings. 
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Traditionally, the legal system in many countries is regarded as a growing process, 
which generally arises and reflects the traditions and cultural history of particular people. 
Most contemporary commercial law originated from one of two main legal systems: English 
common law and Roman civil law. The origin of civil law can be further divided into three 
main groups: French, German and Scandinavian. The majority of legal systems originate 
from one of these four legal systems (Denis & McConnell, 2003). 
Some empirical studies have been carried out focusing on the impact of different legal 
systems on the structure and effectiveness of corporate governance across countries. In this 
regard, (La Porta et al., 1997; La Porta, De-Silanes et al., 1998) have pointed out the impact 
of country legal systems on corporate governance as well as shareholders' protection. They 
argue that countries with English Law (common law) have the strongest legal protection for 
minority shareholders compared to French Law countries, which offer the weakest protection. 
German Law countries fall in between in terms of investor protection. 
Johnson et al. (2000) found that common law countries better protect their minority 
shareholders than civil law countries. In civil law countries, transactions are not assessed in 
terms of fairness to minority shareholders, but rather in terms of conformity with statutes. 
This system is likely to favour the majority shareholders, in terms of control, at the expense 
of minority shareholders' interests (Denis & McConnell, 2003). 
La Porta et al, (1999, p. 4) clarify this issue, arguing that protecting minority 
shareholders is very important to good corporate governance. They state that "corporate 
governance is, to a large extent, a set of mechanisms through which outside investors protect 
themselves - against expropriation by insiders". They further suggest that investors are 
confident and feel encouraged when the company develops effective rules to protect minority 
shareholders' interest and includes them within the legal and corporate governance 
framework (La Porta, De-Silanes et al., 1999). 
This is confirmed by Klapper and Love (2004), who found that firm-level corporate 
governance provisions were more important in countries with weak legal systems since firms 
have sufficient flexibility to affect corporate governance. However, firm-level corporate 
governance is not a replacement for reform of the country-level legal system because 
governance indices are influenced by country-level legal protection. 
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Krishnamurti, Sevic and Sevic (2003) argued that companies with a high degree of 
control, and situated in countries with weak legal protection for minority shareholders, 
generally receive lower scores in corporate governance indices because they do not 
voluntarily improve their governance environment. In contrast, high control firms situated in 
countries with a strong legal protection for minority shareholders generally receive higher 
scores because they improve their governance by adopting measures to strengthen their 
discipline. 
However, the differences in corporate governance across countries have not been fully 
explained by the legal approach. According to Licht, Goldschmidt and Schwartz (2005), in 
the counties that implemented several legal reforms to improve corporate governance 
practices during the 1990s, some of the changes were not successful. 
They continue to argue that "at the turn of the millennium, commentators came to 
share the view that simply writing investors rights into the law is not enough, more 
fundamental issues must be confronted" (p. 8 ). This means that passing new laws protecting 
investors does not guarantee their application in improving corporate governance (Licht, 
Goldschmidt et al., 2005). 
Furthermore, some empirical evidence underlines the importance of law enforcement 
in the development of financial markets. Among these researchers are Shleifer and 
Wolfenzon (2002), who argued that the enforcement of law and the structure of a society are 
much more important to effective investors' protection than mere existence of statutes. They 
suggest that legal rules are only a reflection of a broader societal stance. 
Another area of relevant research is the Brazilian corporate law reform. Gorga (2003) 
studied the impact of economic incentives in Brazil, and the findings of this research 
indicated that the aim of Brazilian Corporate Law of 2001 was to provide efficient corporate 
governance practices and to promote market development. However, during the initial legal 
reforms, some important aspects were dismissed from the legislative process due to pressure 
mounted by rent-seeking groups. 
Ultimately, it seems that the impact of a regulatory environment depends on the type 
and effectiveness of the legislation that is in place. For instance, flexible mandatory 
disclosure of rules tends to discourage investors from buying shares due to insufficient 
information about the companies (De-Jong & Semenov, 2002). 
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As a result, a debate has arisen among researchers on how legal change can be better 
advanced across countries. A number of researchers argue that there is a tendency to 
converge toward internationally accepted good corporate governance practices. O'Sullivan 
(2003) states that significant change has occurred in the governance systems in some 
countries, such as France and Germany. He, however, argues that controlling shareholders 
does not normally support legal reforms that would transfer their wealth to minority 
shareholders, and they are likely to lobby against this practice. 
Therefore, it may be difficult to alter the country-level legal protection system, and it 
could take considerable time. However, it is possible to strengthen the organisational level of 
governance by implementing various strategies such as board monitoring and an audit 
committee. 
In a nutshell, the legal mechanism varies from country to country. Corporations 
operating in a given country are affected by the existing legal mechanism despite its own 
corporate governance style. Changes in the regulatory system at corporate level do not affect 
the national legal system, but rather changes in the national legal system require strategic 
flexibility of corporate governance. 
3.5.3 Board of Directors 
Fama and Jensen (1983) noted that two roles are played by the board of directors in 
ensuring good corporate governance: decision-making and decision-control. Under the 
decision-making role, also known as the decision management role, the responsibility of the 
board is to act in the interests of its shareholders and the company as a whole by participating 
in and ensuring proper screening, selection and implementation of projects (Maharaj, 2009). 
Although the first responsibility of directors is to increase value by protecting 
shareholders' interests, in law this is undefined and at worst unenforceable (Parkinson, 2002). 
Directors are always expected to act in the best interest of shareholders and to ensure their 
interests are aligned with those of managers. 
In addition to that, they are required to avoid actions that promote self-interest and are 
expected to take into account the interests of others. Failure to align their interests with others 
might bring a negative impact on shareholders as well as affects the performance of the 
company as a whole (Parkinson, 2002; Tudway & Pascal, 2006). On the other hand, the 
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decision control process is achieved through monitoring and evaluating management 
decisions and implementations (Tudway & Pascal, 2006). 
The board of directors is one of the various interrelated factors that contribute to the 
proper functioning of the corporate governance system (Abdel-Shahid, 2001). As a board of 
directors has crucial accountability for all the mistakes in the execution of company strategy, 
they serve two general functions (Monks & Minow, 2008). The first role of the board of 
directors (Jensen & Fama, 1983; Chen, 2008) is to advise managers about the overall strategy 
of the firm's business. This is also called the advisory function. The second crucial 
responsibility of the board is to monitor the general performance of each manager in a firm 
(Booth & Deli, 1999; Song & Thako, 2006; Monks & Minow, 2008). 
In essence, the conflict of interest between shareholders and managers is known as the 
agency problem, and it always takes place during the decision-making process, when the 
managers ignore the main role of the organization (Mallin, 2007). Therefore, it is very 
important for shareholders to choose for themselves a board of directors composed of 
qualified people, who are concerned to make decisions that will benefit the company as a 
whole and increase shareholder value (Mallin, 2007; Solomon, 2007). 
1.5.3.1 Board Responsibilities 
The board of directors is entrusted with roles and responsibilities which vary across 
countries and companies. According to the Western style model, the role of the board of 
directors is to protect the interests of shareholders, especially minority shareholders (Dahya, 
Karbhari et al., 2002). Their main tasks are to monitor managers and to require them to 
maximise the company value and shareholders' wealth (Denis & McConnell, 2003; Allen, 
Carletti et al., 2009). For example, in the US and the UK, boards of directors focus on 
maximising shareholders' wealth, while in other countries, such as Germany and Austria, the 
role is to maximise all stakeholders' wealth. 
Monks and Minow (2008) suggest that the two duties to be exercised by the directors 
are loyalty and care. The first requires directors to display complete loyalty to the company's 
shareholders. Importantly, they should not act as directors in two different companies as this 
would constitute conflict of interests. This could also affect them in decision-making because 
they may not demonstrate equal loyalty to the owners of the two companies concerned. In 
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such cases, it is necessary that they understand this matter and be able to show that, in 
reaching a decision, they have considered all reasonable alternatives. 
In the 1990s, several guidelines for corporate practices and codes of conduct were 
published. These were aimed at providing advice about "what is acceptable conduct and 
practice and to spread and reinforce high standards of corporate conduct" (McCabe and 
Nowak, 2008, p. 55 ). 
In fact, due to the strategic role of boards of directors, corporate governance codes 
have strongly emphasised the role of boards in companies. For example, the "Principles of 
Corporate Governance", developed by OECD (2004) (April 1999, revised in June 2004), 
suggested some specific recommendations on how to make boards more effective. This 
included the optimum number of board membership and its composition and committees. 
According to the UK Combined Code (2006), the role of the board is to provide 
skilful leadership designed with prudent and effective control mechanisms and aimed at both 
risk assessment and management. Furthermore, the UK Combined Code (2006, p. A. 1) 
emphasised that some of the duties for the board of directors should include the following: 
- "Directors should make decisions in an objective way and in the company's best 
interests; 
- The board should have regular meetings, with an agenda; 
- There should be a formal schedule of matters over which the board has the right to 
make decisions; 
- There should be appropriate reporting procedures defined for the board and its sub- 
committees; 
- All directors should have access to the company secretary and also be able to take 
independent professional advice 
- Directors should receive appropriate training when they are first appointed to the 
board. " 
In Egypt, the corporate governance code on the board of directors stresses the 
importance of independent directors, separation between the chairman and CEO and the need 
to have a proper disclosure system (Egyptian Institute of Directors, 2005). The Jordanian 
code of corporate governance, furthermore, stresses the need to have different types of 
committees in order to assist the board to carry out its functions. The code provides 
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recommendations for increasing the effectiveness of some of the duties and responsibility of 
the board of directors (Central Bank of Jordan, 2007). 
According to Mallin (2007), the board responsibilities are to determine the direction 
of the company by elaborating its aims, plans, policies and strategies for success. Maharaj 
(2009) emphasised the fiduciary role of the board of directors, where the latter not only has 
the legal power to oversee management operations, but also to determine the future direction 
of the firm. He further remarks that the board must be responsible for the overall well-being 
of the firm and is always expected to act in good faith with regard to the interests of the 
corporation and its stakeholders. 
Petra (2005) identified two major characteristics that help the board fulfil its 
responsibilities: having a vigorous and diligent board of directors. They should be in a 
position to understand their responsibilities, such as evaluating and approving the 
corporation's long-term strategies; possessing a clear understanding of the position of the 
firm in the industry, and overseeing management performance. 
3.5.3.2 Board Structure 
The structure of a board refers to its size and its composition as per the distinction 
between executive and non-executive directors, the separation of the CEO and board chair 
positions and board independence (Berghe & Levrau, 2004; Webb, 2004). 
Nam and Nam (2004) state that the main determinants of effectiveness are board size 
and composition. Jensen (1993, p. 20) comments: "when boards get beyond seven or eight 
people they are less likely to function effectively and are easier for the CEO to control". In 
addition, Lipton and Lorsch (1992) recommended a preferred size of eight or nine with a 
limit of ten people. 
Nam and Nam (2004) argue that the size of the board should be large enough to 
ensure expertise flows from the many members. He, however, cautions that the board should 
not be so large as to make free discussion impossible among directors. 
However, Salmon (2000) suggests that eight and fifteen members would constitute a 
good board for large companies. He believes that with fewer than eight members, boards are 
more exposed to difficulties when formulating, for instance, audit, nomination and 
compensation committees. 
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In terms of board composition, Xie, Davidson and DaDalt, (2003) suggest that the 
board may consist of three types of board members: inside, grey and outside directors. Inside 
directors are employed by firms in an executive or operational capacity, whereas outside 
directors have only a relationship with the firm or executives through the board of directors. 
Outside directors should be independent directors who have no affiliation with the firm other 
than membership of the board of directors. 
The third type, grey, is outside directors who have some relationship with non-board 
members. They are, for example: relatives of management; consultants to the firm; involved 
in other related party transactions; affiliated to the firm's banks; lawyers receiving a fee 
income; retirees of the corporation; or engaged in investment banking, which may impair 
their real and perceived independence (Beasley, 1996; Carcello & Neal, 2000). 
According to Fama and Jensen (1983), independent directors are considered better 
overseers than other directors because they tend to demonstrate their expertise in decision- 
making, control and monitoring and evaluation. Solomon (2007) states that a good board 
composition should include a minimum of three independent directors capable of influencing 
the members' decisions. The contribution that independent directors could make during board 
decision-making meetings is of special importance in setting and maintaining well balanced 
standards of a firm's corporate governance (Mallin, 2007). 
Another important issue of board composition, which contributes to its independence, 
is the separation of the positions of chief executive officer (CEO) and chairman of the board 
(Webb, 2006). Jensen (1993) suggests that "duality" reduces the monitoring power of the 
board of directors. Thus, a board with individuals controlling the firm is more likely to 
protect shareholders from agency problems. 
In addition, the OECD (2004) states that the CEO and chairman positions should be 
separated for an effective monitoring system, since the CEO is mainly responsible for 
corporate management, whereas the chairman is the head of the board of directors, which 
monitors management. Therefore, the prevention of duality of CEO and chairman may 
guarantee the equality in authority between the two people, so as to avoid excessive powers 
of decision-making by either individual (Webb, 2006). 
The investigations by Kaplan and Minton (1994) of the effectiveness of boards in 
Japan, revealed that appointments of outside directors increased following poor stock 
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performance and earnings losses. They further found that the appointment of outside directors 
was a characteristic of firms with significant bank loans, concentrated ownership, as well as a 
firm's members of a corporate group. Additionally, the results showed that outside directors 
are very important in corporate governance. 
An examination of the UK code of practice by Dahya and McConnel (2005) 
recommends that boards of UK corporations should include at least three outside directors. It 
also advised a split between the chairperson and CEO with regard to the positions they held 
within the board. Additionally, Long (2006) investigated the UK code of corporate 
governance and shareholder expectations that have led the boards of directors to demonstrate 
effective leadership, quality decision-making processes and the ability to exercise corporate 
controls. The results indicated that the board structure and composition, as well as its non- 
executive independence, were the indicators shareholders and stakeholders focused on as a 
measure of effectiveness. 
McCabe and Nowak (2008) examined the views of directors of companies listed on 
the Australian stock exchange regarding the role of the independent director. The results 
indicated that the directors who participated were persuaded that many of the non-executive 
directors provided a protection of relationships between managers as well as the balance of 
power in the board. 
Abor and Adjasi (2007), who conducted a study on Ghanaian corporate governance 
structures, argued that while the existence of external independent directors on boards 
improved corporate governance structures, their presence also increased company 
competitiveness and provided new strategic thinking. 
In Bahrain, Hussain and Mallin (2003) examined corporate governance by analysing 
the board structures of companies listed on the Bahrain Stock Exchange Market. They 
employed a survey questionnaire. Their findings revealed that non-executive directors 
dominated the board composition. Moreover, the key factors which influenced the 
appointment of these directors related to relevant skills, business experience and reputation. 
The average board size is nine, with the insurance sector respondents having the largest 
average number of directors, eleven. More importantly, they found that Bahrain does not 
have a corporate governance code. 
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3.5.4 Board Committees 
A number of studies and regulatory bodies have indicated that corporate governance 
codes should regulate companies to establish necessary committees, which are required by 
the stock markets in which the companies are registered (Vafeas, 1999; Spira and Bender, 
2004; Chhaochharia & Grinstein, 2007; Minichilli, Gabrielsson et al., 2007). 
There are several types of board committees, but the most common are nomination, 
audit and remuneration committees. These are of a great importance in that they contribute to 
the performance of the board. This is necessary given the various tasks, duties, functions and 
responsibilities of a company's board of directors. It is evident that most lateral committees 
derive from the board and are temporarily delegated some authority to exercise the functions, 
duties and responsibilities of the directors (Spira & Bender , 2004; Minichilli, Gabrielsson et 
al., 2007) There are many other board committees which should not be ignored in a corporate 
governance system. These include the committee on information technology, the committee 
on governance, the committee on risk and the environmental committee. 
However, regardless of the many possible committees which may be incorporated in a 
corporate governance mechanism, this study will focus on the role of audit, nomination and 
remuneration committees. 
3.5.4.1 Audit Committees 
The focus on audit committees has drawn the attention of both regulatory bodies and 
researchers, especially after international companies faced failures and financial troubles 
(McMuUen, 1996). The need to formulate audit committees as a corporate governance 
mechanism was in response to the fact that they inspire and increase the transparency and 
trust of the financial statements that are produced by companies (Piot and Janin, 2005). 
In the UK, the Cadbury Report in 1992 recognised the role the audit committee plays 
in making sure that financial reports produced by their companies represent a fair valuation of 
the company's affairs, and are of high integrity. Furthermore, the Turnbull Report issued in 
1999, confirmed the audit committee's importance and the key role it plays in improving and 
supporting the controllability of the internal corporate system. 
In addition to this, the Smith Report, which was issued in 2003, recommended that 
companies should stipulate the role and responsibilities of audit committees in their annual 
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reports. It further suggested that the audit committees should publish an annual report which 
described the duties that were performed by each of the members in the course of the fiscal 
year. 
In the USA, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002 determined the method of audit 
committee formulation and its duties. It suggested that corporations which have securities 
circulating in the stock exchange market should be obliged to have an audit committee 
because of its importance with regard to corporate governance. 
Pomeranz (1997) suggests that the audit committee is being recognised as vital to an 
entire board, with whom it works in collaboration. Moreover, Smith (2003, p. 22) claims that 
the "benefits of the audit committees as corporate governance mechanisms are not only 
limited to increasing the level of assurance of corporate performance, or rule out catastrophic 
failure and gross malpractice; it also often incorporates elements that help to improve the 
overall standard of corporate governance of implementing company". 
Corporate governance recognises the audit committee as an important aspect of the 
corporate governance mechanism process. Klein (2002) argues that if it is possible to 
improve corporate governance, then there is a need for the firm's corporate mechanism to 
have an active audit committee, which is deemed to be independent. 
In the paper of the Basel Committee on internal audit in banking organisations and the 
relationship of the supervisory authorities with internal and external auditors, it was 
recommended that constituting an independent and permanent audit committee is a probable 
solution to meeting practical challenges arising from the board of directors' responsibilities to 
ensure the protection of an adequate system of internal corporate controls (Basel Committee, 
2002). 
Steinthorsdottir (2004) credits audit committees for assuming the responsibility to 
represent boards of directors on very important matters related to financial information 
reporting, auditing and the overall mechanism of corporate governance. Shareholders' 
interests are protected by audit committees as they monitor the entire management system, 
including both the external auditor and the internal auditor (DeZoort, 1997). 
Several studies have listed the numerous functions and responsibilities that should be 
performed by an audit committee. These functions have been classified under three main 
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board categories of oversight of the financial statements, the external auditor process and the 
internal control system (Piot & Janin, 2005; Zain & Subramaniam, 2007). 
In addition, Pickett (2005, p. 39) listed other components that may be incorporated in the 
role and responsibilities of the audit committee. These are listed below: 
- "To review the external audit process and make recommendations to the board where 
appropriate; 
- To consider the annual accounts and the external audit report that attaches to these 
accounts; 
- To consider the adequacy of systems of internal controls; 
- Involvement in the appointment of the internal auditors and ensuring that the internal 
audit function operates to professional standards; 
- The audit committee will ensure that there is an effective system of risk management 
within the organisation; 
- An oversight of systems and procedures is in place to ensure compliance with 
regulations, policies, laws and procedures and the organisation's code of conduct; 
- To consider the finances and expenditure of the organisation and ensure that there is a 
good financial reporting and budgeting system in place". 
In most countries, the role and responsibilities of the audit committee are usually and clearly 
stated by accounting regulatory bodies and codes of corporate governance. However, it is 
evident from most previous studies that for the audit committees to be effective and efficient, 
they must be influenced by their formulation and the working conditions that are availed to 
the committee members (Carcello & Neal, 2000; Abbott, Parker et al., 2003). 
Among the very important working conditions, that should be available to audit 
committees, is that its members are experts in financial matters. Also, they should work 
independently given their responsibility for monitoring corporate financial information. In 
practice, it is recommended that membership of the audit committee should be limited to non- 
executive directors, due to their independence with regard to corporate management (Abbott, 
Parker et al., 2003). 
Carcello and Neal (2003) state that if audit committees members are independent of 
corporate management, they are likely to be more effective in protecting the credibility of a 
firms' financial reports. Additionally, Abbott (2003) states that since audit committee 
members have a greater concern for maintaining their reputation and integrity than non- 
independent directors, they are more efficient and effective. It is evident that firms with 
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independent audit committees are more likely to select external auditors, who are specialists 
in that company's industry, in order to enhance audit quality (Abbott and Parker, 2000). 
Additionally, the results of different surveys by Raghunandan, Read and Rama (2001) 
on the relationships between audit committee members and internal auditors, indicated that 
independent audit committees were more likely to have a good working relationship with 
internal auditors compared to audit committees dominated by executive directors. 
The accounting and audit expertise held by members of the audit committee is another 
important aspect that is fundamental to efficiency and effectiveness, given their responsibility 
for monitoring corporate financial statements. Furthermore, DeZoort (1997) states that it 
should not be mandatory that members of the audit committee are independent of a 
company's management. Rather, expertise in financial matters should be more emphasised. 
In the USA, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act established a number of fundamental 
requirements for members of the audit committee. He or she should be an expert external 
auditor or accountant, or qualified in the field of auditing and accounting. Such a person 
should also be conversant with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAPs), familiar 
with the preparation of financial statements and knowledgeable of the roles and 
responsibilities of the audit committee. 
A number of studies have focused on the importance attached to the expertise of audit 
committee members, external auditors and internal auditors. A survey on members of audit 
committees by DeZoort (1997) found that the respondents unanimously confirmed the 
necessity of financial and accounting expertise. The general belief was that all audit 
committee members should be familiar with matters of accounting and auditing oversight 
areas, in addition to issues relating to the law. 
The results of a survey by Kalbers (1992) on external auditors and internal auditors 
indicated a high degree of agreement between both groups with regard to audit committee 
members' expertise. A survey by Raghunandan et at. (2001) of chief internal auditors noted 
that of all audit committee members, at least one member possessed or had familiarity with 
accounting or finance matters. 
A study by DeZoort (1998), on a sample of 87 audit committee members involved in 
an assessment task, investigated the influence of audit committee members' expertise on the 
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quality of their work. It was found that an audit committee whose members had experience in 
financial matters made better assessment compared to less experienced audit committee 
members. 
An experiment conducted by DeZoort and Salterio (2001) to examine the association 
between audit committee expertise and the ability to resolve auditor and management 
disputes, found that audit committee members with more experience, especially accounting 
expertise, and familiarity with auditing procedures, would not be pressured to support 
management when a dispute arose between the latter and auditors. 
3.5.4.2 Nomination Committee 
As discussed earlier, one of the fundamental committees related to the board of 
directors in corporate governance is the nomination committee. The appointment, 
development and retention of boards of directors are of great importance in corporate 
governance. Companies are required to be objective in decisions pertaining to the selection 
process of directors. According to Jackson, Farndale and Kakabadse (2003), the board of 
directors needs to be made up of members with a balanced portfolio and appropriate business 
skills. Therefore, the nomination committee is required to assist the board in the process of 
employing qualified individuals with the necessary skills to perform corporate 
responsibilities. 
In the USA, the NYSE Corporate Governance Rules (2004) emphasised that all listed 
companies should have a nominating committee, which entirely consists of non-executive 
directors. The committee must have written guidelines that include its roles, goals and 
responsibilities and the modalities of the committee's annual performance evaluation. The 
committee's rationale must at least include: 
" The search for qualified individuals to serve on the board of directors. 
" The recommendation of the identified nominees to the board for the next annual 
general meeting. 
" The formulation of a set of corporate governance principles approved by the board 
and which were to be followed by the company (NYSE, 2004). 
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In the UK, great importance is attached to the nomination committee with regard to 
the appointment of directors. A report by Higgs (2003), further based on the Combined Code 
recommendations, advises appointment of a nomination committee with a majority of 
independent directors. The recommendations suggest that the nominating committee should 
be preferably led by a chairperson, who is an independent director. 
While a fundamental duty of the nomination committee is the appointment of new 
directors, it also serves the purpose of developing and retaining the directors already serving 
on the board. It is additionally tasked with evaluating the qualities of the individual directors 
and assessing the effectiveness and efficiency of the board, including their skills, technical 
knowledge and expertise in corporate governance mechanisms (Higgs Report, 2003). 
3.5.4.2 Remuneration Committee 
Kiel and Nicholson (2003) presented board compensation as another feature that is 
considered an essential area of discussion. Wan-Hussin (2009) also recognises the important 
role played by the remuneration committee in solving some issues associated with the 
directors, such as retirement benefits, bonuses and share options. 
The expectation and requirement of the remuneration committee is to design 
strategies guiding the firm-specific executive compensation. These must be in line with the 
overall corporate strategy (Rowe and Liu, 2010). In the USA, the rules of corporate 
governance require all companies listed on the stock exchange to have a compensation 
committee consisting wholly of independent directors. This latter process is similar to the 
appointment of the nominating committee (NYSE, 2004). 
Additionally, it is a requirement for the compensation committee to have a written 
license called a charter that shows the purpose, goals and responsibilities of the committee as 
well as its annual performance appraisal. The duties and responsibilities of the committee 
should at least comprise the following: 
" To review and approve the overall corporate objectives that are importantly linked to 
CEO remuneration, and to relate the CEO's performance appraisal with these 
objectives in order to decide the CEO compensation; and 
" Look at non-executive remuneration committee recommendations and plans 
concerning inducement and equity-based compensation (NYSE, 2004). 
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The Combined Codes (2006) in the UK emphasises that the remuneration committee 
should be exclusively composed of independent non-executive directors. The responsibility 
of this committee is to determine the salaries and other benefits of directors and senior 
management. Furthermore, the Combined Codes provide that the committee should make all 
possible disclosure regarding its terms of reference and whether or not external consultants 
are used (The Combined Codes, 2006). 
Researched was conducted by Conyon (1997) on the influence of remuneration 
committee adoption in UK companies. The findings revealed that in some cases the adoption 
of such a committee reduced the growth rates in top director remuneration. Further findings 
by Conyon and Peck (1998) suggest that the influence of outside directors on remuneration 
committee decisions augments the pay-for-performance sensitivity. 
In comparison, some other studies in the US by Anderson and Bizjak (2003) revealed 
insufficient results as regards the influence of remuneration committee independence on the 
level of CEO pay. Recently, Sun and Cahan (2009) investigated the same topic and attempted 
to give explanations for the mixed. findings. While other researchers only focused on 
committee independence, Sun and Cahan (2009) used a broader and richer measure of 
remuneration committee quality. The results of the study showed that for all US companies 
with fully autonomous remuneration committees, the governance quality of the committee 
had a direct relationship to the sensitivity of CEO remuneration to accounting performance. 
3.5.5 Internal Audit 
The Cadbury Report (1992) considered the internal audit mechanism to be a good 
practice of corporate governance, which helps companies in setting up internal audit 
functions for monitoring and evaluating the different key controls and procedures to be used 
in an organisation. The report recommended that regular monitoring is very important for a 
company's internal control system, and that this contributes, to a large extent, to its 
effectiveness. The Cadbury Report requested that the internal audit function should be there 
to carry out all necessary investigations on behalf of a firm's audit committee. It also made 
clear that the chairman of the audit committee should be available whenever needed by the 
chief internal auditor. This ensured independence of their positions as they need each other to 
work effectively. 
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Recently, a revised definition of internal auditing was approved by the Institute of 
Internal Auditors (IIA). In the approved definition, internal auditing was referred to as "an 
independent, objective assurance and consulting activity designed to add value and improve 
an organisation's operations. It helps an organisation accomplish its objectives by bringing a 
systematic disciplined approach to evaluate and improve the effectiveness of the risk 
management, control, and governance processes"(The IIA, 1999, p. 2). 
With this new definition, it may be argued that there is a certain improvement in the 
new concept of internal audit compared to the old concept. Whereas the old concept assumed 
that the internal audit function added value to the organisation as a whole by improving its 
operations, and evaluating and increasing the efficiency and the effectiveness of the its 
operations, with emphasis on risk management and the control of the entire governance 
processes (Goodwin, 2004), the new definition of the internal audit function changed its role 
to a value added function as well as a management consulting function. 
Rolandas and Romas (2005) indicate how organisational changes have significantly 
impacted the organisational internal audit function. These changes have enabled the use of 
the internal audit function by management as an appropriate tool in decision-making. It is 
now evident that the audit committee, internal auditors together with management, and 
external auditors are considered the foundation on which efficient and effective corporate 
governance must be built. 
In this respect, Frederick (2004) points out that both internal and external auditors 
have to play their essential roles for the firm's governance to work effectively. He further 
states that the auditors should assure the directors as well as management on the truthfulness 
of financial statements as well as the extent of internal controls. 
After a succession of scandals, especially subsequent to times of recession, it is not 
surprising that the auditing profession becomes the centre of all sorts of criticism (Percy, 
1997). Sarens and Beelde (2006) argue that a change has been noticed in internal auditing 
after the recent failures in corporate governance and accounting scandals in both the US and 
the UK. 
The Turnbull Report (1999) identifies the following criteria as the basis of an 
effective Internal Audit: 
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" Assurance that the management processes are adequate to identify and monitor 
significant risks. 
" Confirmation of the effective operation of the established internal control systems. 
" Credible processes for feedback on risks management and assurance. 
" Objective confirmation that the Board receives the right quality of assurance and 
information from management and this information is reliable. 
According to Daykin (2006), the internal audit is considered a key element of a good 
and effective corporate governance structure. It is important to mention that the IIA's 
definition of internal auditing states that the profession is essential for evaluating and refining 
the effectiveness and efficiency of a company's governance mechanism (Daykin, 2006). 
Pickett (2005) believes that importance is increasingly being placed on the expanded 
roles of internal auditing in ensuring high quality corporate governance mechanism. It is also 
useful to recognise that the IIA has already changed its Standards for the Professional 
Practice of Internal Auditing. These changes, primarily, place emphasis on the merits of 
planning and communication, information technology, mode of governance and consultation 
procedures (Pickett, 2005). 
It is mandatory that internal auditors contribute to corporate governance processes by 
assisting the directors and management, and helping them in activities which will help to 
improve the board's relationship with corporate management and external auditors. They 
should also serve the purpose of an educational recourse regarding trends in the business and 
the legal environment (The IIA, 2009). 
It is commonly recognised that the internal auditing function is one of the most 
fundamental in the corporate governance mechanisms. Applegate (2003) indicates that 
internal auditors offer a unique and independent point of view on the quality of financial 
disclosures that was different to corporate accountants or external auditors. In this regard, 
Orsini (2004) identifies clearly, at strategic level, the shift of focus by internal auditors, in a 
move that better evaluates and contributes to the improvement of the corporate governance 
process. 
It is worth mentioning that the interactions between internal auditing and the audit 
committee are of paramount importance in sound corporate governance. Empowering the two 
mechanisms can enhance the quality of corporate governance and strengthen the 
organisational development (Bishop, Hermanson et al., 2000). 
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3.5.6 Disclosure and Transparency 
According to Abdel Fattah, Dixon, and Woodhead (2008), disclosure and 
transparency are essential in any corporate governance model. There are two categories of 
information, namely, voluntary and mandatory. Mandatory disclosure encompasses all 
information which must be revealed in accordance with rules set out by, for example, the 
Companies Act, stock exchange regulations and accounting standard boards (Akhtaruddin, 
2005; Cheung, Jiang et al., 2010). In comparison, voluntary disclosure is described as release 
of financial and non-financial information through annual reports regardless of the 
requirements by the regulatory bodies (Barako, Hancock et al., 2006). 
For Healy and Palepu (2001), the term disclosure defines the various forms of 
information that a company produces, this being annual reports, such as the director's 
statement, the income statement, balance sheet, cash flow statement, statement of owner's 
equity and other mandatory items. It also encompasses all forms of management voluntary 
communications, such as forecasts, presentations, the AGM, press releases, information 
placed on company websites and other reports, such as corporate social responsibility 
disclosure. 
Nam and Nam (2004) give two main reasons that are crucial for timely disclosure of 
accurate information on important firm-related matters, and which protect shareholders' 
rights. First of all, shareholders need to have accessibility to information about important 
corporate matters in order to make crucial decisions meant to protect their interests and 
rights. Secondly, information disclosure is of great importance in preventing managers from 
making sub-optimal decisions and dominant shareholders from engaging in activities that are 
detrimental to minority shareholders rights. 
Given the disclosure role, managers and dominant shareholders will be more hesitant 
to engage in sub-optimal activities when they anticipate that shareholders will come to know 
about their dealings and may take corrective action against them. Additionally, failure to 
disclose information about illegal activities by managers and dominant shareholders will put 
them under the risk of violating corporate laws (Nam & Nam, 2004). 
According to Healy and Palepu (2001), corporate disclosure is very crucial for the 
smooth functioning of an effective and efficient capital market. Where markets operate 
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freely, full disclosure will be of great help to users by allowing them to make informed 
decisions and also by enhancing the preconditions of an open competitive market. 
Solomon (2007, p. 143) states that "transparency is an essential element of a well- 
functioning system of corporate governance... corporate disclosure to stakeholders is the 
principal means by which companies can become transparent". 
Chen, Chung, Lee and Liao (2005) argue that information asymmetry is a result of 
companies which adopt poor information disclosure and do away with transparency practices. 
Since information irregularity is a result of poor corporate governance, liquidity providers 
will incur reasonably higher unfavourable information risks and will, therefore, put forward 
higher irregular information mechanisms in their effective bid communication. 
Bushman, Piotroski and Smith (2004) assert that corporate transparency can be 
classified into two categories: governance related transparency and financial related 
transparency. They believe that financial transparency concerns the integrity, intensity and 
timeliness of financial reports, while governance transparency deals with corporate 
governance disclosures that help outside investors and other stakeholders to hold officers and 
directors accountable. 
Patel and Dallas (2002) stressed that a measure of corporate governance transparency, 
which was provided by the Transparency and Disclosure of Standard & Poor's (S&P) in 2001 
and 2002, is based on the amount of corporate governance-related disclosures. Three types of 
disclosures are suggested: (1) ownership structure and investor rights; (2) financial 
transparency and information disclosure; and (3) board and management structure and 
mechanisms (Patel and Dallas, 2002). 
The Basel Committee guidance on bank transparency (2006) acknowledged that 
transparency is very important for efficiency and, effective corporate governance. "It is 
difficult for shareholders, other stakeholders and market participants to effectively monitor 
and properly hold accountable the board of directors and senior management when there is a 
lack of transparency. This happens in situations where the shareholders, other stakeholders 
and market participants do not receive sufficient information on the ownership structure and 
objectives of the bank with which to judge the effectiveness of the board and senior 
management in governing the bank" (Basel Committee, 2006, p. 15). 
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Although there are different codes and approaches regarding corporate governance, 
transparency aims at ensuring that all major stakeholders have access, on a regular basis, to 
reliable information about the value of their firm. The aim is also to inspire corporate 
managers to maximise the value of the firm rather than pursue sub-optimal objectives 
(Anand, Milne et al., 2005). 
A study by Collett and Hrasky (2005), furthermore, on Australian listed companies, 
found that voluntary disclosure of corporate governance practices was basically driven by the 
fact that it attracted shareholders to raise more equity capital. Archambault and Archambault 
(2003) identified that culture, the country's political and economic mechanisms, was the basis 
for developing a model for predicting levels of corporate disclosure. 
3.6 Corporate Governance Practices in Developing Countries 
The corporate governance mechanisms described in the previous section, which have 
reduced the possibility of mismanagement arising from fraud or errors and increased the 
investors' confidence in developed market economies, have not worked as well in other parts 
of the world, particularly in developing countries (Okeahalam &Akinboade, 2003; Black & 
Khanna, 2007). Developing countries have a weaker market for corporate control (Gibson. 
2003; Singh. 2003), more concentrated ownership ((Shleifer & Vishny. 1997), stronger 
political connections (Johnson & Mitton. 2003; GUL. 2006), significant family and 
government ownership in publicly listed companies (Young, Peng et al.. 2008), and 
ineffective shareholder rights protection (La Porta, De-Silanes et al.. 1998). 
In addition, Samaha (2010) argues that developing countries are very different 
between themselves. Specifically, they are an amorphous and heterogeneous group, showing 
diversity in many respects. Samaha (2010) accounts for this diversity. First, the group 
includes countries in different geographical locations (Oceania and Eastern Europe, Latin 
America, Africa, Asia and the Middle East). Secondly, these countries are at different stages 
of political development and have adopted conflicting economic philosophies. The list 
includes countries which were colonised (e. g., Mozambique) and former imperial countries 
(e. g., Portugal), communist and capitalist governments and, further still, countries which 
changed from capitalist economies to communism and then back again (e. g., Egypt). Thirdly, 
developing countries are at different stages of economic development. Included are the 
77 
rapidly industrialising countries like Hong Kong and Singapore, and those with rich natural 
resources like Kuwait and Angola, or poor in natural resources such as Tanzania. 
In terms of Libya itself, there were not any relevant literature addressing corporate 
governance in Libya, and to some extent this reflects both the novelty of this concept for 
Libyan society, and the difficulties faces by Libyan institutions in grafting a system of 
corporate governance onto a business environment with almost no history of independent 
management, shareholder rights or concepts such as the protection of the interests of 
stakeholders. It is difficult to compare Libya with other developing countries, because its 
economic development is highly unusual. While its progress from colonial control, through a 
brief period of constitutional monarchy to a long stage of authoritarian socialism on to a 
relaxation of central control and movement towards a free market is by no means unique, 
what makes Libya different is its relatively small population, vast area and the enormous oil 
wealth that has sustained its outmoded institutions through periods of recession as relatively 
unchanged. 
Until very recently, Libya was characterised by stasis and immobility, and therefore 
comparisons with other developing countries, even within the Arab, oil-wealthy nations of 
the Middle East, is problematic. Studies conducted in such countries, such as that of Al-Ajlan 
(2005) in Saudi Arabia, suggest that while attempts have been made to introduce corporate 
governance practices, the effects are mainly superficial and that the concepts central to the 
practice of corporate governance alien to the culture into which they have been transplanted. 
In Libya, the private sector and the Libyan Stock Market and nascent institutions with no 
history of administration to draw on, and that, nearly three years after its launch, only the 
founding eight companies are still the only ones listed on the LSM, is illustrative of the 
enormous task facing Libya in developing a flourishing private sector, let alone a code to 
govern it. Libya is in the position of attempting to enforce international standards developed 
over decades, even centuries of corporate evolution, on companies that until recently were 
under the control of a tightly planned economy. These issues underscore the novel nature of 
Libya as a research environment and support the rationale for its selection as the locus of this 
research. 
However, it would be inappropriate not to make reference to the literature derived 
from countries in the developing world and from countries some commentators regarded as 
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relevant because they refer to transition economies. This material assists in providing a more 
holistic view and ensuring that a firm foundation for this research is established. 
Nam and Nam (2004) investigated corporate governance practices in four Asian 
countries, namely, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia and Thailand, by employing a questionnaire 
survey. Their sample consisted of 307 companies listed on these four countries' stock 
exchanges and covered seven selected industries. In addition, the main participants in this 
opinion survey were directors and executive managers. 
Their results showed that the rights of shareholders in these countries were relatively 
well protected because they were allowed to participate in decision-making and other 
activities. Board sizes varied significantly among the sample countries, with the median being 
12 in Thailand, 8-10 in Malaysia, 6-7 in Korea and 4 in Indonesia. The share of independent 
directors on boards is typically between 25% and 50%. Unlike in Korean companies, the 
CEO position and board chairman are separated in more than 80% in the other three 
remaining countries. Moreover, the board is weak at selecting, monitoring and replacing 
CEOs in all four countries. Finally, they concluded that the quality of corporate governance is 
generally poor in these four Asian counties. 
Another Asian countries study was conducted by McGee (2008), who examined the 
application of corporate governance principles, as identified by, the World Bank, IMF and the 
OECD, in eight selected Asian countries (Vietnam, Malaysia, Philippines, Pakistan Korea, 
Thailand, India and Indonesia). His study focused on the main issues of corporate governance 
practices, that is to say, shareholder rights, board responsibilities and structure, auditing and 
accounting, transparency of ownership and control. The major finding indicated that 
corporate governance practices in these countries were still weak, which meant they all were 
facing challenges in applying their own corporate governance guidelines. 
In Thailand, Limpaphayom and Connelly (2004) investigated governance practices in 
the areas of effectiveness of boards of directors, shareholder rights, and the role of 
stakeholders by employing a survey questionnaire. Their study was conducted using a sample 
of 61 Thai companies in eight sectors. Their results demonstrated that ownership is highly 
concentrated in more than 50% of the sample. While more than half the firms are stand-alone 
companies, slightly more than one fourth has ties to a family group or holding company. 
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Though very few of the companies surveyed are even partially owned by the government, 
many have a significant foreign-ownership stake. 
In Malaysia, Sori and Karbhari (2006) examined the impact of four corporate 
governance programmes on auditor independence from the perspective of Malaysian 
auditors, loan officers and senior managers of public listed companies. Questionnaire and 
interview surveys were employed in order to ascertain the respondents' views on these issues. 
Their results documented that auditor independence would be safeguarded in the following: 
the compliance with the Financial Reporting Standards (FRS) of the Malaysian Accounting 
Standard Board (MASB) was legally mandated; the establishment of the Malaysian Institute 
of Corporate Governance (MICG); the establishment of the Minority Shareholders Watchdog 
Group (MSWG); and the implementation of mandatory director accreditation training 
programme (MDATP). 
Solomon, Lin, Norton and Solomon (2003) investigated current corporate governance 
practices in Taiwan. They employed questionnaire surveys to examine the attitudes of board 
of directors on the role and function of its members in Taiwanese listed companies. Their 
findings suggested that the most important factor in Taiwanese corporate governance was the 
board of directors and the role played by outside directors. Furthermore, they provided that 
the important role played by outside directors supported the agency theory perspective on 
corporate governance as the responses considered the existence of outside directors' 
improved corporate accountability to shareholders. Finally, their results revealed that few 
Taiwanese companies had established remuneration and audit committees. 
In the Philippines, Wong (2009) conducted investigation on the various reforms of 
corporate governance in the Philippines after the adoption of the 2002 Code of Corporate 
Governance issued by the Philippine Securities and Exchange Commission. The study found 
that the Philippines have not been short of reforms or lacking in laws that promote corporate 
governance. However, there are two inherent weaknesses in its legal and regulatory 
framework that critically impedes the progress of the various governance initiatives. One of 
the more prominent weaknesses is the enforcement power 'of regulatory bodies. This is 
primarily due to the lack of funding and qualified personnel. Likewise, the Philippine 
judiciary system remains ineffective in protecting the rights of shareholders and minority 
interest as it continues to be slow issuing final resolutions and decisions on cases. The light 
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sanctions for non-compliance and the absence of serious penalties associated with fraud are 
further major hindrances. 
In the Indian banking sector, Gupta (2008) examined the practices of corporate 
governance in six public and four private banks. The study found that the Indian corporate 
governance of the banking sector was at a formative stage compared to developed nations. 
Therefore, it needs more transparency and disclosure mechanism in order to avoid even the 
slightest of financial irregularities. The results also revealed that there was no significant 
difference in practices of corporate governance by public sector banks and private sector 
banks. Finally, the compliance of certain non-mandatory requirements by some banks 
suggests that they were quite serious in bringing about effective implementation of corporate 
governance practices. 
In Eastern European countries, Duca et al., (2007) evaluated the institutional and 
legislative progress made in Romania during the last years in terms of corporate governance, 
the challenges facing this process and proposals for improving the corporations' 
administration practices. Their findings provided a picture of the current state of corporate 
governance in Romania. The results indicated that most of the companies consider the 
adoption of corporate governance principles as complicated because it involves change in the 
company's memorandum of association and huge legal and financial-accounting consultancy 
expenses. In addition, in the emerging economies, similar to Romania, the corporate 
governance standard of a company is not so important to the funds suppliers, whether they 
are banks, investment funds or individual investors. For this reason, companies do not feel 
rewarded in any way for making efforts to improve their administration practices. 
In Latin America, Arce and Robles (2005) conducted a survey to determine the status 
of corporate governance of Costa Rican companies. The study estimated corporate 
governance charter measures using firm-level data for 87 firms. Their results suggested that 
firms must implement a set of additional measures to compensate for the weakness of the 
legal environment. Also, they concluded that better practices were associated with publicly 
traded firms (not family owned), using foreign capital, and members of a Free Zone 
enterprise. 
Alberto Chong and Lopez-de-Silanes (2007) conducted a cross-continent 
investigation using a corporate governance index in six Latin American countries (Argentina, 
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Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela). This study employed a questionnaire 
survey as a method of collecting data. The questionnaire covered corporate governance 
principles and the target respondents of this questionnaire were the board members of each 
company. Their key findings indicated that, first, the countries under analysis suffered from a 
generally lower level of legal protection, which weakened the region's capital markets. The 
poor enforcement levels of their laws constituted a key challenge to effective corporate 
governance practices in this region. Secondly, there was low corporate governance practice in 
these countries, in general, and wide variation in the practices across firms within each 
country. 
Black, Carvalho and Gorga, (2008) provided an overview of the corporate governance 
practices of Brazilian private listed companies. They used a corporate governance index and 
employed a questionnaire survey, which was sent to 116 private companies. The main 
findings indicated that corporate governance in Brasilia was considered relatively weak. They 
found that the boards of most Brazilian companies were almost completely comprised of 
insiders or representatives of the controlling family or group, and many companies had no 
independent directors. However, the minority of shareholders have legal rights to 
representation on the boards of many companies. In addition, financial disclosure was poor in 
many companies due to the lack of adoption of international accounting and auditing 
standards. Audit committees were also uncommon. 
As regards the Latin American banking sector, Geller (2009) conducted a study of 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru and Mexico, focusing on the characteristics of 198 directors in 
a sample of 17 banks in the period between 2001 and 2007. 
The study found a low proportion of female directors (5,6%), a high proportion of 
directors with previous banking experience (76.5%) and with previous education in finance, 
economics or accounting (52.5%), and a high proportion of directors with higher levels of 
education from abroad, mainly in the US, followed by Europe. Also, Geller's results revealed 
that the board sizes varied from a minimum of 4 directors to a maximum of 17; the average 
size in the sample was 9.62 directors. However, the proportion of bankers in relation to total 
directors was 76.89%, and the proportion of independent directors who have banking 
background in relation to total directors was 30.85%. 
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Turning attention briefly to the African continent, Nganga, Jain and Artivor (2003) 
evaluated the state of corporate governance practices in nine countries: Kenya, Mauritius, 
Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Ghana, Nigeria, Zimbabwe and Botswana. Their study focused on 
the shareholder rights and their equitable treatment, the law and regulation, accounting and 
disclosure and board of directors. The main finding of this study was that there was a high 
level of ownership concentration, where owners (mainly multinational firms and family 
interests) on most stock markets. Moreover, the legal and institutional protection to the 
minority shareholders was still weak, especially when investing alongside governments and 
family interests. This was due to the lack of efficiency and enforcement of laws. In addition, 
their results indicated that the majority of countries have enforced governance requirements, 
introduced a `Corporate Governance Code of Best Practices' and adopted International 
Accounting Standards (IAS) or standards with similar disclosure requirements. 
Okike (2007) examined the mechanisms for corporate governance, including the Code 
of Best Practices, in Nigeria. In particular, he examined the roles of the government, the 
Corporate Affairs Commission, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Nigerian Stock 
Exchange, the "representatives of the shareholders of the company", directors, auditors and 
audit committees within the corporate governance framework. His findings indicated that 
despite the government efforts to initiate an effective system of corporate governance by 
changing company legislation and establishing the Code of Best Practices for all Nigerian 
listed companies, the effectiveness of the corporate governance mechanisms is still in doubt, 
due to the fact that the enforcement mechanisms are weak. 
In Uganda, Musaali (2005) evaluated the current state of affairs after the various 
efforts to enhance corporate governance were made by many organisations - including the 
Bank of Uganda, the Institute of Corporate Governance of Uganda and the Capital Markets 
Authority - and to introduce Ugandan Corporate Governance Guidelines in 2003. His study 
revealed that the majority of the firms did not adhere to corporate governance standards, and 
that only 42 % of the companies had board committees. The roles of board chairman and the 
CEO were also combined; 43% of the companies had a board chairman who also doubled as 
the CEO. There was a high level of compliance with the requirement to have audited 
accounts. However, this was attributed to the requirement also for audited accounts for tax 
purposes. Hence, the survey revealed that 99% of the firms had accounts that were audited by 
an external auditor. 
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Wanyama, Burton and Helliar (2009) also investigated views about corporate 
governance practices in the developing African nation of Uganda. Their findings indicated 
that corporate governance standards in developing countries may appear on paper to be 
broadly similar to those in developed countries, however, a common perception exists that 
Ugandan frameworks were not yet strong enough to support what might normally be 
considered to be "good" practice. Furthermore, their results also suggested that attempts to 
improve governance standards in a particular nation require more than the simple publication 
of codes of best practice. Root and branch changes are needed in a wide range of areas, 
including at political and cultural levels, in order to provide the conditions in which 
meaningful improvements in corporate governance will occur. 
In relation to Arab regions, the IMF published Reports on the Observance of 
Standards and Codes (ROSC), entitled `Corporate Governance Country Assessment', in 
Morocco (2003), Egypt (2001; 2004) and Jordan (2004). The key findings of these studies are 
that the legal and regulatory frameworks in most assessed Arab countries seem to be largely 
compliant with the OECD principles of corporate governance. However, practices are not due 
to the inefficiency and weakness of enforcement. Also, the results revealed that the issues of 
corporate governance have not been ignored in public debates in the region. Practitioners 
from capital markets, banks, public and private sector representatives and other civil society 
groups have accepted the need to address corporate governance reforms as one of the crucial 
topics affecting the economic growth and development of firms, industries and whole 
economies in their region. 
In Egypt, Fawzy ( 2003 ) evaluated corporate governance rules, laws and standards in 
accordance with the five OECD principles. The results revealed that Egypt's corporate 
governance standards improved significantly, as reflected in the overall assessment of all five 
OECD principles. 
The degree of progress, however, varied from one principle to another. Also, the study 
pointed out that Egyptian companies were still far from properly implementing corporate 
governance principles. 
In addition, Dahawy (2008) conducted a study which focused on disclosure and 
transparency by analysing the financial statements and websites of 30 of the most active 
companies in the Egyptian stock market. The study started with an assessment of recent key 
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developments in Egypt related to corporate governance disclosure, including reforms to the 
regulatory framework. His key findings indicated that the level of disclosure in Egypt was 
low. He also showed that some of the non-conformity might be due to lack of knowledge 
about the needs and benefits of corporate governance. Furthermore, among the main 
recommendations of this study was the need for increased focus on training and education, 
explaining to all stakeholders the means and benefits of disclosures in general, and 
disclosures related to corporate governance in particular. 
Abd-Rahman (2008) also carried out a survey investigating general board practices 
among the 30 most active companies in the Egyptian stock market. The findings showed that 
there is a need for greater improvement in order for them to become more effective. This 
demonstrates that Egyptian listed companies have, to some extent, tried to use best practices, 
but this has not yet reached the level of global corporate governance. 
Recently, Samaha (2010) examined the impact of board independence and the 
presence of an audit committee at the level of disclosure of different corporate governance 
information categories (i. e. ownership structure and exercise of control rights, financial 
transparency and information, auditing, corporate responsibility and compliance and board 
and management structure and process). Samah studied 30 of the most active companies in 
the Egyptian stock market, using the data of actual disclosure practices measured and 
published in the report by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development in 
2007. His findings indicated that there was no significant association between the existence 
of audit committees and the different corporate governance disclosure categories. Therefore, 
education and training, incentives or disincentives to disclose, including the nature of 
enforcement regimes, are possible policy recommendations in Egypt. Furthermore, the results 
revealed that the practices and advantages of such disclosures may not have been fully 
realised in the Egyptian market due to the fact that corporate governance information 
disclosure is, in general, a relatively new requirement for Egyptian companies. 
Sourial (2004) overviewed the governance models of the corporate sector and the 
securities market of eleven Middle East and North Africa regions; Morocco, Jordan, 
Lebanon, Egypt, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Tunisia and Qatar. 
His study found that the Arab markets in the last decade underwent a number of reforms and 
restructuring in terms of legislation and infrastructure. However, the key issue was the gap 
between legislative framework and enforcement. Furthermore, the study recommended that 
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traditions and cultures should be allowed implicitly to choose their acquaintance with the 
number reforms measures that yield to better corporate governance practices, however, the 
system with new wave of ideas might create resistance to reforms and deterioration. Another 
key recommendation of the study is that banks should play their proper role as main 
stakeholders because they are far developed in comparison to the securities markets in the 
region. 
In Lebanon, Saidi (2004) investigated the practices of the OECD principles by 
conducting a questionnaire survey. His results revealed that the Lebanese legal system suffers 
from a lack of efficiency and consistency and, therefore, requires more reform to meet the 
corporate governance principles. Also, the findings indicated the need for an independent 
body to monitor the implementation of corporate governance in Lebanon. 
Al-Ajlan (2005) examined the roles and responsibilities of the boards of directors in 
the Saudi banking sector. Interviews and surveys of banks' directors indicated that boards in 
banks played a significant part in strategic planning. The results revealed that in relation to 
strategic planning, the board of directors in Saudi banks appeared to fulfil the role of setting 
plans; guiding top management; approving strategy; defining the main goals; and discussing 
the strategy submitted by the top management. However, as regards the role of boards in 
monitoring and controlling top management, the results indicated that there was a mix of 
views among the participants in relation to whether directors in Saudi banks were actually 
controlling the performance of top management. The major shareholders played a significant 
role in monitoring these banks as most of them were board members or had a representative 
on the board. 
The Union of Arab Bank, UAB (2007), conducted a survey on the perceptions of 
senior key personnel in a number of Arab countries (Jordan, Egypt, Oman, United Arab 
Emirates, Qatar and Yemen) on the banks' level of compliance with international best 
practice in corporate governance. 
A total of 67 banks participated in the survey. The survey results revealed that 
shareholders in most of the banks enjoyed considerable rights in terms of access to secure 
methods of ownership registration, the ability to transfer shares, to obtain relevant 
information on a timely basis and to participate and vote in general shareholders meetings, 
the sole authority to elect and dismiss board members and profit sharing. However, more 
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policies need to be in place to protect minority rights. Regarding disclosure, the. majority of 
banks enjoyed a high level of disclosure of material information and financial transparency in 
line with international standards. The survey also revealed that the majority of banks had 
written policies concerning codes of ethics and corporate governance systems. Finally the 
study recommended that more emphasis was needed on designing and implementing special 
training programs for corporate governance and internal control practice for employees. 
From the above discussion, it can be concluded that many developing regions have 
been paying increasing attention to the issues of corporate governance, especially in the Arab 
countries, on the level of official bodies, such as the World Bank, OECD and IMF and on the 
academic level. This is due to the importance of corporate governance in these countries. 
Unfortunately, there have been no studies conducted in Libya concerning the issue of 
corporate governance. There is also no published report from the official bodies (World 
Bank, OECD and IMF) that describe corporate governance practices in this country. 
The survey of the literature has also shown that a large number of studies have 
examined the subject of corporate governance in more than one country (Chong & Lopez-de- 
Silanes, 2007; Geller, 2009; Nam & Nam, 2004; Nganga, Jain, & Artivor, 2003; Sourial, 
2004), while others have focused on a particular mechanism of corporate governance (Abd- 
Rahman, 2008; Al-Ajlan, 2005; Dahawy, 2008; Samaha, 2010) such as shareholder rights, 
the role of the board of directors, ownership structure, and disclosure and transparency. 
In addition, the majority of previous studies, focused on examining corporate 
governance practices by using single methodological approaches as the qualitative approach 
(Al-Ajlan, 2005; Nganga et al., 2003) or the quantitative approach (Arce & Robles, 2005; 
Black, Carvalho, & Gorga, 2008; Musaali, 2005; Nam & Nam, 2004; Saidi, 2004; Wong, 
2009). In contrast, the present study has used both approaches. It has used questionnaire 
surveys and semi-structured interviews to overcome the weaknesses of using one method and 
to obtain reliable, accurate results. This study has adopted both qualitative and quantitative 
methods for collecting data. 
An overview of the established literature indicates there is a dearth in research 
examining the views of regulators and officials in reducing the obstacles of applying 
corporate governance in different countries. The current study surveyed the perceptions of 
listed companies' staff and Libyan financial experts regarding the application of corporate 
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governance and the obstacles that faced these practices. This study also has examined the 
views of regulators and officials with regard to reducing the obstacles to applying corporate 
governance in Libya. 
3.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has provided an overview of the literature on corporate governance, with 
an explanation of its emergence as a concept and development as an element of business 
management. The key issues arising from the chapter are: 
Despite its long history in the developed world and the importance attached to it in 
political and legal terms, corporate governance codes have not been able to provide complete 
protection to investors and several recent scandals have damaged confidence in corporate 
governance as a process. 
The literature also indicates that for organisations to adopt corporate governance 
codes enthusiastically, they need to believe that the implementation of such a code will 
confer benefits on the company in the form of greater inward investment, an improved public 
profile and favourable treatment in the awarding of public contacts. 
The benefits to investors (and to organisations themselves) can be explained with 
reference to theoretical concepts of corporate governance, in particular agency theory and 
stakeholder theory. Therefore, the conceptualisation of corporate governance has been driven 
by two theories: firstly, agency theory addresses the relation between the shareholders and the 
management of a company, as proposed by Jensen and Meckling (1976); secondly, the 
stakeholder theory, proposed by Freeman (1984), examines the relationship between a range 
of interested parties both inside and outside the company. This research follows in these 
traditions in its treatment of the conceptualisation of corporate governance. 
In terms of the development of corporate governance in developing countries, many 
previous studies have concluded that each country has different factors that have an effect on 
the practice of corporate governance, and which influence the structure of corporate 
governance mechanisms. Therefore, the differences in these factors between countries may 
explain the differences of their corporate governance frameworks. This expectation gives the 
study its theoretical argument and leads to the assumption that corporate governance in Libya 
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is a distinctive and unique process and therefore cannot be explained by frameworks 
developed for other contexts. 
The main learning points which arise from the literature on corporate governance in 
Libya in chapter two, and the background on global corporate governance in chapter three, 
indicate that a country's adoption of corporate governance systems is influenced by a wide 
range of factors, which are distinctive to each country in their nature and extent. Established 
legal, societal, political and business norms each have their role, and as such this study 
investigating corporate governance as the first of its kind in a country, requires a 
methodology that can identify the unique features of the Libyan context, while also providing 
guidance for future implementation of corporate governance. The following chapter therefore 
critically examines the methodology adopted to meet the study's aim to investigate current 
corporate governance practices, perceptions and obstacles to implementation within Libya. 
89 
Chapter four 
Research Methodology 
4.1 Introduction 
Having, in the previous chapter, reviewed the relevant literature in order to place this 
research into a wider context, and in particular considered the nascent state of corporate 
governance in the developing economies, this chapter provides an overview of the research 
methodology adopted in this study, which is designed to measure the extent to which 
corporate governance has been adopted in Libya, and how it can be improved in the future. 
Denscombe (2007) states that in the process of producing a valuable piece of research, 
the social sciences researcher is faced with a variety of options and alternatives. Furthermore, 
he maintains that each choice that is made can be associated with a certain set of assumptions 
about the social world it investigates; including within this certain inherent advantages and 
disadvantages. Denscombe also asserts that there is no `one right' direction to take, although 
acknowledging that some strategies are better suited than others for addressing specific 
issues. This chapter is therefore divided into three key sections: section one gives an 
overview of research philosophy; section two deals with data collection methods; and, finally, 
section three is dedicated to a discussion of the design of the current research. 
4.2 Research Philosophy 
For researchers in the social sciences it is essential to appreciate the implications of 
the research concept. In this context, Saunders et al. (2009), describe a research philosophy as 
reflecting the way a researcher thinks about the development of knowledge, and how theory 
can be transformed into knowledge through the proper manipulation of data; meanwhile 
Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Lowe (2002) observe that the relationship between data and 
theory has been an issue of contention between philosophers for many centuries. 
Easterby-Smith et al. (2002) propose three reasons which underscore the importance 
of philosophical assumptions to scientific research. The first reason is that knowledge of 
philosophy can inform and clarify research design. This involves not only a consideration of 
the kind of evidence needed to achieve research objectives, and how it is to be collected and 
interpreted, but also the extent to which this will provide useful answers to the fundamental 
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questions being investigated by the research. The second reason they propose is that 
knowledge of philosophy can help the researcher to identify which designs will achieve 
objectives and which will not, and thus maximise the chance of avoiding errors by identifying 
the limitations of particular approaches. Finally, knowledge of philosophy can enable 
researchers to recognise, or even create, designs that may be outside their previous 
experience, as well as facilitating the adaptation of research designs within the constraints 
that different subjects impose. 
When researchers consider research philosophy, this raises questions of ontology and 
epistemology, which are crucial to the successful completion of social and behavioural 
research. It is essential to adopt the ontological and epistemological positions that are most 
suitable to a particular area of research. 
According to Crotty (2003), ontology is the study of the nature of reality and 
existence. As such, it may be regarded as the starting point of all research, from which the 
researcher's epistemological and methodological positions logically follow. The ontological 
debate is related to the nature of reality, and questions whether it exists in hard, tangible and 
relatively immutable structures which are independent of the perceiver, and capable of 
accurate measurement and analysis. The ontological position that hold that this is the case is 
known as realism: (Crotty, 2003). The other related concept is epistemology. This term 
derives from two Greek words: "'episteme', which means 'knowledge' or 'science', and logos, 
meaning reason, which is defined by Crotty, (2003, p. 63 ) as being "the theory of knowledge 
embedded in the theoretical perspective and thereby in the methodology" Therefore, if a 
researcher adopts a realist ontological position, certain epistemological and methodological 
assumptions therefore follow from this position. Crotty describes epistemology as the branch 
of philosophy that deals with the theory of knowledge. 
Epistemology can therefore be said to be concerned with assumptions about the nature 
of knowledge and the grounds for adopting certain methods to increase knowledge, and is as 
a result related to the meanings attached to reality (Crotty, 2003). A range of epistemological 
standpoints have been identified in the literature of the social science, (positivism, 
interpretivism, etc. ). In the objectivist epistemology, for example, the researcher position to 
the production of knowledge is based on the notion that knowledge exists independently of 
any consciousness which comprehends it. Subjectivism, on the other hand, assumes that 
knowledge is to some extent imposed on the object by the subject, and that the act of 
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perception informs knowledge of the object being perceived (Crotty, 2003). A variety of 
different approaches is embedded in these and other epistemological positions, each with 
their relevance to a particular way of conducting research and acquiring knowledge. 
Therefore, the different ontological and epistemological stances of researchers can lead to 
widely divergent research approaches, and to different perceptions of, the same social 
phenomena. . 
4.3 Research Paradigm 
A paradigm may be described as being very closely related to the philosophical 
assumptions of research mentioned previously, and the term is indicative of a worldview 
stance adopted by a researcher that informs all aspects of a research project (Tashakkori & 
Charles, 2009). As the result of philosophical discourse, paradigms are social constructs and 
as such they are historically and culturally embedded practices. Byrne and Humble (2006) 
regard paradigms as reflecting the basic belief systems or worldviews of researchers, and as 
such they enable researchers to move beyond the general to a study of specifics while 
maintaining a rigour and consistency in terms of philosophy and approach. Paradigms 
therefore involve ideas around how knowledge is established, and the ways change can be 
achieved or facilitated. 
These differences in looking at how knowledge can be obtained have created different 
schools of thought and created what is known as the paradigm war, a decades-long academic 
debate as to the best way to conduct research. 
The three principle philosophical orientations are outlined in Table 4.1. The first is 
often called the purist stance, and within this position researchers argue against the mixing of 
paradigms. Within this orientation there are two extreme positions ,- positivism and 
constructivism - which a diametrically opposed paradigms. Secondly, researchers within the 
post-positivism paradigm believe that a degree of reconciliation is possible between the two 
extremes mentioned previously. Thirdly, researchers holding the pragmatic stance considers 
paradigms to be compatible models, and therefore posit their coexistence within the same 
research project as a complementary way as attain valuable conceptual constructions. 
This paradigm bases practical methodological decisions on contextual responsiveness and 
relevance thereby often including diverse methods. 
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Table 4.1 Key Social and Behavioural Research Paradigms 
Paradigm positivism Post Positivism Pragmatism Constructivis 
m 
Methods Quantitative Primarily quantitative Quantitative + Qualitative 
Qualitative 
Logic Deductive Primarily deductive Deductive + Inductive 
Inductive 
Epistemology Objective point Modified dualism. Both objective Subjective 
of view. Knower Findings probably and subjective point of view. 
and known are objectively true. points of view. Knower and 
dualism. known are 
inseparable. 
Axiology Inquiry is value- Inquiry involves Values play a Inquiry is 
free values, but they may large role in value-bound 
be controlled. interpreting 
results. 
Ontology Naive realism Critical or Accept external Relativism 
transcendental realism. reality. Choose 
explanations 
that best 
produce desired 
outcomes. 
Causal The Real causes There are some lawful, There may be All these 
Linkages temporarily reasonably stable causal entities 
precedent to or relationships among relationships, simultaneously 
simultaneous social phenomenon. but we will shaping each 
with effects. These may be known never be able to other. It's 
imperfectly. Causes pin them down impossible to 
are identifiable in a distinguish 
probabilistic sense that causes from 
chan es over time. effects. 
Source: "lashakkori and Charles (1998). 
Finally, in the dialectical stance, people view paradigms as vital guides for practice 
and regard the inevitable tensions invoked by juxtaposing diverse paradigms as potentially 
generating more complete and more insightful, even transformed evaluation understandings 
(Greene and Caracelli, 1997). 
4.3. lThe Pragmatism Paradigm 
The compromise position of the pragmatism paradigm has emerged as a result of a 
long debate into the kind of methodology that best enables researchers to combine the 
strengths of different approaches while minimising their drawbacks (Easterby-Smith et al., 
2002). In the social sciences, since the late 1970s qualitative methods have come to be 
regarded as indispensable to constructing knowledge about human activities, and many 
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advocates of qualitative methods have forcefully argued that this paradigm should take 
precedence over quantitative methods as the dominant methodology (e. g. Seale, 2004; 
Marshall & Rossman, 2006; Denzin & Lincoln, 2008). Contrary viewpoints have emerged 
from supporters of the quantitative method, who strongly oppose this assumption of 
superiority (e. g. Swift & Piff, 2005). Further to this intense debate, a growing number of 
researchers have advocated study approaches that combine both quantitative and qualitative 
methods (Greene & Caracelli, 1997; Tashakkori & Charles 1998; Creswell & Clark. 2007). 
Because of the potential advantages of combining the strengths of mixed paradigms, some 
commentators have argued that this approach should form the basis of a dominant 
methodology in the future (Creswell & Clark, 2007). 
Such a movement suggests an end to the era of methodological segregation in applied 
social science (e. g. interpretivist, positivist, activist, literary, feminist), and this harmonisation 
of methods in theory has encouraged researchers to embrace multiple methodologies in 
practice, within the same study (Creswell & Clark, 2007). 
A pragmatist holds the view that although existing philosophical assumptions are 
logically independent, they can be combined, in conjunction with decisions with regard to 
methods, and provided the methods of data collection, analysis and interpretation remain 
discrete, and to arrive at a combination that best suits a specific research problem. 
Furthermore, in the practice of social inquiry these paradigm differences are of relatively 
little consequence because paradigms can be regarded a descriptive of consequent methods, 
not prescriptive, (Patton, 2002). 
According to Patton, (2002b) what is most important within the pragmatism 
paradigm, and what should inform all methodological decisions in social research, are the 
practical objectives of the research problem. Therefore, "inquirers should be able to choose 
what will work best for a given inquiry problem in a particular context without being limited 
or inhibited by philosophical assumptions" (p. 117). Throughout the last three decades 
adherents of the pragmatism paradigm have produced a number of logical and rational 
arguments that have attracted an increasing number of researchers (e. g. Patton, 2002; 
Creswell & Clark, 2007; Tashakkori & Charles, 2009). 
Patton (2002), is an influential advocate of the pragmatic paradigm who argues that 
"pragmatic differences are real in that they describe much research practice. Interpretivist 
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typically use qualitative methods, post positivists typically use quantitative methods, and 
these two types of studies typically vary along such dimensions as induction-deduction and 
context specificity- generalizability" (Patton, 2002b, p. 118). Further scholars have given 
their support to this position by stating that the pragmatism paradigm provides the best 
justification for employing a mixed method approach and mixed model studies (Patton, 2002; 
Creswell & Clark, 2007; Tashakkori & Charles, 2009). 
Furthermore, Tashakkori and Charles (1998) consider the pragmatist position to be 
appealing to the researcher "because it gives us a paradigm that philosophically embraces the 
use of mixed method and mixed model designs, it eschews the use of metaphysical concepts 
(Truth, Reality) that have caused much endless (and often useless) discussion and debate, and 
it presents a very practical and applied research philosophy: study what interests and is of 
value to you, study it in the different ways that you deem appropriate, and use the results in 
ways that can bring about positive consequences within your value system" (p. 30). As a 
result, at the present time most researchers in the social sciences use whatever method is 
appropriate for their studies, or for a particular part of their studies, instead of confining 
themselves to one method exclusively (Creswell & Clark, 2007; Tashakkori & Charles, 
2009). 
4.4 Quantitative and Qualitative Methods 
Research methods may be categorised into two distinct types: quantitative and 
qualitative (Neuman, 2006). That is, much of the debate on the choice of research methods 
has tended to concentrate on and revolve around the choice between quantitative and 
qualitative methods. 
Quantitative research is concerned with numbers and shows how the variables are 
organised, measured and analysed (Punch, 2005). On the other hand, qualitative research is 
concerned with words, coding and categorising the main themes in order to construct 
generalisations or theories (Punch, 2005). Neuman (2006) pointed out that quantitative 
researchers adopt a deductive approach, which involves a well-planned approach to the 
research design, measurement and sampling, before collecting and analysing the data. In 
contrast, qualitative researchers adopt an inductive approach, characterised by concern for the 
richness, texture and feeling of the data in order to construct generalisations or theories from 
these data (Neuman, 2006). 
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Another difference is related to the sample size. In quantitative research, samples are 
larger than in qualitative research and generalisation through sampling to the sampling frame 
and population is essential (Punch, 2005). In qualitative research, theoretical generalisation is 
used. It should be highlighted that "despite constituting alternative strategies for research, 
quantitative and qualitative methods are not seen as mutually exclusive" (Patton, 2002b, p. 
118). Both types of data can be and have been collected in the same study (Easterby-Smith et 
al., 2002). 
The mixed methods approach of data collection is a new and growing trend in social 
and behavioural sciences (Tashakkori & Charles, 1998). The logic of this trend is based on 
the principle that "no single method ever adequately solves the problem" ( Denzin, 1978 cited 
in Perlesz & Lindsay, 2003, p. 28) and using only one method is more vulnerable to error 
linked to that particular method (Patton, 2002). 
Johnson, Onwuegbuzie and Turner (2007, p. 123) have tried to define more broadly 
the mixed methods. They state that "mixed methods research is the type of research in which 
a researcher or team of researchers combines elements of qualitative and quantitative research 
approaches (e. g. use of qualitative and quantitative viewpoints, data collection, analysis, 
inference techniques) for the broad purposes of breadth and depth of understanding and 
corroboration". 
According to several authors (Tashakkori & Charles, 1998; Creswell & Clark, 2007; 
Johnson, Onwuegbuzie et al., 2007; Saunders, Lewis et al., 2009) the main purpose of this 
approach (mixed research) is not to replace either of the quantitative nor the qualitative 
approaches, but rather to draw from the strengths and minimise the weaknesses of both in 
single research studies and across studies. For example, Johnson et al. (2007) identify several 
reasons for conducting this kind of research. These include: 
" "Enhance description of the investigated phenomena and provide a fuller picture and 
deeper understanding. 
" Validate and explicate findings from another approach and produce more 
comprehensive, internally consistent, and valid findings. 
" Provide more elaborate understanding and greater confidence in conclusions. 
" Handle threats to validity and gain a fuller and deeper understanding. 
" Provide richer/more meaningful/more useful answers to research questions" (Johnson 
et al., 2007, p. 122). 
96 
4.5 Overview of the Current Research Design 
For the purposes of achieving the objectives of this research, using both qualitative 
and quantitative approaches will be extremely valuable in this study. This combination falls 
into what is known as the pragmatism paradigm, which uses mixed methods that reconcile 
the two extremist paradigms: the positivistic (or the pure quantitative) and the constructivist 
(or the pure qualitative). 
Based on these approaches, research objectives and methods were designed. Semi- 
structured interviews and questionnaire surveys were conducted sequentially. Additionally, 
there is very little known about the Libyan market, which necessitates using such mixtures of 
research design to explore other important aspects about corporate governance practices in 
the country. In the current study, the sequential design has been adopted as it appears below: 
Figure 4.1 Field Work Process 
Semi-structured Semi-structured 
Stage interviews (A) interviews (B) 
One Questionnaire 
With board of Stage Two Survey With Libyan 
directors of Libyan Stage Regulators & 
Listed Companies Three officials 
The above figure gives an overview of the three main stages that were followed in 
order to collect the required research data. The study started with semi-structured interviews 
(A) conducted on September (2009) followed by a questionnaire survey performed between 
October and December (2009). Finally, the study concluded this process with semi-structured 
interviews (B) conducted between May and June (2010), which are explained further in this 
chapter. The rationale for this sequence of stages was as follows: 
Stage one, a qualitative investigation of the opinions and experiences of senior 
personal tasked with implementing the LCGC in Libya's publically listed companies, was 
intended to provide an overview of how the code was being managed in practice, attitudes to 
the code from those bound by its strictures, and to develop themes that would be investigated 
in more detail in the second and third stages. Specifically, this stage was intended to canvass 
opinion about the obstacles to the code that Libyan directors considered the most serious 
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barriers to its implementation, so that these barriers could be incorporated into the 
questionnaire employed in stage two. 
Stage two was the primarily quantitative phase of the research, and was intended to 
provide a broader overview of the implementation of the LCGC in Libya, canvassing a wider 
range of stakeholders and interested parties. Questions within the questionnaire on the 
requirements of the code itself were decided before stage one was conducted, primarily based 
on the literature review, but questions on the obstacles to implementation were based on the 
responses given in stage one, and these questions were written after preliminary thematic 
analysis of the data from stage one. 
Stage three adopted a qualitative method, involving semi-structured interviews 
similar to those employed in stage one, but this time taking as a sample officials involved in 
the supervision and regulation of the LCGC. It was anticipated that these respondents would 
provide a broader to the participants in stage one, giving a view of how the LCGC has the 
potential to affect the whole economy and boost its standing in international trade. These 
respondents were the decision-makers with regard to the state's oversight over the whole 
economy, and as such their interests were expected to be broader than the respondents to 
'stage one. They therefore were able to offer option on not only the obstacles faced, but also 
provide suggested mitigations to addresses the perceived concerns. 
Overall, the qualitative elements of the study were intended to establish themes and 
identify barriers and obstacles to the LCGC, while the quantitative element (stage two) 
measured attitudes at a wider level but in less detail, based on themes established by stage 
one and the literature review. The research as a whole aimed to establish how Libya was 
implementing its code of corporate governance as a country, and to provide data on how 
obstacles to this implementation can be overcome in the future, on a national level. 
4.5.1 The Objectives of the Study and the Research Questions 
The main aim of this research is to investigate the current corporate governance 
practices, perceptions and obstacles in Libya following the introduction of the LCGC. The 
rationale is to draw attention to the limitations and shortcomings, if any, of such frameworks, 
with particular focus on the question of whether the LCGC currently adds significant value to 
these companies and potential for improvement and enhancement. 
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To achieve the above aim, the study has several broad objectives: 
1. To explore the nature and extent of applying current corporate governance within 
eight listed Libyan companies following the introduction of the LCGC. 
2. To survey the perceptions of listed companies' staff (senior managers and employees 
in financial function) and Libyan financial experts (academics and auditors) regarding 
the introduction of the LCGC. 
3. To identify the current obstacles facing the application of the LCGC. 
4. To examine the views of the Libyan regulators and officials in relation to the 
obstacles identified and how they may be reduced. 
The study endeavours to answer the following questions: 
1. What are the nature and extent of current corporate governance practices within eight 
listed Libyan companies following the introduction of the LCGC? 
2. What are the perceptions of listed companies' staff and Libyan financial experts 
regarding the introduction of the LCGC? 
2.1 What are the perceptions of both groups regarding the rights of shareholders as 
set out in the LCGC? 
2.2 What are the perceptions of both groups regarding the board structure as set out 
in the LCGC? 
2.3 What are the perceptions of both groups regarding the board responsibility as 
set out in the LCGC? 
2.4 What are the perceptions of both groups regarding the internal auditing as set 
out in the LCGC? 
2.5 What are the perceptions of both groups regarding the disclosure and 
transparency as set out in the LCGC? 
2.6 What are the perceptions of both groups regarding the conflict of interest as set 
out in the LCGC? 
2.7 What are the perceptions of both groups regarding the board committees as set 
out in the LCGC? 
3. What are the current obstacles to the application of the LCGC? 
4. What are the views of the Libyan regulators and officials in relation to the obstacles 
identified and how they may be reduced? 
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Table 4.2 Relationship between Research Questions, Objectives, Methods and 
Process 
Research Questions Research Objectives Methods Research 
Process 
What are the nature and To explore the nature and extent Semi-structured 
extent of current corporate of applying current corporate interviews (A) 
governance practices governance within the eight listed Stage One 
within the eight listed Libyan companies following the With board of 
Libyan companies introduction of the LCGC. directors of Libyan 
following the introduction Listed Companies. 
of the LCGC? 
What are the perceptions To survey the perceptions of 
of listed companies' staff listed companies' staff (senior 
and Libyan experts managers and employees in Questionnaire Survey Stage Two 
regarding the introduction financial function) and Libyan 
of the LCGC? experts (academics and auditors) 
regarding the introduction of the 
LCGC. 
What are the current To identify the current obstacles Questionnaire Survey Stage One 
obstacles facing the facing the application of the & Semi-structured & Two 
application of the LCGC? LCGC. interviews (A) 
What are the views of the To examine the views of the Semi-structured Stage 
Libyan Regulators in Libyan Regulators in relation to interviews (B) With Three 
relation to the obstacles the obstacles identified and how Libyan Regulators & 
identified and how they they may be reduced. officials. 
may be reduced? 
Table 4.2 presents the relationship between research questions, objectives, methods 
and process. In the first stage, information from the semi-structured interviews (A) was used 
to achieve objectives relating to applying current corporate governance practices in Libyan 
listed companies. In the second stage, information from questionnaires revealed the opinions 
of listed companies' staff and Libyan experts about the LCGC. Information from both 
questionnaires and semi-structured interviews (A) was also used to determine the current 
obstacles facing the application of the LCGC. In the last stage, semi-structured interviews (B) 
were the method used to achieve the last research objectives - ascertaining the views of the 
Libyan Regulators in relation to identified obstacles. 
4.6 Data Collection Methods 
There are two main sources from which data can be collected; primary and secondary. 
Primary data refers to information collected by the researcher on the variables of interest for 
the specific purpose of the research; for example, focus groups, case studies, interviews, 
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observations and questionnaires. Secondary data refers to information that already exists. 
These sources might include books, journals, theses, company records and government and 
professional bodies' publications. According to Sekaran (2003) questionnaires, interviews and 
observations are the three main data collection methods in survey research. It has been argued 
that there is no single best way of collecting data; the method chosen depends on the nature 
of the research and the specific questions needed to be asked. In similar previous studies to 
this one, interviews and questionnaires were the most popular methods of collecting data. 
As mentioned earlier, to achieve the research objectives, and in the light of the 
research methodology standpoint, this study adopts the qualitative method of semi-structured 
interviews and a quantitative method of a questionnaire survey as the methods of collecting 
the primary research data divided into three stages. This section highlights the different issues 
in relation to the research methods and the reasons for these choices. 
4.6.1 Stage One: Semi-Structured Interviews (A) 
At this stage of the study, the qualitative method of semi-structured interviews was 
employed. This is one type of interview method in social sciences research. Other interview 
methods are unstructured, structured and focus group. Interviews are considered to be useful 
methods, enabling interviewers to obtain a rich insight into interviewees' lives, experiences, 
opinions, values, aspirations, attitudes and feelings (May, 2005). 
The differences between structured and semi-structured types of interviews are noted 
by May (2005): "In moving from the structured interview to the unstructured interview, 
researchers shift from a situation in which they attempt to control the interview through 
predetermining questions and thus 'teach' the respondent to reply in accordance with the 
interview schedule (standardization), to one in which the respondent is encouraged to answer 
a question in their own terms". (p. 121) 
Bryman (2007) describes the process of a semi-structured interview: "The researcher 
has a list of questions or fairly specific topics to be covered, often referred to as an interview 
guide, but the interviewee has a great deal of leeway in how to reply. Questions may not 
follow on exactly in the way outlined on schedule. Questions that are not included in the 
guide may be asked as the interviewer picks up on things said by interviewees. But, by and 
large, all of the questions will be asked and a similar wording will be used from interviewee 
to interviewee" (Bryman, 2007, p. 321). 
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A semi-structured interview is the most appropriate method consistent with the 
purpose of this stage of the study. One of the main reasons for choosing a semi-structured 
interview as the primary method in gathering data is its flexibility. The flexibility of the 
interview depends on the extent of freedom that the interviewer has to raise questions that are 
generated from the issues being investigated through the meeting, whereas the interview can 
be inflexible if the interviewer has to follow strictly ordered questions (Kumar, 2005). 
Therefore, this method permits the coverage of general themes that have been 
identified in the literature on corporate governance practices. The study at this stage seeks to 
explore the nature and extent of current corporate governance practices in the eight listed 
Libyan companies, and attempt to identify the current obstacles facing the application of the 
LCGC. Furthermore, this method was adopted to enable the board members of these listed 
companies to give answers in specific areas suggested by the general literature as being 
important. This approach also gives the respondents a chance to discuss any related issues 
that they think are pertinent to the area of study. 
Accordingly, for the purpose of this stage of the study, the researcher has developed 
an interview guide, which contains a list of topics followed by some questions (see Appendix 
A) that need to be covered during the interviews. Patton (2002) indicates that the interview 
guide can be developed in more or less detail, depending on the extent to which the 
interviewer is able to specify important issues in advance and on how important it is to put 
questions in the same order to all respondents. The topics and questions are mainly generated 
from the literature on corporate governance generally and in developing countries 
specifically, in an attempt to cover the most significant issues related to these practices in 
Libya following the introduction of LCGC. This is in response to the lack of resources within 
this field both in the published literature and in official reports. 
The interview guide has three main parts. The first part covers the background 
information of the interviewees, while the second part covers six main topics and some 
important aspects of corporate governance - the ownership structure, shareholder rights, and 
board of director's structure and responsibilities, conflict of interest, discourse and 
transparency and board committees. The last part covers the current obstacles facing the 
application of the LCGC. 
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The questions of the interview guide were originally written in English and then 
translated into Arabic. This process needed some additional care in order to avoid any 
mistranslation of the words, expressions and concepts that were used in the construction of 
the questions. As regards this issue, a number of steps were taken to construct the Arabic 
version. These included the following: 
1. The questions of the interview guide were firstly translated by the researcher and then 
discussed in detail with one of supervisory team whose native language is Arabic. 
2. The Arabic copy along with its English version was given to an expert translator for 
comments and amendments if necessary. 
After considering all the procedures that were necessary for ensuring an appropriate 
translation, the researcher was satisfied with the accuracy of the Arabic version. 
The semi-structured interview (A) was conducted in September 2009 with eight 
members of a board of directors and a general manager. According to Kumar (2005), in 
qualitative research, the issue of sampling has little significance as the main aim of this type 
of enquiry is either to explore or describe the diversity in a situation, phenomenon or issue. 
Therefore, the interview samples were chosen to cover eight Libyan listed companies: five 
commercial banks and three insurance as indicated in Table 4.3. These are the only 
companies registered in the LSM and subject to the LCGC. 
Table 4.3 Listed Companies and Interviewees Positions 
Wahda Bank 
Gamhuria Bank 
Alsari Bank 
Company Sahara Bank 
Name Bank of Commerce & Development 
Libya of Insurance Co 
Al-Sahara Insurance Co 
United Insurance co 
Member of board of directors 
Chairman of the board of directors 
General Manager 
Interviewee Member of board of directors 
Position Member of board of directors 
Member of board of directors and general manager 
Member of board of directors 
Member of board of directors 
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The particular interviewees were selected based upon their position in high level 
management in these companies. Another factor that influenced the selection of interviewees 
was their knowledge, experience and participation in the field of corporate governance. All 
interviews were conducted at the offices of the respondents at the time and date of their 
choice, and the duration was one hour on average. 
It is important to note that all interviewees agreed to the interviews being recorded. 
Rubin and Rubin (2005) pointed out that audiotapes enable the researcher to retrieve data in 
an accurate form. Similarly, Kvale (1996) remarked on the importance of the tape-recorder: 
"The usual way of recording interviews today is with a tape recorder. The interviewer can 
then concentrate on the topic and the dynamics of the interview. The words and their tone, 
pauses, and the like, are recorded in a permanent form that can be returned to again and again 
for re listening" (Kvale, 1996, p. 160). 
4.6.2 Stage Two: Questionnaires Survey 
As previously mentioned, one research objective is to survey the perceptions of 
listed companies' staff (senior managers and employees in a financial capacity) and Libyan 
experts (academics and auditors) regarding the introduction of the LCGC. 
Therefore, distributing a questionnaire survey was the second method of data 
collection. According to Collis and Hussey (2003, p. 173), "a questionnaire is a list of 
carefully structured questions, chosen after considerable testing, with a view to eliciting 
reliable responses from a chosen sample ". 
Similarly, Sekaran (2003, p. 236) defines the questionnaire as: "a reformulated 
written set of questions to which respondents record their answers, usually within rather 
closely defined alternative". 
Questionnaires are an important and efficient tool for collecting primary data when 
the researcher knows exactly what information is required and how to measure the variables 
of interest (Oppenheim, 2000). Questionnaires can be distributed by two main methods: 
personal distribution or mailed distribution. Personal distribution questionnaire can be used 
when the sample is situated in one location such as a place of work. The main advantages of 
this method are: 
" All completed responses can be collected within a short period of time. 
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" Any doubts that the respondents might have on any question could be clarified. 
" The researcher has the opportunity to introduce the research topic and to motivate the 
respondents to offer frank answers. 
" Good response rates can be ensured. 
" This is less expensive and consumes less time than interviewing, and it does not need 
as much skill to administer the questionnaire as to conduct interviews. (Oppenheim, 
2000). 
4.6.2.1 Design and Contents of the Questionnaire. 
4.6.2.1.1- Questionnaire Design 
Designing an effective questionnaire that takes into consideration Libyan society, 
which differs in characteristics, circumstances, culture, and corporate environment to 
developed and other developing countries, marks a significant challenge for this study. 
Libya's transition economy is facing a problem of under-research of corporate governance 
practices, which makes this process more crucial, as there is a scarcity of reliable references 
to act as input to the current study. Therefore, a rigorous review of international corporate 
governance research was undertaken at the outset. 
However, the literature suggests that the researcher must consider some important 
aspects in the design of a questionnaire. These are as follows: the questionnaire should 
incorporate particular specifications; it should have the correct length and attractive layout; 
and it should be constructed in steps. There should also be consideration of the type of 
questions provided (open, closed ended or both). A questionnaire has to be designed 
according to particular specifications and with specific aims so that a considerable amount of 
relevant information can be obtained with low expenditure of both time and effort 
(Oppenheim, 2000). 
Accordingly, the questionnaire was designed to satisfy at least the above conditions. 
First, the questions must be constructed in such a way that they are relevant to the themes of 
the study. Secondly, all respondents must be given the assurance of anonymity so as to give 
free answers - therefore, there is no scope for divulging any confidential information such as 
names. Thirdly, according to the previous conditions, close-ended questions are utilised, 
which offer a choice of answers in the form of a rating scale, since this would allow a 
numerical value to be given to an opinion. This is also simpler for respondents to complete 
and easier for the researcher to code and analyse (Oppenheim, 2000). 
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Additionally, this technique is very important, since this ' study has two different 
respondent groups that may have diverse beliefs. For this reason, it may not be appropriate to 
use open-ended questions. However, closed-ended questions may have inherent limitations 
resulting from loss of expressiveness (Oppenheim, 2000, p. 114) and limited space for 
reasoning on answers. To overcome these limitations, a half-page space was provided in the 
final section for respondents to provide further comments they considered relevant to the 
study topic. 
In terms of length, the questionnaires (Appendices B and C) are divided into three 
sections and consist of seven pages when set out on a single-sided A4 paper. Additionally, a 
covering letter was attached to the questionnaire. This letter, which introduces the author as 
the researcher and the research objectives, asks for assistance from the respondents and 
confirms that all information would be treated in the strictest confidence. The intention of this 
letter is to increase respondents' trust in the research project and to encourage them to 
cooperate with the researcher. 
It is widely agreed that a long questionnaire will result in a low response rate, but it 
has also been observed that the latter is likely to be enhanced by an attractive layout 
(Bryman, 2007). Therefore, the correct layout was considered important in this study and, 
accordingly, a set of themes were grouped together in the questionnaire under one theme in 
order to order ideas chronologically. 
Conversely, a five-point Likert scale was used in the questionnaire to obtain 
respondents' opinions on the issues being studied (Saunders, Lewis et al., 2009). A Likert 
scale comprises a set of response categories constructed around a range of 
agreement/disagreement levels. Participants tick the appropriate level on the Likert scale. 
The following the Likert scales was used: 
1- This Likert scale was used in some questions to obtain respondents' level of 
agreement with specific statements presented under it. 
Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree 
5 4 3 2 1 
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2- This Likert scale was used in some questions to obtain respondents' views on the 
importance of specific statements presented under it. 
Very Important Important Don't know Not very important Not important at all 
5 4 3 2 1 
4.6.2.1.2 Questionnaire Contents 
As mentioned earlier, the main goals of the questionnaire were, first, to collect the 
required primary data to answer the research questions. Secondly, the respondents' opinions 
and general attitudes were sought regarding the introduction of the LCGC by the LSM. And, 
thirdly, the opinions and general attitudes of the respondents were determined regarding the 
current obstacles facing the application of the LCGC. Accordingly, two different 
questionnaires were used (see Appendix B and Q. Both questionnaires included similar 
questions' with differences in the first page that contain respondents' background so to 
identify the two groups from each other. Therefore, the questionnaire content was split into 
the following three main sections: 
Section One - Respondents' Background: In this section, the respondents were asked six 
questions, which would provide information, such as job position, length of experience, level 
of qualification, place of study and fields of knowledge. The main aim of the questions was 
to obtain the background details of respondents who participated in this study. This is very 
important for obtaining high quality information. The first section was specifically designed 
for a particular group of respondents, while the remaining sections applied to all groups of 
respondents. 
Section Two - General Perception of the LCGC: The second section of the questionnaire 
focused on respondents' general perceptions of the LCGC. This section was comprised of 
five subsections: 
Under the first subsection, respondents were asked to provide their views on the rights of 
shareholders as set out in the LCGC. This subsection covered three main issues, namely, 
voting rights, other rights of shareholders and the rights of shareholders at the AGM as 
defined in the LCGC. 
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Under the second subsection, respondents were asked to provide their views regarding the 
board of directors and internal auditing. This subsection covered board structure, 
responsibility and internal auditing structure and functions as set out in the LCGC. 
Under the third subsection, respondents were asked to provide their views on the issue of 
disclosure and transparency, while in the fourth subsection they included opinion regarding 
conflict of interests. 
Under the finally subsection, respondents were asked to provide their views on board 
committees structure and functions (audit committee, nomination committee and control 
committee, as set out in the LCGC). 
Section Three - The Obstacles Affecting the Applications of the LCGC: In this section 
the respondents were asked to provide their views on obstacles affecting the applications of 
the LCGC. 
4.6.2.1.3 Piloting the Questionnaire and Assessment of Validity 
The final and most important step in the design process of the questionnaire is the 
piloting stage. Oppenheim (2000) listed the following aims for conducting a pilot study: 
1- To test the reliability and validity of the instrument to avoid any future problems. 
2- To ensure the accessibility to the study participants. 
3- To confirm the future co-operation with the participants. 
4- To test the methodological techniques. 
Therefore, a number of procedures were employed before conducting the final survey. 
The first step in piloting the questionnaire involved the first draft of the questionnaire being 
formulated in the English language. It was presented to the supervisory team and some 
university staff to give their comments on the questionnaire. Other copies were given to my 
colleagues (PhD students) and they were asked for their comments and advice. Based on the 
feedback from these individuals, several modifications were made to the wording of some 
questions, some of which were also clarified. 
In the second stage, the questionnaire was translated into Arabic. Similar procedures 
to those used in the preparation of the questions of the semi-structured interviews (A) were 
followed in the design of the questions of the questionnaire. 
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The final step was conducted in Libya. Fink (2003) argues that the minimum number 
of ten copies is sufficient for a pilot test. The Arabic version of the questionnaires was 
personally distributed to the two main targeted groups. These included 9 external auditors, 7 
academic and 12 members from companies listed staff. Out of the 26 personally distributed 
questionnaires, 20 usable questionnaires were received making an overall response rate of 
77%. 
The purpose of conducting the pilot study in three stages was to reveal any 
weaknesses or contradictions in the questions, to correct them prior to the main survey and, at 
the same time, to test and improve reliability and validity where the questions posed elements 
of vagueness and difficulty. It was also essential to assess the length of time respondents 
might need to complete the questionnaire. In this respect, the researcher had two purposes in 
mind: to maximise response rate and to minimise error frequency. Finally, and most 
importantly, it was necessary to test the questionnaire's ability to do the job for which it was 
designed. However, at every stage, points emerged, indicating that changes needed to be 
made before the final draft of the questionnaire could be completed and distributed. 
Moreover, the positive reactions of the pilot study were taken into account in constructing the 
final questionnaire. 
4.6.2.2 The Population and Sampling of the Research 
The choice of research participants is one of the most important issues that determine 
the quality of the produced data. Therefore, it is highly recommended by Denscombe (2007) 
that researchers choose the right population to participate in research studies. According to 
Sekaran (2003), population refers to: "the entire group of people, events or things of interest 
that the researcher wishes to investigate" (Sekaran, 2003, p. 265). 
The populations identified for this study comprised of two Libyan groups; the first 
consisted of the staff of companies listed on the LSM (senior managers and employees in the 
financial function), and the second consisted of Libyan experts (external auditors and 
academics). The main reason for choosing these particular groups was based on previous 
research that had identified them as the most relevant groups as regards the issue of corporate 
governance (Kadir, 1999; Nganga, Jain et al., 2003; Solomon, Lin et al., 2003; Limpaphayom 
and Connelly, 2004; Al-Ajlan, 2005; Sori & Karbhari, 2006; Okike, 2007; Gupta, 2008; 
Wanyama, Burton et al., 2009; Wong, 2009). Thus, these groups' perceptions of corporate 
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governance practices are worthy of study. In addition, these two groups include 
professionally qualified and trained individuals, who are capable of making informed 
judgements about the subject of this study. The justification for targeting these groups is as 
follows: 
Internal group: The first group consisted of the staff of companies listed on the 
LSM (senior managers and employees in a financial capacity). They were selected because 
they were responsible for the implementation of the LCGC in their companies. It was very 
beneficial to know their views regarding the issue of corporate governance in general and the 
LCGC in particular. Furthermore, it was very important at this stage to see how this group 
perceive the current obstacles to the application of the LCGC that were mentioned by the 
board of directors in the first stage of semi-structured interview A. 
External group: The second group consisted of Libyan experts (external auditors and 
academics). They were selected because of their expert knowledge and their understanding of 
the importance of corporate governance. Furthermore, external auditors, who are members of 
the Libyan Accountants and Auditors Association (LAAA), are legally allowed to practise 
accounting and auditing. They are professional persons expected to detect the application of 
corporate governance and to report any incompliance with LCGC from their auditing 
findings. Therefore, they should have authority and be less biased in providing information 
on corporate governance issues. 
Academics, furthermore, are involved in teaching accountancy, finance, management, 
and economy modules in the Faculty of Business of Libyan universities. Those academics are 
very important subjects for a survey due mainly to their knowledge and experience. For the 
purpose of the current study, the academics interviewed are all working as full time members 
of staff in the Faculty of Business in the three main Libyan universities (EI-Fateh University 
in Tripoli, Garyounis University in Benghazi and the Academy of Graduate Studies in Tripoli 
and Benghazi). 
Having defined the populations intended for this study, a sample has to be selected 
which can be seen as representative. This process is known as sampling. Sekaran (2003, p. 
266) defines sampling as: "The process of selecting a sufficient number of elements from the 
population, so that a study of the sample and an understanding of its properties or 
characteristics would make it possible for us to generalise such properties or characteristics to 
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the population elements ". The main reason for using samples, rather than collecting data 
from entire populations, is that it is less prohibitive in terms of time, cost and other resources, 
especially when a large number of elements are involved and sometimes in different 
geographical areas. 
There are two main forms of sampling: probability and non-probability. In probability 
sampling, each unit will have a known, non-zero chance of being selected, while in non- 
probability sampling, the chances of being selected are not equal for each unit (Sarantakos, 
2005). Probability and non-probability sampling are also known respectively as random and 
non-random sampling. Moreover, probability sampling is employed in many forms (e. g. 
simple, systematic, stratified, cluster and other random sampling), while non-probability 
sampling is employed in four forms: accidental, purposive, quota and snowball sampling 
(Sarantakos, 2005). 
It is important to note that information on an individual group is not publicly available 
in Libya. In the light of this as well as other factors - the limitation of resources, the lack of a 
post-coding system to use, and the fact that no reliable list of names of all groups was 
available - the non- probability sampling `non-random' was used. 
The researcher mainly used purposive sampling. According to Saunders et al. (2009), 
purposive sampling enables researchers to use their judgement to select cases that will best 
enable them to answer their research questions and to meet the research objectives. Purposive 
sampling maximises the chance of obtaining accurate information about the studied 
phenomenon as it relies upon choosing those who have both the experience of the 
phenomenon and also the ability to communicate their experience of that phenomenon 
(Sarantakos, 2005). Therefore, the specific individuals were selected based upon their 
availability and willingness to participate in the survey. A major consideration was whether 
individuals belonged to those two groups that would be likely to have up-to-date knowledge 
of, and concern about, issues relating to the corporate governance in Libya. 
4.6.2.3 Questionnaire Distribution and Collection 
Because the survey was confined to some specific locations (the main cities in Libya), 
the method of personally distributing and collecting questionnaires was adopted in the current 
research. The main advantages of this method, as Sekaran (2003, p. 187) mentions, are: 
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" "The researcher or a member of the research team can collect all the completed 
responses within a short period of time; 
" Any doubts that the respondents might have on any question could be clarified on the 
spot; 
" The researcher is afforded the opportunity to introduce the research topic and 
motivate the respondents to offer frank answers; 
" Administering questionnaires to a large number of individuals is less expensive and 
consumes less time than interviewing; 
" It does not require as much skill to administer the questionnaire as to conduct 
interviews". 
The distribution and collection process of the questionnaires were conducted with the 
assistance of the companies listed on the LSM and its branches, Faculty of Business in the 
three main Libyan universities, the LAAA and its branches and accounting and audit firms. 
The distribution and collection process was conducted in Libya between October and 
December 2009 and planned as follows: 
First, the handing-over visits. The questionnaires with the attached covering letters were 
personally delivered to the coordinators, such as managers of departments or directly to the 
selected subjects from the two targeted groups. 
Secondly, other visits were made in order to collect completed questionnaires from 
coordinators and to thank them. They were also asked to inform non-respondents that there 
was a ten day deadline for completing the questionnaire. 
Finally, a final visit was made to collect the remaining completed questionnaires. 
Based on the above procedures, 208 usable questionnaires out of the 300 personally 
distributed questionnaires were collected making a response rate of 69%. A summary of the 
number of the distributed and collected questionnaires for each group of the targeted 
population is illustrated in Table 4.4. 
Table 4.4 Responses to the Questionnaire Survey for Each Group 
Distributed Received Unanswered Answered 
Type Questionnaires Questionnaires Questionnaires Questionnaires Percentage 
Companies' 150 106 6 100 67% 
staff 
Libyan 150 110 2 108 72% 
Experts 
Total 300 216 8 208 69% 
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1- Responses to the Questionnaire of Company's Staff 
Table 4.5 shows the responses from Libyan company staff in forms of frequency and 
percentages. 
With regard to responses to the questionnaires distributed to staff, 8 companies were 
consulted to provide respondents. Of the 100 questionnaires returned, 13% were from Wahda 
Bank, 13% were from Gamhuria Bank, 9% were from Alsari Bank, 10% were from Sahara 
Bank, 14% were from Bank of Commerce and development, 15% were from Libya insurance 
company, 11% were from Al-Sahara insurance company and, finally, 15% were from Al- 
Sahara insurance company. 
Table 4.5 Responses to the Questionnaire of Company's Staff 
N Company Name Frequency Percentage 
I Wahda Bank 13 13% 
2 Gamhuria Bank 13 13% 
3 Alsari Bank 9 9% 
4 Sahara Bank 10 10% 
5 Bank of Commerce & Development 14 14% 
6 Libya of Insurance Co 15 15% 
7 Al-Sahara Insurance Co 11 11% 
8 AI-Sahara Insurance Co 15 15% 
Total 100 100% 
2- Responses to the Questionnaire of Libyan Experts 
Table 4.6 shows the responses from Libyan experts in forms of frequency and 
percentages. Questionnaires were distributed to academics and external auditors. As regards 
the percentage of respondents, 67.6% academics returned the questionnaires and 32.4% 
external auditors. 
Table 4.6 Responses to the Questionnaire of Libyan Experts 
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4.6.2.4 Reliability of the Study 
Assessing the reliability of the data is important prior to any statistical analysis. Reliability 
analysis allows for study of the properties of measurement scales and the items that make 
them up. 
According to Collis and Hussey (2003), reliability is concerned with the results of the 
research. Sekaran (2003) states that: "The reliability of a measure indicates the extent to 
which it is without bias (error free) and hence ensures consistent measurement across time 
and across the various items in the instrument "(Sekaran, 2003, p. 203). 
Many approaches can be utilised to assess the reliability of the data. However, in this 
study, Cronbach's Alpha was used due to its relevance to the analysis of questionnaires based 
on the five-point Likert scale. These measures the internal consistency of the questionnaire 
based on the average inter-item correlation of the items. Moreover, Pallant (2007) states that 
Cronbach's Alpha Coefficient is one of the most commonly used indicators of internal 
consistency. 
Table 4.7 below shows the results of the reliability analysis of the six dimensions that 
were included in the questionnaire. As can be seen, the Cronbach's Alpha Coefficient is 0.87. 
Sekaran (2003) mentions that the closer the reliability coefficient gets to 1.0, the better. In 
addition, he states those reliabilities less than 0.60 are considered to be poor, while those in 
the range of 0.70 are acceptable. Thus, the internal consistency reliability of the measures 
used in the current study can be considered to be acceptable. 
Table 4.7 Reliability Analysis 
No Statements Number of items Alpha 
1 Shareholders Rights 18 75.44 
2 Board of Directors 22 65.45 
3 Disclosure and Transparency 20 76.31 
4 Conflict of Interests 6 60.47 
5 Audit Committee 13 72.96 
6 Nomination Committee 7 86.12 
7 Control Committee 7 62.56 
8 Obstacles affecting the applications of the 
LC'GC 
15 96.60 
Total 108 87.16 
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4.6.3 Stage Three: Semi-Structured Interviews (B) 
In the last stage of this study, the qualitative method of semi-structured interviews (B) 
was employed. The main purpose of this method was to examine the views of the Libyan 
officials and regulators in relation to removing the obstacles - identified in the first two 
stages - facing the application of the LCGC. 
Therefore, for the above purpose, the researcher has developed an interview guide 
which contains a list of topics followed by some questions (see Appendix D and E) that need 
to be covered during the interviews. The interview guide has four main sections: the first 
section concerns general information about the interviewees; the second section contains an 
overview of current corporate governance practices; the third section deals with the identified 
obstacles; and the last section is about future development. 
The questions of the interview guide were originally written in English and then 
translated into Arabic. The translation process needed some additional care in order to avoid 
any mistranslation of the words, expressions and concepts that were used in the construction 
of the questions. Therefore, similar procedures to those used in preparing the questions of the 
semi-structured interviews (A) were followed in the design of the questions of the semi- 
structured interviews (B). 
The semi-structured interview (B) was conducted between May and June 2010. 
Twelve interviews represented four Libyan officials and four regulatory bodies -the Ministry 
of Trade and Economy (MTE), the Libyan Stock Market (LSM), the Insurance Monitoring 
Body (1MB) and the Central Bank of Libya (CBL) - as illustrated in Table 4.8. Indeed, the 
decision in choosing these four groups depended on their relationship with the scope of this 
study and its objective as mentioned earlier. 
Hence, it was decided to interview participants from four groups. First, the MTE was 
approached, since it represents the highest authority and oversees all economic sectors in 
Libya. Secondly, the LSM is also essential as it issued the LCCG and is regarded as the only 
means to monitor the application of this code. Thirdly, IMB and the CBL were included 
because they supervise the insurance companies and banking sectors. They were investigated 
in the first stage of this study. Furthermore, those particular interviewees were selected based 
upon their position in these four Libyan officials and regulatory bodies. Another factor that 
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influenced the selection of those interviewees was their knowledge, experience and 
participation in the field of corporate governance. 
Table 4.8 Libyan Official Bodies and Interviewees Positions 
No. 
1 Ministry of Trade and Economy (MTE) 
2 Libyan Stock Market (LSM) 
3 Official Bodies Central Bank of Libya (CBL) 
4 Insurance Monitoring Body (IMB) 
1 Manager of corporate department 
2 Deputy - manager of corporate department 
3 Member of corporate department 
4 Chairman of the board 
5 Ex- deputy chairman of the board 
6 Head of Supervision and control department 
7 Position Ex-Member of control committee 
8 Deputy - manager of bank monitoring board 
9 Head of documentary credit department 
to Manager of auditing department 
II Department manager 
12 Member of corporate department 
4.7 Data Analytical Techniques 
4.7.1 Analysing Qualitative Data - Stages 1 and 3 
Unlike quantitative data analysis, qualitative data analysis does not have a 
standardised approach to the analysis of data (Collis & Hussey, 2003; Punch, 2005; Saunders, 
et al., 2009). For the purpose of answering the research questions, thematic analysis 
technique was used to analyse data that was collected from the semi-structured interviews A 
and B. Saunders et al., (2009) provided a general strategy for qualitative data analysis: 
" Categorisation - to understand the statements and establish meanings within the 
current context. This is important to generate the meanings based on the purpose of 
this research. 
" Data rearrangement and reduction - guided by the literature and the purpose of the 
research, to identify related ideas or discussions for broad themes development. 
Recognising relationships and forming additional categories - to analyse the 
reorganised data and to generate key themes, patterns, or relationships. 
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According to Brauna and Clarkeb (2006), "thematic analysis is a method for identifying, 
analysing and reporting patterns (themes) within data. It minimally organises and describes 
your data set in (rich) detail. However, frequently it goes further than this, and interprets 
various aspects of the research topic". Furthermore, Brauna and Clarkeb (2006) provide an 
guide for the six phases of analysis, and offer examples to demonstrate the process as 
summarised in Table 4.9. 
Table 4.9 Phases of Thematic Analysis 
N Phase Description of the process 
I Familiarizing yourself with your data Transcribing data (if necessary), reading and re- 
reading the data, noting down initial ideas. 
2 Generating initial codes Coding interesting features of the data in a 
systematic fashion across the entire data set, 
collating data relevant to each code. 
3 Searching for themes Collating codes into potential themes, gathering 
all data relevant to each potential theme. 
4 Reviewing themes Checking if the themes work in relation to the 
coded extracts (Level 1) and the entire data set 
(Level 2), generating a thematic `map' of the 
analysis 
5 Defining and naming themes On-going analysis to refine the specifics of each 
theme, and the overall story the analysis tells, 
generating clear definitions and names for each 
theme. 
6 Producing the report The final opportunity for analysis. Selection of 
vivid, compelling extract examples, final 
analysis of selected extracts, relating back of the 
analysis to the research question and literature, 
producing a scholarly report of the analysis 
Source: (Brauna and Clarke, 2006) 
According to these phases, the qualitative data was analysed by using thematic 
analysis. These procedures were applied in order to determine the themes and patterns in the 
data. Concepts underlined in the analysis were analysed according to the research framework. 
Also, new themes or concepts that were highlighted in the interviews were handled in a 
flexible way and considered in relation to the research framework. 
4.7.2 Analysing Quantitative Data - Stage 2 
There are numerous statistical techniques, which can be used in analysing the data 
captured by the questionnaire employed in this study. According to Oppenheim (2000), 
different statistical tools will have to be used for different purposes depending on the nature 
of the data. In this respect, Pallant (2007) suggests that when designing research, this gives 
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them a wider range of possible techniques to use for the analysis of data. Therefore, the 
methods and techniques utilised in this study include (1) descriptive statistics and (2) non- 
parametric tests (i. e. testing the differences between independent samples). 
4.7.2.1 Descriptive Techniques 
With regard to the use of the descriptive techniques, Pallant (2007) states that 
descriptive statistics (e. g. mean, median, standard deviation, etc) have different usage, for 
example, to describe the characteristics of the participants of the study, to check the variables 
for any violation of the assumptions underlying the statistical techniques that will be used to 
address the research questions, and to address any specific research questions. 
Therefore, descriptive statistics were used in this study to describe the characteristics 
of the participants of the study and to assist in answering the questions of the research. The 
main aim of the questionnaire is to seek the respondents' opinions and general attitudes 
toward the introduction of the LCGC by the LSM and as regards the current obstacles facing 
the application of the LCGC. 
The 'mean' was the main statistical method employed in this study to analyse the 
participants' returns. The idea is that for a particular item on the questionnaire, the researcher 
aims to compute the mean value that underscores the respondents' behaviour with respect to 
the stated research question. The questionnaire in this study utilises a five-point scale in the 
majority of the questions (strongly agree = 5, agree = 4, neutral = 3, disagree = 2, strongly 
disagree = 1), where 1 represents the lowest point and 5 indicates the highest point. The 
respondents' average (i. e. the mean) response to a question or an issue is ranked in order. That 
is to say, a response with a mean score of 4.5 is ranked higher than the one with a mean score 
of 3.5. This ranking represents the strength of responses from 'important' to 'not important', or 
from 'agree' to 'disagree'. However, it is important to note that this was the case with regard to 
the positive statements, while the negative statements were scaled in reverse order (strongly 
disagree = 5, disagree = 4, neutral = 3, agree = 2, strongly agree = 1). 
Robson (2002) argues that "the most common is to have five fixed-alternative 
expressions, labelled `strongly disagree', `disagree', `neutral', `agree', `strongly agree'. 
Weights of 1,2,3,4, and 5 whether the statement is positive or negative (e. g. 5 for a 
`strongly agree' with a positive statement, and `strongly disagree' with a negative statement". 
Such a ranking order is particularly important for this study because it indicates respondents' 
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opinions in terms of their perception of the importance of a specific problem or an issue, plus 
their preferred solutions from the alternatives provided. 
4.7.2.2 Non-Parametric Test 
Bryman (2007) indicates that there are two broad classifications of statistical tests 
used in data analysis, namely parametric and non-parametric. The use of parametric tests is 
said to be appropriate when the following assumptions are adhered to: 
1. The observations must be independent of error. 
2. The observations must have equal variance in the various treatment populations. 
3. The observations must be drawn from normally distributed scores in the treatment of 
the population. 
4. The variables must have been measured in at least an interval scale. 
Conversely, non-parametric tests in social science research are equally as important as 
their parametric counterparts. Siegel and Castellan (1988) argue that behavioural scientists 
rarely have data that satisfies the assumptions of the parametric test, which includes 
achieving the sort of measurement that permits meaningful interpretation of parametric tests. 
Hence, non-parametric statistical tests play a prominent role in behavioural and social 
sciences. 
This technique is considered distribution-free due to the fact that it makes no 
assumption about the distribution of scores in the population. In fact, non-parametric 
techniques do not necessitate measurement on an interval scale and do not require the data to 
fulfil the strict assumptions of parametric methods, such as normality and homogeneity of 
variance (Siegel and Castellan, 1988). From the above discussion, the non-parametric test was 
clearly preferable and therefore employed in this study to analyse questionnaire survey data, 
because the data collected did not meet the conditions necessary for the application of 
parametric testing, such as being an interval scale and the sampling employed is not random. 
However, it is important to recognise that it is disadvantageous to use non-parametric 
methods when all the assumptions of the parametric procedures are met and the data is to be 
measured on either an interval or ratio scale. 
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Mann-Whitney U test: 
The Mann-Whitney U test is a non-parametric test of the differences between two 
independent groups on a continuous measure (Pallant, 2007). More specifically, it compares 
two sample means on a continuous measure and determines whether two population means 
significantly differ. It converts scores on the continuous variable to ranks across two groups 
and assesses significant differences between two groups. It is an alternative to the 
independent sample t-test for two independent samples in the parametric test when the 
assumption of normal distribution of population is held (Pallant, 2007). This technique was 
applied to test the difference in perceptions between two Libyan groups: the Libyan listed 
companies' staff and the Libyan Experts. 
4.8 Conclusion 
The major methodological concern of the study can be summarised as producing a 
framework capable of capturing the unique context of Libya's business environment, while 
also identifying the attitudes and perceptions of Libyan corporate governance stakeholders to 
the LCGC thus: 
The ontological approach of the study was a mixed-methods one, employing different 
perspectives to understand the research object, leading to more `holistic' picture and 
understanding, and helping to create a closer `truth, while at the same time allowing the 
respondents to the study to express opinions and ideas freely and openly. 
The research functions under a pragmatic paradigm, which leads to the selection of a 
sample including those Libyans best placed to voice ideas and opinions on corporate 
governance; academics, experts, and the managers and directors of companies listed on the 
LSM. This sample provides a wide range of competencies and expertise on the subject under 
investigation - and in some part can be considered as `stakeholders'. 
The nature of the field-work and the time-consuming approaches to data collection 
and analysis dictated a relatively small sample; however, this was consistent with the depth of 
corporate governance practice's penetration into Libyan business life. Statistical techniques 
were employed to make comparisons between the opinions of different groups of 
respondents. 
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The methodological approaches adopted by the study have determined the structure of 
the remainder of the study. In seeking to meet the objectives of the study through the three 
research stages described in section 4.5, the research adopts a mixed-methods approach as 
illustrated in table 4.2. Accordingly, the next three chapters (five, six and seven) report and 
analyse the findings of each of the three stages of the data collection process, which in 
combination meet the study's aim and represent its contribution. 
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Chapter Five 
Analyses and Results of Semi-Structured Interviews (A) 
With Eight Libyan Listed Companies 
5.1 Introduction 
The first stage of this study is to collect the primary data from semi-structured 
interviews. This method seeks to explore the nature and extent of current corporate 
governance practices within the eight listed Libyan companies following the introduction of 
the LCGC. It also attempts to identify the current obstacles facing the application of the 
LCGC. As a consequence, this chapter is divided into three sections. The first section 
provides the general information about the interviewees; the second focuses mainly on 
current corporate governance practices within these listed companies; and the third deals with 
the current obstacles facing the application of the LCGC. 
5.2 General Information about the Interviewees 
The semi-structured interviews (A) were conducted during September 2009 with 
seven members of the boards of directors and a general manager. Each interview included 25 
questions and took, on average, one hour (see Appendix A). Table 5.1 provides some 
information concerning the interviewees. 
Table 5.1 shows the respondents' place of work, position, education and level of 
experience. Generally, they are from different companies and occupy different positions, 
these being: member of board of directors in Wahda Bank, Chairman of the board of directors 
in Gamhuria Bank, General Manager in Alsari Bank, member of the board of directors in 
Sahara Bank, member of board of directors in Bank of Commerce and Development, member 
of the board and manager of Benghazi branch in Libyan Insurance Co, member of the board 
of directors in Al-Sahara Insurance Co and member of the board of directors and general 
manager in United Insurance Co. 
Regarding respondents' qualification, four of them hold masters degrees, two possess 
a PhD, while the remaining two hold bachelor degrees. Furthermore, three qualified in the 
United States, three others qualified in Libya, while the remaining two qualified in the UK 
and Fränce. With regard to work experience, three have experience of more than 20 years 
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three others have experience of more than 25 years; while the two remaining have more than 
30 years of experience. 
Table (5.1) General Information about the Interviewees 
NO. Interviewee Position Qualification Level Qualifiic Years of 
Name ation experience 
Place 
(A [31 ) Member of board Master in I ih a More than 20 
of directors Accounting years 
2 (AB2) Chairman of the PhD in Banking UK More than 25 
board of directors years 
3 (AB3) General Manager Master in Banking France More than 20 
& Finance years 
4 (AB5) Member of board PhD in finance USA More than 25 
of directors years 
5 (AB4) Member of board Bachelor in Libya More than 25 
of directors Accounting years 
6 (A12) Member of board Bachelor in Finance More than 30 
and manager of and Insurance years, since 
Benghazi branch USA 1973 
7 (A13) Member of board Master in Banking Libya More than 20 
of directors & Finance years 
8 (All) Member of board Master in More than 30 
of directors & International law years 
General manager and Financial USA 
Institutions 
5.3 Current Corporate Governance Practices 
The second part of the interview contained respondents' information about current 
corporate governance practices of Libyan listed companies. According to some academic 
studies (Fawzy, 2003; Nganga, Jain et al., 2003; Solomon, Lin et al., 2003; Saidi, 2004; Arce 
& Robles, 2005; Chong & Lopez-de-Si lanes, 2007; Okike, 2007; Black, Carvalho et al., 
2008; Gupta, 2008; McGee, 2008; Wanyama, Burton et al., 2009; Wong, 2009) corporate 
governance mechanisms include ownership structure, shareholder rights, board of director's 
structure and responsibilities, conflict of interest, discourse and transparency and board 
committees. At the international level, the World Bank-IMF (2001; 2003; 2004) and the 
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OECD (1999,2004) principles have introduced the same corporate governance mechanisms. 
Moreover, these mechanisms are covered by corporate governance codes in various countries 
all over the world, such as in the UK (The Combined Codes, 2006), in Egypt (The Egyptian 
Code, 2005) and in Libya (LCGC, 2007). Therefore, the interviewees were asked about the 
application of corporate governance mechanisms. 
5.3.1 Ownership Structure 
Table 5.2 shows the two types of ownership structure in listed Libyan companies. 
Under the concentrated ownership fall three other categories, which are government, 
institutional and foreign shareholders. On the other hand, distributed ownership is composed 
of individual and small private companies. 
Table (5.2) Ownership Structure 
Concentrated Ownership Distributed 
5% or more ownership less than 
Company Name 5°/, % 
Government institutional Foreign Individual & small 
(%1) shareholders shareholders private companies 
c%o) (%ý) (%1) 
Wahda I3ank 54.1 "/0 261)°, o 
Gamhuria Bank 89% 11% 
Alsari Bank 8% 92% 
Sahara Bank 5% 5% 19% 71% 
Bank of Commerce 15% 85% 
& Development 
Libyan Insurance 45% 17% 38% 
Co 
Al-Sahara 46% 10% 44% 
Insurance Co 
United Insurance 31% 69% 
Co 
Source Libyan Stock Market (2009) 
The table also shows the different companies involved in the research with their ownership 
structure in percentages. 
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Wahda is 54.1% in government ownership, 19% foreign shareholders and 26.9% 
individual and small private companies. In Sahara Bank is, 4% is government ownership, 5% 
institutional shareholders, 19% foreign shareholders and 72% individual and small private 
companies. Gamhuria Bank is 89% government ownership and 11 % individual and small 
private companies. For some banks, government ownership represents the majority of 
shareholders. 
This is in line with Berglof and Claessens (2004), Omrana et al., (2008) and Wei and 
Geng (2008), whose study found that government ownership represented the majority of 
shareholders in China. Consequently, they exercised a strong control in corporate governance 
and impaired the rights of other minority shareholders in the arrangement of corporate 
governance. Furthermore, Wei and Geng (2008) conducted a study on listed companies in 
China, and concluded that the government, as the majority shareholder exercised a strong 
control in corporate governance and, consequently, impaired the rights of other minority 
shareholders in the arrangement of corporate governance. 
Alsari Bank is 8% institutional shareholders and 92% individual and small private 
companies. Bank of Commerce & Development is 15% institutional shareholders and 85% 
individual and small private companies. Libyan Insurance Co is 45% government ownership, 
17% institutional shareholders and 38% individual and small private companies. Al-Sahara 
Insurance Co is 46% government institutions, 10% institutional shareholders and 44% 
individual and small private companies. United Insurance Co is 31% institutional 
shareholders and 69% individual and small private companies. 
These results are also in line with findings and recommendations made by Hartzell 
and Starks (2002), Chung et al., (2002) and Baek et al., (2004), who stated that an 
institutional shareholder may take the role of monitoring all the actions and decisions taken 
by the firm's top management. 
5.3.2 Rights of Shareholders 
The studies of the IMF (2001; 2003; 2004) in many countries around the world 
suggested that the corporate governance framework should protect the rights of shareholders 
to secure methods of ownership registration, to convey or transfer shares, to obtain relevant 
information on the company on a timely and regular basis, to participate and vote in the 
AGM, to elect members of the board and to share in the profits of the company. 
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Furthermore, the OECD (1999,2004) established the same basic rights of shareholders, 
which included voting rights, rights to obtain relevant and timely information, rights to share 
in the profits and rights of attendance and participation at the AGM . Therefore, participants 
were asked to give their opinion on how effective their company had been applying the 
LCGC regarding the rights of shareholders: 
5.3.2.1 Voting Rights 
1. Voting by Mail or the Internet 
Nam and Nam (2004) state that "use of the internet and other information 
technologies can be helpful for the timely and cost-effective dissemination of information and 
can also facilitate action by shareholders". 
According to the interview data, all eight companies do not use voting by mail or the 
internet and they emphasised that personal attendance is necessary for voting at the AGM, 
which means that technology cannot be used. Furthermore, some participants attributed the 
lack of the use of technology to the existence of some difficulties, both cultural and 
educational, in Libya in particular and in most Third World countries in general. 
As the chairman of Gamhuria Bank stated: 
"Personal attendance at the AGM is required as no other means of voting are 
allowed. Furthermore, according to my personal opinion, even if the company 
allowed their shareholders to use the internet in voting, as you know, there are 
some cultural and educational difficulties that will face most of the shareholders 
in using such a technique, at least at the present time in Libya" (BB2). 
Additionally, a board member of Al-Sahara Insurance Co argued that 
"Personal attendance at the AGM is obligatory. As for the internet, it is too 
difficult to use for such purposes for the time being, not only in Libya but, in my 
view, most developing countries face problems in using this technique" (A13). 
These results are in line with findings reported by Leal and Carvalhal-da-Silva (2005). 
They conducted a study of corporate governance practice in Brazil. Their study revealed that 
more than 90% of the companies did not facilitate voting by mail or the internet. 
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2. Proxy and Cumulative Voting 
The majority of companies (six out of eight) used proxy voting and the other two 
companies did not use it at all. Of these two companies, Central Bank of Libya had only 
recently placed a small portion of its shares on the stock market, while the other company had 
only held one AGM. However, all the interviewees were in support of proxy voting. They 
argued that it is acceptable for a shareholder to delegate another shareholder to attend the 
AGM and vote for him in his absence. 
The OECD (2004) has stated that there is still a need to increase further worldwide 
consideration of proxy voting, notwithstanding the timely receipt of relevant resources prior 
to shareholders' general meetings. In addition, this result is also supported by the findings of 
Nam and Nam (2004), whose study investigated corporate governance practices in four Asian 
countries (Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia and Thailand) and found that all use proxy voting, 
although in Indonesia, shareholders seem less able to use this right compared with the other 
countries. Some statements from the interviewees may illustrate these points: 
"Proxy voting is a lawful right as the shareholder is allowed to authorise 
another shareholder to attend the A GM as long as this authorisation is legal and 
within the time and place of session, but cumulative voting is not 
followed"(HI3). 
"A shareholder has the right to delegate another shareholder to attend the 
AGM, but he has the legal right to represent only one. However, there may be 
some transgressions. Cumulative voting is not followed" (CB3). 
"Proxy voting is used and a shareholder may authorise another shareholder to 
represent him or her in the AGM as long as that is done legally within the time 
and place of the AGM, but cumulative voting is not followed "(ABI). 
The policy of cumulative voting is not used by any company, in spite of its 
importance in protecting the rights of minority shareholders by allowing them to work as a 
group to elect a candidate of their choice to represent them and safeguard their rights as a 
member of the board of directors (McGee, 2008). Additionally, the LCGC recognised the 
importance of this policy and noted that "The Company may use the policy of cumulative 
voting to elect members of the board of directors at the AGM" (LCGC, 2007). 
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5.3.2.2 Obtaining Relevant and timely Information and the Right to Share Profits 
The interviewees argued that all shareholders (both majority and minority) have full 
right to obtain both financial and non-financial information regarding the company's 
operations through financial and non-financial reports two weeks before the AGM, except the 
majority shareholders who can access the information on request. However, shareholders do 
not have the right to know about the internal operations of companies and all other 
confidential details. For instance, they cannot go through the company's books of account. 
Some companies do not present their reports on time as a board member in the Bank 
of Commerce and Development mentioned: 
"Of course, all shareholders have a legal right to obtain information on time - 
through budget and other statements - according to what the bank management 
discloses in order to keep them informed of relevant data two weeks before the 
general assembly is held. However, they do not have the right to know any 
information related to the work andlor confidential to the bank. Generally 
speaking, shareholders and investors have the right to acquire financial and 
non-financial information, but as for timeliness, the statements that contain such 
information are practically delayed" (AB4). 
In addition, a board member in Sahara Bank stated: 
"As for major shareholders, they get the information on request automatically, 
as they own the bulk of shares, while the only channel for the minority is the 
financial statements disclosed by the stock exchange, newspapers, or the bank 
branches. All documentary papers are collected prior to the general assembly in 
order to ensure that all the participants are informed" (ABS. ) 
This matches the views of Milan (2007), who argues that shareholders should be fully 
informed of all the procedures and other details governing shareholders meetings, so that they 
are prepared and can send their queries both before and during the meeting. 
In terms of sharing profits, six out of eight interviewees had the same idea. They 
agreed that their companies have no clear dividend policy with regard to the distribution of 
dividends. They claimed that the dividend policy is set by the board of directors and 
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approved, adjusted or rejected by the general assembly. A board member in the Libyan of 
Insurance Co pointed out: 
"As a matter of fact, there is no clear policy in this regard, but the board of 
directors makes proposal of profits distribution and that doesn't mean it is 
entitled to deciding such policy as the assembly may reject it. In fact, the board 
suggested a policy in the last meeting and the assembly adjusted it" (AI2). 
However, the other two interviewees argued that they have a clear dividend policy. The 
dividend is a fixed percentage of the total profit. In support of this, a board member in Sahara 
Bank said: 
"Here, there is a clear dividend policy. Over the last two years, the bank paid 
15% of the profit. This policy lies within the function of the board of directors 
before being submitted to the general meeting". (ABS). 
This point has relevance to the IMF (2004) statement that shareholders have the right to 
attend and vote at the annual general meeting, the right to vote on the appointment and 
removal of directors and auditors, and the right to receive dividend payment. They also 
have the right to declare dividends and to decide on the amount to be declared as 
dividend falls within the powers of the board. 
5.3.2.3 Rights of Shareholders to Attend and Participate at the AGM 
All the companies tend to apply the rules of Libyan commercial law of rights 
regarding shareholders at the AGM. The announcement of the meeting should be made at 
least eleven days before the AGM and it should also be advertised in local newspapers. All 
the companies state that they are keen to choose carefully the dates and places of a meeting in 
order to achieve maximum attendance of shareholders. Also, all the other information 
included in the AGM agenda are disclosed ahead of time to enable the shareholders to get 
hold of this before the meeting. Some quotations from interviewees may illustrate these 
points: 
"The bank ensures all the rights related to the AGM. It announces the meeting 
in local newspapers as well as on the bank website; sends personal notes to 
shareholders two weeks before the meeting; and chooses an appropriate time 
and location to encourage the concerned parties to attend the meeting. It also 
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provides the shareholders with leaflets, which includes relevant information 
beyond all other information, agenda and financial statements released. 
Attendants are only allowed to discuss what is reported in the agenda. " (EB5). 
"The AGM is announced 11 days prior to its meeting in two local papers 
according to the commercial law. When the meeting is held, a person would be 
legally appointed to verb that the meeting procedures were performed 
according to the law. For instance, this assigned person would make sure that 
the company has made an announcement in local papers and that the quorum is 
completed along with other legal requirements. Virtually all companies seek to 
gather as many participants as possible at the meeting, which should be held at 
the right time and place. For data and information, all participants, both 
majority and minority, are indeed supplied with this information. They also have 
the right to discuss and present their opinions as long as that comes within the 
agenda" (CB3). 
This opinion is in line with recommendation made by the IMF ( 2004) and it supports 
the findings of McGee (2008), who examined corporate governance practices in eight Asian 
countries (India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam) 
and found that all of them are keen to ensure good application of shareholders' rights of 
attendance and participation at the AGM. His findings showed that India was the best country 
for applying this right, while Vietnam was the least efficient. 
These results were also in line with the findings provided by the UAB (2007); they 
conducted a survey study on banking sectors in six Arab countries: Yemen, Qatar, Oman, the 
UAE, Jordan and Egypt. One of their findings showed that shareholders in all surveyed 
countries, except Yemen and Qatar, enjoyed considerable rights in terms of access to secure 
methods of ownership registration (95%), the ability to transfer shares (94%), to obtain 
relevant information on a timely basis (91%), to participate and vote in general shareholders' 
meetings (96%), the sole authority to elect/dismiss board members (92%) and to profit share 
(95%). 
5.3.3 Board of Directors 
The board of directors is a central mechanism among the other corporate governance 
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composition should include a minimum of three independent directors capable of influencing 
decisions. 
Concerning the separation of board responsibilities, all eight companies have different 
people in the two positions of Chairman and CEO. In the five banking companies, they apply 
the LBL (1/ 2005), which heavily emphasises that the CEO and the chairman must be 
different people. In the three insurance companies, they also have different people in the two 
positions of the Chairman and the CEO, despite the fact that it is not required by the law. The 
opinions of interviewees may illustrate these points: 
"The number of board of directors is seven including the chairman and his 
deputy and all members have good qualifications and experience. Regarding the 
proportion of non-executive directors, there are four non-executive directors on 
the board of our company and there are different persons in both positions of 
CEO and Chairman" (H13) 
"The board size consists of seven members which includes the chairman, and all 
the board members are non-executive as they are outsiders and do not enjoy any 
function within the executive management. Also, according to the new banking 
law, the positions of chairman and the executive manager on the board of 
directors in a bank must be separated" (CB3) 
"There are seven highly qualified members, including the chairman, on the 
board of directors and only two of them are Libyan. The executive management 
and the board of directors' membership are totally separated. Also, it is illegal 
to have the same person as CEO and chairman. Personally, I believe that this is 
an important step taken by the central bank through. the new law" (ABI). 
These results support the findings of Black et al. (2008), which found that most 
Brazilian companies (62 out of 88 companies) have different persons as CEO and Chairman. 
These results are also in line with common corporate governance recommendations 
(Cadbury, 1992; OECD, 2004; The Combined Codes, 2006), which state that the CEO and 
Chairman positions should be split to prevent the CEO from having too much power over the 
company. However, these results go against the findings of Abd-Rahman (2008), who found 
67.9% of the 30 most active Egyptian listed companies as having no separation between the 
two functions of Chairman/CEO. 
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5.3.3.2 Board Tasks and Responsibilities 
The participants were asked to give their opinion on the extent to which the boards of 
their companies carried out the following tasks and responsibilities referred to in the LCGC 
(2007): setting the company's objective and strategy; issuing rules stipulating the role and 
responsibilities of the board; setting their own corporate governance rules; writing policies 
clarifying the relationship with stakeholders; evaluating top management performance; and 
reviewing the company's internal policies. 
1. Setting the Company's Objectives and Strategy 
According to the interview data, the majority of companies (seven out of eight) 
reported that their boards of directors play an important role in setting the company's 
objectives and strategies. A board member in Wahda Bank expressed opinion on this subject 
in the following terms: 
"Among the main tasks of the board is setting up plans, strategies and general 
objectives. In fact, the board has played a significant role in setting out a 
package of financial and non-financial, short and long-term, goals and 
strategies" (AB)). 
In addition, the chairman of Gamhuria Bank stated: 
"The board of directors plays an important role in setting the overall objectives 
and strategies of the bank as well as the way of accomplishing these goals, 
especially after the merger of this bank with Al-Oma' bank This required a 
reconsideration of these objectives and strategies in order that they were in line 
with the new operation after the merging process and the movement towards 
privatization through a flotation of the bank shares in the market and its listing 
as a stock company" (AB2). 
This supports the findings and recommendations made by the Cadbury Report (1992); 
OECD (2004); Solomon et al. (2003); Gupta, (2008) and Mallin, (2007), who stated that the 
board responsibilities are to determine the direction of the company through elaborating its 
aims, plans, policies and strategies for future success. 
However, a board member in the Bank of Commerce and Development claimed that 
the board did not play an important role in setting the company's objectives and strategies. 
This role was mainly played by the CEO due to his knowledge of all technical and 
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professional aspects, while the boards' role was limited to accepting or modifying these 
objectives and strategies. He put forward the following statement: 
"According to the law, the board must set the strategy and objectives but in 
practice it is the general director who sets all plans, objectives and strategies 
and tries to persuade the board of that. From my experience, I realised that all 
the tasks that should be undertaken by the board are performed by the general 
manager due to his knowledge of the technical and professional aspects, while 
the board meets occasionally only to discuss or confirm what the executive 
management has proposed. But the tasks and functions reported in this guideline 
are also included in the foundation system or in commercial and banking law. In 
the Libyan environment, the board of directors' role is not in fact a position 
which enables it to carry out such tasks" (AB4). 
These findings do not differ from those of Petra (2005), who identified two major 
characteristics that help the board fulfil its responsibilities: having a vigorous and diligent 
board of directors. They should be in a position to understand their responsibilities, so that 
they may be able to evaluate and approve the corporation's long-term strategies. They should 
also have a clear understanding of the position of the firm in the industry and oversee 
management. 
2. Written Rules Stipulating the Role and Responsibilities of the Board 
According to the interview data, the general rules stipulating the role and 
responsibilities of the board in the banking sector are defined by the LBL (1/ 2005). 
However, some participants from the banking sector emphasised the need for their own 
written rules which were heavily required by a foreign partner. Some statements from 
interviewees may illustrate these points: 
"There are rules stated in banking law, which clarify the role of the board of 
directors and set out the tasks and responsibilities entrusted to them. But there 
are no bank-specific rules due to the importance of this sector in the State's 
economic process. However, there are clear, rigorous regulations denoting the 
functions and responsibilities of board of directors in banking law" (AB3). 
"There is no effective guideline yet, but the board is now working on preparing 
a document which specifies its functions, though it is quite aware of them. As 
you know, foreign partners need to know the tasks and responsibilities. In this 
context, the bank has benefited from this partner" (ABJ). 
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Concerning the other three insurance companies, all have their own written rules stipulating 
the role and responsibilities of the board, which are defined in their institutional contracts. 
One interviewee stated: 
"As I have already mentioned, all functions, responsibilities and delegated 
authorities are specifically documented in the company basic system " (HI3). 
3. Setting the Corporate Governance Rules of a Company 
All companies do not have their own corporate governance rules despite the LCGC 
call that these should be formulated by the board of directors of the listed companies. 
However, the five banking companies are following corporate governance rules that were 
published by the CBL, though in the others three insurance companies, there are no such 
rules. All participants tend to give the same reasons for not having their own corporate 
governance rules, that this business concept is new in Libya. This point was discussed by 
some interviewees in the following terms: 
"There is no bank-specific governance code. Instead, the central bank has issued 
a leaflet on governance and the board of directors knows of it. I am confident 
that the bank will make its own guideline, but this will take some time. The good 
news is that the members of the board are greatly concerned with this matter 
because of their experience" (ABS). 
"There are no such rules for the time being. In fact, there are several 
overlapping reasons for the lack of governance rules, some of which are at the 
company level and others at a national level. There is a lack of understanding of 
newly developed concepts such as governance due to its novelty" (A12). 
It should be noted that all respondents emphasized the need for corporate governance rules 
due to their importance in preventing corruption in their companies. As one of the 
interviewees said: 
"The concept of governance is still new in the Libyan business environment and 
the transformation to privatisation, but with time, I am sure that interest in this 
topic will increase in Libya in particular because it has suffered a lot from 
financial corruption during public ownership. Yet, under the private sector 
culture, it is in need, more than ever, of such systems in order to keep 
organisations running and to maximize owners' wealth" (All). 
It is relevant to consider at this point the findings and recommendations made by Dahawy, 
(2008); Wong, (2009); Wanyama et al., (2009): Duca et al., (2007); and McGee (2008), who 
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examined corporate governance practices in eight selected Asian countries and found that the 
application of corporate governance principles was weak, which means they all have work to 
do to meet the guidelines. 
4. Written Policies Clarifying the Relationship with Stakeholders 
With regard to whether written policies are set clarifying the relationship with stakeholders, 
the interview data shows that all eight companies do not have such policies. However, some 
participants said that their companies were functioning according to Libyan laws (for 
example, labour, commercial and banking laws), which ensured the right of all stakeholders. 
The reason behind the lack of such written policies was that the Libyan business environment 
had recently moved toward privatisation. Some quotations from interviewees illustrate these 
points: 
"The bank works according to a set of laws in order to specify and guarantee 
some stakeholders' rights. The orientation toward the private sector has just 
begun. Therefore, a lot of concepts ought to be clarified to maintain these 
rights" (AB3). 
"There are no policies that specify' such relations with stakeholders, but the 
board of directors is quite aware that stakeholders are the core of a bank's 
direct or indirect concern. Therefore, it performs a set of everyday jobs that 
sustains their rights and interests "(ABS). 
"As I mentioned, there is no specific code for corporate governance or for the 
stakeholders, but members of the board group all have relevant regulations" 
(AB2). 
A board member in Libyan of Insurance claimed that there are specific policies 
clarifying the relationship between the company and the stakeholders: 
"As I said earlier, the nature of our activity as an insurance company makes a 
set of rules that guarantee the rights of all concerned parties necessary. Our 
activity is based on contracts which determine all the rights and obligations of 
all parties" (A12). 
These findings are similar to the recommendations made by the OECD (2004), that the rights 
of stakeholders should be protected by law. This is in line with Letza et al. (2004), who 
examined the accountability of stakeholders. They stated that since the local population is 
likely to be affected in certain aspects by a company's activities, it should extend its 
accountability to social obligations. In addition, Collier (2008) pointed out that stakeholders 
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have significant influence in an organisation and, for this reason, they need recognition from 
the company management. Solomon ( 2007) argued that the company has some duties to 
discharge to other stakeholders as they are also affected by the company operations in one 
way or another. 
Furthermore, a survey study on the banking sector in six Arab countries conducted by 
the UAB (2007) showed that the existing regulations and laws of all those surveyed provided 
priority protection for the rights of stakeholders - banks customers (82%), employees (79%) 
and creditors (79%). This was followed by protection of the environment (70%) and suppliers 
(70%). Stakeholders who enjoyed the least level of protection included the communities 
(58%) and competitors (57%). This result was also in line with the findings provided by 
Gupta (2008), who found that the regulatory framework of corporate governance in the 
Indian banking sector was sufficient in protecting the interest of all stakeholders. 
5. Evaluating Top Management Performance 
The majority of the respondents recognised the fact that top management performance 
was evaluated in different ways. A board member of Wahda bank puts it in the following 
terms. 
"The board of directors effectively appraises the executive management using 
multiple financial and non-financial indicators as well as profit-related 
indicators. For instance, the bank replaced the executive manager with a 
Jordanian when the foreign partner was introduced. But as a result of the board 
evaluation that revealed certain errors, this executive was discharged from his 
duties and a Libyan executive was assigned as the foreign partner was quite 
satisfied with Libyan competence. This example explains the role that the board 
had taken in evaluating the performance ". (AB1). 
Additionally, a board member in the Bank of Commerce and Development 
explains that "our company uses a reporting system. Financial and managerial 
reports as well as general manager and internal auditor reports are submitted 
both monthly and quarterly to the board which evaluates the performance" 
(AB4). 
Likewise, respondents noted that performance appraisal was carried out monthly, quarterly 
and even annually. A board member in Libyan Insurance Company said the following: 
"We have monthly statistics that reflect how the activities are managed each 
month. Then this data is grouped into a three-month period and then presented 
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to the board of directors in the form of statements. Through these quarterly 
reports from all branches, the board may evaluate the executive management 
performance. Additionally, there are other managerial reports on employment, 
training and the like, which the board can also appraise in order to determine 
the managerial and financial performance of executive management" (A12). 
This result is similar to that provided by Black et al. (2008). They highlighted the 
important role played by the board members in Brazilian companies in evaluating top 
management performance. Their investigation revealed that most surveyed companies had 
replaced the CEO and other officers because of their poor performance. In addition, the 
results also support the findings of Al-Ajlan, (2005), who examined the roles and 
responsibilities of the board of directors in Saudi banks. He demonstrated that there was a 
mix of views among the participants in relation to whether boards of directors in Saudi banks 
were actually monitoring and controlling the performance of top managements. 
6. Reviewing the Company's Internal Policies 
The interview data shows that the participants clearly recognised that in their 
companies there existed the practice of reviewing both financial and non-financial policies. 
Furthermore, some participants mentioned that reviewing the internal policies was the main 
responsibilities of the board. A board member in the Bank of Commerce and Development 
clarified this fact: 
"The board responsibility includes reviewing the bank's internal policies. For 
example, in 2008, it reviewed the old policies and replaced them with new 
policies that incorporate the latest developments ". (AB4) 
Additionally, a board member in Wahda Bank explains that: 
"The board reviews both financial and non-financial policies. Again, the bank 
has benefited from the foreign partner 'Alarabi Bank' which is staffed by 
Jordanians.. This partner has in many ways contributed in altering several 
policies as a result of including Jordanian members on the board. There is now 
a number of committees that work on drawing up these policies professionally 
for the approval of the board" (ABI). 
It was also the case that some companies used experts to carry out this exercise. This 
was confirmed by a board member in Sahara Bank: 
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"The bank frequently reviews the internal policies with the assistance of 
experts, if necessary. For example, it has changed local training policies to 
foreign training policies in order to promote personnel efficiency in all banking 
areas that utilise developed electronic systems ". (ABS) 
It was also evident that some companies reviewed their internal policies in the light of 
economic conditions. According to a board member and general manager in United Insurance 
Co: 
"It reviews internal policies now and again based on the executive management 
reports and the economic conditions and other factors that require revisions ". (All). 
7. Internal Control System 
All the respondents revealed that they have an effective internal control system. As a board 
member in Wahda Bank argued: 
"I think the internal control system is rather good because our country 
somewhat differs from other countries in terms of the problems that face 
financial institutes, which have provided a kind of protection. But this alone is 
not enough; the system must be developed not in our bank but in the inter 
banking sector" (AB)). 
However, when asked to evaluate how effective they were, some respondents 
explained that there are some control bodies inside and outside the companies that ensure the 
effectiveness of such a system. For example, companies are working under the supervision of 
internal control and internal auditing departments, as well as a `compliance unit', which 
follow the regulations issued by the central bank and report back to it. Some statements from 
interviewees illustrate these points: 
"Yes, I believe it does, as the bank works under three control systems. First, an 
internal control department which undertakes control operation and evaluates 
the internal control system. Secondly, there is a department which inspects and 
follows up the work of the internal control department and which reports 
directly to the executive management. Finally, there is a so-called compliance 
unit which follows up the regulations issued by the central bank and reports to 
it. However, the internal control system isn't perfect ". (AB4). 
"I believe that our control system is effective and well established in spite of the 
criticism of some internal and external auditors. The bank is submitted to 
inspection bodies like members' control committees elected by the general 
assembly. It is also supervised by the Libyan Central Bank, not to mention 
139 
popular control and follow up body which has the right to oversee any 
organisation as long as 25% of it is publicly owned. There are also the internal 
control and reviewing committees of the board. So, it's clear that the bank is 
subject to several bodies which to my knowledge do not exist in UK " (ABS). 
"The nature of company work requires the existence of such a system, and it 
has to be effective. The firm also has an auditing department subordinate to the 
general manager, as well as internal audit divisions in all the company's 
branches that directly report to the main audit department in terms of technical 
operations, but which are managerially run by directors of the branches. Thus, 
no work could be done without going through the internal audit. For this reason, 
I think that the company's internal control mechanism works very well 
compared to other financial or non-financial companies" (AB12). 
Nevertheless, as regards the effectiveness of the internal control system, two participants 
were hesitant to judge it as excellent due to the fact that the code was still very new in the 
country. A board member in Al-Sahara insurance Co puts it as follows. 
"The internal control system is rather good, but I can't consider it excellent 
unless the work guidelines for each job are completed". (Ai3). 
Additionally, a general manager in Sari Bank says: 
"In fact, no bank operating currently in Libya can judge whether its internal 
control system is effective because it is still developing. The internal control in 
our bank is still weak presumably due to the lack of competent bodies that fully 
understand the importance of such a system in order to evaluate it". (AB3). 
These results support the findings provided by Samaha (2010), who claimed that the 
practices and advantages of a corporate governance system may not have been fully 
realised in the Egyptian market because the concept is a relatively new for companies. 
5.3.4 Internal Auditing 
Interviewees' respondents were asked whether their company has an internal auditing 
department and whether their internal auditors were independent and full-time employees. 
All the respondents agreed that it was beneficial having independent internal auditors, who 
were highly educated in both accounting and audit. Three out of eight of the respondents 
argued that the department has complete independence and the internal auditors report 
directly to the board and audit committee. A board member in Bank of Commerce and 
Development said: 
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"The internal auditing department is exclusively directed by a person who works 
under direct supervision of the board of directors in order to enjoy total 
independence. One of the main duties of this department is ensuring the validity 
of financial and accounting systems as well as soundness of data and measures 
followed by the executive management". (AB4) In addition, he stated, "the chief 
of the audit department is directly subordinate to the board of directors as there 
is no audit committee for the time being" (AB4). 
A board member in Sahara Bank explained: 
"This department works directly under the board supervision and has a range of 
duties concerning financial and managerial supervision. Furthermore, the 
internal auditor is independently supervised by the CEO and the audit 
committee also reports monthly to the board. " (ABS). 
However, the five remaining respondents said their companies have no audit committee and 
that the internal auditor is supervised by the CEO and the board. They also pointed out the 
main tasks of this department are: careful examination and auditing of daily financial 
operations of the company, ensuring the validity and soundness of financial and accounting 
systems, and evaluation of internal control. A general manager in Sari Bank stated: 
"This department is working directly under the . supervision of the 
CEO and 
undertakes some of the most successful tasks within the company. It is 
conducted by highly qualified internal auditors ". (AB3). A board member and 
general manager in United Insurance Co remarked: "As I said, he works under 
the supervision of CEO as there is no auditing committee ". (All). 
This finding is in line with a revised definition of internal auditing, which was approved by 
the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA). Internal auditing was defined as "an independent, 
objective assurance and consulting activity designed to add value and improve an 
organisation's operations. It helps an organisation to accomplish its objectives by bringing a 
systematic disciplined approach to evaluate and improve the effectiveness of the risk 
management, control, and governance processes" (The IIA, 1999). 
5.3.5 Conflict of Interest and Board of Directors 
In essence, the conflict of interest between shareholders and managers is known as the 
agency problem, and it always takes place during the decision-making process, if the 
managers ignore the main role of the organisation (Mallin, 2007). 
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Moreover, the majority of respondents (seven out of eight) stated clearly that their 
companies have no clearly written regulations for the directors and staff regarding conflict of 
interest. 
Both the company directors and staff are guided by some rules, which are extracted from 
labour and commercial laws and other guidelines, as well as comparable regulations 
regarding what should be done by the employees. However, some respondents claimed that 
the lack of such written regulations was because the concept of governance is relatively new 
and the private sector only recently emerged in Libya. As a board member in Libyan of 
Insurance Co said: 
"As we all know, the concept of governance is modern and the private sector is 
new, therefore, it is still early for such regulations. Nevertheless, we work 
according to rules which stem from labour and commercial laws" (A12). 
In addition, a board member and general manager in United Insurance Co stated: 
"I'm afraid not, as governance is a new concept for Libyans in the private 
sector. There are, however, comparable regulations on what should and 
shouldn't be done by the employees" (All). 
Conversely, a board member in Wahda Bank stated clearly that they have written regulations 
for the directors and staff regarding conflict of interest. He said that they have rules they 
follow which are secured by law: , 
"As I said before, there is an effective control system in the bank as well as self- 
development that go beyond local standards. Indeed, there are rules secured by 
law that we referred to when considering board responsibilities, although there 
are by-laws that regulate such relations and specify every authority within the 
bank and the relations with external parties. Because of our new structure, there 
is no conflict among most of the stakeholders unlike international banks and 
companies ". (ABS). 
The majority of respondents (seven out of eight) also argued that their company had 
no written professional code of conduct which directors and staff employees could follow. 
This may be due to the fact that corporate governance is an emerging field in Libya and that 
many companies are not aware of its advantages. In support of this, the general manager of 
Sari Bank remarked: 
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"... due to inadequate experience with the private sector, these issues are still 
somehow not of concern ". (AB3). 
This accords with the findings of Dahawy (2008), who found that corporate governance in 
Egypt was poor due to the lack of knowledge about the needs and benefits of this system. 
These results also confirm the findings of Duca, Gherghina et al. (2007), who noted that 
34.7% Romanian companies did not have a written code of ethics formally establishing the 
rights and responsibilities of board members and management. 
5.3.6 Board Committees 
5.3.6.1 Audit Committees 
Respondents were asked whether their companies had an audit committee. In this 
regard, three out of eight respondents confirmed that they did, and that this consisted of three 
of the board members and an accounting expert as chief reporting to the directors. Two of the 
respondents pointed out its functions as, among others: following the internal control system, 
internal auditing work and following up external auditor work. One respondent mentioned 
that they have a guide, which stipulates function, responsibility, the number of meetings and 
other activities. As the chairman in Bank said: 
"Of course, we have an audit committee and it consists of three of the board 
members and has an accounting expert as chief There is also a guide that shows 
its function, responsibility and number of meetings... of this committee" (AB2). 
Additionally, a board member in Sahara Bank pointed out: 
"The bank audit committee consists of three members of the board of directors 
including me as I am an accounting expert. The other two are French members. 
This committee reports to board of directors unlike the control committee that 
reports to the general assembly. Among its functions, it follows the internal 
control system, internal auditing world and it follows up external auditor work 
It is not, however, performing all its functions because it is newly formed". 
(ABS). 
However, five of the eight remaining respondents said that their company did not 
have an audit committee. They explained that this may be due to the fact that corporate 
governance is just emerging in Libya and that many companies are not aware of its 
advantages. Some even did not know anything about it. As a board member in the Bank of 
Commerce and Development explained: 
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"As a matter of fact, there was such a committee once and I was one of its 
members as an external accounting expert, but due to lack of understanding of 
the nature of this committee by external auditor, some issues rose between the 
committee and the external auditor resulted in suspension of the committee's 
activity by the central bank". (AB4). 
The board member and general manager in United Insurance Co stated that: 
"Because governance system is entirely new, however, I strongly recommend the 
establishment of such committee ". (All). There is only audit department. .... 1 
think the importance of governance system and audit committee isn't -quite 
comprehended yet. (AB12). 
This echoes the findings of Abd-Rahman (2008); Dahawy (2008); (Gupta 2008), and Black et 
al. (2008), who found that 73% of Brazilian companies did not have audit committees. In 
addition, this was confirmed by the findings provided by Solomon, Lin et al. (2003), who also 
noted that few Taiwanese companies had established remuneration and audit committees. 
5.3.6.2 Nomination Committee 
Seven out of eight respondents stated that their company did not have a nomination 
committee. In some, however, the duties which should be undertaken by the nomination 
committee became the responsibility of the general assembly. As one of the interviewees 
said: 
"There is no nomination nor remuneration committee acts in any specified 
capacity, but the general assembly carries out those functions ". (AB4). 
In addition, other respondents cited the board of directors as responsible for all the 
duties of the nomination committee, such as nominating managers for all administrative 
positions and it is the same board which is responsible for determining their remunerations as 
well as updating them about the good code of corporate governance to follow. In addition, 
another interviewee argued: 
"The board of directors is responsible for nominating people for all managerial 
positions as well as determining their remunerations. As far as I know, there is 
no committee for the tasks enlisted in the guideline, that is recommendation for 
the general assembly to nominate members for the board of directors, 
verification of the members' independence, identification of strong and weak 
aspects of the board of directors, suggestion of remedies, and other stipulated 
functions. There is a single case in which someone would be nominated to the 
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board - the resignation of another member. Acceptance of a new member lies 
within the responsibility of the general assembly". (ABS). 
On the other hand, only one respondent accepted that their company has a nomination 
committee. He argued that their nomination committee was the board of directors, which was 
responsible for nominating managers in all the different positions. It appeared as if this 
respondent did not understand the difference between the nomination committee and the 
board of directors. The researcher should reiterate that all respondents denied having a 
nomination committee and asserted that all duties were performed by the board and the 
general assembly. 
This differs from the recommendations of many codes in both developed and 
developing countries (Cadbury 1992; OECD 2004; The Combined Codes 2006). In addition, 
this result was in line with findings provided by Solomon, Lin et al. (2003). They found that 
few Taiwanese companies had established remuneration and audit committees. Furthermore, 
the results support the findings of Abd-Rahman (2008), who provided empirical evidence 
from Egyptian studies of corporate governance and found that the board of half of the 
surveyed Egyptian companies did not have remuneration committees. 
5.3.6.3 Control Committee 
Respondents were further asked whether their companies had a control committee. All 
agreed that they did recognise it as playing an important role in corporate governance. They 
explained that the committee was composed of three members with two substitutes who were 
elected by the general assembly and subordinate to it - the latter is a requirement of Libyan 
Commercial Law. Among the main responsibilities of this committee is to ensure the board 
of directors and the managers work in the interest of the shareholders. Therefore, this 
committee directly reports to the general assembly. 
Some respondents listed some of its responsibilities as monitoring the activities of the 
board - by attending all its meetings - and the executive management - by following its tasks 
through the internal auditor's reports. Other respondents pointed out that the duties of this 
committee have been identified in Libyan commercial law and stated in governance 
guidelines issued by the financial market. This was confirmed by a board member of Sahara 
Bank: 
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"There is a control committee, which functions in accordance with Libyan 
commercial law. It consists of three official members and two substitutes chosen 
from shareholders. The commercial law has identified its duties as stated in 
governance guidelines issued by the financial market. This committee differs 
from the audit committee as the latter is the board overseer, while the former is 
the shareholders overseer within the bank. It directly reports to the general 
assembly, attends all the meetings and provides copies of these meetings and all 
the decisions made by the board". (ABS). 
In addition, a board member and general manager in United Insurance Co stated: 
"It is composed of three original members and two substitutes elected by the 
general assembly and subordinate to it. It follows up the company operations by 
attending the board meetings and carries out other duties and reports directly to 
the general assembly ". (ABI 1). 
These findings confirm the important role played by the control committee - within the 
context of agency theory and corporate governance - as its members will improve corporate 
accountability to shareholders. 
5.3.8 An Investor Relation Unit 
Four out of eight respondents agreed that their company had an investor relation unit, 
which they believed was important in order to overcome the problems that shareholders and 
investors encounter. It provided shareholders with relevant financial and non-financial 
information, as well as working as a coordinator between the market and the company. 
Evidence of this is given by the general manager of the Alsari Bank mentioned: 
"They are providing shareholders with some financial and non-financial 
information and other relevant statistics; dealing with stock exchange as bank- 
to-market and bank-to-shareholder linking channel ". (AB3) 
However, four other respondents clearly stated that their company had no investor relation 
unit, as explained by a member of the board of directors of Sahara Bank: 
"There is no unit by this name, but the accounting division undertakes all work 
that such a unit might be responsible for like handing out dividend, responding 
to any inquiries and other services. There is also someone in charge of 
communicating with the financial market and to provide it and its investors with 
the required information. The bank has undergone a restructure covers all 
departments available in any advanced bank as preparation for the transfer of 
its management to the French bank" (ABS). 
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Milan (2007) argued that in accordance with the tradition of transparency and 
fairness, a company has the duty to promote actively relations with shareholders, institutional 
and private investors and financial analysts as well as all other stakeholders. 
5.3.7 Disclosure and Transparency 
In this section, respondents were asked to express their opinions on how effectively 
their company applied the disclosure and transparency requirements of the LCGC as regards 
ownership structure, the annual report of the board, details of board committee, company 
social policies, related party transactions, corporate group structure, quarterly financial 
statements and the external auditor's report and fees. All respondents recognised disclosure 
and transparency as also important for the survival of any business. According to Healy and 
Palepu (2001), corporate disclosure is crucial for the smooth functioning of an effective and 
efficient capital market. Where markets operate freely, full disclosure will be of great help to 
users by allowing them to make informed decisions and also by enhancing the preconditions 
of open competitive market. 
The majority of respondents (seven out of eight), furthermore, accepted that their 
companies disclosed their ownership structure, and two of them argued that it was disclosed 
through the financial market. On the other hand, five of them also agreed but did not explain 
how this was done. One board member of Sahara Bank remarked: 
"Ownership structure and all bank-related information are disclosed. This 
structure, however, consists of a very small portion of the private sector, while 
the major share is owned by a socio-economic development fund, which 
virtually controls the bank; and 19% is owned by the French bank (BNP Paribas 
Group) " (ABS). 
However, one respondent reported that his company did not disclose ownership structure. He 
argued that only financial statements were presented infrequently. This was supported by a 
board member in Wahda Bank, who said that: 
"Generally speaking, the disclosure of all banks does not go beyond the income 
and financial position sheets. I would hardly call this disclosure. Additionally, 
there is even deficiency in preparing those sheets. Last year's financial 
statements are yet to be provided. As for transparency, it is almost completely 
missing. Thus, there is no disclosure other than to official supervisory bodies" 
(ABJ) 
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With regard to the annual report of the board, the majority of respondents (seven out 
of eight) also accepted that their companies disclosed this with financial statements and 
auditing reports in order to allow every authorised user access to them. A board member of 
United Insurance Co stated: 
"It is disclosed with financial statements and auditing report" (ABI1). 
In addition, a board member of Wahda Bank said: 
"It is disclosed, but what matters is the content of this report. As I said before, it 
might include only two sheets and an external auditor's report". (ABJ) 
On the other hand, one respondent argued that his company did not disclose an annual report 
of the board. He argued that only financial statements were disclosed and as a board member 
of Al-Sahara insurance Co pointed out: 
"Only the financial statements are disclosed, but the board annual report has 
never been released. We supply the market just with income and balance sheets" 
(A 12). 
In reference to the details of the board committee, only one respondent answered positively to 
this question. His company is the only one which discloses all the details of the board 
committee. A board member and general manager in United Insurance Co said: 
"There are many details disclosed, such as board members' names and other 
related information, qualification, experience and so on. But there is no 
committee stemmed out of this board" (All). 
On the other hand, the other four respondents argued that their companies disclosed only the 
committee members' names. This may still be due to the fact that corporate governance is 
still new in Libya and that many companies do not yet have sufficient knowledge of the 
benefits of disclosure and transparency. A board member of the Bank of Commerce and 
Development stated: 
"Only the members' names are disclosed by the control committee due to the 
absence of nomination and remuneration committees" (AB4). 
However, the other respondents stated clearly that their company did not have a board 
committee. Therefore, they had no comment regarding this question. 
The majority of respondents (seven out of eight) stated clearly that their company did 
not have a social policy. This shows that Libyan companies are still weak in this aspect of 
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corporate social responsibility. This may be due possibly to the weakness of the accounting 
profession in Libya, resulting from the absence of international accounting and auditing 
standards. This is suggested by a member of the board of directors in Wahda bank, who said: 
"Actually, the social aspect of Libyan institutions is omitted in general. If there 
were social activities, the public wouldn't know about them" (ABI). 
Nevertheless, one respondent claimed that his company did have social policies and disclosed 
this information when required. He said that: 
"Every year, I% of the total profit is retained for different social activities, so 
there are social policies guiding the different social activities performed by the 
company. This is indicated by a board member in Al-Sahara Insurance Co., who 
pointed out that "there is social fund with 1% of profits. The company 
undertakes some social activities for its personnel, which is of benefit to society 
as a whole. However, what is disclosed about this aspect is inadequate in all 
organisations in Libya" (AB12). 
In addition, the majority of respondents (seven out of eight) stated clearly that their 
company did not have related party transactions. This result is further confirmation of the 
weakness of accounting disclosure and transparency in Libya. As a board member in Wahda 
Bank claimed: 
"There are no such transactions, and even if there were, they cannot be verified 
due to the lack offull disclosure and transparency" (AB)). 
However, only one respondent agreed that his company makes related party transactions and 
that they are disclosed. One board member of Sahara Bank states: 
"AII transactions made by the bank are disclosed, but as I mentioned earlier, the 
ownership structure of the bank belongs to a socio-economic development fund 
and the French partner. Therefore, there is no place for such transactions as the 
fund runs these investments for citizens, i. e. it has no interest in any transactions 
carried out by the bank" (ABS). 
With regard to the disclosure of corporate group structure, the majority (seven out of 
eight) also stated that this did not exist in their company. As a board member and general 
manager in United Insurance Co. remarked; 
"There are no groups to be disclosed, but some investments in other firms" (AI 3. ) 
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On the other hand, one respondent agreed that his company has corporate group structure, but 
that it did not disclose much information about them. A board member of the Bank of 
Commerce and Development states clearly: 
"There are two totally owned subsidiaries, one operates in construction and the 
other is still under establishment, but in fact there is no total disclosure about 
this type of firm " (AB4). 
As regards the disclosure of quarterly financial statements, all respondents declared 
production and disclosure of quarterly financial statements in their companies. The majority 
of respondents (six out of eight) explain that those statements are prepared and released to the 
stock market according to the market requirements, and are accessed by other stakeholders 
even though a few companies have technological problems currently using, for example, the 
internet. The two remaining respondents stated clearly that their companies disclose quarterly 
financial statements to the market as well as other users, especially shareholders. This is 
confirmed by a board member in Al-Sahara Insurance Co., who said: 
" Generally speaking, I believe that the company practices a great deal of 
disclosure and transparency and I'm quite satisfied with the level of this 
disclosure as the executive manager is eager to render the most accurate, 
transparent information to both major and minor shareholders with no 
discrimination" (A13). 
In addition, the chairman of Gamhuria bank claimed: 
"They are disclosed through the management market, but it is not yet possible to 
publish this information on the internet because this technology has just been 
introduced, and staff in charge of this information received insufficient training 
to utilise such technology, so obtaining this information is not easy. 
Nevertheless, shareholders and stakeholders are entitled to be informed through 
the bank's management" (AB2). 
With regard to whether the external auditor's report and fees are disclosed, all 
respondents agreed that that information is made available when annual reports are released. 
They argue that even companies disclose their external auditor's report and fees, even though 
disclosure to the public in general is still weak and needs some sensitization, education and 
effort. This concurs with a worldwide investigation by Bushman et al. (2004) on corporate 
transparency, where 45 countries were sampled. They concluded that corporate transparency 
was mandatory in the legislative mechanism of these countries. 
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This means that reports concerning investors, such as credit and risk reports, must be 
disclosed because they help investors make their investment decisions. This is explained by a 
board member of the Bank of Commerce and Development, who said: 
"Yes, they are disclosed, in fact I have several bodies entitled to receive 
copies. I don't see any difficulty in getting such a report by any interested 
party. As to transparency, in the Third World, in general, including Libya, I 
think it's still an incomplete subject as in many respects it hasn't reached a 
satisfactory level. This deficiency is attributable to the fear of monitors and tax 
authorities or competitors that call for certain acts of transparency. In other 
instances, some information is omitted as 'protection" of reputation. 
Therefore, the Libyan economy needs disclosure and transparency more than 
ever" (AB4). 
According to Akhtaruddin (2005) and Cheung and Jiang et al. (2010), there are two 
categories of information, namely voluntary and mandatory. Mandatory disclosure 
encompasses all information which must be disclosed in accordance with the rules of 
regulatory bodies, such as the Companies Act, stock exchange regulations and accounting 
standard boards. In relation to this, one general manager in Alsari Bank pointed out: 
"This information is included in the board's report so it is disclosed when this 
report is released. Disclosure to the public, however, is so feeble, but there are 
about forty disclosure forms which should be submitted monthly to the central 
bank and some must be filled in every ten days. As for information on the Web 
and other networks, there is virtually no disclosure. Thus, in terms of 
transparency from any bank only income and budget sheets are disclosed. As 
far as I am concerned, there are other reports, such as credit and risk reports, 
which must be disclosed as they are indicators that concern the investor and 
enable him to make the right decisions. Anyway, what is taking place now; I 
personally can't call it disclosure" (AB3). 
These results, in general, were in line with findings and recommendations made by 
Nam and Nam (2004); Gupta (2008); Dahawy (2008); and Black et al. (2008). They 
conducted a survey study on the corporate governance practices of Brazilian private listed 
companies. Their results showed that financial disclosure was poor due to the absence of 
applying international accounting and auditing standards. However, the findings of a survey 
conducted on the Arab banking sectors by the UAB (2007), found that the majority of 
surveyed Arab banks enjoyed a high level of disclosure of material information and financial 
transparency in line with international standards. 
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5.4 Obstacles Affecting Corporate Governance Practices 
In this part, respondents were asked to provide opinions regarding the main obstacles 
which affect the application of the LCGC in their companies, in particular, and in Libyan 
businesses, in general. In response to this, different obstacles were presented by all 
respondents, which included: weakness of the organisation management; weakness of the 
legal environment; influence and interference of the government; weakness of the accounting 
and audit professions because of non-adoption of international standards; current ownership 
structure of certain firms; absence of training programs for members of board of directors 
about the governance system; inadequacy of investors' awareness of the investment concept; 
the financial cost of implementing the governance system; limited numbers of listed 
companies in the local market; absence of bodies monitoring governance practice; and 
insufficient international pressure for applying governance in Libya. 
In terms of the first obstacle, all respondents asserted that the weakness of the 
organisation management was one of the obstacles affecting the application of the LCGC in 
their company. They put forward the possible causes of that weakness to be lack of awareness 
and education about corporate governance, poor management (which is still working within 
the public sector), absence of training, education and a good incentive system, as well as 
managers' negligence. These general views are supported by a board member in Libyan of 
Insurance Co, who said: 
"The management of most sectors has almost collapsed and our management is 
no exception though it is a little better off in spite of the rules. Most current 
management leadership suffers from a lack of knowledge about its industry or 
because of less qualified staff ' (A12). 
In addition, a board member in Bank of Commerce and Development stated: 
"Weakness of the organisation management and especially the executive one is 
a major hindrance in understanding and implementing this system as one way or 
the other it reduces the pace of getting used to such a system ". (AB4). 
Furthermore, a board member in Wahda Bank argued that: 
"Management in Libya is generally poor. Its inferior quality is presumably the 
result of a lack of morale and real incentives that encourage those in charge to 
be creative " (AB)). 
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This response supports findings and recommendations made by Mallin (2007) and Solomon 
(2007), who argues that it is very important for shareholders to choose for themselves a board 
of directors, composed of qualified people concerned to make decisions that will benefit the 
company as a whole and increase shareholder value. 
The second obstacle relates to the weakness of the legal environment. They argue that 
one problem is the deficiency in legal enforcement as well as continuing use of outdated laws 
which were never amended. Even in the case of those which were changed, the main problem 
lies in their implementation as the authorities who can enforce them have almost collapsed. 
All this can affect corporate governance as it first has to be accepted and supported by the 
government. As a board member in Wahda Bank argued: 
"There are many outdated laws we still work with which date from the previous 
socialist system. They are no longer suitable and require amendment according 
to recent developments" (ABI). 
This goes in line with findings provided by Fawzy (2003). She highlighted that the 
Egyptian legal framework is among the most important fields which still require additional 
efforts to raise the efficiency of applying corporate governance in Egypt. Wong (2009) also 
conducted investigation on the various corporate governance reforms in the Philippines after 
the adoption of the 2002 code of corporate governance, and noted that there was lacking 
laws promoting corporate governance in the country. Furthermore, the findings and 
recommendations made by Arce and Robles (2005) suggest that Costa Rican companies must 
implement a set of additional measures to compensate for the weakness of the legal 
framework. 
On the other hand, other respondents do not consider this to be an obstacle in Libya as 
there are some rules and regulations which are lacking in other developing countries. They 
attributed this to other problems, such as shortage of technology, transparency and human 
resource at all levels. Moreover, they emphasise that there are sufficient laws in Libya, but 
the real issue lies in their implementation. In support of this view, a board member in Al- 
Sahara insurance Co. argued: 
"I'd rather say weakness of implementing the laws. Yes, I totally agree with you 
about this aspect as the laws must be respected and enforced no matter who is 
the violator (AI3). 
In addition to this, the general manager in Alsari bank stated: 
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"..., I don't consider the Libyan legal environment to be a real obstacle as there 
are sound rules that many other countries don't have... Generally speaking, the 
real issue lies in implementation and compliance with such rules" (AB3). 
This result supports the recommendations made by Chong and Lopez-de-Silanes 
(2007), who conducted a cross-country study on the level of firm corporate governance 
practices in six Latin American countries. Their findings indicated that the Latin American 
countries under analysis suffered from a generally lower level of legal protection and weak 
capital markets due to poor enforcement of their laws. In addition, the findings of Okike 
(2007) revealed that despite the government efforts to initiate an effective system of 
corporate governance by changing company legislation and establishing a code of corporate 
governance for all Nigerian listed companies, the effectiveness of this system was still in 
doubt due to the weakness of law enforcement. 
When respondents were asked to point out different obstacles affecting corporate 
governance practices, the influence and interference of the government was mentioned. They 
argued that this is, to some extent, an obstacle that hinders corporate activity as the state is 
still interfering in some companies that have not yet transferred to the private sector. They 
continued to argue that even in those companies which were already privatised, interference 
of the government is an obstacle to corporate activity, which resulted in misunderstanding of 
such a system. The government still partly owns shares in these companies and treated them 
as public companies. In support of this, a board member in Sahara Bank said: 
"The state still exerts a great deal of control over many banks in spite of their 
privatisation, which negatively affects their operations" (ABS). In addition, 
"The interventions of official bodies and the central bank I've just mentioned, 
are the main obstacles that should be addressed for immediate remedy" (ABI). 
In addition, respondents have put forward the weakness of accounting and audit 
professions as other obstacles to corporate governance in Libyan companies. However, they 
argued that the blame is not the accounting and auditing professions, but the problem arises 
from Libyan laws (tax and commercial laws) that hinder the application of international 
standards. Thus, accounting and auditing functions, which are performed by professional 
bodies, lack support from the government itself. A board member in Sahara Bank said: 
"They are indeed not strong enough as the private sector has emerged only a 
decade ago. Previously, accounting and auditing functions were performed by 
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monitoring bodies according to specific economic regulations imposed. Thus, 
those professions did not develop to practice international standards" (ABS). 
In addition, the general manager in Alsari Bank explained: 
"Non-adoption of accounting and audit standards in Libya is a real hindrance 
to the development of accounting and audit professions. However, I think that 
the current culture is confining this development rather that the absence of such 
standards. If we survey all individual economic activities, we would not find any 
constituents of accounting and audit professions. These activities have no books 
or registers, if accounting were practiced in the first place " (AB3). 
The current ownership structure of certain firms in Libya was mentioned by all 
respondents, who stated that this was dominated by government and public institutions and 
thus constituted an obstacle to corporate governance. They argued that the current ownership 
structure of certain firms is a hindrance in one way or another as many investors were 
institutions and not individuals. In addition, they stated that many companies were controlled 
by the government. Indeed, the influence of certain bodies over some companies, besides the 
government, has caused problems for individuals and private investments. This was noted by 
the general manager in Alsari bank, who stated: 
"Current ownership structure is facing a critical situation. Given that there are 
two types of ownership, state influence, one way or the other, is a major 
hindrance to establishing an efficient management of loyalty without bringing 
competent people. On the other hand, in the second type of ownership, which 
prevails in local banks, the major owners influence the bank to act in their 
interest and thus neglecting the public interest" (AB3). 
In addition, a board member in Wahda Bank said: 
"I have already discussed this issue of the dominance of certain bodies over 
companies causing individual disability of investment due to the surrounding 
economic conditions" (ABI). 
They argue that it is one of the main obstacles of corporate governance as a large 
number of board members and managers do not understand the system. They believe that in 
Libya the issue of training is almost neglected, especially at top management levels. Until 
these people become better informed about the internal and external training benefits, their 
companies will continue to lag behind in this respect. In this regard, there is a great need for 
incorporating corporate governance sessions in their training programs. Both the capital 
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market and the Libyan government should help each other to overcome these obstacles. This 
was stressed by a general manager in Alsari Bank, who said: 
"Unfortunately, to date members of board of directors receive no training of any 
kind. We are desperate for courses and seminars to make the new system 
followed in Libya (open economy culture) familiar and to try to reduce the gap 
between us and the advanced countries" (AB3). 
In addition, the board member in Sahara Bank further stated: "I have personally 
attended several courses presented by the financial market, but unfortunately 
none of them was about the corporate governance system " (ABS). 
This supports the findings and recommendations made by the UAB (2007), which 
emphasised the need to design and implement special training programs on corporate 
governance and internal control practices for employees in the Arab banking sector. This 
result is also similar to the findings of Duca et al. (2007), who found that despite the 
institutional efforts, inside the business environment and even among Romanian listed 
companies on the capital market, there is still no real concern for corporate governance 
issues. Furthermore, Dahawy (2008) recommended that the need to increase the focus on 
training and education of all stakeholders in order to improve the application of corporate 
governance in Egypt. 
Another obstacle suggested by all respondents to the development of corporate 
governance in Libya was inadequacy of investors' awareness of the investment concept. As 
this would help them otherwise to follow the progress of their investments, investors in Libya 
lack sufficient knowledge and experience for scrutinising what is happening in the company. 
Investor pressure could also quicken the establishment of corporate governance. The 
respondents believed that investors' influence may increase the implementation of corporate 
governance in Libya. A board member in the Bank of Commerce and Development stated: 
"The financial market is still fresh, therefore, many people almost know nothing 
about investment. As you know, the investors in developed countries make huge 
investment mistakes, so imagine what it is like with Libyan investors who have 
no experience of such things "(AB4). 
In addition, the board member in Wahda Bank said: 
"This is a real issue facing everyone in the Libyan economy as they still have a 
public sector mentality and do not comprehend the concept of the private sector 
yet" (AB1). 
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This result confirms the findings of Duca et al. (2007), who found that in the emerging 
economies, similar to Romania, the issues of corporate governance were not so important to 
the fund suppliers, whether the bank, the investment fund, or individual investors, and that is 
why companies did not feel rewarded in any way for making efforts to improve their 
corporate governance practices. 
Furthermore, all respondents cited the limited number of listed companies in the local 
market as 'one of the major obstacles in the expansion of corporate governance in Libyan 
corporations. They argued that the number of listed companies in Libya was small, therefore, 
it did not allow for implementation and expansion of the market systems as compared to 
other developing countries. They believe that this is a major problem as many firms are 
unable to join the stock market and to be listed on the Libyan stock exchange, which may 
even have an effect on their future governance practices. In support of this, the general 
manager in Alsari bank argued: 
"For a company to be listed in the market, it must meet certain terms which 
people in charge of these companies are unaware. Unless these conditions are 
fulfilled and the awareness of the investment is spread, this obstacle will remain 
problematic. (AB3) 
In addition, a board member and general manager in the United Insurance Co. stated: 
"This is also a major obstacle as all target companies still face managerial and 
financial problems, so this complication will remain unless those organisations 
are restructured" (A12). 
All respondents pointed out that the absence of a body monitoring governance practice in 
Libya was among the major obstacles in Libya. They argue that the high degree of 
government ownership in the country may have hindered the emergence of governance 
practice monitoring bodies. A board member in Bank of Commerce and Development said: 
"I think this is one of the major obstacles; there should be an independent body 
working on applying this system and surmounting the difficulties that hinder this 
application" (AB4). 
In addition, the general manager in Alsari Bank argued: 
"I believe this is an obstacle for the time being. The market is still small, but in 
future, as it becomes more developed with more listed companies, the absence of 
such a body will be a real obstacle" (AB3). 
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This result supports the findings of Saidi (2004), who investigated the OECD principles 
of corporate governance in Lebanon. One of the main recommendations was that there is 
a need for an independent body to monitor the implementation of corporate governance 
in the country. 
The other obstacle to the application of corporate governance mentioned by some 
respondents was the financial cost of implementation. This is because the system requires the 
establishment of many board committees and other departments, such as internal auditing, as 
well as needs some financial experts from outside the companies. However, the other 
respondents argued that it is a costly system, but that its benefits still outweighed the costs of 
implementation. This again relates to a lack of awareness of both company management and 
the government. The chairman of Gamhuria Bank stated that: 
"Despite the cost, such a good system of control fulfils transparency, which is 
more valuable" (AB2). 
In addition, a board member and general manager in United Insurance Co. remarked: 
"There will be some cost, but this will be negligible compared to expected 
benefits" (A11). 
The board member in Wahda Bank said: 
"There will be a cost, but it won't be considerable enough to be called an 
obstacle. And great efforts must be exerted" (ABJ). 
This result was in line with the findings of Business Roundtable (2006). The survey revealed 
the high costs of applying the Sarbanes-Oxley in the USA. Further still, this result also 
confirmed the findings of Duca et al. (2007), which showed that most Romanian companies 
consider the adoption of a corporate governance system as complicated because it meant 
change in the company memorandum of association and huge legal and financial-accounting 
consultancy expenses. Finally, the majority of respondents believed that insufficient 
international pressure on applying corporate governance was among the obstacles. They 
argued that it is due to the isolation of Libya from the rest of the world, meaning that 
institutions which can exert such pressure have no impact in the country. In addition, they 
noted that corporate governance was not in need in Libya, which led to management 
ignorance in most organisations. A board member in Libyan Insurance Company remarked: 
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"Libya was isolated from the rest of the world for quite some time and this led to 
its absence from so many international fields, which in turn made it miss the 
opportunity of utilising other international organisations' experience.... "(A12). 
In addition, the board of directors in Wahda bank said: 
"It is not a matter of insufficient international pressure. There was no need for 
these systems, which led to ignorance of this organisation experience in this 
domain " (AB1). 
5.6 Conclusion 
The principal conclusions that can be drawn from analysis of the semi-structured 
interviews are: 
With regard to ownership structure, the results indicated that there were two types of 
this in listed Libyan companies: concentrated and distributed. Under concentrated ownership 
there are three sub-categories, which are governmental, institutional and foreign shareholders. 
Four companies have high-degrees of government ownership: Wahda Bank (54.1%), 
Gamhuria Bank (89%), Libyan Insurance Co (45%) and Al-Sahara Insurance Co. (45%). 
Two companies have foreign shareholders: Wahda Bank (19%) and Sahara Bank (19%). 
However, the majority of these companies have institutional shareholders except for Wahda 
Bank and Gamhuria Bank. In terms of distributed ownership, in which individuals or small 
private companies own less than 5% of shares, all companies have varying ratios of these 
kinds of shareholders. 
The results also indicated that respondents knew of the benefits of voting by mail or 
the internet, but it was discovered that this was not widely used by companies in Libya. They 
emphasised that personal attendance was necessary at general meetings. Respondents further 
mentioned that their companies allowed their shareholders to use the method of proxy voting. 
However, cumulative voting was not permitted in spite of this safeguarding the rights of 
minority shareholders by allowing them to work as a group to elect a candidate of their 
choice, who, as a member of the board of directors, would represent them. Shareholders of all 
the companies obtained relevant and timely information regarding financial and non-financial 
matters. They also had the right to share profits as well as to attend and participate at the 
AGM. 
159 
. 
With regard to board structure, the results indicated that the majority of companies 
have the same size - seven members including the chairman. All the participants agreed that 
all the board members should be highly qualified and have the right mix of experience, skills, 
and backgrounds. Additionally, the five banking companies have a majority of non-executive 
directors on their boards, whereas the three insurance companies have a ratio 4: 7,4: 8 and 4: 9 
non-executive directors to executive directors on their boards. The results also showed that all 
companies have different people in the two positions of the Chairman and the CEO. As 
regards the tasks and responsibilities assigned to the board of directors, the results indicated 
that the majority of companies reported that their board played an important role in setting 
objectives and strategy. Furthermore, the general written rules stipulating the role and 
responsibilities of the board in the banking sector are defined by the LBL (1/ 2005). 
However, some participants from this sector stressed the need for their own written rules, 
which were an inflexible requirement of their foreign partner. 
However, the results revealed that all the companies do not have their own corporate 
governance rules and written policies clarifying the relationship with stakeholders, despite the 
LCCG call for this to be produced by the board of directors. The reason may be because the 
concept of corporate governance is new in Libya. In terms of top management performance 
evaluation, the results demonstrated that this is done by board of directors, which effectively 
appraises the executive management using multiple financial and non-financial indicators as 
well as profit-related indicators. The results indicated that most companies have a good 
internal control system and there are bodies inside and outside that ensure the effectiveness of 
such a system. 
The respondents agreed that it was important to have independent internal auditors, 
who were highly educated in both accounting and auditing. However, with regard to the 
conflict of interest with the board of directors, the results indicated that the majority of 
respondents stated clearly that their companies have no clear written regulations for the 
directors and staff regarding this issue. In addition, the results also revealed that the 
disclosure and transparency of all companies was poor. Moreover, some companies have no 
audit and nominating committees and their duties are performed by the board and the CEOs. 
However, all companies have control committees because it is required by Libyan law. 
Finally, a number of obstacles affecting corporate governance were suggested by the 
respondents. These were: 
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" weakness of the organisation management, 
" weakness of the legal environment, 
" influence and interference of the government, 
" weakness of accounting and audit professions because of non-adoption of the 
international standards, 
" the current ownership structure of certain firms, 
" absence of training programs for members of board of directors about the governance 
system, 
" inadequacy of investors' awareness of the investment concept, 
" the financial cost of implementing the governance system, 
" the limited number of listed companies in the local market, 
" absence of a body to monitor governance practice, and 
" insufficient international pressure on applying a governance system in Libya. 
Overall, the impression gained from the responses to this phase of the field study was 
that while substantial progress had been made in those companies attempting to implement 
the LCGC, it was not reasonable to expect complete compliance in companies, and within a 
corporate culture, where the right of stakeholders and the responsibilities of directors were 
new concepts and no history of effective corporate governance existed. In order to provide a 
more complete picture of Libyan attempts to introduce a corporate governance code, the next 
chapter presents an analysis of the results derived from the questionnaire survey, which was 
designed to collect the general perceptions of the staff of Libyan listed companies, and of 
experts in the field of corporate governance, on the LCGC. 
The findings with regard to this stage of the data collection process provided valuable 
insight into obstacles facing the implementation of the LCGC, and were used to form some of 
the questions in stage two of the field work, the results of which are presented in the next 
chapter. 
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Chapter Six 
Analyses and Results of Questionnaires Survey 
6.1 Introduction 
The questionnaire survey was the method adopted in the second stage of this study to 
collect the primary data. This method seeks to survey the respondents' perceptions regarding 
the introduction of the LCGC, and it also attempts to identify the current obstacles facing its 
application. The questionnaire survey was distributed among two groups; the first consisted 
of the staff of companies listed on the LSM (senior managers and employees in the financial 
function), hereafter referred to as `the staff, and the second consisted of Libyan financial 
experts (external auditors and academics). 
The questionnaire contained three sections (see Appendix B and C): the first section 
covered background information about the respondents; the second section asked the 
respondents to express the extent of their agreement with shareholders rights, board structure 
and responsibilities, internal auditing, disclosure and transparency, conflicts of interest, and 
board committees as set out by the LCGC; and the third section asked the respondents to 
express the extent of their agreement with the nature of the obstacles affecting corporate 
governance practice. 
6.2 Staff Background Information 
Table 6.1 presents staff background information. The respondents have been 
classified by job position, length of experience (years), qualification level, fields of study and 
place of qualification. 
Table 6.1 (Panel A) shows the distribution of the respondents by job position. The 
majority (55%) of the respondents work in accountancy, followed by people working in the 
finance department of the companies (17%). Board members of the different corporations 
investigated represented 13% of respondents. On the other hand, financial managers and 
internal auditors were the minority of the respondents. Internal auditors consisted of 7%, 
while financial managers represented 8%. 
As indicated in Panel B, an analysis of the respondents of the staff by length of 
experience revealed that the majority, 40%, had more than 15 years of experience, 21% 
between 5 and 9 years, 21% between 1 and 4 years and, lastly, 3% with less than 1 year. This 
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is an indication that listed Libyan companies have relatively experienced staff; those with a 
working experience of 5 years and above represent76 % of the total respondents. 
Table 6.1 Staff Background Information 
Description Frequency Percentage 
Panel A: Job position 
Member of Board 13 13.0 
Financial Manager 8 8.0 
Internal Auditors 7 7.0 
Accountant 55 55.0 
Others 17 17.0 
Total 100 100.0 
Panel B: length of experience 
Less than I bear 3 3.0 
1-4 years 21 21.0 
5-9 years 21 21.0 
10-15 years 15 15.0 
More than 15 years 40 40.0 
Total 100 100.0 
Panel C: Qualification level 
Pre-Degree Diploma 11 11.0 
Bachelor Degree 66 66.0 
Master's Degree 17 17.0 
Others 6 6.0 
Total 100 100.0 
Panel D: Principal area of study 
Accounting 55 55.0 
Bus. Admin 18 18.0 
Economics 9 9.0 
Finance 2 2.0 
Total 100 100.0 
Panel E: Place of Qualification 
Libya 91 91.0 
Other Arab Country 3 3.0 
USA 3 3.0 
UK 1 1.0 
Others 2 2.0 
Total 100 100.0 
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As shown in Panel C, in terms of qualification level, 66% of the staff respondents have a 
Bachelor Degree, 17% are Master's Degree holders, 11% are pre-degree diploma holders and 
6% are qualified in other fields. This implies that Libyan companies employ qualified 
personnel with Bachelor and Master's Degree holders representing 83%. 
As indicated in Panel D, in terms of fields of study, 55% of the staff respondents are 
qualified in the field of accountancy, 18% have studied business administration and 16% are 
qualified in other areas - economics (9%) and finance (2%). As shown in Panel E, the 
analysis of respondents of the staff according to place of qualification, shows that 91% are 
graduates from Libya, 3% graduated from other Arabic countries, 3% graduated from the 
USA, 1% graduated from the UK, while 2% of the total respondents graduated from other 
countries. 
6.3 Libyan Financial Experts Background Information 
Table 6.2 presents the background information of the Libyan financial experts 
respondents (external auditors and academics) classified by length of experience (years), 
qualification level, fields of study and place of qualification. 
Table 6.2 (Panel A) shows the distribution of the respondents by their length of 
experience. The findings revealed that 32.4% were in the range of 5 and 9 years of 
experience, 22.2% with a working experience between 1 and 4 years, 21% 15 years of 
working experience, 18% with working experience between 10 and 15 years and, finally, 8% 
respondents had less than 1 year of experience. As shown in Panel B, in terms of qualification 
level, 50.9% of respondents held a Master's Degree, 24.1% a Bachelor's Degree, 22.2% a 
PhD and 2.8% held other post graduate studies. This implies that Libyan experts were more 
qualified compared to the staff, with 97.2% qualified above the Bachelor's Degree level. 
Panel C shows the analysis of respondents of Libyan experts according to their fields 
of study. A majority of the respondents, 57.4%, qualified in accountancy, 19.4% studied 
business administration, 12% qualified in economics and, finally, 11.1% qualified in finance. 
Panel D, additionally, reveals data on place of qualification: 70.4% of respondents are 
graduates from Libya, 14.8% graduated from other Arab countries, 8.3% graduated from the 
UK and 7% graduated from the USA. 
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Table 6.2 Background Information of Libyan Financial Experts 
Description Frequency Percentage 
Panel A: length of experience 
Less than I\ ear 8 7.4 
1-4 years 24 22.2 
5-9 years 35 32.4 
10-15 years 18 16.7 
More than 15 years 23 21.3 
Total 108 100.0 
Panel B: Qualification level 
Bachelor Degree 26 24.1 
Master's Degree 55 50.9 
PhD 24 22.2 
Other 3 2.8 
Total 108 100.0 
Panel C: Principal area of study 
Accounting 62 57.4 
Bus. Admin 21 19.4 
Economics 13 12.0 
Finance 12 11.1 
Total 108 100.0 
Panel D: Place of Qualification 
Libya 76 70.4 
Other Arab Country 16 14.8 
USA 7 6.5 
UK 9 8.3 
Total 108 100.0 
6.4 General Perceptions of the Libyan Corporate Governance Code (LCGC) 
The second section of the questionnaire focused on respondents' general perceptions 
of the LCGC. This section comprised of ten questions related to LCGC, analysing the views 
of both the staff and Libyan experts. The analysis of the responses to these questions is 
presented in the sections below. 
6.4.1 Rights of Shareholders 
Under this question, respondents were asked to provide their views on the rights of 
shareholders as set out in the LCGC on a five-point scale ranging from 1=Strongly Disagree; 
2= Disagree; 3= Neutral; 4= Agree; 5= Strongly Agree. 
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6.4.1.1 General Perceptions on the Voting Rights 
This section summarises the findings on the general perception of the voting rights of 
shareholders. Four statements were considered, as displayed in Table 6.3. Both the mean, 
median, standard deviation and the ranks of the staff and Libyan experts were analysed and 
compared. The Mann-Whitney test (U test) and probability values were determined to predict 
the significance at the 5% level of the general perception on the voting rights under the 
LCGC. 
With regard to the statement whether companies should allow voting by mail, the 
mean was 3.04, the median 3.00, the standard deviation 1.370 for the staff, while the Libyan 
experts' scores had a mean of 3.31, a median of 4.00 and a standard deviation of 1.228. This 
implies that both groups agreed that companies should vote by mail as their mean scores fell 
above 3. On the other hand, it should be noted that in consideration of the median, the Libyan 
experts agreed, while the staff did not agree with the statement. Furthermore, the higher 
standard deviation of the staff is an indication that the opinion of the Libyan experts seems to 
be more reliable than the opinion of the staff. Based on the mean, the findings of both the 
staff and the Libyan experts regarding this statement were ranked number 3 and 2 
respectively. Using the Mann-Whitney test, the two sided p-value is equal to 0.168, which is 
not significant at a=0.05. Hence, it can be concluded that there is no real difference in 
agreement with the statement between the groups, although the computed mean and median 
results show differences. 
In order to determine the respondent's attitude regarding the statement whether 
companies should allow voting through the internet, the mean was 3.59, the median 4.00 and 
the standard deviation 1.303 for the staff, while the Libyan experts scores had a mean of 3.65, 
a median of 4.00 and a standard deviation of 1.105. This implies that both groups agreed with 
this statement as their mean and median scores fell below 4. Furthermore, the higher standard 
deviation of the staff is an indication that the opinion of the Libyan experts seems to be more 
reliable than the opinion of the staff. Based on the mean, the findings of both groups 
regarding this statement were ranked 1. 
Using the Mann-Whitney test, the two sided p-value is equal to 0.848, which is not 
significant at a=0.05. 
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Hence, it can be concluded that there is no real difference in agreement with the 
statement between the groups. 
Concerning the statement whether companies should allow proxy voting, the mean 
was 3.05, the median'3.00 and the standard deviation 1.218 for the staff, while the Libyan 
experts' scores had a mean of 2.93, a median of 3.00 and a standard deviation of 1.358. This 
implies that the staff agreed, while the Libyan experts did not agree with the statement as 
their mean scores fell below 4 and 3 respectively. At the same time, it should be noted that in 
consideration of the median, both the groups did not agree with the statement. Furthermore, 
the higher standard deviation of the Libyan experts is indication that the opinion of the staff 
seems to be more reliable than the opinion of the Libyan experts. Based on the mean, the 
findings of both the staff and the Libyan experts regarding this statement were ranked number 
2 and 4 respectively. Using the Mann-Whitney test, the two sided p-value is equal to 0.525, 
which is not significant at a=0.05. Hence, it can be concluded that there is no real difference 
of opinion with this statement for both groups. 
As regards the statement whether companies should allow cumulative voting, the 
mean was 2.90, the median 3.00 and the standard deviation 1.210 for the staff, while the 
Libyan experts' scores had a mean of 3.07, a median of 3.00 and a standard deviation of 
1.190. This implies that the staffs were undecided and Libyan experts agreed that companies 
should allow cumulative voting as their mean scores fell below 3 and 4 respectively. In 
consideration of the median, both groups did not agree with the statement. Furthermore, the 
higher standard deviation of the staff is an indication that the opinion of the company staff 
seems to be less reliable than the opinion of the Libyan experts. Based on the mean, the 
findings of both the staff and the Libyan experts regarding this statement were ranked number 
4 and 3 respectively. Using the Mann-Whitney test, the two sided p-value is equal to 0.285, 
which is not significant at a=0.05. Hence, it can be concluded that there is no real difference 
of opinion with this statement for both groups. 
6.4.1.2 General Perceptions on the Other Rights of Shareholders 
This section summarises the general perception on the other rights of shareholders 
under the LCGC. Five statements were considered as displayed in Table 6.4 below. 
With regard to the statement whether shareholders should obtain relevant information 
about the company on a timely and regular basis, the mean was 4.33, the median 5.00 and the 
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standard deviation 0.933 for the staff, while the Libyan experts scores had a mean of 4.31, a 
median of 5.00 and a standard deviation of 0.954. This indicates that both groups strongly 
agreed with the statement as their mean and median scores fell above 4. Furthermore, the 
higher standard deviation of the Libyan experts is an indication that the opinion of the staff 
seems to be more reliable than the opinion of the Libyan experts. Based on the mean, the 
findings of both the staff and the Libyan experts regarding this statement were ranked number 
2 and 1 respectively. Using the Mann-Whitney test, the two sided p-value is equal to 0.902, 
which is not significant at a=0.05. Hence, it can be concluded that there is no real difference 
in agreement with the statement between the groups. 
Considering the statement whether shareholders should have the right to prosecute the 
board of directors, the mean was 4.14, the median 4.00 and the standard deviation 1.137 for 
the staff, while the Libyan experts scores had a mean of 4.18, a median of 4.00 and a standard 
deviation of 1.092. This shows that both groups strongly agreed with the statement as their 
mean scores fell above 4. In addition, it should be noted that while considering the median, 
both groups agreed with this statement. Furthermore, the higher standard deviation of the 
staff is an indication that the opinion of the company staff seems to be less reliable than the 
opinion of the Libyan experts. Based on the mean, the findings of both groups regarding this 
statement were ranked number 4. Using the Mann-Whitney test, the two sided p-value is 
equal to 0.908, which is not significant at a=0.05. Hence, it can be concluded that there is no 
real difference in agreement with the statement between the groups. 
With regard to the statement whether shareholders should have the right to register 
and transfer the ownership of shares, the mean was 4.19, the median 4.00 and the standard 
deviation 1.002 for the staff, while the Libyan experts' scores had a mean of 4.19, a median 
of 4.00 and a standard deviation of 0.997. This implies that both groups strongly agreed with 
the statement as their mean scores fall above 4. On the other hand, it should be noted that 
while considering the median, both groups agreed with this statement. Furthermore, the 
higher standard deviation of the staff is an indication that the opinion of the company staff 
seems to be less reliable than the opinion of the Libyan experts. Based on the mean, the 
findings of both groups regarding this statement were ranked number 3. 
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Using the Mann-Whitney test, the two sided p-value is equal to 0.911, which is not 
significant at a=0.05. Hence, it can be concluded that there is no real difference in agreement 
with the statement between the groups. 
As regards the statement whether shareholders should have an equal right to share in 
the profits, the mean was 3.64, the median 4.00 and the standard deviation 1.382 for the staff, 
while the Libyan experts' scores had a mean of 3.74, a median of 4.00 and a standard 
deviation of 1.179. This implies that both groups agreed with the statement as their mean and 
median scores fell below 4. Furthermore, the higher standard deviation of the staff is an 
indication that the opinion of the company staff seems to be less reliable than the opinion of 
the Libyan experts. Based on the mean, the findings of both groups regarding the statement 
were ranked number 5. Using the Mann-Whitney test, the two sided p-value is equal to 0.936, 
which is not significant at a=0.05. Hence, it can be concluded that there is no real difference 
in agreement with the statement between the groups. 
Concerning whether the company should disclose a dividend policy, the mean was 
4.34, the median 5.00 and the standard deviation 0.987 for the staff, while the Libyan experts' 
scores had a mean of 4.31, a median of 5.00 and a standard deviation of 0.973. This implies 
that both groups strongly agreed with the statement as their mean median scores fell above 4. 
Furthermore, the higher standard deviation of the staff is an indication that the opinion of the 
company staff seems to be less reliable than the opinion of the Libyan experts. Based on the 
mean, the findings of both the staff and the Libyan experts regarding this statement were 
ranked number 1 and 2 respectively. Using the Mann-Whitney test, the two sided p-value is 
equal to 0.958, which is not significant at a=0.05. Hence, it can be concluded that there is no 
real difference in agreement with the statement between the groups. 
6.4.1.3 General Perceptions on the Rights of Shareholders at the AGM 
This section summarises the general perception on the rights of shareholders at the 
Annual General Meeting (AGM) under the LCGC. Nine statements were considered as 
displayed in Table 6.5 below. 
With regard to the statement whether the processes and procedures for the AGM 
should allow for equitable treatment of all shareholders, the mean was 4.33, the median 5.00 
and the standard deviation 0.922 for the staff, while the Libyan experts' scores had a mean of 
4.29, a median of 4.00 and a standard deviation of 0.907. This implies that both groups 
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strongly agreed with the statement as their mean scores fell above 4. On the other hand, it 
should be noted that while considering the median, the staff strongly agreed and the Libyan 
experts agreed with this statement. Furthermore, the higher standard deviation of the staff is 
an indication that the opinion of the company staff seems to be less reliable than the opinion 
of the Libyan experts, although both deviations fall below 1 which is good. Based on the 
mean, the findings of the staff regarding the statement were ranked number 4, while those of 
the Libyan experts were ranked number 2. Using the Mann-Whitney test, the two sided p- 
value is equal to 0.579, which is not significant at a=0.05. Hence, it can be concluded that 
there is no real difference in agreement with the statement between the groups. 
As regards the statement whether adequate time should be given to shareholders for 
asking questions and raising issues at the AGM, the mean was 4.36, the median 5.00 and the 
standard deviation 0.871 for the staff, while the Libyan experts scores' had a mean of 4.17, a 
median of 4.00 and a standard deviation of 0.826. This implies that both groups strongly 
agreed with the statement as their mean scores fell above 4. On the other hand, it should be 
noted that while considering the median, the staff strongly agreed and the Libyan experts 
agreed with the statement. Furthermore, the higher standard deviation of the staff is an 
indication that the opinion of the company staff seems to be less reliable than the opinion of 
the Libyan experts, although both deviations fall below I which is good. Based on the mean, 
the findings of the company staff regarding the statement were ranked number 3, while those 
of the Libyan experts were ranked number 6. Using the Mann-Whitney test, the two sided p- 
value is equal to 0.021, which is the highly significant difference at a=0.05. 
Hence, it can be concluded that the opinion of the staff differed significantly from 
those of the Libyan experts regarding the above statement. A possible explanation for this 
difference may be that the Libyan experts had more experience and knew that in practice it 
would be difficult to give shareholders this right because the AGM has a specific duration 
and agenda. So they were less keen to express a stronger level of support. 
With regard to the statement whether the dates and locations of the AGM should be 
carefully chosen in order to maximise attendance of shareholders, the mean was 4.38, the 
median 5.00 and the standard deviation 0.838 for the staff, while the Libyan experts' scores 
had a mean of 4.22, a median of 4.00 and a standard deviation of 0.857. This shows that both 
groups strongly agreed with the statement as their mean scores fell above 4. Furthermore, the 
higher standard deviation of the Libyan experts is indication that the opinion of the staff 
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seems to be more reliable than the opinion of the Libyan experts. Based on the mean, the 
findings of the staff regarding the statement were ranked number 2, while those of the Libyan 
experts were ranked number 5. Using the Mann-Whitney test, the two sided p-value is equal 
to 0.071, which is not significant at a=0.05. Hence, it can be concluded that there is no real 
difference in agreement with the statement between the groups. 
Regarding the statement whether the information on each board member candidate 
and his/her curriculum vitae should be disclosed before the AGM, the mean was 4.33, the 
median 5.00 and the standard deviation 0.943 for the staff, while the Libyan experts' scores 
had a mean of 4.24, a median of 4.00 and a standard deviation of 1.040. This implies that 
both groups strongly agreed with this statement as their mean scores fell above 4. 
Furthermore, the higher standard deviation of the Libyan experts is indication that the opinion 
of the staff seems to be more reliable than the opinion of the Libyan experts. Based on the 
mean, the findings of the staff regarding the statement were ranked number 5, while those of 
the Libyan experts were ranked number 4. Using the Mann-Whitney test, the two sided p- 
value is equal to 0.988, which is not significant at a=0.05. Hence, it can be concluded that 
there is no real difference in agreement with the statement between the groups. 
Concerning the statement whether information on each nomination and audit 
committee member candidate and his/her curriculum vitae should be disclosed before the 
AGM, the mean was 4.22, the median 4.00 and the standard deviation 0.991 for the staff, 
while the Libyan experts' scores had a mean of 4.27, a median of 4.00 and a standard 
deviation of 1.001. This implies that both groups strongly agreed with this statement as their 
mean scores fell above 4. Furthermore, the higher standard deviation of the Libyan experts is 
indication that the opinion of the staff seems to be more reliable than the opinion of the 
Libyan experts. Based on the mean, the findings of the staff regarding the statement were 
ranked number 6, while those of the Libyan experts were ranked number 3. Using the Mann- 
Whitney test, the two sided p-value is equal to 0.639, which is not significant at a=0.05. 
Hence, it can be concluded that there is no real difference in agreement with the statement 
between the groups. 
With regard to the statement whether information qualifications and expected fees of 
an external auditor should be disclosed before the AGM, the mean was 4.17, the median 4.00 
and, the standard deviation 0.900 for the staff, while the Libyan experts' scores had a mean of 
4.14, a median of 4.00 and a standard deviation of 0.981. This implies that groups strongly 
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agreed with this statement as their mean scores fell above 4. Furthermore, the higher standard 
deviation of the Libyan experts is indication that the opinion of the staff seems to be more 
reliable than the opinion of the Libyan experts. Based on the mean, the findings of both the 
groups regarding the statement were ranked number 7. Using the Mann-Whitney test, the two 
sided p-value is equal to 0.988, which is not significant at a=0.05. Hence, it can be concluded 
that there is no real difference in agreement with the statement between the groups. 
With regard to the statement whether related party transactions should be fully 
discussed before the AGM, the mean was 3.86, the median 4.00 and the standard deviation 
1.101 for the staff, while the Libyan experts' scores had a mean of 3.74, a median of 4.00 and 
a standard deviation of 0.961. This implies that both groups agreed with this statement as 
their mean and median scores fell below 4. Furthermore, the higher standard deviation of the 
Libyan experts is indication that the opinion of the staff seems to be more reliable than the 
opinion of the Libyan experts. Based on the mean, the findings of both the staff and the 
Libyan experts regarding the statement were ranked number 9 and 8 respectively. Using the 
Mann-Whitney test, the two sided p-value is equal to 0.238, which is not significant at 
a=0.05. Hence, it can be concluded that there is no real difference in agreement with the 
statement between the groups. 
Concerning the statement whether the board should submit an annual report to 
shareholders, the mean was 4.43, the median 5.00 and the standard deviation 0.782 for the 
staff, while the Libyan experts' scores had a mean of 4.30, a median of 5.00, and a standard 
deviation of 0.969. This implies that both groups strongly agreed with this statement as their 
mean and median scores fell above 4. Furthermore, the higher standard deviation of the 
Libyan experts is indication that the opinion of the staff seems to be more reliable than the 
opinion of the Libyan experts. Based on the mean, the findings of both groups regarding the 
statement were ranked number 1. Using the Mann-Whitney test, the two sided p-value is 
equal to 0.456, which is not significant at a=0.05. Hence, it can be concluded that there is no 
real difference in agreement with the statement between the groups. 
Regarding the statement whether the minutes of the AGM should be disclosed 
through its publication in newspapers and through the stock exchange, the mean was 4.10, the 
median 4.00 and the standard deviation 1.020 for the staff, while the Libyan experts' scores 
had a mean of 3.67, a median of 4.00 and a standard deviation of 1.275. 
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This shows that the staff strongly agreed, while the Libyan experts agreed with the 
statement as their mean scores fell above and below 4 respectively. Additionally, it should be 
noted that while considering the median, both groups agreed with the statement. Furthermore, 
the higher standard deviation of the Libyan experts is indication that the opinion of the staff 
seems to be more reliable than the opinion of the Libyan experts. Based on the mean, the 
findings of both the staff and the Libyan experts regarding the statement were ranked number 
8 and 9 respectively. 
Using the Mann-Whitney test, the two sided p-value is equal to 0.016, which is the 
highly significant difference at a=0.05. These results, however, did not represent significant 
division between the two groups in terms of agreement-disagreement, but represented a 
variance in the agreement level as one group of respondents agreed more strongly with the 
statement than the other. Hence, it can be concluded that the staff expressed a stronger level 
of support than the Libyan experts regarding the statement above. This may be due to staff's 
awareness of the importance of disclosure, whereas, in fact, most Libyan companies do not 
meet their obligation to disclose information. 
These results support the findings and recommendations made by the IMF (2001; 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) 2003; International Monetary Fund (IMF) 2004), which 
suggested that the corporate governance framework should protect the rights of shareholders. 
These are: securing methods of ownership registration; conveying or transferring shares; 
obtaining relevant information on the company on a timely and regular basis; participating 
and voting in the AGM; electing members of the board; and sharing in the profits of the 
company. Furthermore, the OECD (1999,2004) established the same basic rights of 
shareholders, which included rights to vote, to obtain relevant and timely information, to 
share in the profits and to attend and participate at the AGM 
6.4.2 General Perceptions on Board Structure 
This section summarises the general perceptions on the board structure under the 
LCGC. Six statements were considered as displayed in Table 6.6 below. The mean, median, 
standard deviation and the ranks of both groups were analysed and compared. The Mann- 
Whitney test (U test) and probability values were determined to predict the significance at the 
5% level of the general perception on the board structure under the LCGC. 
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With regard to the statement whether the size of the board of directors should not be 
less than three members and not more than eleven, the mean was 3.84, the median 4.00 and 
the standard deviation 0.838 for the staff, while the Libyan experts' scores had a mean of 
3.81, a median of 4.00 and a standard deviation of 1.000. This shows that both groups agreed 
as their mean and median scores fell below 4. Furthermore, the higher standard deviation of 
the Libyan experts is indication that the opinion of the staff seems to be more reliable than 
the opinion of the Libyan experts. Based on the mean, the findings of both groups regarding 
the statement were ranked number 5. Using the Mann-Whitney test, the two sided p-value is 
equal to 0.901, which is not significant at a=0.05. Hence, it can be concluded that there is no 
real difference in agreement with the statement between the groups. 
With regard to the statement whether the majority of the board should be non- 
executive directors, the mean was 3.70, the median 4.00 and the standard deviation 1.049 for 
the staff, while the Libyan experts' scores had a mean of 3.69, a median of 4.00 and a 
standard deviation of 1.139. This indicates that both groups agreed with this statement as 
their mean and median scores fell below 4. Furthermore, the higher standard deviation of the 
Libyan experts is indication that the opinion of the staff seems to be more reliable than the 
opinion of the Libyan experts. Based on the mean, the findings of both groups regarding the 
statement were ranked number 6. Using the Mann-Whitney test, the two sided p-value is 
equal to 0.964, which is not significant at a=0.05. Hence, it can be concluded that there is no 
real difference in agreement with the statement between the groups. 
With regard to the statement whether there should be separation between the position 
of the chairman and the CEO, the mean was 3.97, the median 4.00 and the standard deviation 
1.039 for the staff, while the Libyan experts' scores had a mean of 4.27, a median of 4.00 and 
a standard deviation of 0.913. This implies that the staff agreed, while the Libyan experts 
strongly agreed with the statement as their mean scores fell below 4 and above 4 respectively. 
Furthermore, the higher standard deviation of the staff is an indication that the opinion of the 
company staff seems to be less reliable than the opinion of the Libyan experts. Based on the 
mean, the findings of both groups regarding the statement were ranked number 3. Using the 
Mann-Whitney test, the two sided p-value is equal to 0.019, which is the highly significant 
difference at a=0.05. Hence, it can be concluded that the Libyan experts expressed a stronger 
level of support than the staff regarding the above statement. 
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With regard to the statement whether each member of the board may not sit on more 
than three additional boards at the same time, the mean was 3.94, the median 4.00 and the 
standard deviation 0.973 for the staff, while the Libyan experts' scores had a mean of 4.26, a 
median of 4.50 and a standard deviation of 0.961. This implies that the staff agreed with the 
statement, while the Libyan experts strongly agreed with the statement as their mean median 
scores fell below and above 4 respectively. Furthermore, the higher standard deviation of the 
staff is an indication that the opinion of the company staff seems to be less reliable than the 
opinion of the Libyan experts. Based on the mean, the findings of both groups regarding the 
statement were ranked number 4. Using the Mann-Whitney test, the two sided p-value is 
equal to 0.004, which is the highly significant difference at a=0.05. Hence, it can be 
concluded that the Libyan experts expressed a stronger level of support than the staff 
regarding the above statement. 
With regard to the statement whether most board members should have financial and 
technical skills, the mean was 4.34, the median 4.00 and the standard deviation 0.831 for the 
staff, while the Libyan experts' scores had a mean of 4.52, a median of 5 and a standard 
deviation of 0.826. This implies that both groups strongly agreed with this statement as their 
mean scores fell above 4. On the other hand, it should be noted that while considering the 
median, the staff agreed with the statement, whereas Libyan experts strongly agreed with the 
statement. Furthermore, the higher standard deviation of the staff is an indication that the 
opinion of the company staff seems to be less reliable than the opinion of the Libyan experts. 
Based on the mean, the findings of both groups regarding the statement were ranked number 
1. Using the Mann-Whitney test, the two sided p-value is equal to 0.0 19, which is the highly 
significant difference at a=0.05. Hence, it can be concluded that the Libyan experts expressed 
a stronger level of support than the staff regarding the statement above. 
As regards the statement whether newly assigned members of the board should 
receive financial and non-financial information about the company, the mean was 4.29, the 
median 4.00 and the standard deviation 0.844 for the staff, while the Libyan experts scores' 
had a mean of 4.27, a median of 5.00 and a standard deviation of 0.870. This indicates that 
both groups strongly agreed with the above statement as their mean scores fall above 4. On 
the other hand, it should be noted that while considering the median, the staff agreed with the 
statement, whereas Libyan experts strongly agreed with the statement. 
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Furthermore, the higher standard deviation of the Libyan experts is indication that the 
opinion of the staff seems to be more reliable than the opinion of the Libyan experts. Based 
on the mean, the findings of both groups regarding the statement were ranked number 2. 
using the Mann-Whitney test, the two sided p-value is equal to 0.019, which is the highest 
significant difference at a=0.05. Hence, it can be concluded that the Libyan experts expressed 
a stronger level of support than the staff regarding the above statement. 
These results, however, did not represent significant division between the two groups 
in terms of agreement-disagreement, but represented a variance in the agreement level as one 
group of respondents agreed more strongly with the statement than the other. Hence, it can be 
concluded that the Libyan experts expressed a stronger level of support than the staff 
regarding most statements of board structure. A possible explanation for this difference may 
be the fact that the Libyan experts had more experience and were more qualified than the 
other group. Therefore, respondents with lower educational levels may not have understood 
as well the importance of board structure. 
These results support the findings of Hussain and Mallin (2003); Abor and Adjasi 
(2007); McCabe and Nowak (2008); Abd-Rahman, (2008); and Nam and Nam (2004), who 
stated that the size of the board should be large enough to ensure expertise flows from the 
many members. According to Solomon (2007), a good board composition should include a 
minimum of three independent directors capable of influencing decisions. In addition, the 
OECD (2004) recommended that the CEO and chairman positions should be separated for an 
effective monitoring system, since the CEO is mainly responsible for corporate management, 
whereas the chairman is the head of the board of directors which monitors management. 
6.4.3 General Perceptions on Board Responsibility 
This section is a summary of the general perceptions on board responsibility under the 
LCGC. Eleven statements were considered as displayed in Table 6.5 below. 
With regard to the statement whether the company should have written rules on the 
role and responsibility of the board, the mean was 4.24, the median 4.00 and the standard 
deviation 0.866 for the staff, while the Libyan experts' scores had a mean of 4.38, a median 
of 5.00 and a standard deviation of 0.904. This implies that both groups strongly agreed with 
the statement as their mean scores fell above 4. In terms of the median, the staff agreed, while 
the Libyan experts strongly agreed with the statement. Furthermore, the higher standard 
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deviation of the Libyan experts is indication that the opinion of the staff seems to be more 
reliable than the opinion of the Libyan experts. Based on the mean, the findings of both 
groups regarding the statement were ranked number 2. Using the Mann-Whitney test, the two 
sided p-value is equal to 0.059, which is not significant at a=0.05. Hence, it can be concluded 
that there is no real difference in agreement with the statement between the groups. 
Concerning the statement whether the board should shape and review the operational 
and financial plans and objectives of the company annually, the mean was 4.19, the median 
4.00 and the standard deviation 0.929 for the staff, while the Libyan experts' scores had a 
mean of 4.44, a median of 5.00 and a standard deviation of 0.752. This implies that both 
groups strongly agreed with the statement as their mean scores fell above 4. In terms of the 
median, the staff agreed, while Libyan experts strongly agreed with the statement. 
Furthermore, the higher standard deviation of the staff is an indication that the opinion of the 
company staff seems to be less reliable than the opinion of the Libyan experts. Based on the 
mean, the findings of both the staff and the Libyan experts regarding the statement were 
ranked number 3 and 1 respectively. Using the Mann-Whitney test, the two sided p-value is 
equal to 0.035, which is the highly significant difference at a=0.05. Hence, it can be 
concluded that the Libyan experts expressed a stronger level of support than the staff 
regarding the above statement. This may be due to the fact that Libyan law obligates the 
boards to shape and review the objectives of their companies annually, which is clearly 
observed by the Libyan experts. 
Regarding the statement whether the board should review the company's internal 
policies periodically, the mean was 4.17, the median 4.00 and the standard deviation 0.965 
for the staff, while the Libyan experts' scores had a mean of 4.33, a median of 5.00 and a 
standard deviation of 0.823. This indicates that both groups strongly agreed with the 
statement as their mean scores fell above 4. When the median is considered, the staff agreed, 
while Libyan experts strongly agreed with the statement. Furthermore, the higher standard 
deviation of the staff is an indication that the opinion of the company staff seems to be less 
reliable than the opinion of the Libyan experts. Based on the mean, the findings of both the 
staff and the Libyan experts regarding the statement were ranked number 6 and 4 
respectively. Using the Mann-Whitney test, the two sided p-value is equal to 0.216, which is 
not significant at a=0.05. Hence, it can be concluded that there is no real difference in 
agreement with the statement between the groups. 
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Concerning the statement whether the board should shape and review the company's 
risk management policies, the mean was 4.35, the median 4.00 and the standard deviation 
0.801 for listed company staff, while the Libyan experts' scores had a mean of 4.35, a median 
of 5.00 and a standard deviation of 0.801. This indicates that both groups strongly agreed 
with the statement as their mean scores fell above 4. When the median is considered, the staff 
agreed while Libyan experts strongly agreed with the statement. Based on the mean, the 
findings of both the staff and the Libyan experts regarding the statement were ranked number 
1 and 3 respectively. Using the Mann-Whitney test, the two sided p-value is equal to 0.112, 
which is not significant at a=0.05. Hence, it can be concluded that there is no real difference 
in agreement with the statement between the groups. 
Regarding the statement whether the board should play an important role in selecting, 
monitoring and replacing the CEO, the mean was 4.10, the median 4.00 and the standard 
deviation 1.078 for the staff, while the Libyan experts' scores had a mean of 4.21, a median 
of 4.00 and a standard deviation of 0.843. This implies that both groups strongly agreed with 
the statement as their mean scores fell above 4. Additionally, it should be noted that when 
considering the median, the groups agreed with the statement, both scoring 4. Furthermore, 
the higher standard deviation of the staff is an indication that the opinion of the company staff 
seems to be less reliable than the opinion of the Libyan experts. Based on the mean, the 
findings of both the staff and the Libyan experts regarding the statement were ranked number 
9 and 6 respectively. Using the Mann-Whitney test, the two sided p-value is equal to 0.287, 
which is not significant at a=0.05. Hence, it can be concluded that there is no real difference 
in agreement with the statement between the groups. 
With regard to the statement whether the board of directors should attend corporate 
governance director training programmes, the mean was 4.18, the median 4.00 and the 
standard deviation 0.947 for the staff, while the Libyan experts' scores had a mean of 4.08, a 
median of 4.00 and a standard deviation of 0.939. This implies that both groups strongly 
agreed with the statement as their mean scores fell above 4. In addition, it should be noted 
that while considering the median, the two groups agreed with the statement as both scored 4. 
Furthermore, the higher standard deviation of the staff is an indication that the opinion of the 
company staff seems to be less reliable than the opinion of the Libyan experts. Based on the 
mean, the findings of both the staff and the Libyan experts regarding the statement were 
ranked number 4 and 9 respectively. Using the Mann-Whitney test, the two sided p-value is 
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equal to 0.365, which is not significant at a=0.05. Hence, it can be concluded that there is no 
real difference in agreement with the statement between the groups. 
Concerning the statement whether the board and top management should meet at least 
quarterly to discuss the company's future strategy, the mean was 4.05, the median 4.00 and 
the standard deviation 0.914 for the staff, while the Libyan experts' scores had a mean of 
4.23, a median of 4.00 and a standard deviation of 0.849. This indicates that both groups 
strongly agreed with the statement as their mean scores fell above 4. When considering the 
median, the two groups agreed with the statement as both scored 4. On the other hand, the 
higher standard deviation of the staff is an indication that the opinion of the company staff 
seems to be less reliable than the opinion of the Libyan experts. Based on the mean, the 
findings of both the staff and the Libyan experts regarding the statement were ranked number 
8 and 5 respectively. Using the Mann-Whitney test, the two sided p-value is equal to 0.107, 
which is not significant at a=0.05. Hence, it can be concluded that there is no real difference 
in agreement with the statement between the groups. 
With regard to the statement whether the board should formally evaluate performance 
of top management, the mean was 4.12, the median 4.00 and the standard deviation 0.913 for 
the staff, while the Libyan experts' scores had a mean of 4.20, a median of 4.00 and a 
standard deviation of 0.955. This shows that both groups strongly agreed with the statement 
as their mean scores fell above 4. Furthermore, the higher standard deviation of the staff is an 
indication that the opinion of the company staff seems to be less reliable than the opinion of 
the Libyan experts. Based on the mean, the findings of both groups regarding the statement 
were ranked number 7. Using the Mann-Whitney test, the two sided p-value is equal to 0.305, 
which is not significant at a=0.05. Hence, it can be concluded that there is no real difference 
in agreement with the statement between the groups. 
With regard to the statement whether the board should set corporate governance rules for the 
company, the mean was 3.63, the median 4.00 and the standard deviation 0.971 for the staff, 
while the Libyan experts' scores had a mean of 3.74, a median of 4.00 and a standard 
deviation of 1.045. This shows that both groups agreed with the statement as their mean 
scores were between 3 and 4. Furthermore, the higher standard deviation of the Libyan 
experts is indication that the opinion of the staff seems to be more reliable than the opinion of 
the Libyan experts. Based on the mean, the findings of both groups regarding the statement 
were ranked number 11. 
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Using the Mann-Whitney test, the two sided p-value is equal to 0.351, which is not 
significant at a=0.05. Hence, it can be concluded that there is no real difference in agreement 
with the statement between the groups. 
Concerning the statement whether the board should set written policies clarifying the 
relationship with stakeholders, the mean was 3.82, the median 4.00 and the standard 
deviation 0.971 for the staff, while the Libyan experts' scores had a mean of 3.92, a median 
of 4.00 and a standard deviation of 0.877. This indicates that when considering the mean and 
the median, both groups agreed with the statement. 
In addition, the higher standard deviation of the staff is an indication that the opinion 
of the company staff seems to be less reliable than the opinion of the Libyan experts. Based 
on the mean, the findings of both groups regarding the statement were ranked number 10. 
Using the Mann-Whitney test, the two sided p-value is equal to 0.545, which is not 
significant at a=0.05. Hence, it can be concluded that there is no real difference in agreement 
with the statement between the groups. 
Regarding the statement whether the board should set and monitor the system of 
internal control, the mean was 4.17, the median 4.00 and the standard deviation 0.877 for the 
staff, while the Libyan experts' scores had a mean of 4.11, a median of 4.00 and a standard 
deviation of 0.921. This indicates that groups strongly agreed with the statement as their 
mean scores fell above 4. On the other hand, while considering the median, both groups 
agreed with the statement as the score was 4. 
Furthermore, the higher standard deviation of the Libyan experts is indication that the 
opinion of the staff seems to be more reliable than the opinion of the Libyan experts. Based 
on the mean, the findings of both the staff and Libyan experts regarding the statement were 
ranked number 5 and 8 respectively. Using the Mann-Whitney test, the two sided p-value is 
equal to 0.735, which is not significant at a=0.05. Hence, it can be concluded that there is no 
real difference in agreement with the statement between the groups. 
These results are in line with the findings and recommendations made by Dahya et al. 
(2002); Monks and Minow (2008); and Mallin (2007), that the board is responsible for 
determining the direction of the company through elaborating its aims, plans, policies and the 
strategies fit for success. 
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Furthermore, the OECD principles (2004) stated that a corporate governance framework 
should ensure that the strategic guidance of the company provides a great deal of detail about 
the functions of the board in protecting both its external and internal stakeholders. The UK 
Combined Code (2006) also outlines some of the duties for the board of directors (see 
subsection 3.5.3.1 in chapter 3). 
6.4.4 General Perceptions on Internal Auditing under the LCGC 
This section is a summary of the general perceptions on internal auditing under the 
Libyan LCGC. According to Daykin (2006), the internal audit is considered a key element of 
an effective corporate governance structure. Five statements were considered as displayed in 
Table 6.6 below. 
With regard to the statement whether the company should have an internal audit 
department, the mean was 4.31, the median 4.50 and the standard deviation 0.929 for the 
staff, while the Libyan experts' scores had a mean of 4.53, a median of 5.00 and a standard 
deviation of 0.755. This implies that when considering both the mean and median, both 
groups strongly agreed with the statement as their mean and medians fall above 4. In 
addition, the higher standard deviation of the staff is an indication that the opinion of the 
company staff seems to be less reliable than the opinion of the Libyan experts. Based on the 
mean, the findings of both groups regarding the statement above were ranked number 2. 
Using the Mann-Whitney test, the two sided p-value is equal to 0.047, which is significant 
difference at a=0.05. Hence, it can be concluded that the Libyan experts expressed a stronger 
level of support than the staff regarding the above statement. 
With regard to the statement whether the internal auditor should be independent, the 
mean was 4.20, the median 4.00 and the standard deviation 1.054 for the staff, while the 
Libyan experts' scores had a mean of 4.37, a median of 5.00 and a standard deviation of 
0.892. This shows that both groups agreed with this statement as their mean scores fell above 
4. On the other hand, when considering the median, the staff agreed with the statement while 
the Libyan experts strongly agreed. Furthermore, the higher standard deviation of the staff is 
an indication that the opinion of the company staff seems to be less reliable than the opinion 
of the Libyan experts. Based on the mean, the findings of both groups regarding the statement 
were ranked number 3. Using the Mann-Whitney test, the two sided p-value is equal to 0.228, 
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which is not significant at a=0.05. Hence, it can be concluded that there is no real difference 
in agreement with the statement between the groups. 
Regarding the statement whether the internal auditor should be supervised by the 
CEO and audit committee, the mean was 3.86, the median 4.00 and the standard deviation 
1.172 for the staff, while the Libyan experts' scores had a mean of 3.95, a median of 4.00 and 
a standard deviation of 1.278. This indicates that both groups agreed with the statement as 
their mean scores fell below 4. Additionally, the higher standard deviation of the staff is an 
indication that the opinion of the company staff seems to be less reliable than the opinion of 
the Libyan experts. Based on the mean, the findings of both groups regarding the statement 
were ranked number 5. Using the Mann-Whitney test, the two sided p-value is equal to 0.234, 
which is not significant at a=0.05. Hence, it can be concluded that there is no real difference 
in agreement with the statement between the groups. 
Concerning the statement whether the internal auditor should be a full time employee, 
the mean was 3.97, the median 4.00 and the standard deviation 1.068 for the staff, while the 
Libyan experts' scores had a mean of 4.36, a median of 5.00 and a standard deviation of 
0.859. This shows that the staff agreed with the statement whereas Libyan experts strongly 
agreed as their mean scores are falling below and above 4 respectively. Additionally, the 
higher standard deviation of the staff is an indication that the opinion of the company staff 
seems to be less reliable than the opinion of the Libyan experts. Based on the mean, the 
findings of both the groups regarding the statement were ranked number 4. Using the Mann- 
Whitney test, the two sided p-value is equal to 0.002, which is the highly significant 
difference at a=0.05. Hence, it can be concluded that the Libyan experts expressed a stronger 
level of support than the staff regarding the above statement. 
Regarding the statement whether the internal auditor should submit a quarterly report 
to the board and control committee, the mean was 4.20, the median 4.00 and the standard 
deviation 1.910 for the staff, while the Libyan experts' scores had a mean of 4.47, a median 
off 5.00 and a standard deviation of 0.75 5. This indicates that both groups strongly agreed 
with the statement as their mean scores fell above 4. In addition, when considering the 
median, the staff agreed while the Libyan experts strongly agreed with the statement. 
Furthermore, the higher standard deviation of the staff is an indication that the opinion of the 
company staff seems to be less reliable than the opinion of the Libyan experts. Based on the 
mean, the findings of both groups regarding the statement were ranked number 2 
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Using the Mann-Whitney test, the two sided p-value is equal to 0.008, which is the 
highly significant difference at a=0.05. 
Concerning the statement whether the internal auditor should be a full time employee, 
the mean was 3.97, the median 4.00 and the standard deviation 1.068 for the staff, while the 
Libyan experts' scores had a mean of 4.36, a median of 5.00 and a standard deviation of 
0.859. This shows that the staff agreed with the statement whereas Libyan experts strongly 
agreed as their mean scores are falling below and above 4 respectively. Additionally, the 
higher standard deviation of the staff is an indication that the opinion of the company staff 
seems to be less reliable than the opinion of the Libyan experts. Based on the mean, the 
findings of both the groups regarding the statement were ranked number 4. Using the Mann- 
Whitney test, the two sided p-value is equal to 0.002, which is the highly significant 
difference at a=0.05. Hence, it can be concluded that the Libyan experts expressed a stronger 
level of support than the staff regarding the above statement. 
Regarding the statement whether the internal auditor should submit a quarterly report 
to the board and control committee, the mean was 4.20, the median 4.00 and the standard 
deviation 1.910 for the staff, while the Libyan experts' scores had a mean of 4.47, a median 
of 5.00 and a standard deviation of 0.755. This indicates that both groups strongly agreed 
with the statement as their mean scores fell above 4. In addition, when considering the 
median, the staff agreed while the Libyan experts strongly agreed with the statement. 
Furthermore, the higher standard deviation of the staff is an indication that the opinion of the 
company staff seems to be less reliable than the opinion of the Libyan experts. Based on the 
mean, the findings of both groups regarding the statement were ranked number 2. Using the 
Mann-Whitney test, the two sided p-value is equal to 0.008, which is the highly significant 
difference at a=0.05. 
These results, in general, support the findings and recommendations made by the 
Cadbury Report (1992); the Turnbull Report (1999); Rolandas and Romas (2005); and 
Applegate (2003), which indicated that internal auditors offered a unique and independent 
point of view on the quality of financial disclosures that differed from corporate accountants 
or external auditors. Furthermore, these results support the recommendation of the IIA 
(2009). It is mandatory that internal auditors contribute to the corporate governance 
processes, assisting the board of directors and management and helping them in such 
activities which will improve their relationship with corporate management and external 
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auditors. They should also serve the purpose of an educational recourse regarding trends in 
the business and the legal environment. 
These results, however, did not represent significant division between the two groups 
in terms of agreement-disagreement, but represented a variance in the agreement level as one 
group of respondents agreed more strongly with the statement than the other. Hence, it can be 
concluded that the Libyan experts expressed a stronger level of support than the staff 
regarding most statements of board structure. These finding can be explained by the fact that 
the academics and external auditors had more experience about internal auditing. Moreover, 
differences between groups may be due to the higher educational level and qualifications of 
Libyan experts. Therefore, they are aware of and strongly agreed with the importance of this 
subject. 
6.4.5 General Perceptions on Disclosure and Transparency 
This section summarises the general perceptions on disclosure and transparency under 
the LCGC. The Basel Committee guidance on bank transparency (2006) acknowledged that 
transparency is very crucial for efficiency and effective corporate governance; "it is difficult 
for shareholders, other stakeholders and market participants to effectively monitor and 
properly hold accountable the board of directors and senior management when there is a lack 
of transparency" (Basel Committee, 2006). Twenty statements were considered as displayed 
in Table 6.7 (A and B) below. 
Concerning the statement whether disclosure should include information concerning 
significant changes in ownership, the mean was 4.19 and the standard deviation 0.950 for the 
staff, while the Libyan experts' scores had a mean of 4.20 and a standard deviation of 0.862. 
This implies that both groups strongly agreed with the statement as their mean scores fell 
above 4. Furthermore, the higher standard deviation of the staff is an indication that the 
opinion of the company staff seems to be less reliable than the opinion of the Libyan experts. 
Based on the mean, the findings of both the staff and the Libyan experts regarding this 
statement were ranked number 6 and 2 respectively. Using the Mann-Whitney test, the two 
sided p-value is equal to 0.760, which is not significant at a=0.05. 
With regard to the statement whether disclosure should include information on 
financial and operating results, the mean was 4.28 and the standard deviation 0.817 for the 
staff, while the Libyan experts' scores had a mean of 4.18 and a standard deviation of 0.874. 
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This implies that both groups agreed with the statement as their mean fell above 4. 
Furthermore, the higher standard deviation of the Libyan experts is indication that the opinion 
of the staff seem to be more reliable than the opinion of the Libyan experts. Based on the 
mean, the findings of both the staff and those of the Libyan experts regarding this statement 
were ranked number 3 and 4 respectively. Using the Mann-Whitney test, the two sided p- 
value is equal to 0.366, which is not significant at a=0.05. 
Regarding the statement whether disclosure should include name, background 
information and the remuneration of board members, the mean was 4.24 and the standard 
deviation 0.878 for the staff, while the Libyan experts' scores had a mean of 4.17 and a 
standard deviation of 1.055. This implies that both groups strongly agreed with the statement 
as their mean scores fall above 4. Furthermore, the higher standard deviation of the Libyan 
experts is indication that the opinion of the staff seems to be more reliable than the opinion of 
the Libyan experts. Based on the mean, the findings of both the staff and Libyan experts 
regarding the statement were ranked number 4 and 5 respectively. Using the Mann-Whitney 
test, the two sided p-value is equal to 0.966, which is not significant at a=0.05. 
With regard to the statement whether disclosure should include name, background 
information and the remuneration of board committee, the mean was 4.16 and the standard 
deviation 0.940 for the staff, while the Libyan experts' scores had a mean of 4.15 and a 
standard deviation of 0.994. This shows that both groups strongly agreed with the statement 
as their mean scores fell above 4. Furthermore, the higher standard deviation of the Libyan 
experts is indication that the opinion of the staff seems to be more reliable than the opinion of 
the Libyan experts. Based on the mean, the findings of both groups regarding the statement 
were ranked number 7. Using the Mann-Whitney test, the two sided p-value is equal to 0.915, 
which is not significant at a=0.05. 
In relation to the statement whether disclosure should include functions and tasks of 
board committees, the mean was 4.29 and the standard deviation 0.856 for the staff, while the 
Libyan experts' scores had a mean of 4.25 and a standard deviation of 0.929. This indicated 
that both groups strongly agreed with the statement as their mean scores fell above 4. 
Furthermore, the higher standard deviation of the Libyan experts is indication that the opinion 
of the staff seems to be more reliable than the opinion of the Libyan experts. Based on the 
mean, the findings of both groups regarding the statement were ranked number 1. Using the 
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Mann-Whitney test, the two sided p-value is equal to 0.869, which is not significant at 
a=0.05. 
With regard to the statement whether disclosure should include shares of the members 
of the board, the mean was 4.05 and the standard deviation 0.968 for the staff, while the 
Libyan experts' scores had a mean of 4.07 and a standard deviation of 1.030. This implies 
that both groups strongly agreed with the statement as their mean scores fall above 4. 
Furthermore, the higher standard deviation of the Libyan experts is indication that the opinion 
of the staff seems to be more reliable than the opinion of the Libyan experts. Based on the 
mean, the findings of both staff and those of experts regarding the above statement were 
ranked number 8 and 12 respectively. Using the Mann-Whitney test, the two sided p-value is 
equal to 0.650, which is not significant at a=0.05. 
With regard to the statement whether disclosure should include majority shareholders 
of the company, the mean was 3.95 and the standard deviation 0.903 for the staff, while the 
Libyan experts' scores had a mean of 3.94 and a standard deviation of 1.070. This indicated 
that both groups agreed with the statement as their mean scores fall below 4. Furthermore, the 
higher standard deviation of the Libyan experts is indication that the opinion of the staff 
seems to be more reliable than the opinion of the Libyan experts Based on the mean, the 
findings of both the staff and Libyan experts regarding the statement were ranked number 15 
and 16 respectively. Using the Mann-Whitney test, the two sided p-value is equal to 0.619, 
which is not significant at a=0.05. 
With regard to the statement whether disclosure should include information on the 
rights of stakeholders, the mean was 4.00, the median 4.00 and the standard deviation 0.899 
for the staff, while the Libyan experts' scores had a mean of 3.95, a median of 4.00 and a 
standard deviation of 1.027. This implies that both groups agreed with the statement, as their 
mean scores were 4 and close to 4 respectively. Furthermore, the higher standard deviation of 
the Libyan experts is indication that the opinion of the staff seems to be more reliable than 
the opinion of the Libyan experts. Based on the mean, the findings of both the staff and the 
Libyan experts regarding the statement were ranked number 13 and 15 respectively. Using 
the Mann-Whitney test, the two sided p-value is equal to 0.935, which is not significant at 
a=0.05. 
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With regard to the statement whether disclosure should include forecasts of 
company's operations for the coming year, the mean was 3.89, the median 4.00 and the 
standard deviation 2.11 for the staff, while the Libyan experts' scores had a mean of 4.01, a 
median of 4.00 and a standard deviation of 0.881. This implies that the staff agreed while the 
Libyan experts strongly agreed as their mean scores fell closer and above 4 respectively. 
Additionally, it should be noted that in considering the median, both groups agreed with the 
statement. Furthermore, the higher standard deviation of the staff is an indication that the 
opinion of the Libyan experts is more reliable than the opinion of the staff. Based on the 
mean, the findings of both the staff and the. Libyan experts regarding the above statement 
were ranked number 17 and 13 respectively. Using the Mann-Whitney test, the two sided p- 
value is equal to 0.204, which is not significant at a=0.05. 
Concerning the statement whether disclosure should include related party transactions 
in detail, the mean was 3.79, the median 4.00 and the standard deviation 0.911 for the staff, 
while the Libyan experts' scores had a mean of 3.75, a median of 4.00 and a standard 
deviation of 1.086. This implies that both groups agreed with the statement as their mean 
scores fell below 4. Furthermore, the higher standard deviation of the Libyan experts is 
indication that the opinion of the staff seems to be more reliable than the opinion of the 
Libyan experts. Based on the mean, the findings of both the staff and Libyan experts 
regarding the statement were ranked number 19 and 20 respectively. Using the Mann- 
Whitney test, the two sided p-value is equal to 0.338, which is not significant at a=0.05. 
These results support the findings and recommendations made by the Cadbury Report 
(1992); Nam and Nam (2004); the OECD(2004); and Healy and Palepu (2001), who stated 
that corporate disclosure is crucial for the smooth functioning of an effective and efficient 
capital market. Where markets operate freely, full disclosure will be of great help to users, 
allowing them to make informed decisions and enhancing the preconditions of an open 
competitive market. Patel and Dallas (2002) emphasised that a measure of corporate 
governance transparency, provided by the Transparency and Disclosure of Standard & Poor 
(S&P) in 2001 and 2002, is based on the amount of corporate governance-related disclosures. 
Three types of disclosures are suggested: (1) ownership structure and investor rights, (2) 
financial transparency and information disclosure and (3) board and management structure 
and mechanisms (Patel and Dallas 2002). 
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Furthermore, Solomon (2007, p. 143) stated that "transparency is an essential element 
of a well-functioning system of corporate governance... corporate disclosure to stakeholders 
is the principal means by which companies can become transparent". 
6.4.6 General perceptions on conflict of interests 
This section summarises the general perceptions on conflict of interest under the 
LCGC. Six statements were considered as displayed in Table 6.8 below. 
With regard to the statement whether the company should have clear written 
regulations for directors and staff on conflict of interests, the mean was 4.08, the median 4.00 
and the standard deviation 0.971 for the staff, while the Libyan experts' scores had a mean of 
4.01, a median of 4.00 and a standard deviation of 0.891. This implies that groups strongly 
agreed with the statement as their mean scores fell above 4. Furthermore, the higher standard 
deviation of the Libyan experts is indication that the opinion of the staff seems to be more 
reliable than the opinion of the Libyan experts. Based on the mean, the findings of both 
groups regarding the statement were ranked number 1. Using the Mann-Whitney test, the two 
sided p-value is equal to 0.320, which is not significant at a=0.05. 
Concerning the statement whether board members, directors and staff may not trade 
company stocks for a specified period before the disclosure of company financial statements, 
the mean was 3.85, the median 4.00 and the standard deviation of 1.019 for the staff, while 
the Libyan experts' scores had a mean of 3.93, a median of 4.00 and a standard deviation of 
0.974. This indicates that both groups agreed with the statement as their mean scores fell 
above 3. Furthermore, the higher standard deviation of the staff is an indication that the 
opinion of the Libyan experts is more reliable than the opinion of the staff. Based on the 
mean, the findings of both the staff and the Libyan experts regarding the statement were 
ranked number 2 and 3 respectively. Using the Mann-Whitney test, the two sided p-value is 
equal to 0.5 10, which is not significant at a=0.05. 
Regarding the statement whether board members, directors and staff may not trade 
company stocks after sudden financial events until such information is disclosed to the 
public, the mean was 3.85, the median 4.00 and the standard deviation 1.104 for the staff, 
while the Libyan experts' scores had a mean of 3.98, a median of 4.00 and a standard 
deviation of 0.995. This implies that both groups agreed with the statement as their mean 
scores fell above 3. Furthermore, the higher standard deviation of the staff is an indication 
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that the opinion of the Libyan experts is more reliable than the opinion of the staff. Based on 
the mean, the findings of both the staff and the Libyan experts regarding the statement were 
ranked number 3 and 2 respectively. Using the Mann-Whitney test, the two sided p-value is 
equal to 0.995, which is not significant at a=0.05. 
With regard to the statement whether board members and directors may not obtain 
any loan from the company, the mean was 3.14, the median 3.00 and the standard deviation 
1.198 for the staff, while the Libyan experts' scores had a mean of 3.47, the median was 4.00 
and a standard deviation of 1.148. This shows that both groups agreed with the statement as 
their mean scores fell above 3. Furthermore, the higher standard deviation of the staff is an 
indication that the opinion of the Libyan experts is more reliable than the opinion of the staff. 
Based on the mean, the findings of both groups regarding the statement were ranked number 
6. Using the Mann-Whitney test, the two sided p-value is equal to 0.995, which is not 
significant at a=0.05. 
Concerning the statement whether board members and directors may not have direct 
or indirect interest in company activities, the mean was 3.82, the median 4.00 and the 
standard deviation 2.17 for the staff, while the Libyan experts' scores had a mean of 3.82 
median of 4.00 and a standard deviation of 1.133. This implies that both groups agreed with 
the statement as their mean scores fall above 3. Furthermore, the higher standard deviation of 
the staff is an indication that the opinion of the Libyan experts is more reliable than the 
opinion of the staff. Based on the mean, the findings of both groups regarding the statement 
were ranked number 5. Using the Mann-Whitney test, the two sided p-value is equal to 0.035, 
which is a significant difference at a=0.05. Hence, it can be concluded that the Libyan 
experts expressed a stronger level of support than the staff regarding the above statement. A 
possible explanation for this difference may be that Libyan companies are less keen to apply 
corporate governance than the other group 
Regarding the statement whether the company should set a professional code of 
conduct, the mean was 3.83, the median 4.00 and the standard deviation 1.111 for the staff, 
while the Libyan experts' scores had a mean of 3.83, a median of 4.00 and a standard 
deviation of 0.978. This implies that both groups agreed with the statement as their mean 
scores fell above 3. 
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Furthermore, the higher standard deviation of the staff is an indication that the opinion 
of the Libyan experts is more reliable than the opinion of the staff Based on the mean, the 
findings of both groups regarding the statement were ranked number 4. Using the Mann- 
Whitney test, the two sided p-value is equal to 0.738, which is not significant at a=0.05. 
These results were in line with the findings of Hart (1995), who argues that corporate 
governance must be enforced in an organisation in order to eliminate conflict of interest 
between company management and shareholders. 
6.4.7 General Perceptions on Board Committees 
This section of the questionnaire focused on respondents' general perceptions on the 
board committees (audit, remuneration and control committees). Respondents were asked to 
indicate their views on the importance of having and operating these committees as set out in 
the LCGC. The five-point scale ranges from 1=Not important at all; 2= Not very important; 
3=; Do not know; 4= Important; 5= Very important. 
6.4.7.1 General Perceptions on Audit Committee 
This sub-section summarises the general perceptions on the audit committee under the 
LCGC. Thirteen statements were considered as displayed in Table 6.9 below. 
With regard to the statement whether the company should have an audit committee, 
the mean was 4.43, the median 5.00 and the standard deviation 0.82 for the staff, while the 
Libyan experts' scores had a mean of 4.23, a median of 4.00 and a standard deviation of 
0.913. This implies that the two groups viewed the establishment of an audit committee as 
very important; both their mean scores fell above 4. Furthermore, the higher standard 
deviation of the Libyan experts is an indication that the opinion of the staff seems to be more 
reliable than the opinion of the Libyan experts. Based on the mean, the findings of both the 
staff and the Libyan experts regarding the statement were ranked number 2 and 8 
respectively. Using the Mann-Whitney test, the two sided p-value is equal to 0.071, which is 
not significant at a=0.05. 
In considering the statement whether the audit committee should consist of three non- 
executive directors elected by the board, the mean was 3.83, the median 4.00 and the standard 
deviation 2.17 for the staff, while the Libyan experts' scores had a mean of 3.85, a median of 
4.00 and a standard deviation of 0.863. This shows that the two groups regarded the statement 
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as important; both their mean scores fell above 3. Furthermore, the higher standard deviation 
of the staff is an indication that the opinion of the Libyan experts is more reliable than the 
opinion of the staff. Based on the mean, the findings of both groups regarding the statement 
were ranked number 13. Using the Mann-Whitney test, the two sided p-value is equal to 
0.701, which is not significant at a=0.05. 
With regard to the statement whether the audit committee should include a member 
with finance and accounting expertise, the mean was 4.48, the median 5.00 and the standard 
deviation 0.835 for the staff, while the Libyan experts' scores had a mean of 4.44, a median 
of 4.00 and a standard deviation of 0.824. This shows that the two groups regarded the 
statement as important; their mean scores fell above 4. Furthermore, the higher standard 
deviation of the staff is an indication that the opinion of the Libyan experts is more reliable 
than the opinion of the staff. Based on the mean, the findings of both groups regarding the 
statement above were ranked number 1. Using the Mann-Whitney test, the two sided p-value 
is equal to 0.672, which is not significant at a=0.05. 
Regarding the statement whether the audit committee should at least meet once every 
3 months, the mean was 4.14, the median 4.00 and the standard deviation 0.888 for the staff, 
while the Libyan experts' scores had a mean of 4.28, a median of 4.00 and a standard 
deviation of 0.783. This shows that the two groups regarded the statement as very important; 
both their mean scores fell above 4. Furthermore, the higher standard deviation of the staff is 
an indication that the opinion of the Libyan experts is more reliable than the opinion of the 
staff. Based on the mean, the findings of both the staff and the Libyan experts regarding the 
statement were ranked number 8 and 7 respectively. Using the Mann-Whitney test, the two 
sided p-value is equal to 0.290, which is not significant at a=0.05. 
Concerning the statement that the audit committee should recommend the 
appointment and removal of the external auditor and identify fees, the mean was 3.89, the 
median 4.00 and the standard deviation 1.034 for the staff, while the Libyan experts' scores 
had a mean of 3.98, a median of 4.00 and a standard deviation of 1.032. This shows that the 
two groups regarded the statement as important; both scores fell above 3. Furthermore, the 
higher standard deviation of the staff is an indication that the opinion of the Libyan experts is 
more reliable than the opinion of the staff. Based on the mean, the findings of both groups 
regarding the statement were ranked number 12. Using the Mann-Whitney. test, the two sided 
p-value is equal to 0.433, which is not significant at a=0.05. 
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With regard to the statement that the audit committee should review the external 
auditor's comments on the financial statements, the mean was 4.05, the median 4.00 and the 
standard deviation 0.936 for the staff, while the Libyan experts scores had a mean of 4.21, a 
median of 4.00 and a standard deviation of 0.786. This shows that the two groups regarded 
the statement as very important; both their mean scores fell above 4. Furthermore, the higher 
standard deviation of the staff is an indication that the opinion of the Libyan experts is more 
reliable than the opinion of the staff. Based on the mean, the findings of both the staff and 
those of the Libyan experts regarding the statement were ranked number 10 and 9 
respectively. Using the Mann-Whitney test, the two sided p-value is equal to 0.199, which is 
not significant at a=0.05. 
Regarding the statement that the audit committee should review the independence of 
the external auditor, the mean was 4.34, the median 4.00 and the standard deviation 0.879 for 
the staff, while the Libyan experts' scores had a mean of 4.32, a median of 4.00 and a 
standard deviation of 0.783. This shows that the two groups regarded the statement as very 
important; both their mean scores fell above 4. Furthermore, the higher standard deviation of 
the staff is an indication that the opinion of the Libyan experts is more reliable than the 
opinion of the staff. Based on the mean, the findings of both the staff and those of the Libyan 
experts regarding the above statement were ranked number 3 and 4 respectively. Using the 
Mann-Whitney test, the two sided p-value is equal to 0.566, which is not significant at 
a=0.05. 
When considering the statement that the audit committee should review the external 
auditor's plan and make suggestions, the mean was 3.99, the median 4.00 and the standard 
deviation 0.990 for the staff, while the Libyan experts' scores had a mean of 4.21, a median 
of 4.00 and a standard deviation of 0.887. This implies that the staff regarded the statement as 
important, while Libyan experts regarded it as very important; their mean scores fell below 4 
and above 4 respectively. Furthermore, the higher standard deviation of the staff is an 
indication that the opinion of the Libyan experts is more reliable than the opinion of the staff. 
Based on the mean, the findings of both the staff and those of the Libyan experts regarding 
the statement were ranked number 11 and 10 respectively. Using the Mann-Whitney test, the 
two sided p-value is equal to 0.080, which is not significant at a=0.05. 
Regarding the statement that the audit committee should review the company's 
accounting policies and present opinions and recommendations, the mean was 4.12, the 
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median 4.00 and the standard deviation 0.879 for the staff, while the Libyan experts' scores 
had a mean of 4.31, a median of 4.00 and a standard deviation of 0.719. This shows that the 
two groups regarded the statement as very important; both their mean scores fell above 4. 
Furthermore, the higher standard deviation of the staff is an indication that the opinion of the 
Libyan experts is more reliable than the opinion of the staff. Based on the mean, the findings 
of both the staff and those of the Libyan experts regarding the statement were ranked number 
9 and 5 respectively. Using the Mann-Whitney test, the two sided p-value is equal to 0.116, 
which is not significant at a=0.05. 
With regard to the statement that the audit committee should review and discuss the 
internal audit department plan and its efficiency, the mean was 4.21, the median 4.00 and the 
standard deviation 0.913 for the staff, while the Libyan experts' scores had a mean of 4.42, a 
median of 4.00 and a standard deviation of 0.657. This shows that the two groups regarded 
the statement as very important; both their mean scores fell above 4. Furthermore, the higher 
standard deviation of the staff is an indication that the opinion of the Libyan experts is more 
reliable than the opinion of the staff. Based on the mean, the findings of both the staff and 
those of the Libyan experts regarding the statement were ranked number 7 and 2 respectively. 
Using the Mann-Whitney test, the two sided p-value is equal to 0.302, which is not 
significant at a=0.05. 
With regard to the statement that the audit committee should review the independence 
of the internal auditor, the mean was 4.31, the median 4.00 and the standard deviation 0.907 
for the staff, while the Libyan experts scores had a mean of 4.18, a median of 4.00 and a 
standard deviation of 0.984. This shows that the two groups regarded the statement as very 
important; both their mean scores fell above 4. Furthermore, the higher standard deviation of 
the staff is an indication that the opinion of the Libyan experts is more reliable than the 
opinion of the staff. Based on the mean, the findings of both the staff and the Libyan experts 
regarding the statement were ranked number 4 and 11 respectively. Using the Mann-Whitney 
test, the two sided p-value is equal to 0.128, which is not significant at a=0.05. 
Regarding the statement that the audit committee should review the internal auditor's 
reports and any corrective measures taken, the mean was 4.29, the median 4.00 and the 
standard deviation 0.844 for the staff, while the Libyan experts' scores had a mean of 4.37, a 
median of 4.00 and a standard deviation of 0.718. 
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This shows that the two groups regarded the statement as very important; both their mean 
scores fell above 4. Furthermore, the higher standard deviation of the staff is an indication 
that the opinion of the Libyan experts is more reliable than the opinion of the staff. Based on 
the mean, the findings of both the staff and the Libyan experts regarding the statement were 
ranked number 5 and 3 respectively. Using the Mann-Whitney test, the two sided p-value is 
equal to 0.665, which is not significant at a=0.05. 
Concerning the statement that the audit committee should review the financial 
statements before presenting them to the board and provide recommendations, the mean was 
4.25, the median 4.00 and the standard deviation 0.857 for the staff, while the Libyan experts' 
scores had a mean of 4.31, a median of 4.00 and a standard deviation of 0.837. This shows 
that the two groups regarded the statement as very important; both their mean scores fell 
above 4. Furthermore, the higher standard deviation of the staff is an indication that the 
opinion of the Libyan experts is more reliable than the opinion of the staff. Based on the 
mean, the findings of both groups regarding the statement were ranked number 6. Using the 
Mann-Whitney test, the two sided p-value is equal to 0.600, which is not significant at 
a=0.05. 
These results support the findings of Abbott et al. (2003); Carcello and Neal (2003); Pickett 
(2005); the Cadbury Report (1992); and the Smith Report, which was issued in 2003 and 
recommended that companies should produce reports annually stipulating the role and 
responsibilities of audit committees. It further suggested that the audit committees should 
publish an annual report, which describes the duties that were performed by each of the 
committee members in the course of the fiscal year. Furthermore, Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 
2002 determined the method of audit committee formulation and its duties. It suggested that 
corporations, which have securities circulating in the stock exchange market, should be 
obliged to have an audit committee because of its importance with regard to corporate 
governance 
6.4.7.2 General Perceptions on the Nomination Committee 
This section summarises the general perceptions on nomination committees under the 
LCGC. Seven statements were considered as displayed in Table 6.10 below. 
With regard to the statement whether the board should have a nomination committee, 
the mean was 3.69, the median 4.00 and the standard deviation 1.125 for the staff, while the 
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Libyan experts' scores had a mean of 3.81, a median of 4.00 and a standard deviation of 
0.968. This shows that both groups regarded the statement as important, as their mean scores 
fell above 3. Additionally, the higher standard deviation of the staff is an indication that the 
opinion of the Libyan experts is more reliable than the opinion of the staff. Based on the 
mean, the findings of both groups regarding the statement were ranked number 6. Using the 
Mann-Whitney test, the two sided p-value is equal to 0.537, which is not significant at 
a=0.05. 
In considering the statement whether the nomination committee members should be 
elected by the board, the mean was 3.11, the median 3.00 and the standard deviation 1.163 
for the staff, while the Libyan experts' scores had a mean of 3.47, a median of 4.00 and a 
standard deviation of 1.143. This shows that both groups regarded the statement as important, 
as their mean scores fell above 3. Furthermore, the higher standard deviation of the staff is an 
indication that the opinion of the Libyan experts is more reliable than the opinion of the staff. 
Based on the mean, the findings of both the groups regarding the statement were ranked 
number 7. Using the Mann-Whitney test, the two sided p-value is equal to 0.024, which is a 
significant difference at a=0.05. Hence, it can be concluded that the Libyan experts expressed 
a stronger level of support than the staff regarding the statement above. 
Concerning the statement that the nomination committee should recommend 
candidates for membership of the board to the annual general meeting, the mean was 3.78, 
the median 4.00 and the standard deviation 0.883 for the staff, while the Libyan experts' 
scores had a mean of 3.87, a median of 4.00 and a standard deviation of 1.148. This shows 
that both groups regarded the statement as important, as their mean scores fell above 3. 
Furthermore, the higher standard deviation of the Libyan experts is an indication that the 
opinion of the staff seems to be more reliable than the opinion of the Libyan experts. Based 
on the mean, the findings of both groups regarding the statement were ranked number 5. 
Using the Mann-Whitney test, the two sided p-value is equal to 0.316, which is not 
significant at a=0.05. 
With regard to the statement that the nomination committee should review skills and 
qualifications required for the board membership, the mean was 4.05, the median 4.00 and 
the standard deviation 0.821 for the staff, while the Libyan experts' scores had a mean of 
4.02, a median of 4.00 and a standard deviation of 0.896. This shows that both groups 
regarded the statement as very important, as their mean scores fell above 4. Furthermore, the 
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higher standard deviation of the Libyan experts is an indication that the opinion of the staff 
seems to be more reliable than the opinion of the Libyan experts. Based on the mean, the 
findings of both the staff and the Libyan experts regarding the statement were ranked number 
1 and 3 respectively. Using the Mann-Whitney test, the two sided p-value is equal to 0.999, 
which is not significant at a=0.05. 
Regarding the statement that the nomination committee should review the board 
structure and make recommendations of possible changes, the mean was 3.86, the median 
4.00 and the standard deviation 0.975 for the staff, while the Libyan experts' scores had a 
mean of 3.96, a median of 4.00 and a standard deviation of 0.906. This shows that both 
groups regarded the statement as important, as their mean scores fell above 3. Additionally, 
the higher standard deviation of the staff is an indication that the opinion of the Libyan 
experts is more reliable than the opinion of the staff. Based on the mean, the findings of both 
the staff and the Libyan experts regarding the statement were ranked number 3 and 4 
respectively. Using the Mann-Whitney test, the two sided p-value is equal to 0.461, which is 
not significant at a=0.05. 
With regard to the statement that the nomination committee should define the board's 
weakness and strengths and propose remedies in accordance with company interests, the 
mean was 4.04, the median 4.00 and the standard deviation 1.004 for the staff, while the 
Libyan experts scores had a mean of 4.04, a median of 4.00 and a standard deviation of 
0.985. This shows that both groups regarded the statement important, as their mean scores fell 
above 3. Additionally, the higher standard deviation of the staff is an indication that the 
opinion of the Libyan experts is more reliable than the opinion of the staff. Based on the 
mean, the findings of both the staff and Libyan experts regarding the statement were ranked 
number 2 and I respectively. Using the Mann-Whitney test, the two sided p-value is equal to 
0.947, which is not significant at a=0.05. 
Concerning the statement that the nomination committee should set clear policies of 
compensation and remuneration for board members and senior executives, the mean was 
3.82, the median 4.00 and the standard deviation 1.038 for listed company staff, while the 
Libyan experts' scores had a mean of 4.03, a median of 4.00 and a standard deviation of 
0.990. 
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This implies that the staff regarded the statement important, while Libyan experts 
regarded it as very important as their mean scores fell below 4 and above 4 respectively. 
Additionally, the higher standard deviation of the staff is an indication that the opinion of the 
Libyan experts is more reliable than the opinion of the staff. Based on the mean, the findings 
of both the staff and the Libyan experts regarding the statement were ranked number 4 and 2 
respectively. Using the Mann-Whitney test, the two sided p-value is equal to 0.124, which is 
not significant at a=0.05. 
These results support the findings and recommendations made by Jackson et al. 
(2003); and the NYSE (2004) Corporate Governance Rules emphasised that all listed 
companies should have a nominating committee which entirely consists of non-executive 
directors. The Higgs Report (2003) further built on the Combined Code recommendations, 
requiring the appointment of a nomination committee with a majority of independent 
directors. The recommendations suggest that the nominating committee should preferably be 
lead by a chairperson who is an independent director. 
6.4.7.3 General Perceptions on the Control Committee 
This section summarises the general perceptions on the control committee under the 
LCGC. Seven statements were considered as displayed in Table 6.11 below. 
With regard to the statement whether the company should have a control committee, 
the mean was 4.25, the median 4.00 and the standard deviation . 914 for the staff, while the 
Libyan experts scores had a mean of 4.32, a median of 5.00 and a standard deviation of 
0.994. This shows that both groups regarded the statement as very important; their mean 
scores fell above 4. Furthermore, the higher standard deviation of the Libyan experts is an 
indication that the opinion of the staff seems to be more reliable than the opinion of the 
Libyan experts. Based on the mean, the findings of both the staff and the Libyan experts 
regarding the above statement were ranked number 4 and 3 respectively. Using the Mann- 
Whitney test, the two sided p-value is equal to 0.259, which is not significant at a=0.05. 
Concerning the statement whether the control committee should consist of at least 
three members appointed by the AGM , the mean was 3.95, the median 
4.00 and the standard 
deviation 
. 1.019 
for the staff, while the Libyan experts scores' had a mean of 4.23, a median 
of 4.00 and a standard deviation of 0.923. This implies that the staff regarded the statement as 
important, while Libyan experts regarded it as very important; their mean scores fell below 4, 
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and above 4 respectively. Additionally, the higher standard deviation of the staff is an 
indication that the opinion of the Libyan experts is more reliable than the opinion of the staff. 
Based on the mean, the findings of both groups regarding the statement were ranked number 
6. Using the Mann-Whitney test, the two sided p-value is equal to 0.026, which is a 
significant difference at a=0.05. Hence, it can be concluded that the Libyan experts expressed 
a stronger level of support than the staff regarding the above statement. 
With regard to the statement whether the control committee should represent all the 
shareholders of the company, the mean was 3.88, the median 4.00 and the standard deviation 
1.183 for the staff, while the Libyan experts' scores had a mean of 4.04, a median of 4.00, 
and a standard deviation of 1.215. This implies that the staff regarded the statement as 
important while Libyan experts regarded it as very important; their mean scores fell below 4 
and above 4 respectively. Furthermore, the higher standard deviation of the Libyan experts is 
an indication that the opinion of the staff seems to be more reliable than the opinion of the 
Libyan experts. Based on the mean, the findings of both groups - regarding the above 
statement were ranked number 7. Using the Mann-Whitney test, the two sided p-value is 
equal to 0.176, which is not significant at a=0.05. 
In considering the statement that the control committee should control the company 
administration and verification of its legal progress, the mean was 4.37, the median 5.00 and 
the standard deviation 0.928 for the staff, while the Libyan experts' scores had a mean of 
4.31, a median of 5.00 and a standard deviation of 0.805. This shows that both groups 
regarded the statement as very important; their mean scores fell above 4. Additionally, the 
higher standard deviation of the staff is an indication that the opinion of the Libyan experts is 
more reliable than the opinion of the staff. Based on the mean, the findings of both the staff 
and those of the Libyan experts regarding the statement were ranked number 2 and 4 
respectively. Using the Mann-Whitney test, the two sided p-value is equal to 0.230, which is 
not significant at a=0.05 
Regarding the statement that the control committee should verify the validity and 
legitimacy of contracts conducted by the company, the mean, was 4.3 8, the median 5.00 and 
the standard deviation 0.886 for the staff, while the Libyan experts' scores had a mean of 
4.44, a median of 4.00 and a standard deviation of 0.687. This shows that both groups 
regarded the statement as very important; their mean scores fell above 4. 
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Additionally, the higher standard deviation of the staff is an indication that the 
opinion of the Libyan experts is more reliable than the opinion of the staff. Based on the 
mean, the findings of both groups regarding the statement were ranked number 1. Using the 
Mann-Whitney test, the two sided p-value is equal to 0.732, which is not significant at 
a=0.05. 
Concerning the statement that the control committee should ensure all the accounting 
procedures are in accordance with legal and regulatory rules, the mean was 4.28, the median 
5.00 and the standard deviation 0.975 for the staff, while the Libyan experts' scores had a 
mean of 4.36, a median of 4.00 and a standard deviation of 0.910 This shows that both groups 
regarded the statement as very important; their mean scores fell above 4. Additionally, the 
higher standard deviation of the staff is an indication that the opinion of the Libyan experts is 
more reliable than the opinion of the staff. Based on the mean, the findings of both the staff 
and those of the Libyan experts regarding the statement were ranked number 3 and 2 
respectively. Using the Mann-Whitney test, the two sided p-value is equal to 0.963, which is 
not significant at a=0.05. 
In 'analysing the statement that the control committee should permit committee 
members at any time to inspect the company and the progress of its work, the mean was 4.16, 
the median 4.00 and the standard deviation 1.080 for the staff, while the Libyan experts' 
scores had a mean of 4.31, a median of 4.50, and a standard deviation of 0.839. This shows 
that both groups regarded the statement as very important; their mean scores fell above 4. 
Additionally, the higher standard deviation of the staff is an indication that the opinion of the 
Libyan experts is more reliable than the opinion of the staff. Based on the mean, the findings 
of both groups regarding the statement were ranked number 5. Using the Mann-Whitney test, 
the two sided p-value is equal to 0.550, which is not significant at a=0.05. 
6.5 General Perceptions on Obstacles Affecting the Application of the LCGC 
This section summarises the general perceptions on obstacles affecting the application 
of the LCGC. Fifteen statements were considered as displayed in Table 4.15 below. 
Respondents from two groups (the staff and Libyan experts) involved in this study were 
asked to give their opinions about the current obstacles affecting corporate governance in 
Libya on a five-point scale ranging from 1=Strongly Agree; 2= Agree; 3= Neutral; 4= 
Disagree; 5= Strongly Disagree. The mean, median, standard deviation and the ranks of the 
211 
staff and Libyan experts were analysed and compared. The Mann-Whitney test (U test) and 
probability values were determined to predict the significance at the 5% level of the general 
perception on obstacles affecting corporate governance practices. 
Regarding the statement whether there was poor leadership within Libyan companies, 
the mean was 2.05, the median 2.00 and the standard deviation . 1.218 for the staff, while the 
Libyan experts' scores had a mean of 1.95, a median of 1.00 and a standard deviation of 
1.248. This implies that the staff agreed with the statement, while the Libyan experts' 
strongly agreed as their mean fell above and below 2 respectively. Furthermore, the higher 
standard deviation of the Libyan experts is an indication that the opinion of the staff seems to 
be more reliable than the opinion of the Libyan experts. Based on the mean, the findings of 
both the staff and the Libyan experts regarding the statement were ranked number 12 and 13 
respectively. Using the Mann-Whitney test, the two sided p-value is equal to 0.405, which is 
not significant at a=0.05. 
This result supports findings and recommendations made by Mallin (2007) and 
Solomon (2007) stressing the importance for shareholders to choose for themselves a board 
of directors composed of qualified people, who are concerned with making decisions that will 
benefit the company as a whole and increase shareholder value. 
With regard to the statement whether there was a weak legal environment for 
companies, the mean was 2.25, the median 2.00 and the standard deviation 1.123 for the staff, 
while the Libyan experts' scores had a mean of 2.31, a median of 2.00 and a standard 
deviation of 1.195. This implies that both groups agreed with the statement as their mean fell 
above 2. Furthermore, the higher standard deviation of the Libyan experts is an indication 
that the opinion of the staff seems to be more reliable than the opinion of the Libyan experts. 
Based on the mean, the findings of both the staff and those of the Libyan experts regarding 
the statement were ranked number 4 and 1 respectively. Using the Mann-Whitney test, the 
two sided p-value is equal to 0.838, which is not significant at a=0.05. 
These results are in line with findings provided by Fawzy (2003). She highlighted that 
the Egyptian legal framework stills requires efforts to raise the efficiency of applying 
corporate governance in Egypt. Wong (2009) also conducted investigation on the various 
corporate governance reforms in Philippines after the adoption of the 2002 code of corporate 
governance, and documented that there was lacking laws promoting corporate governance in 
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the Philippines. Furthermore, the findings and recommendations made by Arce and Robles 
(2005) suggested that Costa Rican companies must implement a set of additional measures to 
compensate for the weakness of the legal environment. 
Concerning the statement whether there was a lack of knowledge about corporate 
governance among the Libyan companies, the mean was 2.05, the median 2.00 and the 
standard deviation 1.123 for the staff, while the Libyan experts' scores had a mean of 2.07, a 
median of 2.00 and a standard deviation of 1.228. This shows that both groups agreed with 
the statement as their mean falls above 2. Furthermore, the higher standard deviation of the 
Libyan experts is an indication that the opinion of the staff seems to be more reliable than the 
opinion of the Libyan experts. Based on the mean, the findings of both the staff and those of 
the Libyan experts regarding the statement were ranked number 11 and 9 respectively. Using 
the Mann-Whitney test, the two sided p-value is equal to 0.885, which is not significant at 
a=0.05. 
With regard to the statement whether there was a current ownership structure of 
companies, the mean was 2.30, the median 2.00 and the standard deviation 0.990 for the staff, 
while the Libyan experts' scores had a mean of 2.25, a median of 2.00 and a standard 
deviationofl. 112 This shows that both groups agreed with the statement as their mean falls 
above 2. Furthermore, the higher standard deviation of the Libyan experts is an indication 
that the opinion of the staff seems to be more reliable than the opinion of the Libyan experts. 
Based on the mean, the findings of both the staff and those of the Libyan experts regarding 
the statement were ranked number 2 and 3 respectively. Using the Mann-Whitney test, the 
two sided p-value is equal to 0.412, which is not significant at a=0.05. 
With regard to the statement whether there was a lack of training among directors of 
companies about corporate governance, the mean was 2.09, the median 2.00 and the standard 
deviation 1.138 for the staff, while the Libyan experts' scores had a mean of 2.09, a median 
of 2.00 and a standard deviation of 1.172. This shows that both groups agreed with the 
statement as their mean falls above 2. Furthermore, the higher standard deviation of the 
Libyan experts is an indication that the opinion of the staff seems to be more reliable than the 
opinion of the Libyan experts. Based on the mean, the findings of both the staff and the 
Libyan experts regarding the statement were'ranked number 10 and 8 respectively. Using the 
Mann-Whitney test, the two sided p-value is equal to 0.993, which is not significant at 
a=0.05. 
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This result supports findings and recommendations made by the UAB (2007). More 
emphasis is needed on designing and implementing special corporate governance training 
programmes and internal control practices for employees in the Arab banking sector. This 
result is also in line with Duca et al. (2007), who found that despite the institutional efforts, 
inside the business environment and even among Romanian listed companies on the capital 
market, there is still no real concern about corporate governance issues. Furthermore, 
Dahawy (2008) recommended that there is a need to increase the focus on training and 
education among all stakeholders in order to improve the application of corporate governance 
in Egypt. 
With regard to the statement whether there was notable government intervention in 
companies, the mean was 2.17, the median 2.00 and the standard deviation 1.264 for the staff, 
while the Libyan experts' scores had a mean of 2.00, a median of 2.00 and a standard 
deviation of 1.192. This shows that both groups agreed with the statement as their mean falls 
above 2. Additionally, the higher standard deviation of the staff is an indication that the 
opinion of the Libyan experts is more reliable than the opinion of the staff. Based on the 
mean, the findings of both the staff and the Libyan experts regarding the statement were 
ranked number 5 and 11 respectively. Using the Mann-Whitney test, the two sided p-value is 
equal to 0.356, which is not significant at a=0.05. 
With regard to the statement whether there was a weak accounting profession in 
Libya resulting from a lack of adoption of international accounting standards, the mean was 
2.26, the median 2.00 and the standard deviation 1.244 for the staff, while the Libyan experts' 
scores had a mean of 2.13, a median of 2.00 and a standard deviation of 1.193. This shows 
that both groups agreed with the statement as their mean falls above 2. Additionally, the 
higher standard deviation of the staff is an indication that the opinion of the Libyan experts is 
more reliable than the opinion of the staff. Based on the mean, the findings of both the staff 
and the Libyan experts regarding the statement were ranked number 3 and 6 respectively. 
Using the Mann-Whitney test, the two sided p-value is equal to 0.478, which is not 
significant at a=0.05. 
Regarding the statement whether there was a weak auditing profession in Libya 
resulting from a lack of adoption of international auditing standards, the mean was 2.13, the 
median 2.00 and the standard deviation 1.125 for the staff, while the Libyan experts' scores 
had a mean of 2.14, a median of 2.00 and a standard deviation of 1.234. This shows that both 
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groups agreed with the statement as their mean falls above 2. Furthermore, the higher 
standard deviation of the Libyan experts is an indication that the opinion of the staff seems to 
be more reliable than the opinion of the Libyan experts. Based on the mean, the findings of 
both the company staff and the Libyan experts regarding the statement were ranked number 9 
and 5 respectively. Using the Mann-Whitney test, the two sided p-value is equal to 0.816, 
which is not significant at a=0.05. 
With regard to the statement whether there was weak investment awareness among 
investors, the mean was 2.01, the median 2.00 and the standard deviation 1.193 for the staff, 
while the Libyan experts' scores had a mean of 1.89, a median of 2.00 and a standard 
deviation of 1.062. This implies that the staff agreed with the statement, while the Libyan 
experts' strongly agree as their mean falls above and below 2 respectively Furthermore, the 
higher standard deviation of the Libyan experts is an indication that the opinion of the staff 
seems to be more reliable than the opinion of the Libyan experts. Based on the mean, the 
findings of both the staff and the Libyan experts regarding the above statement were ranked 
number 13 and 15 respectively. Using the Mann-Whitney test, the two sided p-value is equal 
to 0.665, which is not significant at a=0.05. This result confirms the findings of Duca et al. 
(2007) who found that in the emerging economies, similar to Romania, the issues of 
corporate governance were not so important to the fund suppliers, whether banks, investment 
funds or individual investors, and for this reason, companies did not feel rewarded in any way 
for making efforts to improve their corporate governance practices. 
With regard to the statement whether there was absent a Libyan capital market 
authority, the mean was 2.15, the median 2.00 and the standard deviation 1.132 for the staff, 
while the Libyan experts' scores had a mean of 2.12, a median of 2.00 and a standard 
deviation of 1.125. This shows that both groups agreed with the statement as their mean falls 
above 2. Furthermore, the higher standard deviation of the Libyan experts is an indication 
that the opinion of the staff seems to be more reliable than the opinion of the Libyan experts. 
Based on the mean, the findings of both the staff and the Libyan experts regarding the 
statement were ranked number 6 and 7 respectively. Using the Mann-Whitney test, the two 
sided p-value is equal to 0.844, which is not significant at a=0.05. 
With regard to the statement whether there were high costs of application of corporate 
governance system, the mean was 2.38, the median 2.00 and the standard deviation 1.033 for 
the staff, while the Libyan experts' scores had a mean of 2.26, a median of 2.00 and a 
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standard deviation of 1.105. This shows that both groups agreed with the statement as their 
mean falls above 2. Furthermore, the higher standard deviation of the Libyan experts is an 
indication that the opinion of the staff seems to be more reliable than the opinion of the 
Libyan experts. Based on the mean, the findings of both the staff and the Libyan experts 
regarding the statement were ranked number 1 and 2 respectively. Using the Mann-Whitney 
test, the two sided p-value is equal to 0.393, which is not significant at a=0.05. This result 
was in line with findings of the Business Roundtable (2006) survey, which revealed that there 
were high costs of applying the Sarbanes-Oxley in the USA. Furthermore, this result also 
confirmed the findings of Duca et al. (2007), which showed that most of Romanian 
companies consider the adoption of a corporate governance system as complicated because it 
involved changing the company memorandum of association. Legal and financial-accounting 
consultancy was also hugely expensive. 
With regard to the statement whether there was absent an institute of directors, the 
mean was 1.97, the median 2.00 and the standard deviation 1.141 for listed company staff, 
while the Libyan experts' scores had a mean of 2.09, a median of 2.00 and a standard 
deviation of 1.092. This shows that both groups agreed with the statement as their mean falls 
above 2. Additionally, the higher standard deviation of the staff is an indication that the 
opinion of the Libyan experts is more reliable than the opinion of the staff. Based on the 
mean, the findings of both staff and the Libyan experts regarding this statement about 
directors were ranked number 15 and 10 respectively. Using the Mann-Whitney test, the two 
sided p-value is equal to 0.393, which is not significant at a=0.05. 
With regard to the statement whether there was a limited number of listed companies, 
the mean was 1.99, the median 2.00 and the standard deviation 1.087 for the staff, while the 
Libyan experts' scores had a mean of 1.96, a median of 2.00 and a standard deviation of 
1.158. This implies that the staff agreed with the statement, while the Libyan experts strongly 
agree as their mean falls above and below 2 respectively. Furthermore, the higher standard 
deviation of the Libyan experts is an indication that the opinion of the staff seems to be more 
reliable than the opinion of the Libyan experts. Based on the mean, the findings of both the 
staff and the Libyan experts regarding the statement were ranked number 14. Using the 
Mann- Whitney test, the two sided p-value is equal to 0.699, which is not significant at 
a=0.05. 
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With regard to the statement whether there was lacking an independent institution or 
body to monitor corporate governance practices, the mean was 2.14, the median 2.00 and the 
standard deviation 1.164 for the staff, while the Libyan experts' scores had a mean of 1.99, a 
median of 2.00 and a standard deviation of 1.123. This implies that the staff agreed with the 
statement, while the Libyan experts' strongly agree as their mean falls above and below 2 
respectively. Additionally, the higher standard deviation of the staff is an indication that the 
opinion of the Libyan experts is more reliable than the opinion of the staff. Based on the 
mean, the findings of both the staff and the Libyan experts regarding the statement were 
ranked number 8 and 12 respectively. Using the Mann-Whitney test, the two sided p-value is 
equal to 0.352, which is not significant at a=0.05. This result supports findings and 
recommendations made by Saidi (2004), who investigated the OECD principles of corporate 
governance in Lebanon. A main recommendation was that there should be an independent 
body to monitor the implementation of corporate governance in Lebanon. 
With regard to the statement whether international pressure on Libya to apply 
corporate governance was weak (World Bank), the mean was 2.15, the median 2.00 and the 
standard deviation 1.086 for listed company staff, while the Libyan experts' scores had a 
mean of 2.200, a median of 2.00 and a standard deviation of 1.134. This shows that both 
groups agreed with the statement as their mean falls above 2. Furthermore, the higher 
standard deviation of the Libyan experts is an indication that the opinion of the staff seems to 
be more reliable than the opinion of the Libyan experts. Based on the mean, the findings of 
both the staff and the Libyan experts regarding the statement were ranked number 7 and 4 
respectively. Using the Mann-Whitney test, the two sided p-value is equal to 0.836, which is 
not significant at a=0.05. 
6.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has presented analysis of questionnaire survey, and represents the 
qualitative element of the research's approach. The questionnaire was designed to identify 
obstacles to the LCGC's successful implementation. The principal findings were: 
The majority of respondents had positive perceptions of the corporate governance 
mechanisms set out in the LCGC. The groups of respondents categorised as experts tended to 
support the guidelines of the LCGC more strongly than the staff of the listed companies, and 
also supported movement towards the adoption of international standards of corporate 
governance. 
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There was general agreement over the fifteen most serious obstacles to the 
implementation of the LCGC, which were: 
" weakness of organisational management, 
" weakness of the legal environment, 
" influence and interference of the government, 
" weakness of accounting and audit professions because of non-adoption of 
international standards, 
" the current ownership structure of certain firms, absence of governance system 
training programmes for members of board of directors, 
" inadequacy of investors' awareness of the investment concept, 
" the financial cost of implementing a governance system, the limited number of 
listed companies in local markets, 
" absence of a body monitoring governance practices and 
" insufficient international pressure on Libya to apply a governance system. 
Generally, the experts considered these obstacles to be more serious and challenging 
than did those employed by the listed companies. The findings presented in this chapter, 
combined with those of chapter five, fulfil the purposes of objectives one, two and three, and 
form a basis of knowledge about the obstacles facing the LCGC, and the extent of its 
implementation, which provides a context in which to consider the opinions and perspectives 
of Libyan regulators and officials with regard to the LCGC. The findings with regard to these 
opinions and perspectives are presented in the next chapter, and will fulfil the purposes of 
objective four. 
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Chapter Seven 
Analyses and Results of Semi-Structured Interviews (B) with Libyan 
Officials and Regulators 
7.1 Introduction 
As explained in Chapter One, the study has four objectives divided into three stages. 
The first three objectives were achieved through the first and second stages of the two 
preview chapters of this study. The intention is to complete the objectives of this research in 
this final stage of the study by conducting semi-structured interviews (B) with Libyan 
officials and regulators in order to collect the primary data. This method seeks to examine the 
views of the Libyan officials and regulators in relation to identifying and decreasing 
obstacles, specifically with regard to the introduction of the LCCG. -Therefore, this chapter 
will present the results and highlight the main issues generated from the twelve interviews 
with four Libyan officials and regulatory bodies; the Ministry of Trade and Economy (MTE), 
the Libyan Stock Market (LSM), the Insurance Monitoring Body (IMB) and the Central Bank 
of Libya (CBL). 
Indeed, the decision to choose these four groups depended on their relationship with 
the scope of this study and its objectives as mentioned earlier. Hence, it was decided to 
interview participants from four groups. First, the MTE was included, since it represents the 
highest authority and oversees all economic sectors in Libya. Secondly, the LSM is also 
essential, having issued the LCCG. It is also regarded as the only means of monitoring the 
application of this code. Thirdly, the IMB and the CBL were included because they supervise 
the insurance companies and banking sectors. 
These interviews were conducted between May and June 2010. Each interview 
contained fifteen questions distributed among four sections (see Appendix D); the first 
section covered general information about the interviewees, the second section contained an 
overview of current corporate governance practices, the third section was about the identified 
obstacles, and the last sections was about future development 
7.2 General Information about the Interviewees 
The experience, qualifications and organisational positions of interviewees are among the 
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most important factors that can be relied upon to obtain high quality information. Therefore, 
high quality or more reliable information is expected. Details about these interviewees are 
shown in Table 7.1. 
Table 7.1 General Information about the Interviewees 
N Interviewee Position Qualification Level years of experience 
Name 
I ORI Manager of corporate PhD in Economics Oper ten years 
department 
2 0R2 Deputy of corporate PhD in Accounting Ten years 
department 
3 OR3 Member of corporate Bachelor degree in Over ten years 
department Economics 
4 0R4 Master degree in 
Chairman of the board Accounting Five years 
5 OR5 Ex- deputy chairman of PhD in Economics Over five years 
the board 
6 OR6 Head of Supervision and Bachelor degree in 
control department Accounting Five years 
7 0R7 Ex-Member of control Master degree in 
committee Accounting Ten years 
8 0R8 Deputy - manager of bank Bachelor degree in 
monitoring board Economics Over 20 years 
9 0R9 Head of documentary Bachelor degree in 
credit department Economics Ten years 
10 01110 Manager of auditing PhD in Accounting Five years 
department 
II ORI I Manager of corporate Master degree in finance 
department and insurance Eight years 
12 OR12 Member of corporate Master degree in 
department Accounting Ten years 
The first group of interviewees were from the MTE. They were a manager, his deputy 
and a member of the corporate department. Two of them held a PhD in Economics and 
Accounting, whereas the other held a Bachelor degree in Accounting. All of them had ten 
years of experience or more. 
The second group of interviewees were from the LSM. They were the chairman, his ex- 
deputy, the head of supervision and control department and an ex-member of the control 
committee. Regarding the qualification level, one person held a PhD in Economics and the 
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other two held a Master's degree in Accounting and one of them held a Bachelor degree in 
Economics. One had ten years of experience, whereas the other three had five years of 
experience. The third group of interviewees were from the CBL. They were the deputy 
manager of the bank monitoring board (20 years of experience), the head of the documentary 
credit department (ten years of experience) and the manager of the auditing department (five 
years of experience). Regarding the qualification level, one interviewee held a PhD in 
Accounting and the other two held a Bachelor degree in Economics. The forth group of 
interviewees were from IMB. They were a manager of the corporate department (eight years 
of experience) and a member of the corporate department (ten years of experience). Both held 
a Master's Degree in Finance and Insurance and Accounting. 
7.3 Overview of Current Corporate Governance Practices 
This part discusses the issues relating to the current practice of corporate governance 
practices in Libya; general views about the introduction of the LCGC, the benefit of 
implementing this code, the current state of corporate governance and the role of audit 
committees within companies. The analysis of participants' responses to these issues is 
presented and examined in the following subsections. 
7.3.1 General View about the LCGC Issued by the LSM 
The participants in the interview survey were asked to express their general views 
about the LCGC that was issued by LSM. They responded entirely positively to the idea of 
introducing this code. Although it is evident that the results of the interview survey tended to 
confirm the results obtained from the questionnaire survey, the support for introducing a 
corporate governance system in Libyan companies was much stronger since all interviewees 
were in favor of the LCGC. On this specific point, an ex-deputy chairman of LSM stated that: 
"Corporate governance code is essential for any financial market all over the 
world. However, the market may be a little too hasty in developing such a code 
as it has to be concerned with other issues in order to establish itself. Before 
initiating this code, keep in mind that it may be still too early to put it into 
practice in this new market" (OR 5). 
Another deputy of the corporate department of the MTE and a head of the 
documentary credit department of the CBL expressed their views as follow: 
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"The code is a positive step toward implementing total quality systems and 
lifting the corporate performance especially of financial institutions. Applying 
equality and transparency fundamentals is also a crucial step" (OR 2). 
"The code is excellent if appropriately applied. I personally support issuing 
this code especially at this stage because of its multiple advantages" (OR 9). 
In addition, the main reason behind the introduction of the LCGC was mentioned by the 
chairman of the LSM: 
"When we first established the stock market, we had to clarify some general 
issues connected with the companies to be listed in this market, and certainly 
the concept of corporate governance was one of them. This concept was totally 
unknown to both senior and inferior employees of these companies, so it was 
important to issue this guide to make them aware of this concept among 
others" (OR4). 
However, the other three interviewees -a manager of the corporate department of the MTE, a 
deputy-manager of the bank monitoring board of the CBL and a head of the supervision and 
control department of the LSM - commented that the code was important. They argued: 
It is good to have such a code in Libya, but unfortunately this code is not in 
line with Libyan circumstances as most of its principles are imported or just 
copied from other countries. They weren't developed to fit Libyan state of 
affairs (OR]). 
"This code is entirely new in the local environment and a copy of those 
already enforced in other advanced economies. Nevertheless, issuing such a 
code, at this stage, is a great initiative, and the firms will soon recognise the 
advantages of adhering to it" (0R8). 
"This code is a crucial step, especially now with the emergence of the stock 
exchange, but it was developed without studying the requirements of the local 
environment, which need a detailed survey and careful evaluation before 
applying a code designed to keep pace with the new phase of economic 
openness being experienced "(OR 6). 
7.3.2 The Benefits of Implementing the LCGC 
This subsection further considers the views of the respondents as regards the benefits 
of implementing corporate governance in Libya. All interviewees were asked to give their 
opinions on the benefits of implementing the LCGC. Although Libya is considered a 
developing country, this should not prevent it from adopting effective corporate governance 
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and gaining many benefits from applying the system in its companies. This was demonstrated 
by the positive reaction of the interviewees to this question. The most common benefits were 
mentioned by the interviewees, these being the protection of shareholders' rights, appropriate 
management performance and organising relationships between the board of directors, 
shareholders and auditing committees as well as investors. As the deputy manager of the 
bank monitoring board of the CBL stated: 
There are many benefits of this code, which includes ensuring appropriate 
management performance, well-defined specialities, protection of 
shareholders' rights, especially minority, and assertion of sound control over 
Libyan companies (OR8). 
On the same note, the chairman of LSM and manager of the auditing department of the CBL 
commented: 
"There are several tangible benefits of implementing the code - the stock 
market as a controller of corporate business through organising the 
relationships between shareholders and board of directors' members, general 
assembly and the investors "(OR4). 
"The main advantages are organising the relationships between the board of 
directors and shareholders as well as auditing committees. Generally 
speaking, it has so many benefits for listed and unlisted companies" (OR 10). 
These finding are in line with those provided by La Porta et al. (1999). They clarify this issue, 
arguing that protecting minority shareholders is very important to good corporate governance, 
stating that "corporate governance is, to a large extent, a set of mechanisms through which 
outside investors protect themselves against expropriation by insiders" (p. 4). They further 
suggest that investors are confident and feel encouraged when the company develops 
effective rules to protect minority shareholders' interests and includes them within the legal 
and corporate governance framework (La Porta, De-Silanes et al., 1999). 
Additionally, other important benefits were mentioned by the interviewees: increasing 
disclosure and transparency of Libyan companies, protecting companies from crisis, 
enhancing the confidence in financial market and attracting foreign investors. The manager of 
the corporate department of the MTE, the head of the supervision and control department of 
the LSM and the head of the documentary credit department of the CBL expressed their 
opinions as regards the benefits of implementing the LCGC: 
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"In my view, there would be benefits implementing those principles as doing 
so will lead to market growth as well as transparency. It may even lead to 
foreign investment" (OR1). 
"There will be many benefits, such as investor confidence and corporate 
protection against failure, which benefit the economy as a whole" (OR6). 
"This code may, among other things, protect companies from crisis, safeguard 
investors and help them to recognise their rights and responsibilities, and 
increase confidence in the financial market" (OR9). 
These findings were also in line with those provided by Gregory and Simms (1999); La Porta 
et al. (1997) and La Porta et al. (1999). They highlighted the importance of corporate 
governance in emerging markets for attracting more local and international investors. Their 
results indicated that across countries, corporate governance was an important factor in 
financial market development and firm value. Furthermore, the OECD report supports this 
result: 
"Good corporate governance helps to assure that corporations use their 
capital efficiently. Good corporate governance helps, too, to ensure that 
corporations take into account the interests of a wide range of constituencies, 
as well as of the communities within which they operate, and that their boards 
are accountable to the company and shareholders. This, in turn, helps to 
assure that corporations operate for the benefit of society as a whole. It helps 
to maintain the confidence of investors both foreign and domestic and to 
attract more patient', long-term capital "(OEC,. 1999) 
7.3.3The Current State of Corporate Governance in Libya 
The participants in the interview survey were asked to express their general views 
about the current state of corporate governance, especially in the Libyan financial sector. The 
interviewees responded entirely negatively to the idea of the current application of the LCGC 
by the listed Libyan companies. It is evident that the results of the interview survey tended to 
confirm the results obtained from the first interviews with the board of directors of Libyan 
listed companies regarding the application of the LCGC by these companies, which was in 
the first stage of this study. However, it was clear that all Libyan officials and regulators 
strongly believed that this code was not practicable, since all interviewees were skeptical as 
to whether the code was in use in Libyan companies. As the manager of the corporate 
department of the MTE put it: 
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"Frankly, I don't think that the listed companies on the Libyan stock market 
exercise corporate governance policy due to management unawareness of 
such regulations. As a matter of fact, management isn't aware of the market 
concept in the first place and has no desire to change " (OR]). 
Some interviewees believed that the code was impracticable in financial institutions 
because the CBL had some regulations which were implemented by the managers and 
conflicted, to some extent, with the LCGC. A deputy of the corporate department of the 
MTE stated the following: 
"There are some requirements which, in certain respects, may conflict with 
those of the other committees' tasks, such as an overlap of duties with the 
control committee. In some banks, the practice of corporate governance is 
monitored by the central bank But no requirements of such governance are 
available for the time being. Those in charge of these banks have no initiative, 
perform a routine job and make very conservative decisions which contrast 
with governance requirements" (OR2) 
Yet, some interviewees attributed the non-application of the code to the lack of 
managerial knowledge of it, the non-preparation of its implementation and the fear that it 
would limit their rights. The chairman of the LSM explained: 
"Implementing now corporate governance principles is too difficult because 
Libyan companies aren't prepared yet. When they become ready, they can be 
obligated to apply these rules. I don't think that the listed firms are practicing 
these rules" (ORS). 
Additionally, a deputy manager of the bank monitoring board of the CBL made the 
following comment: 
"I think this code has not implemented completely because most of the 
companies' board of directors are resisting it as they think it limits their 
authority. A lack of understanding of its benefits is the main reason for this 
situation " (OR8). 
Obviously, some Libyan companies are aware of the LCGC in theory, but, in practice, it is 
non-existent. Some interviewees attributed the poor manner of application of this code to the 
ignorance of the implementers, while others believed that this was because it was imported. 
Similarly, some interviewees thought that the Libyan companies feared that this new concept 
would compromise their rights. 
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The findings support the recommendations made by the UAB (2007), which 
emphasised the need for designing and implementing special corporate governance training 
programmes and internal control practices for employees in the Arab banking sector. This 
result is also in line with Duca et al. (2007), who found that despite the institutional efforts 
inside the business sector and even among Romanian listed companies on the capital market, 
there was still no real interest in corporate governance issues. Moreover, Dahawy (2008) 
recommended increased focus on training and education among all stakeholders in order to 
improve the application of corporate governance in Egypt. 
7.3.4 The Role of the Audit Committee 
Besides the findings of both the semi-structured interviews (A) with the board of 
directors about the application of the LCGC by Libyan listed companies, and the attitude of 
questionnaire respondents in relation to the role played by the audit committee, the 
interviewees were asked to give their general views on the role played by the audit 
committees. Regarding this question, all respondents agreed on the role played by the audit 
committee and the recognition of its importance in the overall corporate governance. In this 
regard, the manager of the corporate department of the MTE stated: 
"I believe that the audit committee is of great importance in corporate 
governance simply because of its functions. However, the majority of 
Libyan firms lack qualified individuals of enough experience to be 
members in this committee" (OR1). 
A similar view is expressed by Pomeranz (1997), who claims that the audit committee is 
almost being recognised as another board committee, notwithstanding that it has to work 
in collaboration with the entire board. Moreover, Smith (2003) argues that the benefits of 
the audit committees as corporate governance mechanisms are not only limited to 
increasing the level of corporate performance. They also prevent catastrophic failure and 
gross malpractice, and help to improve the overall standard of corporate governance. 
Moreover, all the interviewees specified the role of the audit committee, 
although the majority of Libyan companies did not recognise the importance attached to 
it. They mentioned the basic roles the audit committee plays. First, its most important 
role is that it improves the implementation of corporate governance and protects minority 
shareholders. Secondly, it ensures the independence of both the external auditors and the 
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board members. The interviewees collectively agreed about the crucial roles of the audit 
committees. 
"In my opinion, the most important point is the independency. In other words, 
if the audit committee can ensure the freedom of the external auditors and 
board members, this can provide efficiency in operating assets and can secure 
the rights of shareholders ". 
Steinthörsdöttir (2004) confirms this view, crediting audit committees with representing 
boards of directors on very important matters related to financial information reporting, 
auditing and overall mechanism of corporate governance. Shareholders' interests are 
protected by audit committees as they monitor the entire management system, including both 
the external auditor and the internal auditor (DeZoort, 1997). 
Furthermore, these results are in line with several studies, which have listed the 
numerous functions and responsibilities that should be performed by an audit committee. 
These functions have been classified under some broad categories: overseeing of the financial 
statements, of the external auditor process and of the internal control system (Cadbury, 1992; 
Not & Janin, 2005; Zain &Subramaniam, 2007). 
Additionally, a member of the corporate department of the MTE explained: 
"The role of the audit committee is essential, but the Libyan legislators 
created a control committee that undertakes the same functions, and to my 
knowledge no other country has such a committee" (OR3). 
These results confirm those obtained from the first interviews with the board of directors 
about the application of the LCGC by Libyan listed companies - all listed companies had 
control committees, whereas the majority of these did not have audit committees. 
Moreover, some interviewees stressed that the audit committee had no role in 
the Libyan companies because it was incompetent and ineffective. A Chairman of LSM 
pointed out the following: 
"This committee has no role in spite of its requirement by the central bank 
in commercial banks and insurance companies ". (OR4). 
Additionally, a head of the supervision and control department of the LSM commented: 
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"In general, the role of the audit committee is incompetent and needs to be 
improved This deficiency is attributable to the board of directors' lack of 
awareness of such roles" (OR6). 
An ex-member of the control committee of the LSM suggested that the audit committee 
would never perform its role unless the chairman of the board became automatically the 
chairman of the audit committee. He expressed his views in the following terms: 
"I consider that the audit committee is ineffective. To activate its role, the 
chairman of the board of directors should also be the chairman of this 
committee" (OR 7). 
This contradicts the claim of DeZoort (1997) that it should not be mandatory for members of 
the audit committee to be independent of companies' management, but that expertise in 
financial matters should be more emphasised. Similarly, Klein (2002) argues that if there 
were possibilities to substitute corporate governance mechanisms, then there would be need 
for the firm's corporate mechanism to have an active audit committee, which was deemed 
independent. 
Carcello and Neal (2003) state that if audit committee members are independent of 
corporate management, then they are likely to be more effective in protecting the credibility 
of the firm's financial reports. Additionally, Abbot et al. (2003) state that since audit 
committee members are more concerned to maintain their reputation and integrity than non- 
independent directors, they are more efficient and effective. It is evident that firms with 
independent audit committees are more likely to select external auditors who are specialists 
in their company's industry in order to enhance audit quality (Abbott & Parker, 2000). 
Chen et al. (2005) sought to examine the relationship between independent audit 
committees and audit quality in Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) Top 500 companies. The 
findings of their study indicated that there was a higher percentage of non-executive directors 
on audit committees. The findings further revealed that these committees were more likely to 
hire a specialist auditor as opposed to those with high percentages of executive directors on 
their audit committees. 
Another manager of the corporate department of the IMB said: 
"The audit committee has an important role but control committees of 
Libyan companies are marginal and do not actually practice their role; 
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even their members do not realise their own role. Furthermore, there is no 
relation between audit committee and external auditor" (OR11). 
Although there is a shortage of financial and operating information to create an 
accurate picture of company performance, these committees are marginalised and cannot 
practice their roles fully. As mentioned earlier, some of the committee members are ignorant 
about their roles. The following view was expressed by one of the managers (the head of the 
documentary credit department in the Central Bank of Libya): 
"This committee has a vital role, but I am sorry to say those in charge will take 
some time to understand this" (OR9). 
The vice president of the bank monitoring board of the Central Bank of Libya also stated: 
"This committee certainly has an essential role. I believe that it should be 
given more responsibility and be completely independent" (OR8). 
This will be possible given the findings of studies conducted to identify the role and 
importance of the auditing committees in other countries. A survey on members of the audit 
committee by DeZoort, (1997) found that the respondents entirely agreed that financial and 
accounting expertise was necessary, and believed that all audit committee members should be 
familiar with matters of accountancy, let alone law related issues. Results of a survey by 
Kalbers (1992) on external and internal auditors and their perceptions on audit committee 
members expertise indicated that both groups had a significantly low level of opinion with 
regards to their perceptions of audit committee members' expertise. 
A survey by Raghunandan et al. (2001) on chief internal auditors indicated that of all 
audit committee members, at least one member possessed or had familiarity with accounting 
or finance matters. In a study by DeZoort (1998), a sample of 87 audit committee members 
were involved in a task to investigate their influence on the quality of their assessment. It was 
found that audit committees whose members had experience in financial matters made better 
assessment when compared to their counterparts with less experience. 
Another important objective in this section is to find out why most of the listed 
companies in Libya did not have audit committees. One reason is that the management of 
these companies had little knowledge about the importance of the audit committees. Six 
respondents stressed this ignorance. A manager of the corporate department of the MTE 
stated the following: 
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"Well there is absence of an audit committee in most companies, 
inadequate knowledge of its role and competence and, as mentioned in the 
previous answer, a lack of qualified individuals of enough experience to be 
members. These are more than enough reasons" (OR]). 
Additionally, one deputy of the corporate department of the MTE pointed out general 
ignorance of the audit committees' importance: 
"I think the main reason is the lack of awareness of those in charge of 
companies about the role of this committee. They think that the functions 
performed by this committee can be assumed by the observance committee. 
On the other hand, these companies have no desire for another watch 
body that may make sole critical decisions such as privileging external 
audit and the like ". (OR2) 
Some interviewees attributed ignorance of the importance of the audit committee to the 
committee members themselves. One deputy manager of the bank monitoring board of the 
CBL explained this lack of knowledge among committee members in the following terms: 
"Till now the absence of this committee is the result of ignorance of its 
importance. The committee members themselves aren't well familiar with 
its function and the role they should undertake " (OR8). 
Additionally, some interviewees pointed out that the ignorance of the importance of the audit 
committee is a result of the general assembly. In relation to this, a manager of the corporate 
department of the 1MB asserted: 
"The general assembly simply isn't aware of its importance. The board of 
directors is not concerned with this committee and the market isn't so keen 
with the subject" (OR] 1). 
Another manager of the auditing department from the CBL pointed out: 
"This is mainly due to the board of directors' ignorance of auditing 
committees' importance" (OR10). 
Similarly, the head of the supervision and control department of the LSM added the 
following: 
"As I already said, the board of directors is still unaware of the 
importance of this committee" (OR6). 
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Further reasons were mentioned by the interviewees. For instance, the deficiencies of 
the audit committees were as a result of the absence of law. The chairman of the Libyan stock 
markets stressed the following: 
"The absence of this committee is due to a lack of legal compulsion as 
well as ignorance among investors in the capital market about the 
importance of these rules" (OR4). 
Similarly, another ex- deputy chairman of LSM pointed out: 
"I think the absence of this committee is because commercial law includes 
nothing concerning this committee" (ORS). 
On the other hand, some managers believed that in addition to the absence of a 
mandatory clause in Libyan law, the lack of competent members made it difficult to recognise 
the importance of the audit committees. The firms are themselves unaware of the importance 
of these committees. One ex-member of the control committee of the LSM remarked: 
"I think the absence of this committee is due to the lack of any mandatory 
clause in the law. This applies to banks as well because of the lack of 
awareness of this committee's importance. I think deficiency of 
competence is a major problem" (OR 7). 
Similarly, one head of the documentary credit department of the CBL pointed out: 
"There is nothing whatsoever obliging firms to have this committee. The 
firms themselves are unaware of this committee's importance" (OR9). 
Overall, this section has overviewed corporate governance in listed Libyan companies. 
It discussed issues regarding the benefits and current status of practices, especially in the 
financial sector, as well as the role of the audit committee in corporate governance. The results 
of the interview indicate that the introduction of corporate governance was a positive 
development, but it was seem to be imported. Similarly, ignorance of the code by both 
managers and audit committee members made it difficult to implement in listed Libyan 
companies. 
7.4 The Current Obstacles Affecting the Application of the LCGC 
This 'chapter has also aimed to identify which, among the 15 obstacles noted in the 
interviews with board members of Libyan listed companies and the participants of the 
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questionnaire survey most affected the implementation of the corporate governance practices 
in Libya. 
The interviewees were provided with a list of the obstacles facing the 
implementation of the LCGC that were suggested by both the interviews with board members 
of Libyan listed companies and the participants of the questionnaire survey in the first and 
second stages of this study. Among the 15 obstacles identified by the participants, the officials 
and regulators ranked five of them as being the most important. They are described below in 
their order of significance. 
Of the twelve respondents, nine mentioned poor leadership in Libyan companies as the 
most significant obstacle, followed by the lack of knowledge about corporate governance 
among Libyan companies (mentioned by eight interviewees). On the other hand, seven 
respondents pointed out the weakness of the legal environment for companies in Libya to be 
among the obstacles facing the implementation of the LCGC. This is similar to findings 
provided by Fawzy (2003), Arce and Robles (2005), Wong (2009) and Okike (2007), who 
revealed that despite the government efforts to initiate an effective system of corporate 
governance by changing company legislation and establishing the code of corporate 
governance for all Nigerian listed companies, the effectiveness of this system is still in doubt 
due to the weakness of legal enforcement. 
This result is also confirmed by Klapper and Love (2004) who found that corporate 
governance provisions are more important in countries with weak legal systems since firms 
have sufficient flexibility to affect corporate governance. Krishnamurti et al. (2003) argued 
that companies with a high control, situated in countries with weak legal protection for 
minority shareholders, generally receive lower scores because they do not improve their 
governance environment. La Porta et al. (1999) have introduced a new approach (the legal 
approach), which explains the cross-country difference in corporate governance systems by 
their legal origin rather than by the index scores. They have argued that the existence of laws 
protecting minority shareholders and their degree of enforcement are key determinants of 
capital markets, and showed that the tradition of law is very important in the development of 
financial markets. 
Furthermore, some empirical evidence stipulated the importance of law enforcement 
rather than law books in the development of financial markets. Among these researchers is 
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Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) who strongly argued that the enforcement of law and the 
structure of society were very important for effectively protecting investors, more so than the 
law. They suggested that legal rules are just a reflection of a broader societal stance. 
Similarly, the impact of government intervention in companies, lack of training 
among directors about corporate governance and weak investment awareness among investors 
were the three obstacles noted by six respondents to be the most significant among the 15 
identified obstacles. 
Another important objective of this section was to find out why interviewees thought 
these obstacles to be so significant. And what could be done to overcome these 
obstacles. Therefore, respondents were asked to give their views regarding the notable 
obstacles hindering corporate governance in Libya and what could be done to overcome them. 
With regard to the obstacle of poor leadership within Libyan companies, two 
respondents mentioned that this was the result of local management isolation from foreign 
skills, which prohibited the transference of other experience. This finding supports the 
recommendations made by Mallin, (2007) and Solomon (2007), who argue that it is very 
important for shareholders to choose for themselves a board of directors composed of qualified 
people, who are concerned to make decisions that will benefit the company as a whole and 
increase shareholder value. However, some respondents said that to overcome this obstacle, 
management should train employees about corporate governance and also hire more qualified 
and experienced workers. As the chairman of LSM stated: 
"Poor management is a result of many factors, such as employment of 
undereducated, inexperienced people, not to mention that top management 
is floundering and not well organised, which is clearly reflected in the 
weakness of these companies. In order to tackle this obstacle, the personnel 
of these companies must be qualified, and setting a work guide helps each 
to recognise the scope of his authority and accountability" (OR 4). 
Similarly, the head of the documentary credit department of the CBL suggested that corporate 
governance code should be introduced in the curriculum of institutions of higher learning: 
"The management is the main target of this code. Therefore, this hindrance 
could be removed by adding this subject to the university curriculum. Then 
comes training of current management so to eliminate incompetence" (OR 
9). 
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Regarding the misunderstanding of corporate governance among Libyan companies, 
some respondents attributed this to the lack of knowledge about its advantages, and the non- 
existence of relevant training programmes. At the same time, six respondents suggested several 
alternatives to overcome this obstacle, including training in various centres and putting in place 
policies that should help in the implementation of this code. The chairman of the LSM 
suggested the following: 
"This could be handled by training and qualification as well as restating 
those rules in a legal form so to emphasise them to the concerned parties" 
(OR 4). 
This finding supports the recommendations made by the UAB (2007); more emphasis is 
needed on designing and implementing special corporate governance training programmes 
and internal control practices for employees in the Arab banking sector. Furthermore, 
Dahawy (2008) recommended an increased focus on training and education among all 
stakeholders to improve the application of corporate governance in Egypt. 
Four respondents also pointed out the significant weakness of the legal environment 
due to Libyan culture and the ownership structure. Similarly, they mentioned the 
nonexistence of regulations for the stock exchange as corporate governance is a new field, 
which has been recently introduced in Libya. As the head of the supervision and control 
department in the LSM said: 
"This is, to a great extent, a consequence of the nonexistence of regulations 
for the stock exchange as the new law for the financial market is still 
incomplete, and does not include some sectors. For this, a new commercial 
law is needed" (OR 6). 
However, four respondents suggested that to overcome this obstacle, new laws should be 
considered by Libyan companies. An ex-member of the control committee in the LSM 
explained: 
"This obstacle may be handled through law and by limiting the decisions so 
to reach a stable legal environment. This can be achieved through defining 
the rules organising economic activities and following up their 
implementation and penalising violators" (OR 7). 
Additionally, a manager of the corporate department of the IMB stated: 
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"Enacting new legislation in Libya takes a great deal of time and effort. 
However, the laws to be made must be sound and cover all aspects of this 
code, and social relations concerning the work should be eliminated" (OR 
11). 
The government has power over all companies operating in the country. One member of 
the corporate department of the MTE said: 
"The state owns a portion of the companies in spite of their privatisation, 
which creates difficulty in managing them - they already suffer a lot from 
government interference. To overcome such an obstacle, the government 
should adopt capitalism and get rid of any ownership no matter how small " 
(OR3). 
Additionally, the majority of the respondents (11 out of 12) believed that the principal 
obstacle was poor leadership within Libyan companies and a lack of knowledge and training 
among directors about management corporate governance. 
They were of the opinion that poor leadership may result from many factors such as 
employment of unqualified and inexperienced personnel. This confirms the results of Core et 
al. (1999), who examined a wide range of board characteristics and found that companies 
with weaker governance structures had more agency problems. These, moreover, were worse 
performers than strongly governed firms. This is so due to the divergence of the relationship 
between board strength and a number of board characteristics. Some of these characteristics 
are the proportion of inside directors, board size, grey directors (those directors who are not 
employees of the firm but receive payment for services other than directorial duties), and the 
appointment of a CEO who also acted as the board chair. 
Furthermore, seven respondents expressed the view that weak investment awareness 
among investors was one of the biggest obstacles to corporate governance in Libya. As 
investors commit their funds to companies, they should investigate how their investment is 
being used and to scrutinise whatever is happening in the corporation. Investors' pressure could 
also hasten the establishment of corporate governance. The interview respondents believed that 
increased investors' awareness and pressure may increase the implementation of corporate 
governance in Libya. The controller of the head of supervision and control department of the 
LSM remarked: 
"This, in particular, is considered one of the major hindrances that can be 
easily identified in stock exchange deals - also investor non-attendance at 
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general assembly and restriction of his interest in only the returns 
regardless of other vital matters in the organisation such as governance 
(OR 6). 
Similarly, the deputy manager of the bank monitoring board of the CBL argued: 
"The investor in Libya isn't quite aware of what investment really is and the 
benefits that may be generated from having confidence in these companies 
and their external auditors. To do away with this apathy, the state should 
educate investors through media or any other suitable way, and provide 
them with alternative investments" (OR8). 
This opinion is reflected in the findings of Duca et al. (2007), who argued that despite the 
institutional efforts, inside the business environment, and even among Romanian listed 
companies on the capital market, there was still no real concern for corporate governance 
issues. 
The absence of a Libyan Capital Market Authority, finally, was pointed out by five 
respondents as an obstacle, while others noted that the impact of government intervention was 
significant due to the ownership structure - the state still owns a majority of companies. This 
factor is referred to by the manager öf the corporate department of the MTE: 
"As we all now, Libya has recently adopted a capitalistic system - it is still 
a new concept - but in spite of quasi-complete diversion frý om socialism, the 
government still owns a great part of most privatised companies. Therefore, 
it is no wonder that it interferes in their management. I think that the state 
should quickly get rid of this ownership and restrict itself to the monitoring 
role" (OR 1). 
Similarly, a member of the corporate department of the MTE mentioned: 
"The state still owns a portion of the companies in spite of their 
privatisation. This makes it difficult to manage these companies that 
already suffer a lot frý om government interference. To overcome such an 
obstacle, the government should adopt capitalism and get rid of any 
ownership no matter how small" (OR 3). 
A member of the corporate department in the IMB suggested a possible remedy: 
"The government must cease its interference in companies, especially those that 
have been privatised" (OR 12). 
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In order to explore further these obstacles, the interviewees were asked to give their 
views on whether there were other obstacles affecting the implementation of corporate 
governance, either from the list or from their own experience, and to state how they could be 
overcome. 
In response to this, the majority of the interviewees (9 from 12) indicated clearly that 
apart from the obstacles they highlighted in the preceding questions, there were no other 
obstacles from the list or from their own experience that were important. However, a few 
interviewees (three from eleven) agreed that there were other obstacles. The deputy of the 
corporate department of the MTE presented a list of other obstacles, but did not give any 
suggestion on how to overcome them. The obstacles are listed below: 
1. "The financial cost of implementing corporate governance 
2. Weakness of the audit profession due to non-compliance with standards; 
3. Lack of qualified staff who could apply governance principles; 
4. Weakness of the accounting profession due to non-implementation of 
relevant international standards; 
5. Absence of an institute that could prepare and train managers; and 
6. Absence of an independent body for monitoring corporate governance 
practices. " (OR2). 
Experienced accountants are needed and, in their opinion, they can overcome these obstacles 
by employing qualified audit staff to implement and strengthen corporate governance practices. 
Furthermore, Libyan companies should include in their budgets the costs for training existing 
staff. In addition, the government, with the help of other bodies such as the capital market, 
should make it compulsory for all companies listed on LSM to follow the LCGC. Additionally, 
these bodies may succeed by making the companies responsible for training existing employees 
and enforcing corporate governance practices. 
Furthermore, two respondents acknowledged the lack of knowledge about corporate 
governance as another obstacle. They believed that this obstacle could be dealt with by 
organising training and providing continuous programmes, as well as developing education 
regarding the application of corporate governance. In support of this, a manager of the 
corporate department of IMB stated: 
"Most people in the marketplace know almost nothing about this, which, 
in turn, necessitates developing curricula as well as media programmes. 
Nevertheless, all these obstacles have an effect" (OR 11). 
238 
The ex deputy chairman of LSM also said: 
"This should be dealt with by training, media and development of education 
curricula" (OR 5). 
However, two of the interviewees stated other obstacles to be the investors' 
inadequate knowledge about corporate governance and the state interference in company 
affairs. 
As regards ways of overcoming these obstacles, in general, interviewees favoured 
organising workshops and training, as well as developing corporate governance education 
programmes. In addition to this, companies needed more freedom, power and support from the 
government in order to publicise and apply corporate governance. One person said: 
"This impediment can be removed by organising symposia and including 
media programmes, and because of that the government must offer 
companies more power ". 
This view may be correct because corporate governance is a new field recently 
introduced in Libya. There is a lack of enough knowledge and information about corporate 
governance, but such an effective system in Libya will continuously help company managers 
improve, while, at the same time, make shareholders and stakeholders aware of their rights. 
7.4 Future Improvement of Corporate Governance in Libya 
In this section some issues relating to the future improvement and development of 
corporate governance in Libya were discussed with the interviewees. This included raising 
public awareness about the concept of corporate governance and identifying the 
responsibility for both improving corporate governance practices and monitoring compliance 
with the LCGC. The interviewees were first asked to express their opinions regarding the 
different ways to raise public awareness of corporate governance in Libya. 
All the interviewees had different views, but they were beneficial. Most (8 from 12) had 
the same idea regarding how to raise public awareness and argued that it can be done through 
the cooperation of all government and non-government authorities, working together to educate 
and spread such awareness among all individuals and companies. 
In addition, both educational and professional institutions should work hand in hand 
with the government to plan conferences and media events, as well as publish booklets and 
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newsletters on a state, stock market and organisational level, in order to promote the awareness 
of corporate governance. In support of this, a chairman of the LSM said: 
"All state authorities' efforts should be coordinated to elevate the level of 
public awareness of corporate governance by setting up scientific and 
professional conferences and creating governmental units within all 
economic activities. The educational aspect should also be considered as it 
is a main source of such knowledge especially in small economies" (OR 4). 
Some interviewees, nevertheless, suggested that the task of spreading awareness 
should be given to company managers to organise training for their board and employees 
regarding the application of corporate governance in Libya, and to set out penalties for 
breaking any rules of this system. In support of this, the director of the auditing department of 
the CBL answered: 
"The management has to train its board of directors and staff and the 
rules must clearly indicate to governance system. The official institutes 
should also contribute in public education" (OR10). 
In the view of the remaining two interviewees, the awareness could be increased by 
involving the Capital Market Authority, as it is an independent authority qualified to introduce 
the corporate governance system in Libya and to compel all listed companies to apply it. In 
relation to this, a member of the insurance monitoring body claimed: 
"First, we should focus on education by developing the curriculum, and then 
we should have specialist institutes and launch training courses for members 
of the corporate management" (OR12). 
In addition, it may also be helpful to give freedom to the private sector to play this role within 
the context of economic activities. In the meantime, the government should also make it 
compulsory for all companies listed on the LSM to adopt the corporate governance code and to 
ensure they are fully applied. 
Secondly, the interviewees were asked to give their opinions on who should improve 
corporate governance practices in Libya and why. Some of the interviewees (4 from 12) 
indicated clearly that responsibility for this should not be confined to one party. Therefore, it 
should be shared between several parties. Neither the government, the stock market, the audit 
committees, nor boards of directors is able to improve it alone. These respondents believe that 
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for corporate governance to be effective every party should play its role and they should 
combine their efforts to enforce it. 
For instance, the Libyan government - the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of 
Commerce - the Capital Market Authority and others can be best for implementing and 
improving the corporate governance system in Libya. This view was supported by a manager 
of the corporate department of the MTE who stated: 
"A task can never be achieved by a single body, but all concerned parties 
in the country must work together. However, the person that bears most 
responsibilityfor the financial market as well as the listed companies is the 
Economy and Commerce Secretary. So, he should play a large part in 
activating this system (OR1). 
The head of the supervision and control department of the LSM also argued 
"I believe that all Libyan authorities are somehow responsible for 
improving the companies' practice of corporate governance, but I think the 
central bank and financial market are more responsible than anybody else. 
This is the case in all other Arab countries" (OR6). 
There were some interviewees who thought that there must be a separate authoritative body 
working under government supervision, or the capital market, to implement and improve the 
corporate governance system because, in their opinion, a specialist is more likely to do better 
than any of these other bodies. In support of this, one person stated: 
"There must be an authoritative body operating under state supervision, 
.... because these matters are technical and require specialist staff to ensure 
sound implementation of corporate governance" (OR2). 
Moreover, a member of the corporate department of the IMB said: 
"There should be a specialist institution subordinate to the capital market" 
(OR12). 
Additionally, another interviewee indicated that the most powerful body for improving the 
corporate governance system is the stock exchange market. He argued: 
"I think the authority responsible for improving the practice of corporate 
governance is the stock exchange itself. This could be done by releasing periodic 
bulletins of which it is the major beneficiary" (ORS). 
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This response may be due to the fact that the stock market is the source of finance for all 
companies. It is most influential and companies are likely to follow its recommendations. 
However, another interviewee assigned the duty of improving corporate governance to the 
central bank for banks, and Insurance Monitoring Body for industries. 
Finally, the interviewees were asked to express their opinions as regards who should be 
responsible for monitoring compliance with the LCGC and why. All presented different views. 
Some of the interviewees (4 from 12) had similar ideas as to who should be responsible. They 
believed that this was a very hard task for one body to monitor compliance with this code and 
so suggested collaboration between all bodies (both government and non-government) without 
leaving out the stock market, which according to them seemed most powerful. 
In addition, both educational and professional institutions should work hand in hand 
with the government, the capital market and other bodies and require all Libyan listed 
companies to include corporate governance and sustainability reports annually. If possible, they 
should also impose penalties for noncompliance. This can serve to increase awareness and 
compliance with the Libyan corporate governance code. One of the respondents, a deputy 
manager of the bank monitoring board of the CBL puts it in the following terms: 
"I have already said that each sector is completely responsible for the 
companies within its domain. This implies that each sector must apply these 
rules in a proper way and deal strongly with those not implementing them" 
(OR8). 
Similarly, four interviewees had the same view that the Capital Market Authority 
should be responsible for monitoring compliance with the LCGC because, they believe, it is 
more powerful than others and, therefore, more suited for this role. In support of this, a 
member of the corporate department of the IMB answered: 
"This should be the responsibility of the Capital Market Authority as it is 
more powerful than the market. It can assign a division for monitoring the 
application of these rules" (OR 12). 
The manager of the corporate department of the MTE also argued: 
"As far as following up compliance with the LCG, the Capital Market 
Authority plays an important role in overseeing such a system in most 
countries and must be established right away" (ORI). 
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On the other hand, one respondent viewed the General People's Committee of Planning and 
Finance that oversees corporate governance practices as the body which can best monitor 
compliance with the LCGC. According to his view, whichever body is assigned the 
responsibility of monitoring compliance with the LCGC needs to operate independently in 
order to be effective. 
"I think, for now, it should be the General People's Committee of planning 
and finance that oversees corporate governance practices. However, 
whichever body is assigned this responsibility must be independent" (OR9). 
This result supports the findings and recommendations made by Saidi (2004), who investigated 
the OECD principles of corporate governance in Lebanon. One of the main recommendations 
was the need for an independent body to monitor the implementation of corporate governance 
in the country. 
7.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has presented an analysis of the findings arising from the final phase of 
the study data collection, which investigated the views of Libyan officials and regulators. 
While agreeing with respondents in the other two groups about the urgent need for an effective 
corporate governance code in Libya, this group considered the level of implementation of the 
LCGC to much lower than that perceived by the other two groups. These respondents regarded 
the main benefits of corporate governance as being protection of shareholder rights; oversight 
of management performance; and regulation of the relationship between boards of directors, 
shareholders and auditing committees. 
The respondents agreed with the other groups that the LCGC faced many obstacles to 
its successful implementation, of which the most important were perceived to be: 
" poor leadership within Libyan companies, 
"a lack of knowledge about the code among companies, 
" the weakness of the legal environment, 
" the impact of government intervention, 
" the lack of training among directors of companies, and 
" weak investment awareness among investors. 
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Suggested solutions to overcoming these obstacles were: organising workshops and 
training, as well as developing corporate governance education programmes. In addition, 
companies were felt to need more freedom, empowerment and support from the government in 
this context. Overall, education was perceived to be the key to overcoming obstacles to the 
LCGC and the lack of experience within the country of operating organizations within a free- 
market system. 
Chapter seven completes the presentation and analysis of the findings from the data 
collection of this study, and in collecting the principal observations of the Libyan regulators 
and officials fulfils the purposes of objective four. Having analysed the findings of the study, 
chapter eight will now consider the study's contribution to the literature on corporate 
governance, the role it can play in the future direction of governance in Libya, and ways in 
which it can be built on by future researchers. 
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Chapter Eight 
Conclusion and Recommendations 
8.1 Introduction 
The main aim of this chapter is to provide an overview of and conclusion to the entire 
study. In order to achieve this broad aim, the chapter is divided into five sections. The first 
section provides an overview of the insights and discussions presented in the previous chapters. 
Section two presents a summary of the main findings of the empirical part of the study. The 
third section outlines the research recommendations arising out of the literature review and the 
analysis undertaken following the field study. The contributions of the study to knowledge of 
corporate governance are illustrated in section four. Finally, the fifth section discusses the 
limitations of the study and provides suggestions for areas of future research. 
8.2 An Overview of the Study 
As was mentioned in chapter two, although Libya is an oil and gas producing country, it 
is experiencing economic problems and has, therefore, adopted several policies to overcome 
these, such as starting a programme of economic reform restructuring that moved from socialist 
oriented policies towards a free-market economy by adopting a massive privatisation 
programme. This covered all economic sectors in the country and established the LSM (see, 
chapter two, section 2.2). As a result, the debate started about the need for good corporate 
governance in Libya, in order to take advantage of local and foreign investment as a means of 
enhancing the private sector in the economy. 
Accordingly, the main aim of this study was to investigate the current corporate 
governance practices, perceptions and obstacles within Libya following the introduction of 
LCGC. To achieve this aim, the study had several broad objectives: 
" To explore the nature and extent of current corporate governance practices within eight 
listed Libyan companies following the introduction of the LCGC. 
" To survey the perceptions of listed companies' staff (senior managers and employees in 
a financial capacity) and Libyan experts (academics and auditors) regarding the 
introduction of the LCGC. 
" To identify the current obstacles to the application of the LCGC. 
245 
" To examine the views of the Libyan Regulators in relation to identified obstacles and 
ways of decreasing them. 
The study consisted of eight chapters. Chapter one addressed the research objectives 
and questions, the rationale and motivation for the study, the chosen research methodology, 
the scope of the study and the structure of the research. Chapter two presented a framework 
within which the study would be conducted. This included an overview of several aspects of 
the Libyan economy, reforms and privatisation programmes of both the financial and non- 
financial sectors, the establishment of the LSM and foreign direct investment in Libya. The 
accounting and auditing profession was also considered in this chapter. It was revealed that 
the country is experiencing major change in its socialist oriented policies toward a free- 
market economy by adopting a massive privatisation programme covering all economic 
sectors. 
Chapter one also showed that the accounting and auditing profession has been 
influenced by the UK and the USA. This was due to the impact of these two countries on the 
profession via oil companies, aid agencies, construction companies and accounting and 
auditing education systems. In addition, it was found that a number of the accounting and 
auditing related regulations were issued a long time ago and that there was an urgent need for 
them to be updated. This chapter further provided an overview of corporate governance in a 
Libyan context, which included the Libyan legal framework and the OECD principles, the 
LCCG and the challenges of applying corporate governance in Libya. 
Chapter three extensively reviewed the previous theoretical and empirical literature 
relating to the area of study. In particular, this chapter started with various definitions of 
corporate governance, the historical development of corporate governance in the UK, the USA 
and the OECD, and a theoretical framework of agency and stakeholders' theories. Based on 
this review, it was found that the concept of corporate governance emerged in the early 1980s, 
following the collapse of large companies in different countries. However, the history of 
corporate governance as a phenomenon may be dated back to when businesses began to 
separate management functions from the ownership. Therefore, the main corporate governance 
problems were based upon the conflicts of interest between various parties; the shareholders 
and management of the company, on one hand, and the stakeholders, on the other hand. 
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After a comprehensive review of the previous literature, this chapter also discussed the 
most significant mechanisms of corporate governance, namely ownership structure, 
shareholders' rights and legal protection, board of directors, board committees, internal 
auditing and disclosure and transparency. Furthermore, it reviewed previous studies on 
corporate governance conducted in developing countries. 
Chapter four described the methodology used to carry out this study in terms of 
research philosophy, paradigm and approach (Quantitative and Qualitative Methods). In 
addition, this chapter provided an overview of the current research design, which outlines the 
objectives, research questions and data collection methods. This latter is a combination of 
semi-structured interviews A&B and a questionnaire survey, as well as the three main stages 
of collecting data: 
9 The first stage was based on a qualitative approach where semi-structured interviews 
(A) were used to explore the current corporate governance in eight Libyan listed 
companies and to identify the current obstacles to the application of the LCGC. 
" The second stage was based on a quantitative approach where a questionnaire survey 
was used to survey the perceptions of listed companies' staff (senior managers and 
employees in a financial capacity) and Libyan experts (academics and auditors) 
regarding the introduction of the LCGC. 
9 The third stage was based on a qualitative approach where semi-structured interviews 
(B) were used to examine the views of the Libyan regulators and officials in relation to 
identifying and decreasing obstacles. 
Chapter five discussed the results of the semi-structured interviews (A) that were 
conducted with board members of eight Libyan listed companies on the current corporate 
governance practices and obstacles to the application of the LCGC. Chapter six examined the 
data from the questionnaire that was conducted with two targeted groups (listed companies' 
staff and Libyan experts) regarding the participants' perceptions on the introduction of LCGC 
in Libya. Chapter seven discussed the results from the semi-structured interviews B that were 
conducted with Libyan regulators and officials in relation to identified obstacles and ways of 
decreasing them. Chapter eight, the last chapter of this study, provided an overview of the 
whole study, which included a summary of the findings, recommendations and the study's 
potential contribution, as well as suggesting areas of further research. 
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8.3 Summary of Main Results of the Study 
This study underscores the efforts of the Libyan regulator to enhance the system of 
corporate governance in Libya by introducing the LCCG, in order to improve the performance 
of companies and overcome the agency problem that can arise from the separation of 
management and control. Therefore, the Libyan business environment is in need of corporate 
governance mechanisms that recommend and impose certain principles, and companies have to 
be made aware of such a system in order to increase the accountability of management toward 
the stakeholders. Accordingly, this section provides a summary of the main findings of the research 
relating to three main stages of collecting data. 
8.3.1 Results of Semi-Structured Interviews (A) 
The main objective of the semi-structured interviews (A) at the first stage was to 
explore the nature and extent of current corporate governance practices in the eight listed 
Libyan companies following the introduction of the LCGC. It also attempted to identify the 
obstacles facing the application of the LCGC. 
Regarding ownership structure, the results indicated that there were two types of 
ownership structure in listed Libyan companies: concentrated and distributed ownership. 
Under the concentrated ownership, fall three other categories, which are government, 
institutional and foreign shareholders. Four companies have government ownership - Wahda 
Bank (54.1%), Gamhuria Bank (89%), Libyan Insurance Co. (45%) and Al-Sahara Insurance 
Co. (45%) - and two companies have foreign shareholders - Wahda Bank with 19% and 
Sahara Bank 19%. However, all companies have institutional shareholders except for Wahda 
Bank and Gamhuria Bank. In terms of distributed ownership, in which individuals or small 
private firms own less than 5% of shares, all companies have varying ratios of this type of 
shareholding. 
Regarding rights of shareholders, the results also indicated that respondents recognised 
the significance of voting by mail or the internet, but it was discovered that these methods were 
not used by companies in Libya, which emphasised the necessity of personal attendance at 
general meetings. On the other hand, respondents said that their companies allowed their 
shareholders proxy voting. However, the policy of cumulative voting was not used by any 
company in spite of its importance in protecting the rights of minority shareholders - this 
allowed them to work as a group to elect a candidate of their choice, who would represent them 
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and protect their rights as a member of the board of directors. Shareholders of all the 
companies obtained relevant and timely information regarding financial and non-financial 
matters. They also enjoyed share profiting as well as the right to attend and participate at the 
AGM. 
With regard to the board structure, the results indicated that the majority of companies 
had the same board size, which consists of seven members including the chairman. All the 
participants said that the board members should be highly qualified and have the right mix of 
experience, skills and educational backgrounds. Moreover, the five banking companies have a 
majority of non-executive directors on their boards, while the three insurance companies have a 
ratio 4: 7,4: 8 and 4: 9 non-executive directors to executive directors on their boards. The results 
also revealed that all companies have different people in the two positions of the Chairman and 
the CEO. 
When questioned about the tasks and responsibilities assigned to the board of directors, 
the results indicated that the majority of companies reported that their boards of directors 
played an important role in setting objective and strategy. In addition, the general written rules 
stipulating the responsibilities of the board in the banking sector were defined by the LBL (1/ 
2005). However, some participants from the banking sector emphasised the need for their own 
written rules, which were heavily required by a foreign partner. 
However, the results illustrated that all companies did not have their own corporate 
governance rules and written policies clarifying the relationship with stakeholders, despite the 
LCCG calls for these to be produced by the board of directors of all listed companies. This may 
be due to the fact that the concept of corporate governance is new in Libya. As regards top 
management performance evaluation, the results indicated that this was done by the board of 
directors, who carried out effective appraisal by using multiple financial and non-financial 
indicators as well as profit-related indicators. The results suggested that most companies had a 
good internal control system, and that there existed bodies inside and outside the companies 
that ensured the effectiveness of such a system. 
The results also indicated that all the respondents agreed on the importance of having 
independent internal auditors, who were highly educated in both accounting and audit. 
However, the majority of respondents stated clearly that their companies had no clear written 
regulations for the directors and staff regarding conflict of interest. Both the company directors 
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and staff were guided by certain rules, which were derived from labour and commercial laws 
and other guidelines, as well as comparable regulations regarding what should be done by the 
employees. In addition, the results also revealed that disclosure and transparency' of all 
companies was poor. Furthermore, some companies have no audit and nominating committees 
and their duties are performed by the board and the CEOs. However, all companies have 
control committees because it is required by Libyan law. 
Finally, a number of obstacles affecting corporate governance were cited by the 
respondent: weakness of the organisation management, weakness of the legal environment, the 
influence and interference of the government, weakness of accounting and audit professions 
because of non-adoption of international standards, the current ownership structure of certain 
firms, absence of training programmes for members of the board of directors about the 
governance system, inadequacy of investors' awareness of the investment concept, the financial 
cost of implementing a governance system, a limited number of listed companies in the local 
market, the absence of a body to monitor practices and insufficient international pressure on 
Libya to apply a governance system. 
8.3.2 Results of Questionnaire Survey 
The main objective of the questionnaire at the second stage was to survey the 
respondents' perceptions regarding the introduction of the LCGC. It also attempted to identify 
the current obstacles facing the application of the LCGC. The primary data was obtained from 
a questionnaire designed to achieve these objectives. The questionnaire survey was distributed 
among two groups; the first consisted of the staff of companies listed on the LSM (senior 
managers and employees in the financial function), and the second consisted of Libyan experts 
(external auditors and academics). 
Descriptive statistics were used in this study to define the characteristics of the 
participants of the study and to assist in answering the research questions. The study also 
employed the Mann-Whitney test to identify any significant differences between the two 
groups, since the questionnaire sought the respondents' opinions and general attitudes. The 
main results of this part indicated that most respondents had positive perceptions regarding the 
corporate governance mechanisms, namely shareholders' rights, board structure and 
responsibilities, internal auditing, disclosure and transparency, conflicts of interest and board 
committees as set out under the LCGC. 
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Analysis of the collated data supports, in general, most of the items presented in the 
questionnaire. Respondents strongly agreed with these mechanisms for protecting shareholders 
and stakeholders' rights as introduced by the LCGC. Their agreement with the items presented 
in the questionnaire was reflected in the high mean and median scores. Despite general 
agreement in opinion between respondents, there were also some significant differences 
regarding certain items in the questionnaire. Basically, these differences were in the degree of 
emphasis among the selected groups who took part in this study. 
Finally, as regards factors that negatively affected corporate governance practices, the 
results indicated that most respondents agreed upon fifteen obstacles: weakness of the 
organisation management, weakness of legal environment, influence and interference of the 
government, weakness of accounting and audit professions because of non-adoption of 
international standards, current ownership structure of certain firms, absence of governance 
system training programmes for members of the board of directors, inadequacy of investors' 
awareness of the investment concept, the financial cost of implementing a governance system, 
the limited number of listed companies in the local market, absence of a body monitoring 
governance practice and insufficient international pressure on Libya to' apply a governance 
system. This was reflected in the reported mean and median scores and no significant 
differences appeared among the two groups. Furthermore, the results also confirm the findings 
obtained from the interviews with board of directors of Libyan listed companies, which were 
conducted in the first stage of this study. 
8.3.3 Results of Semi-Structured Interviews (B) 
The main objective of the semi-structured interviews (B) in the final stage of the study 
was to examine the views of the Libyan officials and regulators in relation to identified 
obstacles and ways of decreasing them, specifically after the introduction of the LCCG. The 
primary data was obtained from semi-structured interviews (B) designed to achieve these 
objective. The semi-structured interviews (B) were conducted with twelve representatives; four 
Libyan officials and regulatory bodies, the MTE, the LSM, the IMB and the CBL. 
The interviews findings indicated that corporate governance is a new phenomenon in 
the Libyan business environment. However, it was clear that support for introducing a 
corporate governance system in Libyan companies was much stronger since all interviewees 
were in favor of introducing the LCGC. Most of the interviewees considered corporate 
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governance as very important for companies. Furthermore, the most common benefits of this 
system were mentioned by the interviewees: the protection of shareholders' rights, appropriate 
management performance and organising relationships between boards of directors, 
shareholders and auditing committees. They tended to perceive corporate governance from an 
agency theory perspective. 
In addition, the interviewees all responded negatively to the current application of the 
LCGC by the listed Libyan companies, which confirms the results obtained from the first 
interviews with the board of directors regarding this matter. Moreover, this result also confirms 
that there are many obstacles facing the application of the LCGC. The interview findings 
indicated that all interviewees agreed about the role played by the audit committee. They 
recognised its overall importance in corporate governance. 
Questions were also asked concerning obstacles affecting the implementation of 
corporate governance practices in Libya, and the results suggested that poor leadership in 
companies was regarded the most significant, followed by the lack of knowledge about 
corporate governance, the weakness of the legal. environment, the impact of government 
intervention in companies, the lack of training among board of directors about corporate 
governance and weak investment awareness among investors. However, as regards how to 
overcome these obstacles, in general, interviewees suggested organising workshops and 
trainings, as well as developing corporate governance education programmes. In addition to 
this, companies needed more freedom, power and support from the government to publicise 
and apply corporate governance. 
As regards the future improvement and development of corporate governance in Libya, 
the results suggested that most interviewees had the same idea on how to raise public 
awareness. They argued that this can be done through collaboration of all government and non- 
government authorities, working together to educate and spread awareness among all 
individuals and companies. In addition, both educational and professional institutions should 
work hand in hand with the government to plan conferences and media, and to publish booklets 
and newsletters on the state, stock market and organisational level in order to promote 
awareness of corporate governance. 
Secondly, with regard to the issue of identifying the party responsible for improving 
corporate governance in Libya, the interviewees indicated clearly that this responsibility should 
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not lie with one party. Therefore, it should be shared between several parties. The government, 
the stock market, the audit committee, or the board of directors is not able to improve it alone. 
These respondents believed that for corporate governance to be effective, every party should 
play its role and combine their efforts to enforce it. 
Finally, the issue of the responsibility of monitoring compliance with the LCGC, the 
interviewees had similar ideas regarding who should be responsible for monitoring compliance 
with the LCGC. They believed that it was a very hard task for one body to monitor the 
compliance with this code and suggested the cooperation of all bodies (both government and 
non-government), including the stock market, which, according to them, seems to be more 
powerful. 
8.4 Recommendations of the Study 
Globally, the issue of corporate governance is one of the main concerns of many 
regulators, academics and practitioners in most countries. Therefore, the Libyan government 
must provide an efficient stock market and improved levels of corporate governance practices 
among its economic activities. These efforts should include the following requirements: 
" Libyan laws and administrative systems should be reviewed and updated in line with 
international corporate governance practices. The LCGC has little chance of successful 
implementation unless it is surrounded by a framework of law that protects the interests 
of corporate stakeholders, therefore there needs to be an updating on laws on personal 
property, land and asset sales, and grater legal protection for shareholders, especially 
minority shareholders. The institutions overseeing these laws also need to be trusted by 
the population at large and free from corruption. This point was made very forcibly by 
certain respondents among the Libyan officials interviewed, and is supported by the 
literature, (La Porta et al., 1997; Johnson, Boone et al., 2000; De Jong & Semenov, 
2002; Denis & McConnell, 2003) 
" The Libyan Institute of Directors should be established, which will play an important 
role overseeing corporate governance in Libya. It should also focus on improving 
awareness of this system, and providing appropriate training methods for directors. The 
aims of this institute should include efforts to overcome the obstacles to corporate 
governance implementation identified in this study. It should be an independent body 
consisting of experts in management and corporate governance from the business and 
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academic fields, shareholders and stakeholders and state officials. The need for a body 
of this kind was stressed by respondents among the Libyan officials and experts in 
particular. 
" An independent government body with adequate resources should be established to 
monitor and evaluate implementation of corporate governance practice in Libya. Given 
the lack of experience in Libyan with a free-market economy in general, the need for 
this body is paramount, so oversee implementation of the code and to guide changes to 
governance structures within the organisations obliged by law to implement the code. 
" More effort should be made to encourage an awareness of corporate governance in the 
Libyan business environment through conferences, seminars and publications. This was 
a point made by both individuals working for the companies listed on the LSM, and the 
officials interviewed, who were in agreement that an enormous amount of education 
and training were necessary to incorporate the LCGC into the everyday operations of 
Libyan companies. 
" The LCGC should be a mandatory code and include penalties for non-compliance. 
Libyan business is in need of corporate governance mechanisms in order to improve the 
performance of companies and thus overcome the agency problem that can arise from 
the separation of management and ownership. Under the previous system of state 
control of business activities, the issue of agency problems did not arise, but with one of 
the aims of the new economic openness being the spread of share ownership and the 
inclusion of small investors in the LSM, it is necessary that such investors should 
receive adequate protection from the interests of their agents in management. 
" There are many other board committees which are necessary to good corporate 
governance, but which are not specified in the LCGC. Among these are committees on 
information technology, committees on governance, committees on risk and 
committees set up to oversee the environmental performance of an organisation. These 
committees are recommended in the literature (Spira and Bender, 2004: Minichilli, 
Gabrielsson et al., 2007) and were mentioned by respondents among the officials 
interviewed. 
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" The LSM should provide corporate governance training and workshops to appropriate 
staff by building relationships with other countries and international organisations. It 
should also learn from the relevant experience of other emerging market economies. 
This development was seen as particularly important by the officials interviewed, 
whose oversight over the whole economy gave them a less positive view of the progress 
made in developing good corporate governance practice in Libya that the directors of 
the listed companies. 
a All Libyan companies, both private and public, should be listed on the LSM, if the 
basic listing conditions are met. Moreover, the LSM should play an important role in 
encouraging them. Almost all participants were in agreement on this point, and it was a 
matter of concern particularly to the officials and experts interviewed that three years 
after the founding of the LSM, only the eight original members were listed and publicly 
tradable companies. The implementation of the recommendations above should go a 
long way to making conditions for the rapid expansion of the LSM possible. 
" There is a need to activate the role of civil organisations. Professional associations, 
others representing shareholders, employees and other special interest groups should be 
encouraged in Libya to, provide a forum to support the interests of the group members. 
Respondents from among the employees, experts and officials were on agreement on 
this point but acknowledged that such groups were easier to form among the 
professions than among potential shareholders and stakeholders. 
" Encourage the creation of financial information institutions and a financial press. One 
of the great barriers to private investment in Libya is the paucity of information 
available to investors, and the difficulty of obtaining the information that is required 
to be communicated. A financial press free from undue influence by business interests 
would help to expand the investment base available to Libyan companies. 
" Libyan accounting and auditing professionq should be developed through the adoption 
of international accounting and auditing standards. In addition, the accounting and 
auditing standards must be enforced by law and controlled by the Libyan government. 
The importance of a reliable and professional accounting system is highlighted in the 
literature and was mentioned by the Libyan officials interviewed as a necessary 
condition of good corporate governance. 
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" The current accounting and auditing curriculum of the Libyan education system should 
be revised and updated. This will facilitate the introduction of corporate governance and 
the adoption of international accounting and auditing standards. Long years of isolation 
have left the Libyan accounting profession struggling to catch up with developments in 
the developed world, and a process on reintegration and re-education is required. 
8.5 Contribution of the Study 
The current study will assist in filling the huge gap in literature regarding corporate 
governance practices in Libya. Indeed, this investigation will not only contribute to the study of 
developing countries, but also the Arab world, a region that is still deeply rooted in the social 
and economic structures of the past. In addition to this, there is also a lack of research that 
focuses on current corporate governance practices, perceptions and obstacles; most are 
positivist studies that evaluate companies' corporate governance according to their 
performance. 
It is anticipated that this study can make a practical contribution to Libyan corporate 
governance by helping in the formation of a Libyan Institute of Directors, drawn from many of 
the groups surveyed by this study's research and tasked with overcoming the obstacles to 
effective corporate governance identified within it. This body should be independent, and 
should work with policy-makers who frame corporate governance legislation to see that the 
interests of all parties involved in a free-market economy with widely distributed ownership 
patterns are protected. 
This body can also go some way to overcoming the gaps in knowledge and experience 
of corporate governance that exist in Libya by forming relationships with similar bodies in 
other countries, and establishing connections of knowledge transfer by such means as seminars, 
conferences, educational exchanges and corporate cooperation. 
This study also contributes to knowledge by providing a general understanding of 
current corporate governance practices in Libyan businesses. It also provides an evaluation of 
the compliance of Libyan companies with LCGC. Another important contribution of this study 
is that it is the first attempt to reveal the current obstacles that affect the application of 
corporate governance. As far as the researcher is aware, this study is also the first of its kind in 
Libya and, therefore, it is hoped, provides useful insights, policy implication and 
recommendation for legislators, researchers and accounting and auditing professionals. 
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In terms of theory, the major contribution of this study is that stakeholder theory was 
more applicable to the situation in Libya at the time the study was conducted than agency 
theory. The data shows that legal protection for stakeholders was weak, especially for small 
shareholders, and that where improvements in protection for shareholders, and in corporate 
governance in general, had been achieved, this was usually due to the influence of foreign 
firms working in partnership with Libyan companies. The fact that Libya was not a stable 
economy at the time of the research and that uncertainty and a paucity of reliable information 
therefore characterised the investment environment meant that the considerable reserves of 
capital available in Libya, particularly in its banks, were under-utilised due to fear of the 
protection available to it in the investment market. 
8.6 Limitations of the Study 
To some extent, this study was limited by the size of the portion of the Libyan economy 
subject to the LCGC, consisting at the time of the research of only eight companies registered 
on the LSM, all of them from the country's financial services sector, with the result that a 
relatively small sample of interviewees and respondents was used. However, the study 
primarily investigates the current corporate governance practices, perceptions and obstacles in 
Libya following the introduction of the LCGC. In doing so, it attempts to elicit board of 
directors' views regarding the current corporate governance practices in eight listed companies 
and the obstacles to the application of the LCGC. Therefore, the semi-structured interviews (A) 
were conducted with board members of these companies. 
Secondly, this study attempts to elicit the perceptions of Libyan listed companies' staff 
and experts regarding the introduction of the LCGC. The first group represented the internal 
group, which consisted of the staff of companies listed on the LSM (senior managers and 
employees in the financial function), and the second group represented the external group, 
which consisted of Libyan experts (external auditors and academics). Thirdly, the study 
attempts to examine the views of the Libyan regulators and officials in relation to identified 
obstacles and ways of decreasing them. Therefore, the semi-structured interview (B) was 
conducted with twelve interviewees representing four Libyan official and regulatory bodies. 
However, this study did not investigate corporate governance in other Libyan companies or 
business sectors, since they are not required to adopt the LCGC requirements and are not 
registered in the LSM. 
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In addition, the study included questions eliciting the respondents' perceptions of the 
issues under consideration. However, respondents' response may have been influenced by 
their values, beliefs and other factors, which may, in turn, have affected the quality of 
findings. Also, the study's findings were restricted to Libyan businesses; cultural, social, 
political, financial and investment differences from other countries may prevent wider 
generalisation. It is important to recognise that this study was essential exploratory in nature, 
and that while many issues which were expected to be of relevance were identified in the 
literature review, the data contained within this study is the first investigation of the extent of 
corporate governance implementation in Libya, and a pioneering attempt to identify the 
obstacles that will have to be overcome before the LCGC can be fully and widely 
implemented. 
8.7Suggestions for Further Research 
The current research project has exposed a number of areas that may need to be 
investigated further. Issues such as the role and responsibility of board of directors, board 
composition, board committees, the independence of board members and transparency and 
disclosure need to be investigated in other sectors due to their importance in Libyan 
economic development. Moreover, many ideas and questions were encountered, such as how 
this research could be improved and extended by further study. For example, would the 
findings of this study be the same if the study were replicated over time? Would the findings 
of this study be the same for other Libyan service companies? Would the findings of this 
study be the same if it were replicated using other research techniques? In this respect, further 
research is still required, much work remains to be done, and many questions need to be 
answered. This thesis is being completed in the early months of 2012, and since the research 
was conducted and its data analysed, enormous changes to Libya's political situation have 
occurred as a result of the revolution begun in February 2011. 
Libya is making its first tentative steps towards the election of a representative and 
accountable government, and the management of the economy and institutions of Libya will 
necessarily be affected by the changes the country has undergone. In terms of the findings of 
this study and the need for further research into the problems with implementing corporate 
governance systems in Libya, these are unlikely to simply alter with a change of political 
context, rooted as they are as much in social and cultural issues as in political ones. 
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Therefore, it is expected that the findings of this study can be of use both to those responsible 
for devising a new legal framework for the Libyan business environment, and to researchers 
investigating corporate governance in a post-revolution context. 
Despite the fact that this study is limited to some extent by the small portion of the Libyan 
economy currently operating under the LCGC, the study makes an original contribution to 
knowledge about corporate governance in the Libyan context; however, as mentioned before, 
research on corporate governance, in developing economies is still limited and has only 
recently become a major focus of attention for academics, international organisations and 
governments. Therefore, further research on corporate governance is recommended in the 
context of other developing countries; in particular the obstacles to the implementation of the 
LCGC identified in this study require further research, both in terms of how they can be 
overcome in Libya, and how similar obstacles have been overcome in other developing 
economies. 
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Appendix A 
Questions of Semi-Structure Interview (A) 
With Eight Libyan Listed Companies 
Part 1: General Information 
1-Name of the company 
2-Name of Participant (optional) 
3-Position 
4-Qualification 
5-Number of years of experience 
Part 2: Information about Corporate Governance Practices 
1: Rights of shareholders: 
1.1 In your opinion, how effectively does your company apply the Libyan Corporate 
Governance Code regarding the following rights of shareholders? 
o Voting rights. 
o Rights to obtain relevant and timely information. 
o Right to share in the profits. 
o Rights of attendance and participation at the AGM. 
2: Board of directors: 
2: 1. How many members does the board have in total? 
2: 2. Are the majority of the board non-executive directors? 
If so, what are the approximate proportions? 
If not, could you explain why? 
2: 3. Are the chairman and CEO the same person? 
2: 4. In your opinion, to what extent does your board carry out the following tasks and 
responsibilities which are referred in the Corporate Governance Code? 
2: 4: 1. Does the board shape the of the company's objectives and strategy 
If so, which procedures does it use in doing that? 
If not, why? 
2: 4: 2. Has your company developed a set of written rules stipulating the role and 
responsibility of the board? 
If so, which ones? 
If not, can you please explain why? 
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2: 4: 3. Does the company have an internal control system? 
If so, does it work effectively? 
If not, why? 
2: 4: 4. Does the board set corporate governance rules for the company? 
If so, can you please list some? 
If not, why? 
2: 4: 5. Does the company has written policies clarifying the relationship with 
stakeholders? 
If yes, can you please list some? 
If no, can you please state why? 
2: 4: 6. Does the board evaluates top management performance? 
If so, which performance measures does it use? 
If not, why? 
2: 4: 7. Does the board reviews the company's internal policies? 
If so, please explain how? 
If not, why? 
2: 4: 8. Does your company have an internal audit department? 
If so, does the board set and supervises it and what are the main tasks of 
this department? 
If not, please explain why? 
2: 49. Are the internal auditor independent and full-time employee? 
If so, does the internal auditor supervise by the CEO and audit committee? 
If not, why? 
3: Conflict of Interest and Board Committees: 
3: 1. Does your company have clear written regulations for the directors and staff regarding 
conflict of interests? 
If so, what does it consist of? 
If not, please explain why? 
3: 2. Does your company have written professional code of conduct? 
If so, what does it consist of? 
If not, please explain why? 
3: 3. Does your company have an audit committee? 
If so, please briefly explain its structure operations. 
If not, please explain why it has not been formed. 
281 
3: 4. Does your company have a nomination committee? 
If so, please briefly explain its structure operations. 
If not, please explain why it has not been formed. 
3: 5. Does your company have a control committee? 
If so, please briefly explain its structure operations. 
If not, please explain why it has not been formed. 
3: 6. Does your company have an investor relation unite? 
If so, what are the main tasks? 
If no, please explain why not? 
4: Disclosure and transparency: 
4: 1. In your opinion, how effectively does your company apply. the disclosure and 
transparency requirements of Corporate Governance Code in relation to: 
o Firstly, ownership structure 
o Secondly, the annual report of the board 
o Thirdly, details of board committees 
o Fourthly, company's social policies 
o Fifthly, related party transactions 
o Sixthly, corporate group structure 
o Seventhly, quarterly financial statements 
o Finally, the external auditor's report and fees 
Part 3: Obstacles affecting corporate governance practices: 
5.1- In your opinion, can you summarise the main obstacles which affect the application 
of Corporate Governance Code in your company in particular and in Libya environment 
in general? 
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Appendix B 
Questionnaire Survey 
UNIVERSITY OF 
GLOUCESTERSHIRE 
Dear Sir/Madam, 
I am a lecturer at Accounting Department in Academy of Graduate Studies, Benghazi 
Branch- Libya. I am currently a PhD student at University of Gloucestershire Business 
School UK. 
The main aim of this study is to investigate the current corporate governance 
practices, perceptions and obstacles within Libya following the introduction of the Libyan 
Corporate Governance Code. Among the objectives of the study is to survey the perceptions 
of listed companies' staff and Libyan experts regarding the introduction of the Libyan 
Corporate Governance Code. 
To achieve the above objective questionnaire were designed as methods of collecting 
data. I am therefore, approaching you as an experienced person in this area to obtain your 
perception on the importance of Libyan Code. 
I would be very grateful if you would complete this questionnaire and include any 
other comments/ suggestions you feel appropriate. Your contribution towards the successful 
outcome of this study is invaluable. 
It must be emphasised that your answer and opinions in this questionnaire will be 
treated in strictest confidence and no information gained from this survey will be identified 
with any particular person or organisation. 
Finally, please accept in advance my sincere thanks and appreciation for your 
assistance and cooperation. 
Yours Faithfully, 
Abdelhamid Magrus 
E-mail s07lOOl9(a-)glos. ac. uk 
Magrus 71(awahoo. com 
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Questionnaire for the Libyan Experts 
Part 1: General and Background Information: 
Please indicate your answer by circling the appropriate number. 
1/1. What is your current job? 
Accounting Academic External Auditor Other* 
1 2 3 
*Please specify: ................................................................................. 
1/2. What is your total length of experience in your current job? 
Less than 1 year 1-4 
years 
5-9 
years 
10-15 
years 
More than 15 years 
1 2 3 4 5 
1/3. What is your most recent educational qualification? 
Bachelor Degree Master's Degree PhD Other* 
1 2 3 4 
*Please specify: ................................................................................ 
1/4. What was the principal area of study of your most recent educational qualification? 
Accounting Bus. Admin Economics Finance Other* 
1 2 3 4 5 
*Please specify: ................................................................................ 
1/5. In which country did you obtain your most recent educational qualification? 
Libya Other Arab 
country 
USA UK Other* 
1 2 3 4 5 
Please specify: ................................................................................ 
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Questionnaire for listed company staff 
Part 1: General and Background Information: 
1/1 Company Name .......................................................................................... 
Please indicate your answer by circling the appropriate number. 
1/2. What is your current job position? 
Member of 
board 
Financial 
Manager 
Internal 
Auditors 
Accountant Other* 
1 2 3 4 5 
*Please specify: ................................................................................. 
1/3. What is your total length of experience in your current job? 
Less than 1 year 1-4 
years 
5-9 
years 
10-15 
years 
More than 15 years 
1 2 3 4 5 
1/4. What is your most recent educational qualification? 
A pre Degree 
Diploma 
Bachelor 
Degree 
Master's Degree PhD Other* 
1 2 3 4 5 
*Please specify: ................................................................................ 
1/5. What was the principal area of study of your most recent educational qualification? 
Accounting Bus. Admin Economics Finance Other* 
1 2 3 4 5 
*Please specify: ................................................................................ 
1/6. In which country did you obtain your most recent educational qualification? 
Libya Arab country USA UK Other* 
1 2 3 4 5 
*Please specify: ................................................................................ 
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Part 2: General perceptions on the Libyan Corporate Governance Code: 
As you know, the Libyan Corporate Governance Code is designed to prevent bankruptcy and collapse in 
the Libyan business environment and protect the rights of shareholders and other stakeholders. Below are 
series of statements and you are asked to show the extent to which you agree or disagree with each in terms 
of their importance to meeting the goals of the Code. Please circle, using a scale from 1-5, the answer that 
most closely corresponds to your perception of each statement. 
Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral agree Strongly agree 
1 2 3 4 5 
2/1: Shareholder rights under the Libyan Corporate Governance Code. 
1 The company should allow voting by mail. 1 2 3 4 5 
2 The company should allow voting through the internet. 1 2 3 4 5 
3 The company should allow proxy voting. 1 2 3 4 5 
4 The company should allow cumulative voting. 1 2 3 4 5 
5 Shareholders should obtain relevant information about the company on a 1 2 3 4 5 
timely and regular basis. 
6 Shareholders should have the right to prosecute the board of directors. 1 2 3 4 5 
7 Shareholders should have the right to register and transfer ownership of shares 1 2 3 4 5 
8 Shareholders should have an equal right to share in the profits. 1 2 3 4 5 
9 The company should disclose a dividend policy. 1 2 3 4 5 
10 The processes and procedures for the AGM should allow for equitable 1 2 3 4 5 
treatment of all shareholders. 
11 Adequate time should be given to shareholders for asking questions and 1 2 3 4 5 
raising issues at the AGM. 
12 The dates and locations of AGM should be carefully chosen in order to 1 2 3 4 5 
maximise attendance of shareholders. 
13 Information on each board member candidate and his/her curriculum vitae 1 2 3 4 5 
should be disclosed before the AGM. 
14 Information on each nomination and audit committee member candidate and 1 2 3 4 5 
his/her curriculum vitae should be disclosed before the AGM. 
15 Information, qualifications and expected fees of an external auditor should be 1 2 3 4 5 
disclosed before the AGM. 
16 Related-party transactions should be fully discussed at the AGM. 1 2 3 4 5 
17 The board should submit an annual report to shareholders including: 1 2 3 4 5 
"A comprehensive overview of the company's operations and financial 
status 
" Prospective vision of the company's activities for the coming year; 
" Audited annual results of an assessment of the efficiency of the 
company's internal control procedures 
"A summary on capital changes 
" The extent of the application of Corporate Governance Code. 
18 The minutes of the AGM should be disclosed through its publication in 1 2 3 4 5 
newspapers and through the Stock Exchange. 
2/2: Board structure and responsibility under the Libyan Corporate Governance Code. 
1 The size of the board of directors should not be less than three members and 1 2 3 4 5 
not more than eleven. 
2 The majority of the board should be non-executive directors. 1 2 3 4 5 
3 There should be separation between the post of chairman and CEO. 1 2 3 4 5 
4 Each member of the board may not sit on more than three additional boards at 1 2 3 4 5 
the same time. 
5 Most board members should have financial and technical skills to understand 1 2 3 4 5 
company's work and its financial reports. 
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6 Newly-assigned members of the board should receive financial and non- 
financial information about the company. 
l 2 3 4 5 
7 The company should have written rules of the role and responsibility of the 
board. 
1 2 3 4 5 
8 The board should shape and review the operational and financial plans and 
objectives of the company annually. 
1 2 3 4 5 
9 The board should review the company's internal policies periodically. 1 2 3 4 5 
10 The board should shape and review the company's risk management policies. 1 2 3 4 5 
11 The board should play an important role in selecting, monitoring, and 
replacing the CEO. 
1 2 3 4 5 
12 The board of directors should attend director training programmes about 
corporate governance. 
1 2 3 4 5 
13 The board and top management should meet at least quarterly to discuss the 
company's future strategy. 
1 2 3 4 5 
14 The board should formally evaluate performance of top management. 1 2 3 4 5 
15 The board should set corporate governance rules for the company. 1 2 3 4 5 
16 The board should set written policies clarifying the relationship with 
stakeholders. 
1 2 3 4 5 
17 The board should set and monitor the system of internal control. 1 2 3 4 5 
18 The company should have an internal audit department. 1 2 3 4 5 
19 The internal auditor should be independent. 1 2 3 4 5 
20 The internal auditor should be supervised by the CEO and audit committee. 1 2 3 4 5 
21 The internal auditor should be a full-time employee. 1 2 3 4 5 
22 The internal auditor should submit a quarterly report to the board and control 
committee. 
1 2 3 4 5 
2/3: Disclosure and transparency under the Libyan Corporate Governance Code. 
1 Disclosure should include information concerning significant changes in 
ownership. 
1 2 3 4 5 
2 Disclosure should include information on financial and operating results. 1 2 3 4 5 
3 Disclosure should include names, background and their remunerations of 
board members. 
1 2 3 4 5 
4 Disclosure should include names, background and their remunerations of 
board committees. 
1 2 4 5 
5 Disclosure should include functions and tasks of board committees. 1 2 3 4 5 
6 Disclosure should include shares of the members of the board. 1 2 3 4 5 
7 Disclosure should include majority shareholders of the company. 1 2 3 4 5 
8 Disclosure should include information on the rights of stakeholders. 1 2 3 4 5 
9 Disclosure should include forecasts of the company's operations for the 
coming year. 
1 2 3 4 5 
10 Disclosure should include related party transactions in detail. 1 2 3 4 5 
11 Disclosure should include corporate group structure. 1 2 3 4 5 
12 Disclosure should include company environmental reports. 1 2 3 4 5 
13 Disclosure should include company social policies and programmes. 1 2 3 4 5 
14 Disclosure should include quarterly financial reports. 1 2 3 4 5 
15 Disclosure should include the board's annual report. 1 2 3 4 5 
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16 Disclosure should include external auditor's report. 1 2 3 4 5 
17 Disclosure should include fees paid to external auditors. 1 2 3 4 5 
18 The company should use its website to disclose all information. 1 2 3 4 5 
19 The company should not leak any information before publication. 1 2 3 4 5 
20 Disclosure should include Information about the company's application of the 1 2 3 4 5 
Libyan Corporate Governance Code. 
214: Conflict of interests under the Libyan Corporate Governance Code. 
1 The company should have clear written regulations for the directors and staff 1 2 3 4 5 
regarding conflict of interests. 
2 Board members, directors and staff may not trade company stocks for a 1 2 3 4 5 
specified period before the disclosure of company financial statements. 
3 Board members, directors and staff may not trade company stocks after sudden 1 2 3 4 5 
financial events until such information is disclosed to the public. 
4 Board members and directors may not obtain any loan from the company. 1 2 3 4 5 
5 Board members and directors may not have direct or indirect interests in 1 2 3 4 5 
activities in which the company is involved. 
6 The company should set up professional code of conduct, including: 1 2 3 4 5 
" Dealing with the company regarding selling and buying shares and 
other transactions. 
" Disclosure of new policies 
" Professional criteria for interaction between staff, directors and 
customers. 
2\5 Board committees under the Libyan Corporate Governance Code. 
Please indicate your perception of the importance of having and operating the following board committees 
in terms of meeting the goals of the Libyan Corporate Governance Code. Again, please indicate this by 
circling the appropriate number on a scale from 1-5 for each of the following statements. 
Not important at Not very Don't know important Very Important 
all Important 
1 2 3 4 5 
2 \5\I: Audit Committee: 
1 The company should have an audit committee. 1 2 3 41 5 
2 The audit committee should consist of three non-executive directors elected 1 2 3 4 5 
by the board. 
3 The audit committee should include a member with accounting and finance 1 2 3 4 5 
expertise. 
4 The audit committee should meet at least once every 3 months. 1 2 3 4 5 
The audit committee tasks and responsibilities should include: 
5 Recommending the appointment and removal of the external auditor and the 1 2 3 4 5 
identification of fees. 
6 Reviewing the external auditor's comments on financial statement. 1 2 3 4 5 
7 Reviewing the independence of the external auditor. 1 2 3 4 5 
8 Reviewing the external auditor's plan and making suggestions. 1 2 3 4 5 
9 Reviewing the company's accounting policies and giving opinions and 1 2 3 4 5 
recommendations. 
10 Assessing the efficiency of the financial manager and other financial staff. 1 2 3 4 5 
11 Reviewing and discussing the internal audit department plan and its 
1 2 3 4 5 
efficiency. 
12 Reviewing the independence of the internal auditor. 
1 2 3 4 5 
13 Reviewing the internal auditor's reports and any corrective measures taken. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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14 Reviewing the financial statements before presenting them to the board and 
1 2 3 4 5 
giving opinions and recommendations. 
2/3/2: Nomination committee: 
1 The board should have a nomination committee. 
1 2 3 4 5 
2 The nomination committee members should be elected by the board. 
1 2 3 4 5 
The nomination committee tasks and responsibilities should include: 
3 Recommending candidates for membership of the board to the AGM. 
1 2 3 4 5 
4 Reviewing skills and qualifications required for the board membership. 
1 2 3 4 5 
5 Reviewing the board structure and making recommendations of possible 
1 2 3 4 5 
changes. 
6 Defining the board's weaknesses and strengths and proposing remedies in 
1 2 3 4 5 
accordance with company interests. 
7 Setting clear policies of compensation and remuneration for board members and 
1 2 3 4 5 
senior executives. 
2/3/3: Control committee: 
1 The company should have a control committee. 
1 2 3 4 5 
2 The control committee should consist of at least three members appointed by 
1 2 3 4 5 
the AGM. 
3 The control committee should represent all shareholders of the company. 
1 2 3 4 5 
The control committee tasks and responsibilities should include: 
4 Controlling the company administration and verification of its legal progress. 
1 2 3 4 5 
5 Verification of the validity and legitimacy of contracts conducted by the 
1 2 3 4 5 
company. 
6 Ensuring that all the accounting procedures are in accordance with legal and 
1 2 3 4 5 
regulatory rules. 
7 Permitting committee members at any time to inspect the company and its work 
1 2 3 4 5 
progress. 
Part 3: General perceptions on the obstacles affecting Corporate Governance practice: 
Please circle on a scale from 1-5 the extent to which you agree or disagree that the following 
obstacles will affect the application of the Libyan Code. 
Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 Poor leadership within Libyan companies. 
1 2 3 4 5 
2 Weakness of the legal environment for companies. 
1 2 3 4 5 
3 Lack of knowledge about corporate governance among the Libyan 
1 2 3 4 5 
companies 
4 Current ownership structure of companies. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Lack of training among directors of companies about corporate 
1 2 3 4 5 
governance. 
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6 Impact of government intervention in companies. 
1 2 3 4 5 
7 Weakness of the accounting profession in Libya resulting from a lack 
1 2 3 4 5 
of adoption of International Accounting Standards. 
8 Weakness of the auditing profession in Libya resulting from a lack of 
1 2 3 4 5 
adoption of International Auditing Standards. 
9 Weak investment awareness among investors. 
1 2 3 4 5 
10 7 Absence of a Libyan Capital Market Authority. 1 2 
3 4 5 
11 Cost of application corporate governance system. 
1 21 31 41 5 
12 Absence of Institute of Directors. 
1 2 3 4 5 
13 Limited number of listed companies. 
1 2 3 4 5 
14 Lack of an independent institution or body to monitor corporate 
1 2 3 4 5 
15 Weak international pressure on Libya for the application of corporate 
12345 
governance (World Bank). 
Finally, are there any other comments or suggestions you think relevant to the issues 
addressed in this questionnaire? If so, please use the space provided below to detail them 
......................................................................................................................................................... 
......................................................................................................................................................... 
...................................................................................................................... .................................. 
......................................................................................................................................................... 
......................................................................................................................................................... 
........................................................................................................................................................ 
........................................................................................................................................................ 
........................................................................................................................................................ 
......................................................................................................................................................... 
.0.......................................... ............................................................................................................. 
...................................... .............................................. .................................................................. 
........................................................................................................................................................ 
........................................................................................................................................................ 
" ........................... N..... NN...... NN. NNNNN........................................................................................... 
t ....................................................................................................................................................... 
............................................ ......................................... N.................................................................. 
. ..................................................................................................................................................... 
........................................ .... 0....................................... 
i............................. NN.... NNN......................... 
THANK YOU VERYMUCH FOR YOUR PARTICIPATIONIN THIS STUDY. 
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Appendix C 
Arabic Version of Questionnaire Survey 
UNIVERSITY OF 
GLOUCESTERSHIRE 
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Appendix D 
Questions of Semi-Structure Interview (B) 
With Libyan officials and regulators 
Part 1: General Information 
I -Name of Participant (optional) 
2-Position 
3-Qualification 
4-Number of years of experience 
Part 2: Overview of current corporate governance practices: 
QI. What is your view about the Libyan corporate governance code issued by LSM? 
Q. 2. What is your view of the benefits of implementing corporate governance in Libya? 
Q3. What is your view of the current state of corporate governance especially in Libyan 
financial sector? Do you think that listed companies apply the LCGC? 
Q4. What is your view of the role played by the audit committee? 
1. Improving the implementation of corporate governance and protecting minority 
shareholders 
2. Ensuring the independence of the external auditors. 
3. Ensuring the independence of the board members. 
Q5. According to interviews results, most listed companies did not have audit committees. In 
your opinion, what is the reason behind that? 
Part 3: Current obstacles: 
According to interview results with board members of listed companies and the questionnaire 
results of the perceptions of company staff and Libyan experts, there are 15 obstacles 
identified by the participants: 
Identified obstacles 
I Poor leadership within Libyan 
8 Weakness of the auditing profession in 
i Libya resulting from a lack of adoption of compan es. International Auditing Standards. 
2 Weakness of the legal environment 
9 Weak investment awareness among 
for companies. investors. 
3 Lack of knowledge about corporate 
10 Absence of a Libyan Capital Market 
governance among Libyan Authority. 
companies 
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4 Current ownership structure of 
11 Cost of the application of a corporate 
companies. governance system. 
5 Lack of training among directors of 
12 Absence of an Institute of Directors. 
companies about corporate 
governance. 
6 Impact of government intervention 13 Limited number of listed companies. 
in companies. 
7 Weakness of the accounting 
14 Lack of an independent institution or 
profession in Libya resulting from a body to monitor corporate governance 
lack of adoption of International practices. 
Accounting Standards. 
15 Weak international pressure on Libya for the application of corporate governance 
(e. g. World Bank). 
Looking at these 15 obstacles: 
Q6. Which five obstacles would you consider to be the most significant? 
2 
3 
4 
Q7 if we can look at each one of five obstacles: 
Q7.1. Why do you think this obstacle is significant? 
Q7.2. What could be done to overcome this obstacle? 
Q8. Are there any other obstacles from the list or from your own experience that are that are 
important? 
If so, what are they and how could they be overcome? 
Part 4: Future development: 
Q9. In your opinion, how can we raise public awareness of corporate governance in Libya? 
Q10. In your opinion, who should improve corporate governance practices in Libya and why? 
Q 11. In your opinion, who should be responsible for monitoring compliance with the LCGC 
and why? 
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Appendix E 
Arabic Version of Questions of Semi-Structured Interview (B) 
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Appendix F 
The Libyan Corporate Governance Code 
Libyan Stock Market 
THE LIBYN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
CODE 
Issued by the Libyan Stock Market 
English Translation of the Official Arabic Text 
Arabic is the official language of the Libyan Stock 
Market 
The current version of these Rules can be found at 
the LSM 
http: //libyastockmarket. com 
(2007) 
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Introduction 
The importance of management emerges from the reality of the evolution of economic activities and 
the growing role of organizations in various aspects. The organizations have become involved with 
many internal and external variables, as well as expanding the size of these organizations, increasing 
competition and increasing the problems they face, which reflected the post of administration to be 
more difficult and complicated. 
The emergence of conflict of interest and tensions between the parties related to the organization, and 
the extent of their responsibilities to the organization' owners and other stakeholders, such as 
employees, creditors, suppliers and competitors, led to the need for special mechanisms that define the 
relationship between all these parties, in order to reduce tensions between these parties and influence 
organizations' performance. These special mechanisms are called "corporate governance". 
A) The Rights of Shareholders 
Prove to the shareholders of all rights related to the share and, in particular the right to a share of the 
profits that are to be distributed, and the right to a share of the Company's assets upon liquidation, the 
right to attend general assemblies, and participation in its deliberations and vote on resolutions, the 
right to dispose of shares, the right to control of the Governing Council and has filed a responsibility 
to the members of the Council, the right of inquiry and information request as not to compromise the 
interests of the company is not inconsistent with the market system and its implementing regulations. 
B) Facilitate the Exercise of Shareholder Rights and Access to Information 
1) The basis system of the company and its internal regulations must include procedures and 
precautions necessary to ensure that all shareholders of their rights. 
2) It must provide all the information that would enable shareholders to exercise their rights to the 
fullest, so that this information is complete and accurate, and to occur in a systematic manner and on 
time, on company use the most effective ways to communicate with shareholders, and shall be no 
discrimination between shareholders with respect to provision of information. 
(C) The Rights of Shareholders Concerning the Meeting of the General Meeting 
(1) The general meeting have right to hold session at least once a year during the four months 
following the end of the fiscal year of the company. 
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(2) General meeting held at the invitation of the board of directors and the board of directors shall 
invite the general meeting of the meeting if requested by the External Auditor or a number of 
shareholders representing ownership at least 1 /5 of capital. 
(3) The announcement of the date, the location and the agenda of the general meeting ten days at least 
in advance. The invitation must be published in the market and the company websites, and in two 
widely circulated, and should use media technology to connect to the shareholders. 
(4) Shareholders must have opportunities to participate effectively and vote in the general meeting 
meetings. Shareholders must also be informed about the rules governing those meetings and the 
procedures of voting. 
(5) Facilitate a greater participation by shareholders in general meeting, including the selection of 
appropriate time and place, voting through the international information networks (Internet), and 
through the systems provided by the market. 
(6) The board of directors must take into account when preparation the agenda of the general meeting, 
the issues that shareholders wishes to be included on the agenda of the board. 
(7) Shareholders have right to discuss topics on the agenda of the General Assembly and ask 
questions about them to the members of the Governing Council and the External Auditor. The board 
of directors or the External Auditor has to answer shareholders' questions to the extent that does not 
jeopardize the company's interest to damage. 
(8) Subjects presented to the general meeting must be provided with sufficient information to enable 
shareholders to make their own decisions. 
(9) Shareholders must have right to access to the general meeting's minutes by publishing them in 
newspapers and the market website. Also the company must provide the market with a copy of the 
minutes of general meeting within fifteen days from the date of conference. 
(10) The market must be informed of the results of the general meeting minutes immediately through 
the publication of the summary of general meeting decisions in two widely circulated daily 
newspapers, one in Arabic at least. 
D) Voting Rights 
1) The vote is a fundamental right for the shareholder cannot be removed in any way, and the 
company avoid any action which may hamper the use of the right to vote, and must facilitate 
the exercise of shareholder right to vote and facilitated, including the use of technological 
methods and international information networks (internet). 
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2) In the general meeting, may approach the division of votes when voting to choose 
members of the board of directors. 
3) The shareholder has right to entrust- by written- another shareholder of non-members of 
the board of directors and non-employees to attend a meeting of the general meeting. 
4) The representatives of legal persons - such as investment funds - the disclosure of their 
policies to vote, and the actual vote in their annual reports, as well as the disclosure of how to 
deal with any fundamental conflicts of interest that may affect the exercise of fundamental 
rights of their investments. 
E) The Rights of Shareholders in Dividends 
1) The board of directors must establish a clear policy related to the distribution of profits in 
the interests of shareholders and the company. Shareholders must be informed of this policy 
through the general meeting. 
2) The general meeting proposed dividend and the date of distribution, and the end of the 
right to distribution of profits which must be: 
A- Two days before the date of distribution in the case of securities deposited 
centrally. 
B- three days before the date of distribution in the case of capital securities are not 
deposited centrally. 
F) Disclosure and Transparency 
The company should develop policies and procedures of disclosure and supervisory regulations in 
written form in accordance with the rules determined by the market. 
G) Disclosure in the Report of the Board of Directors 
The report of the board of directors must contain the follows: 
1) All what has been applied from the provisions of these general rules. 
2) The names of companies that a member of the board of directors has board ship with them. 
3) The composition of the management and classification of its members as follows: 
chairman, member of the board... etc. 
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4) A brief description of terms of reference of board committees and functions, such as audit 
committee, nominations and compensation committee, with the names of these committees 
and their chairmen and members and the number of meetings 
5) A statement of compensation and allowances paid to both the head and members of the 
board of directors and members of the oversight committee and senior executives who 
received the highest emoluments and allowances in the company. 
6) Any penalty or sanction or restriction imposed on the company from any supervisory or 
regulatory or judicial proceedings. 
7) The results of the annual review for the evaluation of the efficiency of internal control 
procedures of the company. 
H) Board of Directors 
The functions of the board of directors must include the following: 
a- The adoption of a strategic direction and key objectives of the company and overseeing its 
implementation, including: 
1- Develop a comprehensive strategy for the company and major plans of action and risk 
management policy, review and guidance. 
2- Determine the optimal capital structure of the company strategies and financial goals 
and adoption of annual budgets. 
3- Supervision of major capital expenditure for the company, owning assets and dispose of 
it. 
4- Setting the targeted objectives and monitoring of implementation and overall 
performance of the company. 
5- Periodic review of organizational and functional structures in the company and its 
adoption. 
b- To set systems and controls of internal control and supervision, including: 
I- Setting a written policy governing conflict of interests, and to address potential conflicts 
of between executives and shareholders, including misuse of corporate assets and 
facilities, and abuse resulting from dealings with the people involved. 
2- To ensure the integrity of financial systems and accounting, including regulations 
relating to the preparation of financial reports. 
3- Ensure the application of control systems suitable for risk management, and through the 
identification of public perception of risks that may face to the company and put it 
transparently. 
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4- Annual review for the evaluation of the efficiency of internal control procedures in the 
company. 
C- Setting the governance system, including private company does not conflict with the 
provisions of these rules and the general supervision and control of its effectiveness and 
modified as needed. 
D- Setting clear and specific policies, standards and procedures of board membership, and put 
them into effect after approval by the general meeting. 
E- Setting a written policy governing the relationship with stakeholders for their protection and 
preservation of their rights. Particular, this policy must over the following: 
1- Procedures regarding to compensate stakeholders in the case of violation of their rights. 
2- Procedures for the settlement of complaints or disputes that may arise between the 
company and stakeholders. 
3- Appropriate procedures to establish good relations with customers and suppliers and 
maintain the confidentiality of Information related to them. 
4- Rules of professional conduct for managers and employees of the company to be 
compliant with the ethical and professional standards governing the relationship between 
them and stakeholders 
5- Company's contribution of workers social activities. 
6- The development of policies and procedures which ensure respect for the company's 
rules and regulations and its commitment to disclose material information to shareholders 
and creditors and other stakeholders. 
I) the Responsibilities of the Board of Directors 
1) The Board of directors handles all the powers and authorities for controlling the company 
and remains the ultimate responsibility for the company to the board of directors, even though 
it established committees or authorized entities or other individuals to do some work. Also the 
board must avoid issuance of warrants general or unspecified duration. 
2) Must specify the responsibilities of the board of directors clearly in the statute of the 
company. 
3) The board of directors must achieve its duty responsibly, and in good faith and seriousness 
and attention, and its decisions must be based on adequate information from the executive 
management, or any other reliable source. 
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4) Member of the board of directors represents all shareholders, and must be bound to do in 
the interest of the company in general, not the interests of the group represented or voted on 
his appointment to the board of directors. 
5) The board of directors must determine the powers delegated to executive management and 
must determine the decision making's procedures and duration of the mandate. Executive 
management must provide the board of directors periodic reports on the practices of the 
powers delegated. 
6) The board of directors must ensure that procedures are in place to inform the new board 
members related to company activities. 
7) The board of directors must ensure that the company provides adequate information on its 
affairs to all members of the board of directors in general and non-executive directors in 
particular, in order to carry out their duties and functions efficiently. 
8) The board of directors is not allowed to sell the company's assets or deposit, or discharge 
the Company's debtors from their obligations, unless authorized to do so in the company and 
the conditions contained therein. If the company did not include provisions in this regard, it is 
not permissible for the board to conduct referred to only with the permission of the general 
meeting. 
K) The Composition of the Board of Directors 
The following must be adhered to regarding the composition of the board of directors. 
1) The number of board members must be between 3 and 11. 
2) The general meeting must appoint members of the board of directors for the period 
stipulated in the statute provided not exceed three years, and may be re-appointment of 
members of the board of directors unless the statute dictates otherwise. 
3) The majority of board members must be from non-executives. 
4) Separation between the position of Chairman of the board of directors and any executive 
function as the company did not put the company's interest to do so. 
5) The number of independent board members must be two members or one third of the 
members of the board, whichever is greater. 
6) The statute must show how the board membership be finished and that the general 
meeting may at any time to isolate all the members of the board of directors or some of 
them, even if the statute texts otherwise. 
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7) When the board membership is finished, the company must notify the market 
immediately with the reasons. 
8) The member of the board of directors is not allows to have other board membership for 
more than three boards at the same time. 
L) The Board of Directors' Committees and Their Independence 
1) In order to perform its functions effectively, the board of directors must form an 
appropriate number of committees as the company's needs and circumstances. 
2) the formation of committees that follow the board of directors must be with general 
procedures established by the board of directors including determine of committee's task, the 
duration of action and the powers granted to them during this period. 
The committee must inform the board of directors of the findings or decisions with absolute 
transparency. The board of directors must observe the work of the committees on a regular 
basis to verify its work assigned to it. 
3) A sufficient number of non-executive directors must be appointed on committees in the 
tasks that may result in cases of conflict of interest, such as checking the integrity of financial 
reporting and non-financial transactions, reviewing bargains of relevant persons, nomination 
for board membership, the appointment of executives, and designing of compensation. 
M) The Audit Committee 
a- the board of directors must constitute a committee from non-executive members to be 
called "audit committee" no fewer than three members, of whom shall be a competent finance 
and accounting. 
b- The board of directors must issue rules for selection of members of the audit committee 
and their length of tenure, and the committee's method of work. 
C- The audit committee' tasks of and its responsibilities include in particular: 
1- Supervision of the internal audit department in the company, in order to verify their 
effectiveness in the implementation of the work and the tasks set by the board of directors. 
2- To examine the internal control system and set- a written report on its views and 
recommendations in this regard. 
3- Examine the internal audit reports and follow up the implementation of corrective actions 
to the observations contained therein. 
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4- Recommendation for the board of directors to appointment and dismissal the external 
auditors and determine their fees, and taking into account when recommending the 
appointment to ensure their independence. 
5- Follow-up of the external auditors and the adoption of any action outside the scope 
of audit work assigned to them during their audit work. 
6- Review the audit plan with the external auditor and make comments on it. Also review 
the comments of external auditor on the financial statements and follow up thereon. 
7- Reviewing the financial statements before submission to the board of directors and to 
express an opinion and recommendation in respect thereof. 
8- Study followed accounting policies and give opinion and recommendation in respect 
thereof. 
N) Nominations Committee 
a. The board of directors must constitute a committee called "Nominations Committee". 
b. The general meeting- according to the board of directors- must issue the rules for selection 
members of the nominations committee and their length of tenure, and the committee's 
method of work. 
c. The tasks of the nominations committee and its responsibilities must include the . following: 
1- Recommendation for the general meeting regarding nominations to the board of directors 
membership according to the standards adopted taking into account not nominate any 
person who had been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude and the Secretariat. 
2- The annual review of needs for appropriate skills for membership of the board of 
directors and prepare a description of capabilities and qualifications required for 
membership of the board of directors. 
3- Review the structure of the board of directors and make recommendations regarding the 
changes that can be made. 
4- Identify weaknesses and strengths in the board of directors, and propose how to deal 
with them with in accordance with the company' interests. 
5- Annual guarantee of the independence of the board's members and that there is no 
conflicts of interests if the member is also a member of other boards of directors. 
6- Setting clear compensation policies for the board of directors' members and senior 
executives. These policies must take into account the use of standards that linked 
compensation to company performance. 
0) Board of Directors Meetings and Its Agenda 
1) The members of the Board of directors have to allocate sufficient time for their 
responsibilities, including the preparation of meetings of the board and ensure its presence. 
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2) The board of directors must have regular meetings, by invitation from chairman of the 
board or his deputy in his absence. The chairman of the board must invite the board to hold an 
emergency meeting when requested by three of the members. 
3) The Chairman of the board of directors has to consult with other members and the chief 
executive officers (the CEO) when preparing a specific agenda to be presented to the board of 
directors. The Chairman of the board of directors has to send the agenda accompanied by 
such documents to the members before the meeting by sufficient time, so they can study 
issues and prepare well for the meeting. If one or more members object to this agenda, this 
objection has to be written in the minutes of the meeting. 
4) The board of directors must document its meetings and prepare minutes for the discussions 
and deliberations, including the voting process that has been compiled, and save it to be easy 
to go back to them. 
P) Board of directors' compensation 
The general meeting has to determine the level and structure of compensation for the board of 
directors' members. The compensation may be paid as a certain remuneration, allowance for 
attending meetings, non-cash benefits or a percentage of the company profits. The member 
allows having two or more of these advantages. 
Q) Internal audit management 
1. The company must have well-set internal control system. 
2. The internal audit management must have a full-time responsible who follow the senior 
management directly. 
3. Internal audit's manager must submit a quarterly report to the board of directors and to the 
audit committee regarding the extent that the company is committed by the laws and rules 
governing their activities. 
4. Issues and objectives of management functions and internal audit terms of reference of a 
decision of the Board of Directors 
R) Conflict of Interest 
1. The company must have a written system related to conflict of interest. This system has to 
be known by all board members, managers and employees. 
2. It is prohibited for all board members, managers and company's employees to deal with the 
company's securities for a specified period preceding the announcement of the result before 
the announcement of the activity or any other information that has a financial nature. 
3. The corporation must set rules of professional conduct include: 
a- Rules for dealing with the company. 
b- What are delegated powers. 
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c- Methods of the announcement of new policies. 
d- Standards of safety and health practices. 
e- Sound professional standards for interaction between managers and employees 
and the outsiders. 
4. The company should develop an internal system to monitor the application of the rules of 
professional conduct. 
5. In its dealing with suppliers, the company must choose suppliers who deal with the same 
level of professionalism and moral pursued. 
6. The chairman or members of the board of directors are not allowed to have any directly or 
indirectly self-interests related to the company's business. 
7. The chairman or members of the board of directors and managers are not allowed to 
participate in any action that would compete with the company or to participate in any 
activities that the company practices. 
8. It is forbidden for the company to provide any kinds of loans to the chairman or any board 
members. Also it is forbidden for the company to guarantee any loan held by them with others 
S) Control Committee 
The company must have an oversight committee consisting of not less than three members appointed 
by the general meeting. The committee must have all rights and committed by all duties settled in the 
Libyan commercial law. The tasks of this committee are: 
1. Overseeing the company management's actions in order to ensure that they are legal. 
2. Ensure the validity of company contracts and their legitimacy. 
3. Review and audit company accountants' books, as prescribed by the law. 
4. Ensuring that all accounting procedures in accordance with legal and regulatory rules. 
5. The members of the control committee have the right to inspect the company and its work 
progress. 
6. The members of the control committee have the right to ask managers about any information 
related to any specific operations. 
7. The committee has to document its investigations and inquiries in a special archive. 
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Appendix G 
Non-Parametric Test: Mann-Whitney Test 
Ranks 
Mean Sum of 
TYPE N Rank Ranks 
The company should comp 100 98.73 9873.00 
allow voting by mail, expe 108 109.84 11863.00 
Total 208 
The company should comp 100 105.29 10529.00 
allow voting through the expe 108 103.77 11207.00 kremet. 
Total 208 
The company should comp 100 107.19 10719.00 
allow proxy voting. expe 108 102.01 11017.00 
Total 
208 
The company should comp 100 100.04 10003.50 
allow cumulative voting. expe 108 108.83 11732.50 
Total 208 
Test Statistics 11 
The 
The company The 
company should The company 
should allow company should 
allow voting should allow 
voting by through the allow proxy cumulative 
mail. internet. voting voting 
Mann-Whitney U 4823.000 5321.000 5131.000 4953.500 
Wilcoxon W 9873.000 11207.000 11017.000 10003.500 
Z -1.377 -. 192 -. 636 -1.070 
Asymp. Sig (2-tailed) 
. 
168 
. 
848 . 
525 
, 
285 
a" Grouping Variable: TYPE 
Ranks 
Mean Sum of 
TYPE N Rank Ranks 
Shareholders should comp 100 104.98 10498.00 
obtain relevant 
kifonnsabn about the expe 108 104.06 11238.00 
company on a lkney Total 
and regular basis. 208 
Shareholders should comp 100 104.04 10404.00 
have the right to expe 108 104 93 11332 00 proethe board . . 
of directors. Total 
208 
Shareholders should comp 100 104.94 10494.50 
have the right to expe 108 104.09 11241.50 
register and transfer Total 
ownership of shares 
208 
Shareholders should comp 100 104.17 10418.50 
have an equal right to expe 108 104.81 11319.50 
share In the profits. Total 208 
The company should comp 100 106.21 10621.50 
disclose a dividend expe 108 102.91 11114.50 
Policy. Total 208 
314 
Ranh 
Mean Sum of 
TYPE N Rank Ranks 
The processes and comp 100 108.88 10668.00 
procedures for the AGM 
should allow for equitable expo 108 10250 11070.00 
treatment of all 
shareholders. 
Total 208 
Adequate time should be comp 100 113.61 11360.50 
given to shareholders for expe 
asking questions and 108 96.07 10375.50 
raising issues at the AGM. 
Total 
208 
The dates and locations comp 100 111.54 11154.00 
of AGM should be expe 108 9798 10582.00 
carefully chosen in order TAI 
to maximise attendance 
of shareholders . 208 
Information on each comp 100 107 01 10701.00 
board member candidate expe 108 102.18 11035 00 
and his/her curriculum Total 208 
Information on each comp 100 102 65 10265.00 
nomination and audit expe 108 106.21 11471 00 
committee member Total 208 
Information, qualifications comp 100 104.44 10444.00 
and expected fees of an expe 108 104.56 11292.00 
external auditor should be Total 208 
Related-party comp 100 109.33 10933.50 
transactions should be expe 108 100.02 10802.50 
fully discussed at the Total 208 
The board should submit comp 100 107.39 10739.00 
an annual report to expe 108 101 82 10997.00 
shareholders including: Total 208 
The minutes of the AGM comp 100 114.43 11442.50 
should be disclosed expe 108 95.31 10293 50 
through its publication In Total 208 
Test Statistic! 
Information 
The The dates Informatio on each The 
processe Adequate and n on each nomination Infomnado minutes of 
s and time locations board and audit n, the AGM 
procedur should be of AGM member committee qualifiicati should be 
as for the given to should be candidate member ons and disclosed 
AGM sharehold carefully and candidate expected The board through Its 
should ers for chosen in his/her and his/her fees of an Related-pa should publication 
allow for asking order to curriculu curriculum external rty submit an in 
equitable questions maximise m vitae vitae auditor transaction annual newspaper 
treatment and attendant should be should be should be s should report to s and 
of all raising e of disclosed disclosed disclosed be fully sharehold rough the 
sharehol issues at sharehold before the before the before the discussed erb Stock 
dens the AGM ers AGM AGM AGM the AGM Including Exchange 
Mann-Whitney U 184.000 4489.500 4696 000 5149.000 5215.000 5394 000 4916500 5111.000 4407.500 
Wilcoxon W 070.000 0375.500 0582.000 1035.000 10265.000 0444.000 0802.500 0997.000 10293.500 
Z -. 554 -2 309 -1.808 -. 641 -. 489 -0,15 -1 180 -745 -2.400 
Asymp. Sig (2-tail 
. 579 . 
021 . 071 . 
522 . 839 . 
988 . 238 . 456 . 016 
a. Grouping Variable: TYPE 
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Ranks 
Mean Sum of 
TYPE N Rank Ranks 
The size of the board of comp 100 104.00 10400.00 
directors should not be 
less than three members exile 108 104.96 11336.00 
and not more than eleven. Total 208 
The majority of the board comp 100 104.32 10431.50 
should be non-executive expe 108 104.67 11304.50 directors. 
Total 208 
There should be comp 100 95.07 9507.00 
separation between the expe 108 113.23 12229.00 
post of chairman and Total 
CEO. 
208 
Each member of the comp 100 92.76 9276.00 
board may not sit on more expe 108 115.37 12460.00 
than three additional Total 208 
Most board members comp 100 95.58 9558.00 
should have financial and expe 108 112.76 12178.00 
technical skills to Total 208 
Newly-assigned comp 100 95.42 9542.00 
members of the board expe 108 112.91 12194.00 
should receive financial Total 208 
Test Statistics 
Most board Newly-assi 
members gned 
should members 
have of the 
The size of Each financial board 
the board member of and should 
of directors the board technical receive 
should not The There may not sit skills to financial 
be less majority of should be on more understan and 
than three the board separation than three d non-financi 
members should be between additional company's at 
and not non-execu the post of boards at work and information 
more than tive chairman the same its financial about the 
eleven. directors. and CEO. time. reports. company, 
Mann-Whitney U 5350.000 5381.500 4457.000 4226.000 4508.000 4492.000 
Wilcoxon W 10400.000 10431.500 9507.000 9276.000 9558.000 9542.000 
Z -. 125 -. 045 -2.345 -2.906 -2.342 -2.354 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed . 901 . 964 . 
019 
. 
004 . 019 . 019 
8. Grouping Variable: TYPE 
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Ranks 
Mean Sum of 
TYPE N Rank Ranks 
The company should comp 100 97 14 9713.50 
have written rules of the expe 
role and responsibility of 108 111 32 12022.50 
the board. Total 208 
The board should shape comp 100 96.26 9628.00 
and review the expe 
operational and financial 108 112.13 12110.00 
plans and objectives of 
the company annually Total 208 
The board should review comp 100 99.59 9959.00 
the company's internal expe 108 109.05 11777.00 
policies periodically. Total 
208 
The board should shape comp 100 98.20 982000 
and review the company's expe 108 110 33 11916.00 
risk management Total 208 
The board should play an comp 100 10022 10022.00 
important role in expe 108 10846 1171400 
selecting, monitoring, and Total 208 
The board of directors comp 100 10815 10815.00 
should attend director expe 108 101.12 10921 00 
training programmes Total 208 
The board and top comp 100 98.13 9813.00 
management should expe 108 11040 11923 00 
meet at least quarterly to Total 208 
The board should formally comp 100 10041 10041.00 
evaluate performance of expe 108 10829 11695.00 
top management. Total 208 
The board should set comp 100 10075 10075 50 
corporate governance expe 108 10797 11680.50 
rules for the company Total 208 
The board should set comp 100 10211 10210.50 
written policies clarifying expe 108 106 72 11525.50 
the relationship with Total 208 
The board should set and comp 100 10583 10583.50 
monitor the system of expe 108 10326 11152.50 
internal control. Total 208 
Test Statlst? cs 
he boar he boar 
should he boar and top 
The hape an he boar directo anage he boar 
mpan view th he boar should should nt shou should 
should eration he boar should play an attend meet at he boar t writte 
have and should hape an portan director least should he boar policies he boar 
written financial view th view th role in training arterly ormai hould s larifyin hould s 
les of th lans an ompan mpany' lectin rogram discuss valuat rporat the and 
ole and bjective intern risk onitori s about the Worms overnan lations onitor t 
sponsi of the policies anage g, and rporat mpany of to rules to ip with ystem o 
ty of the mpan eriodi ant placin overnan future anage the takeho internal 
board. innuallyj V. policies. he CEO e. otrategy, ent. om an ers. control 
Mann-Whitne 63.500 76.000 09.000 70.000 72.000 35.000 63.000 1.000 25.500 0.500 66.500 
Wilcoxon W 13.500 26.000 59.000 20.000 22.000 21.000 13.000 1.000 75.500 10.500 52.500 
Z -1.889 -2.104 -1.238 -1.587 -1.065 -. 905 -1.610 -1.027 -. 932 -. 605 -. 339 
Asymp. Sig. ( 
. 059 . 035 . 
216 . 112 . 287 . 
365 . 107 . 305 . 351 . 545 . 735 
aGrouping Variable: TYPE 
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Ranks 
Mean Sum of 
TYPE N Rank Ranks 
The company should comp 100 96.93 9693.50 
have an internal audit expe 108 111.50 12042.50 
department. Total 208 
The internal auditor comp 100 99.79 9978.50 
should be independent. expe 108 108.87 11757.50 
Total 208 
The internal auditor comp 100 99.63 9962.50 
should be supervised by expe 108 109.01 11773.50 
the CEO and audit Total 
committee. 
208 
The internal auditor comp 100 92.32 9231.50 
should be a full-time expe 108 115.78 12504.50 
employee. Total 208 
The internal auditor comp 100 94.17 9416.50 
should submit a quarterly expe 108 114.07 12319.50 
report to the board and Total 208 
Test Statistics' 
The 
internal 
The The auditor 
company internal should 
should The auditor The submit a 
have an internal should be internal quarterly 
Internal auditor supervised auditor report to 
audit should be by the CEO should be the board 
departme independ and audit a full-time and control 
nt. ent. committee. employee. committee. 
Mann-Whitney U 4643.500 4928.500 4912.500 4181.500 4366.500 
Wilcoxon W 9693.500 9978.500 9962.500 9231.500 9416.500 
2 -1.984 -1.205 -1.189 -3.045 -2.654 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 047 . 228 . 234 . 002 . 006 
a" Grouping Variable: TYPE 
Test Statidtics 
cIo 
cbs foul 
clos hou b dud 
cbs hou ckrd hou scios The rmat 
bs shou clod amen sclos cbs scion ciud shou mpa The out 
hou clud ame ckgro thou hou cbs shou recas clos clos clud hau pa pan 
crud rrna ckgro nd if clod ciud show clud of the hour cba show mpa cios cos cbs cbs se ft ouk! plicat 
nnat non nd th une nctio are* chid orma pan clod hou dlud ocia hou haul hou hou bake ak an of the 
eem anc une ns o d tas the ajo on th eratb late crud mpa olkie crud Jude ciud crud 'sobs rmat' ibya 
n and ns o board boa embe arch hts or th party rpora viro n and e art oard' item pa es all efo rpor 
nge rat' board mmkt mm of the oft keh omin nsacf gro up ental ogre anc nnua uditor exte orma blicat vem 
a sh suit mbe a. as. oard ma ern. ear. n det ructur ort men. orts report ort. dito n. n. Cod 
Mann-Wh 
. 
600 
. 
000 . 
000 
. 
000 . 
000 
. 500 . 000 . 
500 
. 
000 . 500 . 500 . 000 . 
000 
. 
500 
. 
500 
. 500 . 
000 
. 
000 
. 
500 
. 
000 
Wilcoxon 
. 500 . 000 . 
000 . 000 . 000 . 500 . 000 . 
500 
. 000 . 500 500 . 000 . 000 
500 . 500 . 500 . 000 . 000 . 500 . 000 
Z -. 306 . 867 -. 043 -. 107 . 165 -. 453 . 498 . 082 . 270 -. 958 -. 133 . 869 . 074 -. 616 . 094 . 703 -. 609 . 748 -. 151 -. 668 
Asymp_ S . 760 386 966 . 915 869 650 . 619 . 935 . 204 . 338 . 894 . 385 . 941 . 538 274 . 088 . 542 . 454 . 880 . 504 
@Grouping Variable: TYPE 
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Test Statistics' 
Board 
Board members, 
members, directors 
directors and staff 
and staff may not 
may not trade 
The trade company Board 
company company stocks members 
should stocks for after and 
have clear a specified sudden Board directors 
Disdosur written period financial members may not The 
e should regulation before the events until and have direct company 
include a for the disclosure such directors or indirect should set 
informatio directors of Information may not interests in up 
n on the and staff company is obtain any activities in profession 
rights of regarding financial disclosed loan from which the al code of 
stakehold conflict of statement to the the company conduct, 
are interests s. public company is involved. includin 
Mann-Whitney U 5366.500 5003 000 5130.500 5073.000 4516 500 5366.000 5262.500 
Wilcoxon W 10416 500 10889.000 10180 500 10123.000 9566.500 10418.000 10312 500 
Z -. 082 -. 995 -. 659 -. 801 -2103 -. 082 -. 334 
Asymp Si (2-tailed) 
. 935 . 320 . 510 . 423 . 035 . 935 . 738 
a Grouping Variable TYPE 
Ranks 
Mean Sum of 
TYPE N Rank Ranks 
Disclosure should comp 100 104 17 10416 50 
include information on the expe 108 104 81 11319.50 
rights of stakeholders. TAI 208 
The company should comp 100 108.47 10847.00 
have clear written expe 
regulations for the 108 100.82 10889.00 
directors and staff 
regarding conflict of Total 
interests. 208 
Board members, comp 100 101.81 10180 50 
directors and staff may expe 108 107.00 11555.50 
not trade company stocks Total for a specified period 
before the disclosure of 
company financial 208 
statements. 
Board members, comp 100 101.23 10123.00 
directors and staff may expe 108 107.53 11613.00 
not trade company stocks Total 208 
Board members and comp 100 95 87 9566.50 
directors may not obtain expe 108 112.88 12169 50 
any loan from the Total 208 
Board members and comp 100 104.16 10416 00 
directors may not have expe 108 104.81 11320 00 
direct or indirect interests Total 208 
The company should set comp 100 103.13 10312 50 
up professional code of expe 108 105 77 11423 50 
conduct, including. Total 208 
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Ranks 
Mean Sum of 
TYPE N Rank Ranks 
The company should comp 100 111.54 11154.00 
have an audit committee. expe 108 97.98 10582.00 
Total 208 
The audit committee comp 100 106.07 10607.50 
should consist of dim expo 
non-executive directors 108 103.04 11128.50 
elected by the board. Total 
208 
The audit committee comp 100 106.10 10609.50 
should Include a member expo 108 103.02 11128.50 
with accounting and Total 
finance expertise. 
208 
The audit committee comp 100 100.30 10030.00 
should meet at least once expo 108 108.39 11708.00 
every 3 months. Total 208 
Recommending the comp 100 101.29 10129.50 
appointment and removal expe 108 107.47 11606 50 
of the external auditor and Total 208 
Reviewing the external comp 100 99.56 9955.00 
auditors comments on expe 108 109.08 11781.00 
financial statement. Total 208 
Reviewing the comp 100 106.75 10674.50 - 
Independence of the expe 108 102.42 11061 50 
external auditor. Total 208 
. 
Reviewing the external comp 100 97.43 9743.00 
auditor's plan and making expo 108 111.05 11993 00 
suggestions. Total 208 . 
Reviewing that company's comp 100 98.27 9827.00 
accounting policies and expe 108 110 27 11909 00 giving opinions and Total 208 
. . 
Assessing the efficiency comp 100 99.26 9926.50 
of the financial manager expe 108 109.35 11809 50 
and other financial staff. Total 208 . 
Reviewing and comp 100 108.60 10860.00 
discussing the internal expe 108 100.70 10876 00 audit department plan Total 208 . 
Reviewing the romp 100 102.82 10282.00 
Independence of the expo 108 106.06 11454 00 internal auditor. Total 208 . 
Reviewing the internal comp 100 102.43 10243.50 
auditors reports and any expe 108 106.41 11492.50 
corrective measures Total 208 
Test Statistics 
ecomm 
be and he audi ding thi eviewin 
mitt mmitt ppointm the sessin eviewin 
shout should nt and eviewin eviewi mpany the and eviewin 
nsist nclude he Audi uroval the g the untin fficienc 'scussin is intern 
The three embe mmitt the external eviewin xtema policies of the e intern eviewin uditor 
pan n-ex with should xternal uditor' the editor' nd givin mancial audit the reports 
should five : countin meet at ditor a mment depend an an pinion anage partme depend and any 
ave an irect and ast on the on ce of th aking and nd othe plan an ice of th rrectiv 
audit ected finance every 3 entificat nancial xternal ggesti mme mancial its internal easure 
mmitt e boar x rtis months of fees atemen auditor. ns dations. staff. fficienc auditor. taken. 
Mann-Whitn 96.000 2.500 40.500 80.000 79.500 05.000 75.500 3.000 77.000 76.500 90.000 32.000 93.500 
Wilcoxon W 82.000 8.500 26.500 30.000 29.500 55.000 61.500 3.000 27.000 26.500 76.000 82.000 43.500 
Z -1.808 -. 384 -. 424 -1.058 -. 784 -1.284 -. 574 -1.749 -1.573 -1.335 -1.031 -. 433 -. 525 
Asymp. Sig 
. 071 . 701 . 672 . 290 . 433 . 
199 . 566 . 080 . 
116 . 182 . 302 . 665 . 600 
"Grouping Variable: TYPE 
320 
Ranks 
Mean Sum of 
TYPE N Rank Ranks 
The board should have a comp 100 101.97 10197.50 
nomination committee. expe 108 106.84 11538.50 
Total 208 
The nomination comp 100 95.03 9502.50 
committee members expo 
should be elected by the 108 113.27 12233.50 
board. Total 208 
Recommending comp 100 100.53 10053.00 
candidates for expe 108 108.18 11683.00 
membership of the board Total 
to the AGM. 
208 
Reviewing skills and comp 100 104.50 10449.50 
qualifications required for expe 108 104.50 11286.50 
the board membership. Total 208 
Reviewing the board comp 100 101.50 10150.50 
structure and making expe 108 107.27 11585.50 
recommendations of Total 208 
Defining the board's comp 100 104.77 10477.00 
weaknesses and expe 108 104.25 11259.00 
strengths and proposing Total 208 
Setting clear policies of comp 100 98.15 9815.00 
compensation and expe 108 110.38 11921.00 
remuneration for board Total 208 
Test Statistic! 
Defining 
the board's 
weakness Setting 
as and clear 
Reviewing Reviewing strengths policies of 
Recomm skills and the board and compensat 
The ending qualcatio structure proposing ion and 
nomination candidate ns and remedies remunerati 
The board committee s for required making In on for 
should members members for the recommen accordanc board 
have a should be hip of the board dations of e with members 
nomination elected by board to membersh possible company and senior 
committee. the board. the AGM. i p. changes interests. executives. 
Mann-Whitney U 5147.500 4452.500 5003.000 5399.500 5100.500 5373.000 4765.000 
Wilcoxon W 10197.500 9502.500 0053.000 10449.500 10150.500 11259.000 9815.000 
Z -. 617 -2.253 -1.002 -. 001 -. 737 -. 066 -1.538 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tails 
. 537 . 024 . 316 . 
999 . 461 . 
947 . 124 
S. Grouping Variable: TYPE 
321 
Ranks 
Mean Sum of 
TYPE N Rank Ranks 
The company should comp 100 100.07 10007.00 
have a control committee. expe 108 108.60 11729.00 
Total 208 
The control committee comp 100 95.46 9546.50 
should consist of at least expe 108 87 112 12189 50 three members appointed . . 
by the AGM. Total 208 
The control committee comp 100 98.97 9897.00 
should represent all expe 108 109.62 11839.00 
shareholders of the Total 
company. 
208 
Controlling the company comp 100 109.18 10918.00 
administration and expe 108 100.17 10818.00 
verification of its legal Total 208 
Verification of the validity comp 100 105.82 10582.00 
and legitimacy of expe 108 103.28 11154.00 
contracts conducted by Total 208 
Ensuring that all the comp 100 104.32 10432.00 
accounting procedures expe 108 104.67 11304.00 
are in accordance with Total 208 
Permitting committee comp 100 102.13 10212.50 
members at any time to expe 108 106.70 11523.50 
inspect the company and Total 208 
Test Statistics 
The control Ensuring Permitting 
committee Verification that all the committee 
should The control Controlling of the accounting members 
consist of committee the validity and procedure at any time 
The at least should company legitimacy s are in to inspect 
company three represent administrat of accordanc the 
should members all ion and contracts e with legal company 
have a appointed sharehold verification conducted and and its 
control by the ers of the of its legal by the regulatory work 
committee. AGM. company. progress. company. rules. progress. 
Mann-Whitney U 4957.000 4496.500 4847.000 4932.000 5268.000 5382.000 5162.500 
Wilcoxon W 0007.000 9546.500 9897.000 0818.000 1154.000 10432.000 0212.500 
Z -1.129 -2.231 -1.353 -1.200 -. 343 -. 046 -. 598 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tail( 
. 259 . 
026 . 
176 . 
230 . 732 . 
963 . 550 
a" Grouping Variable: TYPE 
322 
Ranks 
Mean Sum of 
TYPE N Rank Ranks 
Poor leadership within comp 100 107.88 10787.50 
Libyan companies expe 108 101.38 10948.50 
Total 208 
Weakness of the legal comp 100 103.64 10384.50 
environment for expe 108 105 29 11371 50 
companies. . . 
Total 208 
Lack of knowledge about comp 100 105.10 10509.50 
corporate governance expe 108 103 95 11228.50 
among the Libyan Total 
companies 
208 
Current ownership comp 100 107.91 10791.00 
structure of companies. expo 108 101.34 10945.00 
Total 208 
Lack of training among comp 100 104.54 10453.50 
dredore of companies expo 108 10447 1128250 
about corporate Total 208 
Impact of government comp 100 108.28 10828.00 
intervention In expe 108 101.00 1090800 
companies. Total 208 
Weakness of the comp 100 107.45 1074500 
accounting profession In expe 108 101 77 10991.00 
Libya resulting from a lack Total 208 
Weakness of the auditing comp 100 105.46 10546.50 
profession in Libya expe 108 103.81 it 189 50 
resulting from a lack of Total 208 
Weak investment comp 100 108.31 1063100 
awareness among exile 108 t02.82 ttt05 00 
investors Total 208 
Absence of a Libyan comp 100 105.32 10531.50 
Capital Market Authority. expe 108 103.75 11204.50 
Total 208 
Coat of application romp 100 109.88 10966.00 
corporate governance expo 108 99.72 10770.00 
system. Total 208 
Absence of Institute of comp 100 101.00 10100.00 
Directors. expo 108 107 74 11838.00 
Total 208 
Limited number of listed comp 100 106.07 10607.50 
companies expo 108 103.04 1112850 
Total 208 
Lack of an Independent comp 100 108 32 10832.50 
Institution or body to expe 108 100.96 10903.50 
monitor corporate Total 208 
Weak international comp 100 103.84 10384.00 
pressure on Libya for the expo 108 105.30 11372.00 
application of corporate Total 208 
rest St"Stfte 
NknN 
of the Nkna" wank 
ccountin an» t 
n audtiný ack of It nal 
Lack of Lack of in Libya volessiot as 
nowNd training resulting in Libya ant Libya 
a about among a Ise nsulGrq nsftdW for the 
Poor Vasknew a ISO w body k: N 
Wga the enu CurnM ornpanie rd of Waak Cat Of LktMlad monitor n of 
a nan about ant Itff a tmer a Libyan nwnbar t 
M for Libya c orporatf on In al anna" Caput of listed ama 
F 
UM o0oun OA among M. fl t taýM " (W 
! " !. " ! tandatd tandard rnaaton t tem as ! Call Bank 
"ý y 2 314 500 40 500 59 000 398 500 22 000 105 000 303 500 219 000 18 500 000 1050 000 42 500 17 500 14 000 
W9co nw 
; 
381500 26 500 945 000 282 500 000 991 000 189 500 los 000 204 500 770 000 100000 28 500 500 000 
Z - 833 -205 -145 - 821 -008 - 923 - 710 - 233 -448 -196 -1 240 -854 -387 -930 -. 207 
A! S2 405 838 885 412 993 358 478 816 855 844 215 393 899 . 
352 838 
8Gfm«nVV. b4 TYPE 
323 
